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“Is a 24 hour ban such a bad thing?”  1
Victoria’s banning provisions: ‘balancing’ 
discretionary police powers and individual rights 
Over the past decade alcohol-related violence in and around licensed premises has 
been an area of notable legislative and operational policing development. Victoria’s 
banning notices sit within a range of provisions enacted in response to problems of 
disorderly behaviour in the night-time economy. The legal principles upon which 
banning notices are based and the way in which they are implemented challenge 
traditional expectations regarding the separation of powers and individual due 
process rights in the administration of justice. Banning notices are one example of a 
move towards police-imposed summary justice, which circumvents the criminal law 
and reconfigures the notion of balance in the criminal justice system. 
There is a disconnect between the use of balance to both explain the need for 
provisions such as banning notices, and to legitimise their consequential 
undermining of the due process rights of individuals. This thesis challenges the 
appropriateness of using a need for balance to justify the discretionary police power 
to ban. A mixed methodological approach facilitates the examination of two core 
themes. The first analyses the underlying political assumptions and justifications that 
secured the passage of the banning notice provisions through the Victorian 
Parliament. The second theme explores the extent to which the implementation of 
banning notices, and their impact upon individual rights, have been subject to 
ongoing scrutiny. 
 (Legislative Assembly 2007c, 4072 [Thomson, Labor]).1
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Chapter One 
Thesis Introduction 
There are two kinds of problems that need to be dealt with in 
any model of the criminal process. One is what the rules shall 
be. The other is how the rules shall be implemented  
(Packer 1968, p.171)
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Chapter 1: Thesis Introduction 2
1     Introduction            
Over the past decade alcohol-related violence and disorder in and around licensed 
premises has been an area of notable legislative, licensing and operational policing 
development.  In jurisdictions across Australia, police officers have been afforded a 1
range of powers to tackle problems associated with excessive alcohol consumption. 
New offences and infringement penalties have been introduced along with move-on 
provisions and police-imposed banning notices.  
Victoria’s burgeoning night-time economy (NTE) reflected significant growth in the 
alcohol industry following the 1986 Nieuwenhuysen Report. Liquor licence reforms, 
taxation changes and deregulation facilitated a proliferation of licensed venues, the 
growth of urban entertainment precincts across the State,  and the escalation of 2
alcohol-related problems (Donnelly et al. 2006; Livingston et al. 2010; Matthews et 
al. 2011, 2012; Zajdow 2011). Victoria’s Alcohol Action Plan: 2008–13 (Department 
of Justice 2008a) presented a suite of initiatives targeting a reduction in the impact of 
alcohol-fuelled violence and anti-social behaviour. A key element of the plan was the 
introduction of police-imposed banning notices. 
Banning has been used in Victoria as a component of court-imposed penalties for 
over a decade, and for longer by venue licensees and under trespass provisions.  The 3
advent of on-the-spot banning notices as an immediate response to alcohol-related 
violence has been developing only since 2007. The Liquor Control Reform 
Amendment Act 2007 (Vic) (‘LCRA Act 2007’) established 24 hour banning notices, 
and the Justice Legislation Amendment (Victims of Crime Assistance & Other 
Matters) Act 2010 (Vic) (‘JLA Act 2010’) extended their permissible length to 72 
  See, for example, Donnelly et al. (2006), Chikritzhs et al. (2007), Nicholas (2008), Eckersley and 1
Reeder (2008), Fleming (2008), Graham and Homel (2008), Livingston (2008), Mcllwain and 
Homel (2009), Babor et al. (2010), Smith et al. (2011), and Trifonoff et al. (2011).
  Between 1995-2005 the number of licensed premises in Victoria rose from 2,000 to 24,000 2
(Alcohol Policy Coalition 2011, p.6).
 For example, under s9(1)(d) of the Summary Offences Act 1966 (Vic).3
Chapter 1: Thesis Introduction 3
hours.  Banning notices apply in designated areas,  and may be imposed by police 4 5
officers for a range of specified offences or pre-emptively in anticipation of 
problematic behaviour. A decision to impose a banning notice is made subjectively 
by a police officer. Recipients are compelled to leave the designated area and not 
return for up to 72 hours. The banning notice applies immediately, must be accepted, 
requires no evidence to be recorded, and a decision to ban is not subject to 
independent appeal. 
Victoria’s banning notice provisions test the conception of balance within the 
criminal justice system. The discretionary powers afforded to police officers, and the 
consequential effect of banning notices upon core individual rights and judicial 
safeguards, present significant challenges to the principle of the separation of powers 
and the expectation of due process in the administration of justice. The justifications 
for the necessity of banning legislation, and the extent of ongoing scrutiny of police 
powers to punish merits detailed examination. This thesis explores these two 
fundamental issues and considers the relevance of balance within evolving criminal 
justice processes.   6
1.1  Separation of Powers, Due Process & Victoria’s  
Charter          
The rule of law embodies the expectation that everyone, citizens and government, are 
subject to the laws that are enacted by parliament (Walker 1988). It is predicated 
upon the principle of the separation of the powers of government into the executive, 
  The key provisions of each Act are outlined in Chapter Two.4
  A designated area may be declared by the Victorian Commission for Gambling and Liquor 5
Regulation (VCGLR) in response to recorded incidents of alcohol-related disorder.
  Banning notices are part of a range of provisions targeting alcohol-related disorder. The 6
complexity of discerning the contribution of individual components of multi-dimensional 
legislative and operational responses is acknowledged (Miller et al. 2012; Kypri, McElduff & 
Miller 2014). Analysis of the effectiveness of banning notices is not within the scope of this thesis.
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legislature and judiciary, at both federal and state/territory level.  All states retain the 7
right to determine the specific content of their laws (The Commonwealth of Australia 
Constitution Act 1900, s118). In Victoria, the Constitution Act 1975 affirmed the 
Victorian Parliament’s right to determine the state's criminal laws.  
A key function of a separate judiciary is to uphold the principle of legality to ensure, 
as far as possible, that executive and legislative decisions protect fundamental rights 
for all citizens (Weller 2004; Spigelman 2005; Meagher 2011). Australia has no 
statutory Bill of Rights and Victoria’s Constitution Act 1975 does not formalise any 
rights for individuals. However, core human rights principles and due process 
expectations reflect the common law tradition of England and Wales and are 
embedded within Australia’s legal system (Castles 1982; Keon-Cohen 1991; Lord 
Irving of Lairg 2002). Fundamental individual rights such as freedom of movement, 
natural justice and access to the courts have been framed as a “common law bill of 
rights” (Spigelman 2008, p.29). Due process extends the principle of natural justice 
to protect the rights of individuals in their treatment by the agencies of the criminal 
justice system, and should ensure procedural fairness in the administration of justice 
(Galligan 1996; Rares 2013). Specific due process rights include the presumption of 
innocence, the right to legal representation, and the right to a fair trial (Blake & 
Ashworth 1996; Wheeler 1997, 2004; Ashworth 2006a; Keyzer 2008; Bateman 2009; 
Findley 2009). 
Individual rights have been increasingly formalised through international 
conventions to which Australia is a signatory,  the Commonwealth Parliamentary 8
 As well as the 1900 Act Constituting the Commonwealth, the States of Australia each have their 7
own constitution. Initially declared largely as Acts of the British Parliament, most have since 
passed Constitution Acts under their own auspices: NSW (1902), South Australia (1934), Tasmania 
(1934), Victoria (1975), Queensland (2001). The Constitution Act of WA, passed in 1889 and 
significantly amended in 1899, has not been re-enacted as a specific Act of the WA State 
Parliament. The two mainland territories, Northern Territory and ACT, operate according to Self 
Government Acts, the former passed in 1975, the latter in 1988.
  Australia played a key role in drafting the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights 8
1948, and is bound, with stated reservations, by the International Convention on Civil & Political 
Rights 1966 (ICCPR) (AHRC n.d). Australia is also a signatory to the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social & Cultural Rights 1966 (ICESCR) and other human rights instruments, 
including the Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989. Compliance is monitored by the 
Commonwealth Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (Parliament of Australia n.d.).
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Joint Committee on Human Rights (established by the Human Rights (Parliamentary 
Scrutiny) Act 2011), and in provisions such as the Australian Capital Territory’s 
Human Rights Act 2004, and Victoria’s Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities 2006 (‘the Charter/Charter Act’). The Charter Act articulates the 
specific rights regarded as “essential in a democratic and inclusive society that 
respects the rule of law, human dignity, equality and freedom” (Charter Act 2006, 
preamble). Individual due process rights in relation to criminal proceedings are 
specified in the Charter, such as the presumption of innocence and the right to a fair 
hearing. Each new Bill introduced into parliament must be accompanied by a 
ministerial Statement of Compatibility that confirms adherence to the rights 
contained in the Charter (Charter Act 2006, s28). Charter rights are not inviolable 
and exemptions are permitted. Any measure that requires a waiver of Charter rights 
must be justified fully, and the need for the exemption must be supported in the 
Statement of Compatibility with empirical evidence (Charter Act 2006, s7(2)).  
Effective oversight of the enactment and application of laws by an independent 
judiciary (The Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 1900, Ch. III) adds a 
further protective layer for the individual rights enshrined in the Charter Act. 
However, the corrective power of Victorian courts is limited unless a legislative Act 
can be declared unconstitutional. Significantly, the Charter itself is a legislative Act 
and its provisions are not enshrined within Victoria’s Constitution Act 1975. As the 
Victorian Parliament retains the constitutional law making remit, it has the ability to 
pass laws that are incompatible with the Charter’s requirement to preserve 
fundamental rights. Despite the passage of the Charter Act, the primacy of 
parliamentary law making power in Victoria provides the foundation for the state to 
erode core rights and due process safeguards (Rares 2013). 
1.2  The Evolving Criminal Process 
Traditional expectations of the criminal law hold that “no person should be liable to 
conviction and/or punishment unless the charge has been duly tried in a criminal 
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court...” (Ashworth & Zedner 2008, p.22). In recent decades perceived public 
anxieties about security, crime and anti-social behaviour have coincided with a range 
of legislative responses and changes to the criminal process. Depicted by Tonry as 
“populist posturing” (2010, p.387), governments in a number of English-speaking 
jurisdictions, such as the UK, USA and Australia, have used political expedience and 
media-driven hysteria to justify a steady dilution of individual rights. A number of 
recurring and specific changes have been documented across a body of literature, 
which is explored in Chapter Two of this thesis. Key themes include the increasing 
use of discretionary police decision-making and summary justice, the blurring of 
boundaries between civil and criminal methods of determining liability, the use of 
pre-emptive police powers to punish, and the criminalisation of an expanding range 
of anti-social behaviours.  Justified by rhetoric that a higher purpose is being served 9
by addressing a pressing socio-political issue, the impact upon the separation of 
powers and individual due process rights has been largely overlooked during the 
legislative process, or is subsumed by claims of a greater good, political expedience 
or parliamentary indifference. Valverde aptly concludes this sentiment by suggesting 
the effect of the game is that the crucial question of how governance is 
done ends up being decided without explicit discussion (2009, p.145).  
Failure to adequately consider the consequences of legislative and operational 
responses to perceived issues of security or disorder are fundamental concerns for the 
protection of individual rights. Zedner (2005) cautioned that specific risks have been 
used to justify legislative provisions and police powers that undermine procedural 
safeguards. The significance of such changes to the criminal process is embodied in 
Crawford’s (2009) depiction of the ‘net-widening’ effect of policing by discretionary 
summary justice.  The expanding remit of discretionary and pre-emptive police 10
  See, for example, Ashworth (2004a, 2004b, 2006a), Zedner (2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c, 2014), 9
Von Hirsch and Simester (2006), Ashworth and Zedner (2008), Beckett and Herbert (2008, 2009, 
2010a, 2010b), Hadfield, Lister and Traynor (2009), and Valverde (2009).
  Net-widening in this context reflects an increase in the range of behaviours that may lead to a 10
penalty, and the resulting growth in the number of people subject to a criminal justice intervention 
(Blomberg 1977; Cohen 1985; McMahon 1990). Crawford (2009) applies ‘net-widening’ to the 
use of Penalty Notices for Disorder (PNDs) in England and Wales, which police officers may 
impose for a range of disorderly behaviours (Criminal Justice & Police Act 2001, s1-11). 
Crawford contends that up to three quarters of recipients of PNDs between 2004-06 would 
previously not have been given a formal sanction (2009, p.821).
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powers applies primarily to lower level disorderly and anti-social behaviours, but this 
should not limit political or public concern about the potential impact of these 
mechanisms upon individual rights. As Zedner noted “both murderer and petty thief 
enjoy the same due process rights” (2005, p.524).  
It is within this broader context of the balance between issues of political expedience, 
public safety and individual rights that Victoria introduced its banning provisions. 
Banning notices target alcohol-related disorder in the NTE, and may be imposed for 
a specified offence, such as assault, or for more general anti-social acts and perceived 
nuisance, such as swearing. Banning notices address the types of low level 
behaviours that are increasingly subject to discretionary police punishment. Valverde 
(2009) questioned why such police powers, typically applied locally, are rarely 
challenged as potential violations of human rights. The balance between police 
powers and individual rights is a central focus of this thesis. Victoria’s banning 
provisions circumvent the separation of powers doctrine, and undermine individual 
due process protections that should be ensured under the Charter Act. However, the 
legislation has not been subject to judicial scrutiny and there is no provision within 
the LCRA Act 2007 for recipients to appeal their police-imposed ban in court:  11
shortcomings which are explored across this thesis.  
1.3  Theoretical Framework & Thesis Rationale 
Balance is embedded in Western legal traditions and political structures, and has 
been debated by criminologists and legal theorists for a number of decades. It is an 
implicit dimension of the way in which laws are enacted, interpreted and enforced, 
through mechanisms such as the separation of powers and due process safeguards. 
However, manifestations of balance are not fixed or uniform. Within criminal justice 
processes the fluidity of how balance operates in practice is exemplified through the 
shifting emphasis on individual rights, community protection and notions of 
victimisation. This is reinforced by evolving theoretical constructs, such as Packer’s 
  The issue of a right of independent appeal was prominent during parliamentary debate of the 11
LCRA Bill 2007. This is discussed in Chapters Five and Six.
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(1964, 1968) depiction of crime control and due process, Dubber’s (2002, 2005, 
2006, 2011) police power model, Roach’s (1999) conception of punitive and non-
punitive victims’ rights, and the human rights models of, among others, Ashworth 
(2004a, 2004b, 2006a), Ashworth and Zedner (2008), Ashworth and Redmayne 
(2010) and Dripps (2011).  These theoretical models demonstrate the difficulty of 12
balancing the conflicting demands of the due process rights of defendants, and a 
collective need for community safety.  
The application of criminal justice models reflects a complex evolution of political, 
operational policing and judicial priorities. Despite an emerging interplay of human 
rights charters and rights-based models, these theoretical concepts have been 
undermined by significant legislative developments that favour enhanced police 
discretion, pre-emption, and lower thresholds of behaviour classified as criminal. 
Police discretionary powers to punish reduce the cost and increase the efficiency of 
administering justice, but typically at the expense of individual rights. Chapter Three 
examines key research and theoretical literature across a range of criminological 
contexts which has explored constructions of ‘balance’ in the provision of justice.  13
Balance suggests a sense of equilibrium, with a legislative and judicial commitment 
to parity between defendants’ due process protections and the needs of victims and 
the broader community. ‘Re-balancing’ conveys the competing expectations of 
individual rights and public safety, and the weight each is afforded in the 
administration of justice. Changes to the criminal process in recent decades have 
reflected a dilution of defendants’ due process rights, and a ‘re-balancing’ towards 
the primacy of risk mitigation and public protection. Embedded within this shift is a 
subordination of the rights of the accused to the needs of potential victims within the 
law-abiding majority. Ashworth and Zedner highlighted a key issue for this thesis 
  Other models of the criminal process are acknowledged, such as Llewellyn’s (1962) parental and 12
arm’s length models, and the hierarchical and co-ordinate models depicted by Damaska (1975), 
which align broadly with European and Anglo-American traditions. These are not explored in this 
thesis.
  Examples include Ashworth (1996, 2004b), Zedner (2002, 2003, 2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2014), 13
Waldron (2003), Tonry (2003), Michaelsen (2005, 2006, 2010), Williams (2006, 2007a, 2007b), 
Neocleous (2007), Ashworth and Zedner (2008), Bronitt (2008), and Pue (2008).
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with their assertion that “suspects and unconvicted defendants ought surely to be 
treated as law-abiding citizens” (2008, p.43). Banning notices challenge conceptions 
of balance in the provision of justice in Victoria. This thesis considers whether the 
notion of balance is appropriate at all in the context of discretionary police-imposed 
punishment. As both a theoretical and applied concept, balance is explored by 
analysing the enactment, Charter compliance and ongoing scrutiny of Victoria’s 
banning notice provisions.  
Banning notices embody many of the recent initiatives that ‘re-balance’ collective 
security away from the due process rights of defendants. The provisions involve a 
discretionary police decision to punish, and may be given pre-emptively and in 
anticipation of a subjectively assessed behaviour. Banning notices prohibit the lawful 
action of being in a public place, with an underlying justification of community 
protection to obviate the risk of victimisation. However, there is a clear dichotomy 
between the protections enshrined in Victoria’s Charter Act and a police-imposed 
pre-emptive summary power to ban. Despite the expectations afforded by the 
Charter Act there is no judicial scrutiny of whether the banning legislation complies 
with Charter rights, and a police decision to issue a banning notice is not subject to a 
court-based appeal. The Charter appears to have been circumvented by a ministerial 
Statement of Compatibility that authorises this addition to police powers at the 
expense of individual rights. Banning notices undermine the due process rights of 
recipients as they are issued on-the-spot by police officers, take effect immediately, 
contain a presumption of guilt, can be imposed pre-emptively before the commission 
of an offence, and require no evidence to be recorded. This thesis examines how the 
banning notice provisions were enacted, and the nature of ongoing scrutiny of the 
police power to ban. An analysis of the presumptions and justifications used to 
support the passage of the provisions through parliament informs consideration of 
how discretionary police powers to punish undermines the notion of ‘balance’ under 
Victorian criminal and liquor control laws. 
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1.4  Thesis Aims                
The need for balance is reflected in a range of responses across the scale of 
seriousness of criminal law, from the terror threat post-9/11, to the control of alcohol-
related violence in urban centres. The resulting increase in the reach and pre-emptive 
nature of criminalisation, typified in changes to operational police powers, are the 
antithesis of balance. An inherent ambiguity exists as the direction in which the 
balance is tipped encompasses a complex array of inter-related pre-emptive security 
issues. These range from widespread restrictions on liberty and civil rights driven by 
the ‘greater good’ of national security,  to short term pre-emptive prohibitions, such 14
banning notices, to tackle localised perceptions of fear and disorder. There has been 
some analysis of the use of Victoria’s banning notices and the exclusionary principles 
they embody (Palmer & Warren 2014).  However, there has been no detailed 15
examination of the consequences of these provisions for individual rights and their 
impact upon the relevance of balance in developing and administering the criminal 
law in the light of contemporary human rights requirements. Three specific research 
questions are explored in this thesis to address this empirical and conceptual gap. 
Firstly, did Victoria’s Charter Act compliance procedures ensure an open and 
comprehensive assessment of the consequences of the banning notice provisions for 
individual rights and due process protections? Secondly, how balanced and rigorous 
were the parliamentary debates of the banning notice provisions? Thirdly, has 
ongoing public scrutiny of the use of banning notices enabled meaningful analysis of 
their imposition and effect? 
  National security and legislative responses to the terrorist threat post-9/11, as well as measures 14
enacted to address concerns relating to organised crime and outlaw motorcycle gangs (OMCGs) in 
Australia, feature prominently across the ‘re-balancing’ literature. Some of the key literature is 
used in Chapter Three where theoretical arguments are pertinent and have a broader relevance to 
this thesis. However, the differences between issues of national security, organised crime, and local 
level responses to alcohol-related disorder and anti-social behaviour are acknowledged. Specific 
measures in relation to national security and OMCGs that challenge notions of balance, such as the 
introduction of Control Orders under the UK Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, or enhanced police 
search powers in Queensland under the Criminal Law (Criminal Organisations Disruption) 
Amendment Act 2013, are not explored in detail.
  A significant body of literature has examined exclusion and the policing of space across a variety 15
of criminal justice contexts. Examples include, MacDonald (1997), Young (1999), Garland (2001), 
Travis (2002), Hermer & Mosher (2002), Gaetz (2004), Belina (2007), Beckett & Herbert (2010), 
Aas (2011), Ewald (2011). However, the broader exclusionary tradition is not a focus of this thesis.
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The research questions sit within two complementary and inter-related themes. 
Firstly, Chapter Three explores the notion of balance as a theoretical and 
methodological construct that informs the development, implementation and 
operation of the criminal law. Legislative and operational ‘re-balancing’ validates the 
shift in recent decades towards pre-emptive discretionary police powers, that are 
described in Chapter Two. There is a disconnect between the use of balance to 
explain both the need for provisions such as banning notices, and to legitimise the 
consequential dilution of the due process rights of individuals. By examining the 
application of Victoria’s Charter compliance processes and parliamentary debates 
that led to the introduction of police-imposed banning notices, the first two results 
chapters (Five and Six) highlight the underlying political assumptions used to justify 
the erosion of the separation of powers doctrine. The examination of parliamentary 
scrutiny of the LCRA Bill 2007 and JLA Bill 2010 is considered against a number of 
perspectives, such as Waiton’s (2008) contention of the nonchalant drift of policies 
through parliament, and Crawford’s (2013) concern that reactive policy development 
is driven by a desire that governments are seen to do something in response to high 
profile issues regardless of the possible consequences for individuals. If banning 
notices dilute due process protections for recipients, and their passage through the 
Victorian Parliament circumvented Charter compliance requirements, then rather 
than ensuring balance the result may be the obverse of balance.  
The second theme acknowledges concern regarding a lack of understanding of the 
effect of police-imposed summary justice (Crawford 2009), and disquiet about the 
erosion of due process rights (Zedner 2005; Ashworth 2006a; Ashworth & Zedner 
2008). Chapter Seven examines the ongoing public scrutiny of the discretionary 
police power to ban. Victoria's banning notice provisions were enacted to ‘re-balance' 
the administration of justice in the NTE by prioritising the collective needs of 
community protection and legitimising the dilution of individual due process rights. 
Published data from Victoria Police, media analysis, and interviews with Victorian 
Magistrates are used to explore the extent to which police officers have been held 
accountable for their discretionary powers to punish. Deficiencies in the provision 
Chapter 1: Thesis Introduction 12
and examination of formal banning notice data, and media indifference to the impact 
of banning upon individual rights, combine with judicial concern about the risks and 
expansion of discretionary police powers. The analysis questions the appropriateness 
of balance to justify Victoria’s banning notice provisions, given the ineffectiveness of 
their scrutiny. 
1.5  Research Design            
This thesis draws on previous studies which have used a mixed method approach to 
consider regulatory issues in the light of broader theoretical concepts, such as 
balance and punitiveness (Hall et al. 1978; Crawford & Lister 2007; Beckett & 
Herbert 2008, 2009, 2010a, 2010b; Hadfield, Lister & Traynor 2009). Of particular 
relevance is the work of Hall et al. (1978), who adopted a mixed method design 
utilising official crime data, detailed document and media analysis. Their 
consideration of constructions of race, crime and youth highlighted how a moral 
panic about the ‘issue’ of mugging in the early 1970s was created and augmented to 
justify urgent and far-reaching legislative and operational policing responses.  
The design for this thesis also synthesises existing research that has utilised 
documentary and data records, stakeholder interviews and focus groups to examine 
the nature of alcohol-related harms, and the practices of fine enforcement (Saunders 
et al. 2013; DCPC  2001a, 2001b, 2006, 2010). This thesis uses multiple research 16
techniques, including a contextual analysis of documentary sources, such as 
parliamentary records, Hansard, Charter guidelines and reviews, secondary analysis 
of published data, examination of online media sources, and interviews with a 
sample of Victorian Magistrates and representatives from the Department of Justice. 
The research comprises two key phases. The first phase analyses Charter 
documentation, Hansard records, and a range of additional secondary sources, and 
applies the findings of interviews conducted at Victoria's Department of Justice and 
Victoria Police (n=5). The objective of this phase is to examine the passage of the 
 Victorian Parliament Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee.16
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banning notice legislation through the formal parliamentary processes. The second 
phase combines published Victoria Police data and media analyses with exploratory 
interviews with Magistrates (n=12) to analyse the ongoing scrutiny of the application 
of banning notices after their introduction. The pre- and post-enactment examination 
of Victoria’s banning provisions informs a broader consideration of whether balance 
is appropriate to justify discretionary police powers to punish. 
1.6  Thesis Structure      
The rationale for this thesis is documented over two chapters. Chapter Two provides 
an overview of Victoria’s banning notice provisions and literature relating to specific 
challenges to the separation of powers and due process rights. The expanding scope 
of discretionary police powers, the blurring of criminal and civil boundaries, the 
increasing role of pre-emptive controls, and the consequences for the administration 
of justice are discussed. The growth of discretionary summary justice and pre-
emptive controls sit within evolving theoretical models of the criminal justice system 
that are examined in Chapter Three. This Chapter addresses the interplay between 
human rights, the drive to ensure security, risk mitigation and community protection, 
and the contentious notion of ‘balance’. Key influences for and consequences of the 
‘re-balancing’ agenda are outlined, along with consideration of the centrality of 
human rights in the development of legislation. Chapter Three confirms the thesis 
rationale for examining the theoretical and methodological construct of balance in 
the light of Victoria’s banning provisions.  
The research approach and design are explained in Chapter Four. Acknowledging a 
range of influential studies (including Hall et al. 1978; Crawford & Lister 2007; 
Beckett & Herbert 2008, 2009, 2010a, 2010b; Hadfield, Lister & Traynor 2009), a 
mixed method approach combines secondary document, media and data analysis 
with interview research across two phases. The methodological approach, research 
design and key data sources are described, along with consideration of key benefits 
and limitations of the research approach. 
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The research analysis and results are documented across three chapters. Chapter Five 
considers the way in which the requirements of Victoria’s Charter were applied to the 
banning legislation. There are competing perspectives regarding the ability of 
charters to uphold individual rights and of parliamentary methods to adequately 
assess the human rights impact of legislation (such as Feldman 2004; Neumayer 
2005; Williams 2006; Gans 2009; Evans & Evans 2006, 2011; Cole 2013). The 
application of Victoria’s Charter to the banning notice Bills is assessed in detail to 
determine the extent of Charter compliance. Chapter Six scrutinises the subsequent 
parliamentary debates in 2007 and 2010 to highlight the justifications used to support 
the introduction of police-imposed banning notices. Chapter Seven looks beyond the 
enactment of the banning legislation to consider the ongoing public scrutiny of the 
discretionary police power to ban. Published banning notice data and the media 
coverage of the banning provisions are both examined in detail. Data from interviews 
with Victorian Magistrates exploring the use and implications of police-imposed 
discretionary justice from a judicial perspective is also presented.  
The key research findings are drawn together in Chapter Eight. The thesis themes 
and research questions are discussed, along with the broader consequences for the 
separation of powers and criminal law-making of discretionary powers afforded to 
police officers, such as Victorian banning notice provisions. The findings are 
considered  in relation to the literature discussed in Chapters Two and Three, in terms 
of their theoretical implications in the context of the ‘re-balancing’ agenda in 
contemporary justice administration.  
Victoria’s banning provisions, and the on-the-spot police power to punish, were 
introduced to address issues of alcohol-related disorder in the NTE. They reflect a 
broader trend, evident across many Western jurisdictions, that seeks to ‘re-balance’ 
criminal justice processes under the auspices of national security and public safety. 
However, banning notices undermine core due process protections and subsume the 
rights of individuals to a perceived need for community protection. The passage of 
Victoria's banning legislation demonstrates flaws in the process of Charter 
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compliance and the rigour of parliamentary scrutiny. That the effect of banning 
notices upon the individual rights of recipients were either not recognised or were 
disregarded during the process of enactment has significant implications for the 
administration of justice and conceptions of balance. These consequences are 
exacerbated by a failure to monitor the way in which banning notices, and the 
discretionary police powers that they embody, are used. Rather than re-balancing 
criminal justice processes, Victoria's banning notices remove long standing due 
process protections and individual rights, for a need that is unsubstantiated and with 
an effect that is unproven.
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2    Introduction                            
The criminal process encompasses two core principles of the Australian 
constitutional system - the rule of law and the separation of powers. Each principle 
embodies the notion of balance. The rule of law embodies the expectation that 
everyone, citizens and government, are subject to the laws that are enacted by 
parliament (Walker 1988). It is predicated upon the separation of the powers of 
government into three distinct entities: the executive, the legislature and the 
judiciary. The right to determine specific criminal laws in Australia is largely 
devolved to the states and territories (Commonwealth of Australia Constitution Act 
1900, s118). 
The rights of those affected by the criminal process are fundamental to the 
expression of balance in the criminal justice system. While determinations made by 
the High Court of Australia have served to read certain human rights guarantees into 
the Constitution (French 2009), Australia has no formal Bill of Rights and none are 
specified in Victoria’s Constitution Act 1975, or its precursors.  Core individual 1
rights and civil liberties are derived from post Magna Carta legal instruments and 
longstanding common law tradition emanating from England and Wales.  For 2
example, the 1688 Bill of Rights, “an act for declaring the rights and liberties of the 
subject”, articulated basic civil rights and was embodied in statute law in Victoria’s 
Imperial Acts Application Act 1980 (Keon-Cohen 1991). Principles that have 
influenced Australia’s legal system include no arbitrary detention, no cruel or 
  The first constitution of Victoria was contained within the Australian Constitutions Act 1850. This 1
was superseded by the Constitution 1855. Numerous amendments were consolidated under the 
Constitution Amendment Act 1890; Constitution Act 1903; Constitution Reform Act 1937; and 
Constitution Act Amendment Act 1958. Since 1975 significant amendments to the Constitution 
include the Constitution (Duration of Parliament) Act 1984; Australia Act 1986; Constitution 
Amendment Act 1994; and Constitution (Parliamentary Reform) Act 2003 (Taylor & Economou 
2006).
  The Magna Carta makes clear the expectation of ‘due process’ in the administration of justice, 2
albeit for freemen: “No free man shall be seized or imprisoned, or stripped of his rights or 
possessions, or outlawed or exiled, or deprived of his standing in any way, nor will we proceed 
with force against him, or send others to do so, except by the lawful judgement of his equals or by 
the law of the land” (full text translation: British Library n.d.). In Momcilovic v The Queen & Ors 
(2011) HCA 34, French CJ observed that most rights derive from the common law.
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unusual punishment, equality before the law and a fair trial (Castles 1982; Lord 
Irving of Lairg 2002; Meagher 2011). The right to a fair trial comprises both 
procedural and substantive principles (Bateman 2009). Procedural principles are 
embedded in a number of due process rights, including the presumption of 
innocence, the time and opportunity to present a defence, the right to legal 
representation, the right of the accused to examine any evidence, and the right of the 
accused not to be compelled to confess guilt or otherwise implicate themselves 
(Blake & Ashworth 1996; Wheeler 1997, 2004; Keyzer 2008; Bateman 2009).  
Due process is applied to the intrinsic rights of individuals in relation to their 
treatment by agencies of the criminal justice system, such as Victoria Police. In the 
absence of a federal Bill of Rights these due process rights have been enshrined 
through longstanding use and expectation (Castles 1982; French 2009). The principle 
of legality upholds such common law provisions by ensuring that executive actions 
and parliamentary decisions are subject to judicial review and statutory interpretation 
(Weller 2004; Spigelman 2005; Meagher 2011). More recently international 
conventions to which Australia is a signatory,  and local provisions such as the 3
Australian Capital Territory’s Human Rights Act 2004 and Victoria’s Charter of 
Human Rights and Responsibilities 2006 (‘the Charter/Charter Act’), have sought to 
provide a more transparent legislative basis for individual rights.  Expectations of 4
due process and of human rights more generally, whether enshrined in statute, treaty 
or common law, are not necessarily enforced or applied consistently.  The notion of 5
‘law in books, law in action’ (Pound 1910; Halperin 2011) embodies the challenges 
inherent in upholding individual rights, which are subject to change over time and 
interpretation according to context.   6
  See Chapter 1, footnote 8.3
  Meagher provides a detailed analysis of the what he terms “methodological opacity” (2011, p.464) 4
in the judicial application of the principle of legality.
  Despite the common law tradition inherited from England and Wales, Australian jurisdictions have 5
experienced ongoing struggles to ensure key due process rights (Neal 1991).
  For example, in NSW the Evidence Amendment (Evidence of Silence) Act 2013 qualified the right 6
to silence and permitted an adverse inference to be drawn.
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In Victoria, the Charter Act provides a commitment that the civil, political, cultural 
and due process rights afforded to all citizens of the state will be upheld, and that 
these rights will be protected in legislative decision-making. Individual rights include 
the fundamental due process protections in relation to criminal proceedings, such as 
the presumption of innocence, a fair hearing, and the right to appeal a conviction and 
sentence. However, the Charter Act acknowledges that individual rights may be 
subject to reasonable limitations. A Ministerial Statement of Compatibility must 
accompany each new Bill to confirm adherence to the Charter (Charter Act 2006, 
s28). Any measures in a Bill that do not comply with one or more Charter rights must 
be justified and the need must be empirically evidenced in the Statement of 
Compatibility (Charter Act 2006, s7(2)). Section 31 of the Charter Act goes further 
with the inclusion of an override mechanism. Parliament may expressly declare, in 
“exceptional circumstances” (s31(4)), that an Act 
has effect despite being incompatible with one or more of the human 
rights or despite anything else set out in this Charter (s31(1)).   7
Victoria’s Supreme Court is authorised to review legislation and to make a 
declaration of inconsistent interpretation if it determines that a statutory provision 
does not uphold a human right protected by the Charter (Charter Act 2006, s36). 
However, while a declaration of inconsistent interpretation triggers an opportunity 
for parliament to reconsider the legislation, it does not invalidate the disputed 
provision (Department of Justice 2008b, p.41).  
In Victoria, the Constitution Act 1975 (s16) articulates the requirement that 
“Parliament shall have power to make laws in and for Victoria in all cases 
whatsoever”. With constitutionally enshrined sovereignty, the Victorian Parliament 
holds the power to determine and enact the state's criminal laws. The Charter is a 
legislative Act, and its provisions are not protected by Victoria’s Constitution Act 
1975. The individual rights of Victorians are formalised in the Charter, but the 
Victorian Parliament retains the ability to pass laws that are incompatible with the 
  An override declaration lasts for up to five years and can be extended.7
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Charter’s basic rights. The potential exists, therefore, for a state initiated erosion of 
core individual rights and due process safeguards. What Valverde (2009) depicts as 
the apparent willingness of the state to side-step due process in certain situations, 
emphasises the significance of the way in which individual rights are upheld, and 
balance is ensured, in both the legislative and criminal processes. 
2.i  Due Process & Balance 
The underlying criminal justice process in Victoria, as with other common law 
jurisdictions such as the UK and USA, extends the principle of the separation of 
executive, legislative and judicial powers. Clear parameters frame its functioning, 
ideally ensuring consistency, transparency, accountability, and effective preservation 
of individual rights and due process protections. To illustrate the separation within 
the criminal process, Ashworth and Zedner depict a “paradigmatic sequence of 
prosecution-trial-conviction-sentence” (2008, p.23), expanding Fox and Freiberg's 
progression of “guilt, conviction, sentence and execution” (1989, p.298). The 
criminal process is central to the state response to crime and to the enforcement of 
individual rights (Ashworth & Redmayne 2010). The rights of citizens in relation to 
criminal law should be maintained, as far as possible, through the independence and 
separation of the judiciary and its capacity to review the actions of parliament (Sage 
2002; Lacey 2003; Wheeler 2004; Hunter-Schulz 2005; Bateman 2009). However, 
the breadth of the parliamentary law-making remit limits the corrective power of the 
Victorian courts, in particular with respect to the erosion of fundamental individual 
rights. 
In 2008, Australia’s Attorney-General highlighted the nexus between the rule of law 
and human rights. 
In Australia the rule of law and human rights are regarded as 
synonymous or at least mutually supportive. They are supported by: our 
democratic system of responsible government; the separation of powers 
between the Parliament, Executive Government and the Judiciary; a 
professional judiciary whose independence is constitutionally protected 
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and who all hold accountable for upholding the law… (McClelland 
2008). 
Reflecting this synonymity, Waldron (2003) conceived the protection of civil 
liberties as central to the prevention of abuses of state power. He cited clear concern 
about the potential for government-initiated injustice. 
… an apprehension that power given to the state is seldom ever used only 
for the purposes for which it is given, but is always and endemically 
liable to abuse (2003, p.205). 
The failure to constitutionally cement core rights allows Victoria’s Parliament to 
undermine longstanding due process principles, that can be challenged only by a 
non-enforceable judicial declaration of inconsistency under the Charter (Charter Act 
2006, s36). Whether for empirically evidenced necessity, political expedience, or 
simply to be seen to be doing something in response to a perceived social need, the 
primacy of parliamentary law-making power in Victoria engenders a profound 
imbalance.  Despite the underlying separation of powers and the provisions within 8
the Charter Act, the way in which individual rights are ensured in Victoria facilitates 
the passage of legislation that erodes due process procedural protections. 
Victoria’s banning notice provisions exemplify the way in which established 
individual due process rights and protections have been subordinated to a declared 
political and social need. The legislation has been subject to limited examination to 
date. In this thesis the passage of the banning provisions through parliament is the 
basis for examining specific changes to the criminal process, and consequential 
theoretical and applied challenges for the legislative assurance of individual rights in 
Victoria. 
The next part of this chapter provides an overview of Victoria’s banning notice 
provisions, highlighting their stated purpose and key features. Banning notices are 
  Constitutional protections do not in themselves guarantee the absolute enforcement of individual 8
rights. Despite its Constitutional Bill of Rights, due process protections in the USA have been 
subject to ongoing legislative, interpretive and enforcement challenges. However, notwithstanding 
the potential for political appointments, the US Supreme Court is empowered to uphold 
Constitutional protections and to compel legislative change (Ratner 1968). The Constitutional 
basis of individual rights provides an additional layer of protection that is absent in Victoria. 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 23
then considered in the context of literature depicting significant changes to criminal 
justice processes over recent decades. Challenges to the separation of powers and 
due process protections include the move towards discretionary police-imposed 
justice, the blurring of boundaries between criminal and civil methods of determining 
liability, the increasing use of pre-emptive, prohibitive restrictions, and a shift in the 
behaviours that lead to police-imposed summary justice. Each development has 
recast how balance is conceived and expressed in the criminal justice system, in 
Victoria and comparable English speaking jurisdictions.  
2.1  Overview of Victoria’s Banning Notice Provisions 
The Liquor Control Reform Amendment Act 2007 (‘LCRA Act 2007’) was the first 
Victorian legislation to permit the police-imposed prohibition of individuals from 
defined areas, initially for 24 hours. Building upon the measures contained within the 
Liquor Control Reform Act 1998 relating to the sale and supply of alcohol in 
Victoria, the LCRA Act 2007 also significantly extended the regulatory framework to 
strengthen penalties for liquor licensing offences. Victoria’s banning notice 
provisions were one component of a multi-dimensional response to concerns about 
issues of alcohol-related disorder in Victoria’s night-time economy (NTE). A 
combination of legislative and operational policing measures were consolidated 
under Victoria’s Alcohol Action Plan (Department of Justice 2008a).   9
Subsequent legislation expanded police powers in the NTE (see Appendix A). The 
Summary Offences & Control of Weapons Acts Amendment Act 2009 increased the 
range of behaviours subject to control and penalties,  introduced police enforceable 10
  Notable measures include the creation of the Safe Streets task force (an operational policing 9
initiative to increase the visible police presence in central Melbourne on Friday and Saturday 
nights) as well as the provisions documented in section 2.1.i of this chapter. 
 Penalties include 'penalty units'. These are outlined in Victoria's Monetary Units Act 2004, and are 10
used throughout Victoria's legislation to describe fine amounts (an offence may constitute a 
number of penalty units). To prevent legislation needing to be updated each time a fine is 
increased, the value of penalty units is fixed for each financial year by the Treasurer (Monetary 
Units Act 2004, s5(3)). One penalty unit has increased from $110.12 in 2007-2008, to $147.61 for 
the 2014-2015 financial year (Victorian Legislation and Parliamentary Documents 2014)
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move-on powers,  and created the offence of ‘disorderly conduct.’  The principles 11 12
of banning have since spread to contexts outside of the NTE. The Summary Offences 
& Sentencing Amendment Act 2014 extended discretionary police move-on powers to 
cover  protests, blockades and demonstrations where a “reasonable apprehension of 
violence” is perceived or where an obstruction is likely to occur (s3(e-h)).  13
To implement the banning provisions, the LCRA Act 2007 empowered the then 
Director of Liquor Licensing  to declare a 'designated area' if “alcohol-related 14
violence or disorder has occurred in a public place that is in the immediate vicinity of 
licensed premises within the area” (s147(1a)), and if it was believed that the 
imposition of banning notices may be effective in controlling, reducing or preventing 
further “alcohol related violence or disorder in the area” (s147(1b)). The “immediate 
vicinity” is defined as a “place that is within 100 metres of the licensed 
premises” (s147(3)). 
Victoria's first two designated areas, declared in December 2007, were the 
Melbourne Central Business District (CBD) and Prahran/South Yarra, incorporating 
the Chapel Street entertainment precinct of inner Melbourne (VCGLR 2015). 
Additional entertainment precincts in Metropolitan Melbourne and all major regional 
centres across Victoria now have designated areas.  15
  Similar to a banning notice, move-on orders can be issued pre-emptively if a police officer 11
suspects that a person may cause damage, injury or “is otherwise a risk to public safety” (s3(1)). 
They specify non-return for up to 24 hours (s3(3)), and carry financial penalties of up to five 
penalty units ($738) for their breach.
 What is meant by ‘disorderly conduct’  was not defined in the legislation.12
  The Attorney-General stated that the Act would “give Victoria Police the power to end unlawful 13
union pickets and protestor blockades that threaten to shut down businesses” (Clark 2013).
 In February 2012, the Director of Liquor Licensing was superseded by the Victorian Commission 14
for Gambling and Liquor Regulation (VCGLR).
 The VCGLR website maintains an inventory of each designated area. The precise location for each 15
is described and depicted visually on individual declarations (VCGLR 2015). 
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2.1.i  Banning Notices: Key Features 
The LCRA Act 2007 afforded Victoria Police on-the-spot discretionary powers to ban 
individuals, including those behaving or likely to behave in an anti-social manner, 
from the designated area for a period not exceeding 24 hours (s148B(1,2)). This was 
increased to a maximum of 72 hours under the Justice Legislation Amendment 
(Victims of Crime Assistance & Other Matters) Act 2010 (‘JLA Act 2010’). A police 
officer can impose a banning notice if he/she  
(a) believes on reasonable grounds that the giving of the notice may be 
effective in preventing the person from— 
 (i) continuing to commit the specified offence; or 
 (ii) committing a further specified offence; and 
(b) considers that the continuation of the commission of the specified 
offence or the commission of a further specified offence may involve or 
give rise to a risk of alcohol-related violence or disorder in the designated 
area (LCRA Act 2007, s148B(3)). 
A banning notice may be imposed if a police officer reasonably believes that it may 
be effective in preventing the recipient from committing a specified offence or 
committing a further offence. Specified offences are documented in the LCRA Act 
2007 (s7, schedule 2), and include offences against the person, sexual offences, 
destroying or damaging property, and assault.  However, no actual offence need 16
necessarily have been committed. A police officer may issue a banning notice in 
anticipation of these listed offences, and any disorderly or anti-social behaviours as 
perceived by the officer. The legislation targets alcohol-related violence and disorder, 
but the behaviours for which banning notices may be imposed are reliant on 
subjective perceptions and the interpretation of vague and undefined terms such as 
‘disorderly’ and ‘anti-social’. The LCRA Act 2007 affords police officers the 
discretionary power to both define a behaviour as disorderly and to determine the 
punishment, by imposing a banning notice.  
  Additional specified offences include trespass, offences relating to drunkenness, offensive and 16
obscene behaviour, possession of prohibited weapons and failure to leave licensed premises.
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Imposition of a banning notice requires that a police officer suspects “on reasonable 
grounds” (LCRA Act 2007, s148B(3)(a)) that an offence has been committed or is 
likely to be committed “wholly or partly in the designated area” (s148B(1)). There is 
no requirement for the officer to offer proof, to demonstrate intent to commit an 
offence, or to record any witness information. The banning notice sanction is 
imposed immediately. The recipient is given a paper copy of the banning notice (see 
Appendix B) and instructed to leave the designated area. There is no recourse to legal 
representation and no capacity to appeal the imposition of a banning notice. 
Recipients are effectively compelled to accept the ban. The legislation requires 
anyone to whom a banning notice is given to provide his or her name and address to 
the requesting police officer. A banning notice recipient must not refuse to provide 
their details “without a reasonable excuse” (s148D(3)), and must not provide false or 
misleading information. If a banning notice recipient refuses to provide their details a 
financial penalty may be imposed, but what is meant by a 'reasonable excuse' is not 
made clear in the legislation. Police officers may also use “reasonable force” to 
ensure the banned person leaves the designated area upon receipt of a banning notice 
(s148H).    
Unlike other infringement provisions that permit the imposition of on-the-spot 
penalties, such as speeding fines,  there is no opportunity to seek an independent 17
review of a police decision to issue a banning notice. Despite the acknowledged 
imperfections within Victoria’s infringement system,  there are clear options 18
available for recipients wishing to challenge the imposition of infringement 
penalties. The penalty, typically a fine, does not have to be paid until the review 
process is complete. Legal representation may be sought and evidence may be 
requested when a recipient instigates an appeal, and due process is therefore ensured 
prior to the financial punishment taking effect. Although only invoked if an appeal 
against the infringement penalty is lodged, these core individual rights are still 
  For example, the Infringements (Reporting and Prescribed Details and Forms) Regulations 2006 17
(Vic), r8, and the Road Safety (General) Regulations 2009 (Vic), r75.
  Saunders et al. (2013) noted, for example, the disproportionate effect of fixed penalty fines upon 18
less wealthy recipients.
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enabled. The only option stipulated in the LCRA Act 2007 for a recipient of a banning 
notice to appeal its effect upon their freedom of movement or its perceived validity, 
is by written notice to a police officer above the rank of sergeant, who may “vary or 
revoke a banning notice” (s148E). The feasibility of being able to submit a written 
application and receive a response within the period for which the banning notice is 
enacted is questionable, as the ban takes effect immediately. No appeal against the 
imposition of an individual banning notice is permitted beyond the agency of 
Victoria Police.  
In Queensland, the Safe Night Out Legislation Amendment Act 2014 introduced 
police-imposed banning notices of up to ten days (s602C-D). The legislation 
expressly permits recipients to seek an independent review of the imposition of a ban 
via the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) (s602P). Victoria’s 
Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) does not have the remit to review police-
imposed banning notice decisions.  It is recognised that provisions exist for more 19
complex administrative reviews of legislative, executive and other agency 
decisions.  However, there is no facility to appeal a police decision to impose an 20
individual banning notice.  
Although a banning notice is not a criminal sanction, its imposition is recorded on 
Victoria Police’s Law Enforcement Assistance Programme (LEAP) database.  21
Breach proceedings may be initiated if a recipient contravenes their banning notice 
by entering or attempting to enter the designated area (LCRA Act 2007, s148F). 
Banning notice breaches are strict liability offences. They operate under reverse onus 
principles, whereby the accused must prove the breach was a consequence of a 
mistake or was beyond their control (s148F(3a,b)). Breach penalties are initially 
  VCAT confirmed that “VCAT does not have jurisdiction to review this type of decision” [police-19
imposed banning notices] (personal email, 20 April 2015). 
 Such as the case of Owens v Normanton Liquor Accord & Ors [2012] QSC 118, and the threatened 20
proceedings in Swan Hill, Victoria. Footnote 24 outlines each case.  
  Introduced in 1993, the LEAP database records Victoria’s crime related data and information. It is 21
used for operational policing and statistical analysis. Police officers and analysts record individual 
offences, penalties, missing persons etc. An individual’s record may remain on LEAP indefinitely 
(Victoria Police 2012).
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financial, set at 20 penalty units (currently $2952 ). In the event of persistent non-22
compliance or non payment of the fine, summary court proceedings may be initiated, 
with the potential for criminal consequences, including imprisonment. 
The way in which banning notices have been legislatively framed has significant 
consequences for their imposition, and for the conception of balance. Banning 
notices are a quasi-criminal sanction, and embody a number of due process concerns. 
The most significant features are their permissible pre-emptive and immediate 
imposition, the lack of opportunity to seek legal representation, and no provision for 
judicial appeal of police decisions despite potentially significant breach 
consequences. 
2.1.ii  Exclusion Orders, Liquor Accord Bans & Barring Orders 
Banning notices are not the only prohibitive mechanisms targeting issues of 
disorderly behaviour in the NTE. The LCRA Act 2007 also introduced exclusion 
orders, which can be imposed by Magistrates for up to 12 months following court 
conviction for a “specified offence that was committed wholly or partly in the 
designated area” (s148I(1)). Unlike banning notices, exclusion orders are issued post 
prosecution and recipients are permitted full due process protections. Data relating to 
the use of exclusion orders is referenced in a comparative capacity in Chapter Seven 
of this thesis. 
Liquor Accords, previously permitted under local government agreements, were 
given legislative authority under the LCRA Act 2007. Participating venue licensees 
and police officers may ban members of the public from their own and other venues 
across an accord (s146A-D). The period of the ban is determined as part of the 
accord. While embodying the issue of private trespassory rights to evict and to 
  See footnote 10.22
Chapter 2: Literature Review 29
exclude,  no breach provisions apply to liquor accord bans. As licensed premises are 23
not public spaces, the banning notice issues relating to due process and procedural 
protections do not apply in the same way to liquor accord bans.  24
Victoria’s Justice Legislation Amendment Act 2011 created barring orders (s4), which 
empower venue licensees, police officers or another “responsible person” (s106D) to 
bar someone from licensed premises if “the person is drunk, violent or quarrelsome”, 
or creating a “substantial or immediate risk” (s106D). Barring orders are a statutory 
extension of the private right to trespass. They may be imposed for up to six months 
(s106G) and records must be kept by the licensee for three years (s106K). Breach of 
a barring order may lead to a fine or court proceedings (s106J). The VCGLR 
confirmed that no records are kept centrally and no data is available relating to the 
use of barring orders (personal email, 27 June 2014). This limits possible analysis 
other than in the event of court documented breach proceedings. As licensed 
premises are not public spaces once again the banning notice issues relating to due 
process and procedural protections do not apply in the same way. 
The evolution of related legislation is pertinent to discussion of the broader 
consequences of the passage of the LCRA Act 2007 and JLA Act 2010. However 
these alternative provisions (exclusion orders, Liquor Accord bans and barring 
orders) embody imposition procedures and/or scope that are substantively different 
to banning notices, and which do not undermine individual rights in the same way. 
Banning notices typify the expansion of police-imposed discretionary summary 
justice in Victoria, and across comparable jurisdictions. The banning provisions 
  Foreshadowing many subsequent developments, Gray & Gray describe such exclusion from quasi- 23
public spaces as “insidious”, and which “has already begun to take hold of us and paralyse our 
critical legal faculties” (1999, p.46).
  Liquor accord bans are also discretionary, potentially punitive, and based upon the subjective 24
opinion of venue licensees. However, as venues are private spaces licensees may determine who is 
permitted to enter (notwithstanding expectations in relation to anti-discrimination legislation). In 
Queensland, the Supreme Court judgement in the case of Owens v Normanton Liquor Accord & 
Ors [2012] QSC 118 confirmed that the Liquor Act 1992 (QLD) confers on licensees the discretion 
to refuse entry to patrons. In 2011, a similar judicial challenge against a decision by Victoria’s 
Swan Hill Liquor Accord to impose a 12 month ban, led to the ban being retracted before legal 
proceedings commenced (this is discussed further in Chapter Seven).
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dilute the separation of powers in the provision of justice, erode due process 
protections for individuals and have influenced the trajectory that police-imposed 
discretionary powers have followed. The remainder of this chapter relates Victoria’s 
banning notice provisions to literature that has depicted and analysed significant 
recent changes to relevant criminal justice processes.  
2.2  Challenges to the Separation of Powers & Due Process 
2.2.i  Summary Justice and Discretionary Decision-Making 
Discretion is exercised whenever a public officer is empowered to “make a choice 
among possible courses of action or inaction” (Davis 1980, p.4). Discretionary 
decisions are made across the criminal process, from pre-trial plea bargaining, 
witness selection and admission of evidence, to jury direction and sentencing 
(Findlay, Odgers & Yeo 2010, p.114). Police decisions, such as when to use force, or 
whether to warn, caution or arrest a suspect, are shaped by a range of legal, 
situational, interpretive, logistical, personal and pragmatic factors (Travis 1983). 
Policing is, therefore, inherently and necessarily discretionary (Davis 1969, 1980; 
Klockars 1985; Finnane 1990; Skolnick 1994; Mastrofski 2004; Bronnitt & Stenning 
2011).  The use of discretion can be an effective and positive aspect of policing 25
(Dixon 1997). Police officers are empowered, for example, to apply their judgement 
of selective enforcement (Klockars 1985) to move someone on rather than arrest 
them, therefore saving time and expense in the provision of justice. However, police 
discretion is not always demonstrably fair, impartial or visible. Notable research into 
US, UK and Australian policing has explored the damaging consequences for 
procedural justice and police legitimacy of the way in which discretionary police 
  Since the 1960s the definition and significance of police discretion and selective enforcement has 25
been the focus of ongoing research. A range of influential sources are acknowledged but not 
explored in this chapter.
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powers, such as to move-on and stop/search, have been used disproportionately 
against certain racial groups.  26
Since the 1970s, diversion and decarceration initiatives have led to a growing 
number of people being subject to an increasing range of controls, creating both a 
net-widening and net-strengthening in the provision of justice (Blomberg 1977; 
Cohen 1985; Polk 1987; Sarre 1999). Cohen contends that attempts to reduce the 
scope and reach of formal criminal processes has “left us with wider, stronger and 
different nets” (1985, p.38), whereby increasing numbers of people receive more 
intensive intervention, determined by an expanding range of agencies. Legislative 
developments in many jurisdictions have challenged the separation of powers within 
criminal justice processes. As members of the executive branch of government police 
officers are increasingly called upon to determine guilt and administer justice 
summarily. Summary justice in this context refers specifically to the use of police-
initiated pre-court punishments, such as banning notices, which risk diluting or 
circumventing established due process protections.  
The evolution of legislative provisions, from infringement penalties to banning 
notices, enables summary justice to be determined and imposed on-the-spot by police 
officers. This has significantly extended the reach of their discretionary powers, with 
consequences for individual rights that are explored in this thesis. The increasing use 
of infringement penalties and move-on provisions are particularly evident in 
regulatory responses to public order issues in England and Wales, the USA, and 
Australia. 
In England and Wales, Hadfield, Lister and Traynor note a sustained “ramping 
up” (2009, p.467) of police powers to control behaviours. The Criminal Justice and 
Police Act 2001, the Anti-Social Behaviour Act 2003, and the Violent Crime 
 For example, Weitzer and Tuch (2002), Weatherspoon (2004), Tyler and Wakslak (2004) Goodey 26
(2006), Hallsworth (2006), Harris (2006), Walsh and Taylor (2007), Sivasubramaniam and 
Goodman-Delahunty (2008), Young (2010), Yesufu (2013), and Mazerolle et al. (2013). Published 
data relating to Indigenous recipients of Victoria’s banning notices is analysed in Chapter Seven. 
However, as this thesis does not address the issue of discriminatory policing per se, this extensive 
body of research is not examined in detail.
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Reduction Act 2006 introduced and extended Police Notices for Disorder (PNDs), 
dispersal orders and police exclusionary powers. PNDs carry financial penalties and 
are issued on-the-spot by police officers for a range of alcohol-related and disorderly 
behaviours. Dispersal orders enable police officers to exclude recipients from 
designated areas for actual or perceived anti-social behaviours. Hadfield, Lister and 
Traynor (2009) and Young (2010) contend that summary justice in this sense 
facilitates a fundamental change in the role of police officers from law enforcers and 
investigators to both judge and jury as well. Such police-imposed summary justice 
presents a tangible challenge to the principle of the separation of powers, as police 
officers determine the culpability of the alleged offender and administer the 
punishment on-the-spot. 
The ‘net-widening' effect of policing by summary justice is highlighted by Crawford 
(2009). He notes that between 2004 and 2006 the number of PNDs issued in England 
and Wales more than tripled to over 200,000 (2009, p.821). Ashworth and Zedner 
(2008) and Crawford (2009) contend that up to three quarters of PND recipients in 
England and Wales would previously have been given a caution or warning and 
would, therefore, not have received a formal sanction or punishment. The changing 
priorities enabled by summary justice, increases the number of people drawn into the 
formal mechanisms of the justice system, who then receive a tangible penalty – 
determined and administered outside of traditional legal processes. The possibility of 
‘add-on’ offences further extends the net-widening concerns. For example, any 
profanities expressed after receipt of an infringement notice could result in another 
being issued (Saunders et al. 2013).  
Research by Beckett and Herbert (2008, 2009, 2010a, 2010b) examines the use of 
police-imposed discretionary powers in Seattle, USA. Trespass rules allow police 
officers to issue on-the-spot exclusion orders from public spaces, which can last for 
up to a year. There is no requirement to provide any evidence of wrongdoing, and 
restrictions apply to extensive geographical areas (Beckett & Herbert 2008, 2010a). 
Breaching a ban can result in arrest with potentially serious consequences, including 
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custody. Beckett and Herbert (2010a) highlight the way in which such programs 
continue to grow, have a disproportionate effect upon the homeless, and 
progressively increase the likelihood of infringement and punishment.  27
Early Australian research identified a similar move towards summary justice. Fox 
and Freiberg (1989) discussed the growth of discretion afforded to the police in 
Victoria through the use of on-the-spot fines and infringement notices.  They noted 28
the ability of the police to negotiate an early resolution to situations without the need 
for prosecution in a summary court. In Victoria, the number of actions and 
behaviours subject to police regulation and control continues to grow. Infringement 
notices issued by Victoria Police increased by over 25% between 2006-7 and 
2010-11 to 2.9 million (Attorney-General, Victoria 2011, p.10). The majority of 
infringement notices were for traffic or driving infractions, with only 15,000 related 
to public order offences. Of particular significance for this thesis, infringement 
notices carry the option of formal review or a hearing before a court before the 
penalty is implemented (Saunders et al. 2013). During 2010-11, 8% of notices were 
reviewed, over half of which were subsequently withdrawn, mostly due to special or 
exceptional circumstances. But nearly 15% of those withdrawn, more than 17,000 
individual notices, cited their imposition as being “contrary to the law” largely due 
to errors made by the issuing officer (Attorney-General, Victoria 2011, p.19). This 
demonstrates the clear potential for error in the application of on-the-spot penalties 
by police officers.  
In a detailed assessment of the NSW Young Offenders Act 1997,  Bargen (2005) 29
offers a more positive perspective regarding discretionary police powers. Prior to the 
 For example, following a decade of little change, the number of trespass cases filed in the Seattle 27
Municipal Court rose by 40% between 1999–2005. In 2005, trespass cases comprised the third 
largest category of cases (10% of the total caseload). Significantly, of the 1,947 criminal trespass 
cases filed, 60% of them had criminal trespass as the only charge (Beckett & Herbert 2010a, p.91).
 Infringement notices were first introduced in Victoria via the Magistrates (Summary Proceedings) 28
Act 1975.
  NSW Young Offenders Act 1997 introduced a hierarchy of diversionary measures as alternatives to 29
court proceedings; informal police warnings, formal police cautions and youth justice 
conferencing options.
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Act fewer than 20% of relevant cases used police-imposed cautions, with over 80% 
being dealt with by the Children’s Court. By the third year of the Act, the proportion 
of cases resolved with the application of a caution increased to 36% (2005, p.16). 
Within this shift the number of interventions remained steady, suggesting no net-
widening effect of the extended discretionary police powers. Bargen does concede a 
number of issues with the consistent and transparent application of this form of 
police discretion, such as deficiencies in police training, resources and the quality of 
legal advice (2005, p.148). However, the overall effect upon the provision of justice 
was positive. 
There are common and recurring themes across a body of literature regarding 
discretionary police powers. The growth of police-imposed summary justice reflects 
underlying pressures to reduce costs and ease judicial burdens. The stated principles 
upon which Victoria’s infringement policies are based include efficiency and 
expediency (Attorney-General, Victoria 2012, p.9). Of significance to Fox and 
Freiberg is the way in which similar changes have progressed over several decades in 
Victoria “without debate or analysis… [and] principles relevant to the exercise of 
that [police] discretion are all but non-existent” (1989, p.299). Crawford's (2008, 
2009) analysis of developments in England and Wales suggests little improvement in 
the appetite for understanding the basis for, and effect of, equivalent police powers to 
punish. Consequences of discretionary police-imposed summary justice, such as 
Victoria’s banning provisions, include the loss of traditional procedural safeguards, 
the dilution of the separation of powers and the erosion of police accountability. 
2.2.ii  Police Discretion and Accountability 
Discretion plays a key role in the imposition of summary justice by police officers. 
While not necessarily negative, discretionary police decisions risk being applied 
inconsistently or improperly, due in part to a lack of visibility and accountability. 
Davis cautioned that “the exercise of discretion may mean either beneficence or 
tyranny, justice or injustice, reasonableness or arbitrariness” (1980, p.3). Klockars 
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(1985) noted that while police decisions to arrest will typically be subject to review, 
decisions not to arrest are much less transparent. Court decision-making processes 
operate under clearly documented guidelines, such as those drawn up by Victoria’s 
Sentencing Advisory Council and the Sentencing Act 1991. Determinations of guilt 
and sentencing pronouncements are, with only limited exceptions, made publicly 
ensuring a level of accountability. The judicial rules of evidence and procedure 
further enhance the safeguards embedded in criminal justice processes (Sage 2002).  30
By contrast, police administered summary justice is not subject to the same processes 
of regulation or accountability. Guidelines and procedural controls do exist, in terms 
of how police discretion should be exercised.  However, supervisory mechanisms 31
and the way in which decisions are actually made are more opaque. Fox (1995) 
specifically cautions against the undesirability of police-imposed penalties that are 
not subject to judicial scrutiny. Mechanisms, such as banning notices, dilute the 
protections that should be provided through the separation of powers and do not 
enable effective scrutiny of the police use of discretion. Victoria’s banning notices 
require no evidence to be recorded and their imposition is not subject to independent 
appeal.  
Concerns about police-imposed summary justice have been identified in other 
jurisdictions. Between 2003 and 2011, the number of out-of-court disposals effected 
by the police in England and Wales increased by 241%, while the number of in-court 
convictions remained stable (Lord Chief Justice 2011, p.14). By 2011, 40% of all 
crimes solved by the police in England and Wales were dealt with outside of the 
court process (HM Inspectorate of Constabulary 2011, p.9). The Lord Chief Justice 
of England and Wales highlighted judicial disquiet about the growth of discretionary 
summary justice. 
  It is recognised that summary justice effected through the courts is also subject to discretion, and 30
the possibility of error and injustice. However, court processes are typically visible, defendants are 
permitted to have legal representation, and decisions are subject to appeal and review.
  For example, the LCRA Act 2007 states that banning notices can be imposed by ‘relevant police 31
members’ (s148N). Specific training is required, and it is not a power intended to be used by all or 
any police officer. However, the extent of adherence to this requirement is unknown.
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We must be very careful about the creation of two separate systems of 
providing summary justice: the one in the hands of the magistrates, and 
the other in the hands of the police, who effectively act as prosecutor, and 
jury and judge. Just as judges are not police officers, so police officers 
are not judges  (Lord Chief Justice 2011, p.15). 
A study by HM's Inspectorate of Constabulary (2011, p.5) compared 190 cases of 
police administered cautions and PNDs across England and Wales with 50 guilty plea 
cases dealt with in a Magistrates Court. The research noted a lack of consistency in 
the application of out-of-court disposals, with 64 (34%) failing to comply with the 
guidelines for their imposition, compared with only one (2%) of the court-based 
cases reviewed (2011, p.22). In 2012, the Chair of the Magistrates’ Association of 
England and Wales issued a warning for the separation of powers doctrine. 
… some offences are being dealt with outside of the judicial process. In 
some cases there is already a suspicion that this has created a lack of 
transparency and openness in the system and effectively means that those 
who are there to enforce the law are effectively put in the position of 
judges and sentencers (Fassenfelt 2012,  p.42). 
The consequential risk of police-imposed discretionary justice is that much “is being 
dealt with inappropriately because it has not come before an independent 
tribunal” (Fassenfelt 2012, p.42). Victoria’s banning notices typify the changes in 
police powers that underpin such judicial concerns. Chapter Seven of this thesis 
documents interview research with a sample of Victorian Magistrates, and offers a 
judicial perspective of the banning provisions. 
It is recognised that court decisions may be made in error, and that discretionary 
police decision-making is not inevitably problematic. However, Beckett and 
Herbert's  (2010a) research in Seattle, USA illustrates the absolute discretion that 
police administered summary justice is able to permit, along with the potential 
consequences for individual rights. The coercive powers available to the Seattle 
police are exercised on-the-spot with limited oversight or opportunity for judicial 
review (Beckett & Herbert 2010a). For example, trespass admonishments, which 
may cover extended geographical areas, can be imposed by a police officer without 
evidence and with no independent authority. The effect is to create a fundamental 
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imbalance of rights, whereby the due process protections of the accused are 
subordinated to expansive discretionary police powers, which embody a 
“problematic lack of constraints” (2010a, p.148).  
Across Australia, research also highlights issues for the accountability of police-
imposed discretionary summary justice. Spooner (2001) notes abuses in Queensland, 
with move-on decisions made by police officers based on their subjective perceptions 
rather than actual behaviours. Walsh and Taylor (2006, 2007) synthesise trends in 
police move-on practices in Queensland. They identify a disproportionate effect upon 
vulnerable groups, such as the homeless, and evidence of harassment by police 
officers. A Queensland Crime and Misconduct Commission (CMC)  report confirms 32
the importance of discretion in the effective policing of public order (CMC 2010). 
The report also cautions that misuse of police discretion poses a serious risk to public 
confidence and police legitimacy. The disproportionate impact upon disadvantaged 
groups (such as the homeless, young and Indigenous) of discretionary police powers 
to move-on, is identified as a specific issue. In New South Wales (NSW), 
recommendations by the NSW Ombudsman (1999) to introduce a clear code of 
practice to improve accountability in the application of police move-on powers were 
not implemented. 
In Victoria, Farrell (2009) considers the then proposals for move-on provisions and 
notes the scarcity of empirical research in other Australian jurisdictions regarding 
their effectiveness in reducing crime. In 2012, the Office of Police Integrity (OPI) 
conducted a detailed review of discretionary police powers to stop and search. Their 
report expresses concern about the lack of appropriate transparency and 
accountability for police decision-making. The absence of oversight and review, and 
failure to meet the legislated reporting requirements due to inadequate data collection 
are highlighted  as significant issues (OPI 2012, p.7). A recent detailed examination 
of the Victorian infringement notice system also notes concerns with respect to 
police conformity with guidelines for their issue (Saunders et al. 2013, p.31). 
  The name was changed to the Crime and Corruption Commission (CCC) in 2014.32
Chapter 2: Literature Review 38
Fundamental to political and criminal theory is Zedner's assertion that “one long 
lauded means of protecting democratic freedom is reliance upon the separation of 
powers” (2005, p.525). In the context of police discretionary summary justice, 
separation should be effected by mechanisms such as judicial oversight of legislative 
provisions and independent review of police decision-making. The changing remit of 
police powers poses a threat to these principles. The strengthening of the 
discretionary authority of the police, at the expense of due process and separation of 
powers, highlights a significant challenge to the criminal process that is exemplified 
by Victoria’s police-imposed banning notices. The post-enactment scrutiny of the 
police use of banning notices is therefore examined in Chapter Seven.  
2.2.iii  The Blurring of Criminal/Civil Boundaries
The boundaries of criminal, civil and regulatory law have become increasingly 
blurred by legislative developments that have expanded the use of police-imposed 
penalties, under the auspices of both punishment and control. Pre-dating many of the 
specific Victorian provisions, Fox and Freiberg (1989) drew attention to long-
standing changes in sentencing practices in Victoria. In the 1980s they documented 
the move towards summary justice, and the rise of what they term non-conviction 
diversionary practices, or contracts, the precursors of contemporary prohibitive 
orders. Fox and Freiberg  (1989) noted the shift of power that sits alongside the 
blurring of civil and criminal boundaries, and expressed concern about the 
undermining of formal due process rights to the promise of leniency. For example, a 
judicial hearing would require guilt to be proven beyond reasonable doubt. The new 
diversionary practices, by contrast, were offered with the incentive of non-conviction 
if recipients consented and accepted their guilt. Fox and Freiberg (1989) contend that 
such consent was flawed, conceptually confusing and was fundamentally coercive. 
Individuals were asked to waive their right to a judicial hearing and accept the police 
determination of their guilt, in return for a more lenient outcome.
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Crawford extends this early discussion of non-conviction dispositions to the 
increasing use of ‘contracts’ to control and govern individual behaviour. He 
questions the “future-focused logic of crime prevention” (2003, p.486) that uses 
prohibition to prevent wrong-doing and promote community security. Referencing 
Young’s (1999) ‘exclusive society’, Crawford (2003, 2008) critiques the 
criminalisation of social policy and the introduction of largely prohibitive measures, 
such as Anti-Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs) in the UK.  ASBOs epitomise the 33
blurring of criminal and civil boundaries, and the dilution of the separation of 
powers. As well as being a post-conviction disposal, an ASBO could be applied for 
by police, social landlords and other local authority bodies (Crime and Disorder Act 
1998 (UK) s1; Police Reform Act 2002 (UK) s61), and imposed without conviction.  
A key criticism of ASBOs is their reliance upon discretionary powers and the 
combining of the lower burden of proof of civil orders, with the potential for 
criminal breach proceedings (Burney 2002, 2006, 2009). The restrictive nature and 
the extent to which ASBOs transgress fundamental legal principles is highlighted by 
Ashworth (2004a). ASBOs typically included prohibitive elements, such as not 
entering a defined geographical area, or not associating with named individuals. 
These actions in themselves are not criminal, but if undertaken when an ASBO is in 
place may lead to criminal prosecution.  Ashworth (2004a) notes that limits 34
embedded within the rule of law do not apply to prohibitions like ASBOs, as they are 
a future-focused community protective measure rather than a punishment for an 
actual offence. However, like banning notices, their effect can be considerable and 
disproportionate to the behaviour that triggered the order. 
  ASBOs were introduced under the UK’s Crime and Disorder Act 1998. Intended to be used to 33
resolve neighbourhood disputes, the legislation was designed to tackle behaviour that “caused or 
was likely to cause harassment, alarm or distress to one or more persons not of the same 
household” (UK Crime & Disorder Act 1998, part 1), and envisaged to apply primarily to adults. 
However, ASBOs quickly became synonymous with young people (Burney 2002), although their 
success continues to be debated (Garrett 2007; Squires 2008; Crawford 2008, 2009; Burney 2009; 
Donoghue 2010; Hodgkinson & Tilley 2011).
  ASBOs were eventually superseded by new Criminal Behaviour Orders (CBOs) under the Anti-34
Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014. CBOs continue to operate under prohibitive 
principles, with criminal sanctions available for breaches. 
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Von Hirsch and Simester (2006) echo the concerns of Crawford (2003), Ashworth 
(2004a) and Burney (2006) in their analysis of what they term “two-step prohibitions 
(TSPs)” (Von Hirsch & Simester 2006, p.174), which combine prohibitive civil 
orders with criminal breach proceedings. Von Hirsch and Simester position TSPs, 
such as ASBOs, as a form of criminalisation that punishes, yet carries a fundamental 
loss of procedural safeguards. Ashworth (2006a) considers civil and hybrid orders in 
the context of their specific threat to the presumption of innocence. Like Victoria’s 
banning notices, the civil nature of ASBOs enables their imposition to side-step 
fundamental due process protections that would be afforded in criminal proceedings. 
Their breach reverses the presumption of innocence and conflates criminality with 
otherwise non-criminal acts (Martin 2011). Similarly, in the USA a Stay Out of 
Drugs Area (SODA) order, which covers more than half of the city of Seattle, is 
offered to defendants to avoid a drug prosecution (Beckett & Herbert 2008, 2010a). 
SODAs are civil dispositions that do not require a conviction, but which retain 
criminal breach provisions. Key due process rights that would be assured by 
summary prosecution are subsumed to the promise of leniency and the avoidance of 
conviction. 
Similar prohibitive orders and related concerns across Australian jurisdictions pre-
date the introduction of ASBOs. The creation of a range of family violence 
protection and stalking intervention orders embodied the same issues of the 
hybridisation of civil and criminal proceedings. Such measures restricted the free 
movement of recipients with penalties invoked for their breach (McMahon & Willis 
2003; Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) 2010). In Victoria, the Crimes 
(Family Violence) Act 1987  empowered police to issue discretionary orders with a 35
variety of generally prohibitive conditions, for example exclusion from specified 
addresses, breach of which could lead to criminal prosecution.  Examining 36
Prohibitive Behaviour Orders (PBOs) introduced in Western Australia in 2010, 
  Superseded by the Family Violence Protection Act 2008.35
  Under Victoria’s Crimes (Family Violence) Act 1987 (s23) police were able to impose an 36
Intervention Order, and initiate an arrest for alleged breaches without a warrant.
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Crofts and Witzleb (2011) contend these orders are predicated on the empirically 
unproven assumption that certain behaviours that in themselves are lawful, will 
increase the likelihood of previously convicted offenders committing further acts of 
anti-social behaviour. Like ASBOs, PBOs therefore prohibit lawful behaviours, such 
as being present in a particular place. Breach of any of the requirements constitutes a 
criminal offence – thereby effectively criminalising non-criminal behaviours (Crofts 
& Witzleb 2011). As Belina observes in relation to similar spatial orders in Bremen, 
Germany, this becomes the “...criminalisation of the merely being there” (2007, p.
327).
Discretionary summary justice fundamentally challenges the separation of powers, 
and circumvents entrenched aspects of criminal law and procedure (Young, Byles & 
Dobson 2000; Ashworth 2004a). Significantly, rather than amending specific 
policing laws, such as Victoria’s Crimes Act 1958, new police powers and control 
mechanisms are being introduced via existing administrative provisions. In the case 
of banning notices, Victoria's Liquor Control Reform Act 1998 has been amended to 
enable their imposition. Reinforcing the blurring of criminal and civil processes, the 
police power to punish is intentionally transformed outside of the boundaries of the 
criminal law. A consequence for banning notices in particular is to render their 
individual imposition immune from judicial scrutiny. Fox and Freiberg’s (1989) 
concern about the coercive imposition of diversionary mechanisms under the guise 
of leniency is taken a step further, as banning notices require no consent from the 
recipient to be imposed.  
2.2.iv  Pre-emptive Justice and Pre-Crime 
Prohibitive orders, such as ASBOs, PBOs and banning notices, typify the principles 
of pre-crime and preventative justice. Pre-crime relates to the notion of preventing 
wrongdoing, controlling risk and pro-actively managing behaviours, by enabling a 
person’s intentions to be presumed rather than waiting for actions to occur. Such pre-
emptive justice, envisaged in Feeley and Simon's 'New Penology' (1992), finds 
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explicit expression in Fitzgibbon (2004), Tonry (2004), Pratt et al. (2005), Zedner 
(2007c), Rodger (2008a, 2008b), Pantazis (2008), Crawford (2009), Van Wijck 
(2011), Hallsworth & Lea (2011) and others. Crawford presents pre-crime as 
“directing and influencing prospective behaviour rather than reordering and 
accounting for past conduct” (2009, p.814). Zedner summarises the nature and 
implied consequences of the move towards pre-crime.  
In important respects we are on the cusp of a shift from a post- to a pre- 
crime society, a society in which the possibility of forestalling risks 
competes with and even takes precedence over responding to wrongs 
done (2007c, p.262). 
The transformation of criminal justice processes and priorities, from individual 
responsibility and punishment to the management of probability and risk, is 
addressed by Feeley and Simon (1992). They outline the ‘old penology’ need to 
prove individual intent and the existence of protective barriers, or due process, to 
afford necessary protection for the accused. Feeley and Simon suggest that the 'new 
penology' manifests a more managerial and regulatory approach, with a focus upon 
“surveillance, confinement and control” (1992, p.452). Groups and sub-populations 
are targeted for control with a justifying discourse emphasising the need to promote 
public safety. This control approach validates the use of administrative measures to 
deal with crime, and finds subsequent expression in many examples, including the 
UK's ASBO legislation and the growing body of police-imposed penalties, such as 
the banning provisions of Victoria’s LCRA Act 2007.  
Hallsworth and Lea (2011) extend the work of Rodger (2008a, 2008b) with respect 
to pre-crime. They explore a number of examples from the UK to illustrate how the 
traditional reactive, post-hoc criminal process is being “mutated” (2011, p.146) by 
pre-emptive criminalisation. Depicted as “'tooling up' Leviathan”, Hallsworth and 
Lea explore some of the primary developments that are used to justify what they 
regard as the increasing “coercive powers of the criminal justice agencies” (2011, p.
146), particularly in the realm of pre-crime. Rather than continuing the traditional 
functions of arrest and evidence gathering for subsequent court prosecution, policing 
organisations now seek 
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pre-emptive responses that previously would have been unthinkable other 
than at times of major civil disturbance and the suspension of normal 
legality (2011, p.151). 
Hallsworth and Lea (2011) suggest that strategies developed in response to serious 
crime are subsequently applied to lower level crime control under the banner of 
common sense. In Victoria pre-punishment mechanisms had previously been directed 
towards serious risks to public safety from, for example, sex offenders  or the 37
post-9/11 terror threat.  Discretionary police banning powers lowered the threshold 38
to include prospective public disorder in the NTE. The implication of Hallsworth and 
Lea’s analysis is that corners are being cut in the administration of justice through the 
circumvention of due process. The framework of individual rights and protections 
remain but their application is quietly diluted. The pre-crime approach is thereby 
increasingly enshrined, at the behest of legislative assistance, in ‘normal legality’. 
Crawford (2009, 2011, 2013) notes that coercive powers may initially be introduced 
as exceptional measures, that are time limited or spatially restricted (such as banning 
notices). However, they become routinised through use and the exceptional 
transitions into the normal (2009, p.826). One example is the dispersal order. 
Introduced in the Anti-social  Behaviour  Act  2003  (UK) (ss30–36) as a specific 
measure to be used only in pre-designated areas for a specific purpose, a 48-hour 
dispersal order may now be imposed anywhere with blanket restrictions, preclusions 
and preventative prohibitions (Crawford & Lister 2007). The extent to which the 
individual rights of banning notice recipients have been subject to a similar 
“hollowing out” (Hallsworth & Lea 2011, p.153) is explored in Chapters Five and 
Six. 
The temporal shift inherent in the move from a post-crime, reactive focus towards 
pre-emptive management fundamentally challenges the traditional model of dealing 
with criminal behaviours, and the separation of powers (Rodger 2008a, 2008b). 
  Victoria’s Serious Sex Offenders Monitoring Act 2005 authorised extended supervision for serious 37
sex offenders after release from prison, in the interests of community protection.
  The Anti-Terrorism Act 2005 (Cth) introduced Control Orders and Preventative Detention Orders.38
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Intent can be assumed merely from being present in a location, leading to 
preventative prohibitions. In a comprehensive consideration of pre-crime, Zedner 
argues that conflating intent and punishment is morally as well as legally 
questionable, as “to close this window pre-emptively fails to respect the moral 
autonomy of the individual to choose to do the right thing” (2007c, p.274). It is 
acknowledged that the pre-crime approach may fit with theories of crime prevention 
by removing or reducing the available opportunities for crime to occur (Felson & 
Clarke 1998). However, once the notion of pre-emptive control is established, the 
risk exists of it being applied more broadly to actions and behaviours only remotely 
related to crime. This is exemplified by the range of permissible provisions embodied 
within measures such as ASBOs, SODA orders, and PBOs. Victoria’s banning 
notices take this a step further, as a ban may be imposed entirely pre-emptively, 
according to the subjective assessment of a police officer. 
Underpinning much of the implementation and practice of pre-emptive justice is the 
expectation that a person or community has the right not to be put at risk of harm by 
the intended or actual actions of another person or group (Finkelstein 2003; Oberdiek 
2009). Measures that prohibit certain behaviours and lead to consequences in 
anticipation of their occurrence reflect a basic right to be safe. Banning notices are an 
example of such a pre-emptive prohibition, which may be imposed in the interests of 
public safety. By contrast, Husak examines and supports the proposition of a 
“substantial risk requirement” (2008, p.161) when it comes to the imposition of pre-
emptive controls, and consideration of their breach. He suggests the context of the 
risk matters and should determine the nature of the response, particularly in relation 
to breaches of prohibitive orders. Husak cites the example of a US defendant who 
was convicted of breaching an order not to be within 1000 feet of a school zone. The 
breach involved cycling near a public park that the defendant did not know was 
school property which had been leased to the community. Despite the clear intention 
of the original prohibition, the technical nature of the breach was sufficient for 
conviction. Husak criticises the failure to consider the context in which the breach 
occurred. Duff (2011) extends this thinking and asserts that it is only the most serious 
Chapter 2: Literature Review 45
types of risk that should be controlled and criminalised. Under Duff's model, the 
defendant would not have breached his order, as there was no intent or serious risk 
involved.  
Victoria’s banning notices may be imposed pre-emptively, with a consequential 
conflation of intent and punishment. Intent is assumed in initial implementation, as a 
police officer may issue a ban following their subjective assessment of the recipients 
potential behaviour.  However, the due process expectation of the presumption of 39
innocence is undermined if the mere presence in a location can be deemed evidence 
of intent without the need for proof. Significantly for Ashworth and Zedner (2011), 
such presumptions do not allow for the possibility that the accused may have 
changed their mind about an intended action. The precedents being set by the 
implementation of legislation such as banning notices mean, in the view of Ashworth 
and Zedner, that “the requirement of intent is being diluted....” (2011, p.288-89). In a 
later study, Ashworth and Zedner (2012) are fundamentally critical of civil 
preventative orders and the way in which procedural safeguards are denied. 
However, they caution against extending the scope of criminalisation simply to 
ensure that due process in enabled. 
Rather than allowing the procedural tail to wag the substantive dog, it is 
preferable to determine the proper limits of criminalisation on the 
grounds of principle alone, leaving due process to attach to conduct that 
is rightfully criminalised rather than criminalising conduct in order to 
ensure that appropriate protections are provided (2012, p.571).  
Building upon Zedner's (2007c) notions of temporal and conceptual pre-crime, 
Crawford presents a thorough critique of the principle of “governing the 
future” (2009, p.819). Early interventions, risk assessments and preventive measures 
offer fundamental challenges to traditional principles of criminal justice, including 
the presumption of innocence and protections afforded by judicial review. Ashworth 
(2004a, 2004b, 2006a), Tadros and Tierney (2004), Roberts (2014) and Ulvang 
(2014) extend a body of research addressing threats to traditional conceptions of the 
presumption of innocence, and the consequences for the criminal law, due process 
  Intent is also assumed in consideration of any breaches, for which strict liability rules apply. 39
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and individual rights. Significantly, Ashworth (2004a) and Crawford (2009) contend 
that the language of control, protection, prevention and enforcement allows 
established legal protections to be pushed aside, while in many cases failing to 
address or measure the effectiveness of interventions. This is exemplified by 
O’Malley’s depiction of the monetisation of justice (2009, 2010, 2011), whereby 
money, risk and justice converge. Administrative instruments, typified by 
infringement fines for traffic offences, enable simulated summary justice to operate 
generally outside of traditional judicial mechanisms. Both the risk and consequence 
are calculable and as long as the fine is paid, regardless of culpability or intent, then 
the risk is mitigated and justice served. 
It is a process of justice for consumers, in which both risk and justice are 
monetised, and justified by a mathematised jurisprudence of risk 
(O’Malley 2009, p.555).  
O’Malley (2009) observes the progression of this monetised approach into non-
traffic related forms of offending, such as disorderly behaviours. This enables police 
discretion to be enhanced and justice to be administered through on-the-spot 
executive action. Guilt is presumed, unless an appeal is lodged by the recipient. 
Justice can occur almost invisibly, with speed and efficiency. The policing Leviathan 
depicted by Hallsworth and Lea (2011) is therefore reinforced and normalised. 
2.2.v  Undesirable Behaviours, Prevention and Punishment
Alongside the growth of discretionary, pre-emptive summary justice, across 
jurisdictions in the US, UK and Australia the body of criminal law is increasing. 
Between 1997-2006, a new criminal offence was created nearly every day in the UK 
(Pantazis 2008). In Victoria, the official crime statistics illustrate the growth in the 
number of individual offence codes, with more than 4000 statutory and common law 
offences noted in 2010-11, rising to over 5000 in 2011-12 (Victoria Police 2011, 
2012). The expanding reach of criminalisation is explored here in relation to the type 
of behaviours that are drawn into the criminal process, their potentially subjective 
assessment, and the consequences for the individual rights of the accused.  
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The emphasis upon preventing undesirable behaviours, manifested in the literature 
on pre-emptive justice, is predicated on the assumption that the state can and should 
regulate such behaviours. Extending Garland’s (2001) responsibilisation thesis, 
behaviours are regarded as the personal choices of individuals rather than as a result 
of fundamental social or economic failings. The effect is to move the responsibility 
from the public to the personal sphere (Crawford 2009). Crawford emphasises the 
contractual and conditional nature of the legislative responses to anti-social 
behaviour. While prohibitive and restrictive orders such as ASBOs place the 
responsibility for conformity or compliance upon the individual, recipients exercise 
that choice from a position of weakness. In the case of banning notices recipients 
may be intoxicated and unable to comprehend the nature of the restriction. Crawford 
(2009) urges careful scrutiny of regulatory reforms and their consequences.  
There is a lack of objectivity in key constructs of criminality, and fluidity around 
what may be regarded as criminal behaviours. The actions that may lead to the 
imposition of various orders, admonishments and punishments are often vaguely 
defined and may not necessarily pass an appropriate threshold of criminality. Terms 
such as anti-social, quarrelsome and troublemaker are used in relation to Victoria’s 
banning provisions, but what they mean in an objective or measurable sense is 
unclear. In a critique of the significance of key words and phrases in social policy, 
Garrett (2007) observes the subjective interpretation of behaviours which lead to 
discretionary controls, such as banning notices. In a more conceptual analysis of 
police decision-making Van Wijck (2011) contends that police have no objective 
measure by which to judge the likely risk of particular individuals, actions or 
behaviours. To Van Wijck, the expectation that police can anticipate problems is 
rooted in subjective and unstructured assessments. In the context of the rise of 
police-imposed summary justice and the lack of visibility and accountability 
regarding how and why such decisions are made, there is an absence of clarity 
regarding the definition and interpretation of behaviours that are subject to increasing 
police discretion. Victoria’s banning provisions empower police officers to set their 
own precedents for behavioural thresholds and determinations of guilt, without their 
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decisions being subject to judicial review. This is explored in Chapter Six of this 
thesis in relation to the parliamentary debates of the banning notice provisions. 
Addressing what he regards as a void in the study of the judgements that underpin 
the process of criminalisation, Millie (2011) contends that the application of value 
judgements explains why some people and behaviours are criminalised more than 
others in particular circumstances. Millie observes that “each behaviour occurs in a 
place/time context and that there are behavioural expectations specific to that 
context” (2011, p.291). Despite applying aspects of his model to an examination of 
aesthetic judgements in relation to graffiti, begging and the control of billboards in 
Toronto, Mille's argument is framed more philosophically than empirically. His 
notion of value judgements is, however, relevant to the subjective assessment of 
behaviours which may lead to the imposition of a banning notice.  In a discussion of 40
UK anti-social behaviour legislation and the notion of offensiveness, Roberts (2006) 
concedes, with acknowledged reticence, that wrongfulness is a pre-requisite to 
criminalisation. Roberts’ diffidence arises, in part, from the subjectivity of ‘anti-
social’ as a concept and a behaviour. For example, the anti-social nature of 
behaviours, such as playing loud music, are not objectively assessed. The 
‘wrongfulness’ of playing loud music is determined by the context in which it is 
played, rather than the act itself. 
Central to the criminalisation of behaviours are the works of Feinberg (1984, 1985) 
and his depiction of the “harm principle” and the “offence principle”. Feinberg 
proposes a complex set of considerations to underpin the legitimate development and 
application of crime control legislation. His principles and “mediating 
maxims” (1984, p.214), find additional expression in Hillyard et al. (2004), and Von 
Hirsch and Simester (2006). Behaviours become criminalised when they cause 
sufficient harm and/or offence to victims. While the notion of harm may be easier to 
define and to measure than wrongfulness, what constitutes offence is more subjective 
and liable to change depending upon the context and the conceptions of the victim. 
 This is explored in Chapters Six and Seven of this thesis. 40
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Offensive behaviours that are criminalised include many that are categorised as ‘anti-
social’, such as bad language, sleeping in public places or playing loud music. 
Whether such behaviours are regarded as offensive is determined almost entirely by 
context, in particular whether anyone is affected by the behaviour. Playing loud 
music is an anti-social act only when it is problematic for someone else.  
Within a detailed reflection of the changes to criminalisation, Ashworth and Zedner 
(2008) discuss the convergence of what they term the regulatory state, the preventive 
state and the authoritarian state. The regulatory state typically accepts the “normality 
of crime” and seeks to manage it through a “routinization of crime control” (2008, p.
39), typified by police-imposed summary justice. The preventive state reflects a 
desire to manage future behaviour, through the use of pre-emptive prohibitive 
sanctions in anticipation of unacceptable behaviour. The authoritarian state actively 
deploys the weight of criminal law in the interests of the community at large, and to 
“induce conformity with predetermined social norms” (2008, p.44). In response to 
these key developments, Ashworth and Zedner (2008, 2011, 2012) emphasise that 
procedural safeguards should underpin the functioning of any criminal process. With 
respect to discretionary decision-making by the police, any penalties imposed 
summarily must be fully accountable. The accused should retain the right to judicial 
oversight of both the legitimacy of the sanction and of their liability for it. As a 
police-imposed penalty that permits perceived future behaviours to be controlled in 
the interests of the broader community, Victoria’s banning notices embody Ashworth 
and Zedner’s (2008) convergent ‘states’. 
A key issue for Ashworth (2006b) is the basis upon which legislative and regulatory 
developments, such as banning notices, are predicated. He highlights the influence of 
political expedience upon government responses to high profile issues about which 
'something must be done'. The specific effect of the response is potentially 
“symbolic” (2006b, p.65) and not necessarily appropriate or effective. In such 
circumstances, what Ewald (2011) refers to as 'collateral consequences' resulting 
from the government intervention become more evident, and their effects potentially 
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more invasive and extensive. The response is considered to be proper and just, yet 
without meaningful examination of the means or the ends (Ewald 2011, p.107). 
The risk of well-meaning but ill conceived legislative provisions was noted in an 
earlier paper by Steiker (1998). Her analysis of the limits of the preventive state 
relates specifically to the USA. However, key issues raised in relation to changes to 
criminal procedure and to considerations of punishment versus prevention, translate 
to other jurisdictions. Of particular relevance to this thesis is Steiker’s contention that 
the consequences of policies which are framed as preventive, non-punitive, and not 
deemed to constitute a criminal punishment, are too often trivialised.  
Courts and commentators often tend to conclude, too quickly, that if 
some policy or practice is not “really” punishment, then there is nothing 
wrong with it (1998, p.777). 
That a policy or operational measure is not regarded as a punishment means that 
potentially significant consequences, such as the dilution of individual rights, are 
overlooked or ignored.  
Victoria’s banning provisions are one example of a range of sanctions and penalties, 
such as spatial exclusion orders and other prohibitive controls, which are not 
necessarily formally declared as punishments, but which have significant 
consequences for recipients. Banning notices were introduced to address alcohol-
related disorder in the NTE. The extent to which both the appropriateness and the 
collateral consequences of the provisions were examined during the enactment of the 
legislation are explored in Chapters Five and Six.  
  
2.3  Chapter Conclusion                 
A range of legislative, regulatory and operational provisions have both prompted and 
coincided with significant changes to criminal processes in recent decades. Recurring 
themes expressed across a body of literature include the increasing use of 
discretionary police decision-making and summary justice, the blurring of criminal 
and civil boundaries, the use of pre-emptive police powers to punish, and the 
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subjective assessment of an expanding range of minor and vaguely defined offensive 
behaviours. The specific changes, exemplified by Victoria’s banning notice 
provisions, reflect evolving theoretical models of the criminal justice system, and 
fundamental changes to conceptions of balance in the provision of justice. Chapter 
Three considers the theoretical perspectives embodying the interplay of human 
rights, the drive to ensure community protection, examines the contentious notion of 
‘re-balancing,’ and outlines the thesis rationale. 
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3  Introduction         
The changes to criminal justice processes in recent decades, documented in Chapter 
Two, are evident within evolving theoretical perspectives of the criminal justice 
system. This chapter considers key criminal process models in the light of the 
increasing use of discretionary, pre-emptive police powers to interpret behaviours 
and administer justice on-the-spot. Many of the new legislative provisions and 
operational policing controls reflect the contentious notion of re-balancing. Key 
themes and literature relating to balance and re-balancing are explored, to examine 
the consequences of ‘re-balancing’ for the separation of powers and individual rights, 
and the application of human rights charters to the legislative process. The final 
section draws together the key literature and theoretical perspectives from Chapters 
Two and Three to outline the thesis rationale. 
3.1  ‘Modelling’ the Criminal Process        
The increasing use of discretionary summary justice and pre-emptive controls are a 
reflection of, and a response to, changing political and operational pressures within a 
generally expanding body of criminal law. Clear procedures frame the functioning of 
criminal justice processes, ideally ensuring consistency, transparency, accountability, 
and effective separation of powers to uphold individual rights. A typically consistent 
sequence of discrete events (depicted by Fox and Freiberg (1989) and Ashworth and 
Zedner (2008), and documented in Chapter Two), supports the investigation and 
resolution of alleged offending behaviours. However, legislative, regulatory and 
operational developments have expanded discretionary police powers and conflated 
previously distinct elements of the criminal process. Mechanisms such as 
infringement penalties and banning notices empower police officers to act as 
investigator, judge and jury. Criminal justice models have evolved in response to 
changing expectations and pressures. Examples discussed in this section include 
crime control, police power and due process, human rights and victim-centric 
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perspectives, and the prioritisation of community safety and national security under 
the banner of ‘re-balancing’.  1
3.1.i  Crime Control and Police Power Models     
While not claiming to present a normative theory for the criminal process, Packer 
(1964, 1968) depicted two broad and competing rationales within which the criminal 
sanction operates: crime control and due process. The crime control model seeks to 
expedite the criminal process as efficiently as possible. Crime control operates with 
“routine, stereotyped procedures” (Packer 1968, p.159), carries an underlying 
presumption of guilt, and acts as “a positive guarantor of social freedom” (p.158). 
Packer accepts that resources across the criminal process are limited, and depicts the 
crime control model as one that should not be slowed by safeguards or technical 
procedures. As a result, extra-judicial processes underpin the crime control 
conception of criminal justice. The sequential nature of the crime control model 
positions each stage as a screening exercise to ensure successful passage to the 
desired conclusion – which is conviction. 
An extension of crime control is Dubber's articulation of the police power model of 
the criminal process (Dubber 2002, 2005, 2006, 2011). Police power finds particular 
expression at the lower level of offending through summary, discretionary 
mechanisms such as infringement notices, on-the-spot fines and prohibitive orders, 
which are used to control and regulate an increasing range of behaviours (Ashworth 
& Zedner 2008; Crawford 2009). Police discretionary powers to interpret behaviours 
and invoke a penalty, without the encumbrance of due process safeguards and 
procedures, are typified by dispersal orders in England and Wales, SODA orders in 
Seattle, USA, and Victoria’s banning notices.  Packer's (1964, 1968) crime control 2
model focuses upon controlling the actions of the alleged offender without 
necessarily upholding the rights of individual victims. The police power model of 
  See Chapter One, footnote 12.1
  These mechanisms were explored in Chapter Two.2
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regulation and control is fundamentally collective. Political expedience and social 
need are used to justify the prioritisation of risk management in the best interests of 
the community (Dubber 2005, 2011; Sarat, Douglas & Umphrey 2011). 
The police power model comprises vague definitions of criminality and an 
expanding scope of the criminalisation of behaviours, activities and spaces (Dubber 
2005; Dubber & Valverde 2006; Pantazis 2008; Crawford 2009). For Crawford 
(2009), the effect of new police powers and regulatory tools requires detailed 
analysis, which he contends is missing from much of the recent criminological 
research. Through an examination of the anti-social behaviour agenda in the UK, 
Crawford suggests that the evolution of behavioural expectations has led to “a 
proliferation of novel mechanisms of regulatory control” (2009, p.811). Examples 
include prohibitive disposals, such as ASBOs and dispersal orders. He observes that 
Regulatory ideas are being used to circumvent and erode established 
criminal justice principles, notably those of due process [and] 
proportionality… novel technologies of control have resulted in more 
intensive and earlier interventions (Crawford 2009, p.810). 
Police powers and regulatory controls are being extended but without a formally 
sanctioned evaluation process. Both the need for and the effectiveness of such 
discretionary mechanisms are presumed, but have not been objectively measured. 
3.1.ii  Due Process to Rights Driven Theories    
In contrast to the crime control and police power perspectives, Packer's (1964, 1968) 
due process model is significantly more judicially oriented. It details an expectation 
that any conviction requires the prosecution to overcome a set of obstacles in the 
pursuit of justice (Packer 1968, p.163). Fundamental to the due process model are 
safeguards, or rights, for the alleged offender. Criminal process theorists are 
unambiguous about the role of due process in the administration of justice.  Due 3
  See, for example, Zedner (2005), Ashworth (2006b), Ashworth and Zedner (2008, 2011, 2012), 3
Crawford (2009), Valverde (2009), Ashworth and Redmayne (2010), Duff and Green (2011), 
Sarat, Douglas and Umphrey (2011), and Ashworth and Horder (2013).
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process safeguards and procedures support the key objectives of fair, proportionate 
and appropriate judicial decisions, and effective review of police actions. 
The separation of powers is central to the operation of the criminal process and the 
assurance of appropriate protections for defendants (Zedner 2005). Ashworth and 
Zedner contend that traditional expectations of the criminal law hold that 
no person should be liable to conviction and/or punishment unless the 
charge has been duly tried in a criminal court… (2008, p.22).  
Keyzer (2008) agrees that punishment for a breach of the law should only be ordered 
by a court, and that this is a fundamental principle of the separation of judicial 
power. Bateman (2009) acknowledges the key role of procedural due process 
protections in the provision of justice. He notes the risk posed by mechanisms such 
as reverse onus and limitations on the right to silence, which have steadily subverted 
safeguards for defendants. 
Ashworth (2006b) questions why governments may wish to avoid affording 
defendants their full due process protections. He posits the drive for streamlined and 
efficient procedures for the handling of more minor offences, and considers that 
governments may believe that due process protections are an obstacle to the control 
of issues such as anti-social behaviour. Legislators may potentially perceive that 
individual rights “stand in the way of vigorous responses to certain forms of 
conduct” (Ashworth 2006b, p.3). This perspective appears to be reflected in the 
pragmatic preference for the crime control approach when governments need to be 
seen to be addressing high priority issues, exemplified by increasing discretionary 
police-imposed powers. 
Critiquing the prevailing criminal process in the UK, Ashworth and Redmayne’s 
(2010) analysis translates to Australian jurisdictions. They regard the respect for 
individual rights as a core requirement of the criminal process. Rather than simply 
creating obstacles, due process should apply clear rules and procedures to ensure 
transparent and consistent decision-making (2010, p.48). Ashworth and Redmayne 
assert that dispositive decisions that are effected outside of the formal trial process 
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still require the principle of “the right of an innocent person not to be 
punished” (2010, p.55). Pre-trial sentencing outcomes, such as infringement notices, 
cautions and prohibitive orders, should retain and be framed by core due process 
principles. Of particular significance is the right of access to the full judicial process 
for alleged offenders who maintain their innocence, via legal representation and 
resolution through the courts. Ashworth and Redmayne (2010) highlight the 
challenge inherent in ensuring that individual rights are respected through the 
criminal law. Their analysis remains largely aspirational. They acknowledge the 
conflicts and pressures under which criminal justice systems operate, and offer no 
solution to ensure the effective implementation of a rights-based theory.  
Dripps (2011) extends Ashworth and Redmayne (2010) by examining the increasing 
embodiment of criminal procedure in human rights charters. Despite their 
formalisation, individual due process rights and expectations remain fluid and open 
to interpretation. For example, the requirements of Victoria’s Charter Act can be 
overridden by a parliamentary Act.  Dripps also explores the “challenge of 4
reductionism” (2011, p.413), the way in which the criminal process is modified by 
the steady blurring of procedure and substance. He urges consideration of the due 
process implications of increasing the use of discretionary summary justice and 
changing the nature of what is regarded as criminal behaviour. Dripps contends that 
the relationship between substance and procedure in the criminal justice system 
remains “problematic”, but that “hard problems.... do not disappear because they are 
ignored” (2011, p.432). Implied in Dripps’ observation is a need to examine 
carefully the effect of changing criminal justice processes.  
Within a detailed, multi-jurisdictional analysis of the formalisation of human rights 
within criminal procedures, Roberts and Hunter consider the extent to which human 
rights legislation has facilitated “institutional realignments in the distribution of 
powers and responsibility for developing and implementing procedural 
norms” (2012, p.3). Despite Australia being aligned to the requirements of the 
  Explained in Chapters One and Two.4
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International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the passage of 
specific human rights Charters in Victoria and the Australian Capital Territory, the 
assurance of individual rights still requires legislative enactment (Gans et al. 2011). 
In Victoria, the rights that are formalised in the Charter Act may be qualified, limited 
and reduced by simple Acts of Parliament, such as the LCRA Act 2007. The 
institutional realignments to which Roberts and Hunter (2012) refer do not 
necessarily operate to ensure that human rights are upheld.  
One notable omission from much of the early theoretical thinking regarding models 
of criminal justice are the rights of victims, which includes both individual targets of 
crime and the broader public who may be at risk. Roach (1999) positions victims of 
crime prominently within his models of criminal justice. He embraces the needs of 
victims throughout the criminal process, and juxtaposes them within both a crime 
control and due process context. Roach’s models acknowledge the complexity of 
ensuring the due process protections of defendants, but he reinforces the police 
power approach as the primacy of the rights of victims inevitably subsumes the 
rights of offenders. Prohibitive and pre-emptive orders imposed to prevent 
victimisation of individuals and to protect the broader community, such as banning 
notices, are tangible manifestations of a victim focused criminal process. 
3.1.iii  Balance and Re-Balancing?    
A renewed focus on national and international human rights declarations and 
conventions over the last three decades has attempted to formalise due process 
protections for those accused of crimes.  Much of the literature and theoretical 5
thinking around individual rights, victimisation and criminal justice processes 
 Building upon the early examples of the Bill of Rights amendments to the US Constitution 1791, 5
the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, the European Convention on Human Rights 
1950, and the UN ICCPR 1966, the last three decades have seen a renewed emphasis upon formal 
human rights conventions. Examples include the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms 1982, 
the New Zealand Human Rights Act 1993, South African Bill of Rights 1996, UK Human Rights 
Act 1998, Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 2000, ACT Human Rights Act 
2004, Victoria's Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities 2006. The Commonwealth 
Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (established by the Human Rights 
(Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011), oversees human rights compliance at a Federal level.
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reflects the notion of balance. Despite the emerging interplay of human rights 
charters and a rights-based theory of the criminal process, significant legislative 
developments demonstrate a move to ‘re-balance’ the criminal process from the 
perceived primacy of defendants’ rights towards the needs of victims and 
communities more generally. Re-balancing, while evident across key legislative 
provisions, has been comprehensively challenged within a significant body of 
literature.  6
Manifestations of balance are problematic. The increasing reach and pre-emptive 
nature of criminalisation, reflected in the changes to operational police powers 
described in Chapter Two, are the antithesis of balance. An inherent ambiguity exists 
as the direction in which the balance is tipped encompasses a complex range of inter-
related drivers with multi-layered results. An insistence on the need for balance is 
evident across the scale of criminal law, from state level responses to the terror threat 
post-9/11, to UK New Labour’s ‘tough on crime’  reforms in the 1990s, to Victoria’s 7
localised attempts to control alcohol-related violence in urban entertainment 
precincts. The consequences of re-balancing range from widespread restrictions on 
liberty and civil rights driven by the ‘greater good’ of national security, to short term 
pre-emptive prohibitions, such as ASBOs and banning notices, to tackle local issues 
of disorder. 
Across recent legislative changes and operational policing initiatives, balance is 
framed in terms of liberty, security and community rights, and typically predicated 
upon a desire by governments to be seen to do something about specific issues. The 
rhetoric used to justify measures to ‘re-balance’ embodies notions of them and us, 
and presumes that the balancing responses are made in the best interests of ‘us’, the 
community. Significantly, the victimisation construct drives the ‘re-balancing’, with 
  For example, Ashworth (1996, 2004b), Zedner (2002, 2003, 2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2014), Waldron 6
(2003), Tonry (2003), Michaelsen (2005, 2006, 2010), Neocleous (2007), Williams (2007a, 
2007b), Bronitt (2008), Pue (2008) and others.
  Tony Blair first used the phrase “tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime” during his first 7
speech to the Labour Party as its new leader (Blair 1994).
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consequences for the due process rights of defendants rarely addressed openly. The 
precise way in which victims are defined skews the way in which balance is effected. 
Legislative developments have increasingly positioned the broader community as the 
primary, if prospective, victim. The expansion of discretionary, pre-emptive 
provisions has been justified, therefore, in the interests of public protection. 
Ashworth (1996, 2004a, 2004b) has expressed repeated concern about the use of the 
balance metaphor in relation to criminal processes. As early as 1996 he called for the 
term balance to be banned. Ashworth contends that the rights of individual victims, 
defendants and the community should be clear, and any incompatibility must be 
examined openly and carefully. Similarly, Bronitt regards balance as a “crude 
metaphor” (2003, p.80) in his insistence on the primacy of individual rights. 
Ashworth and Redmayne demonstrate continued disquiet and urge 
greater transparency about the weighting of rights, and closer attention to 
claims about the need to diminish rights and the outcomes of doing so… 
(2010, p.61).  
Rather than ensuring parity of rights for all parties involved in the criminal process, 
balance is used increasingly by legislators to justify the removal of individual due 
process protections, in the interests of political expediency and the perception of 
proactive governance. Ashworth and Redmayne (2010) question the purpose of the 
formalisation of human rights, if they can be overlooked or ignored by governments 
through the enactment of legislation and the acceptance of charter ‘waivers’. While 
acknowledging the issues inherent in the application of balance, Williams (2006, 
2007a, 2007b) specifically recognises the convenience of the balance metaphor as a 
means to facilitate dialogue. 
The consequences of measures to ‘re-balance' are tangible. Legislative and 
administrative changes to the criminal process and to police powers have steadily 
reduced the rights of those accused of crime, diluted the separation of powers, and 
lowered the threshold for criminal behaviours. Measures enacted in response to a 
range of drivers are predicated upon a need to ensure the security and safety of the 
community, at a national and a local level. However, fundamental issues are evident. 
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Firstly, the ‘need’ to re-balance has been substantiated via political expediency rather 
than empirically evidenced necessity. Secondly, despite the formalisation of 
individual rights, for example in Victoria’s Charter, the proposed ‘means’ of re-
balancing have been subject to limited scrutiny. Finally, the desired and actual ‘ends’ 
of measures to re-balance may not be the same. 
3.1.iii(a)  Political Expediency or Empirically Driven Necessity?      
Political priorities are increasingly driven by a need to be seen do something about 
high profile issues (Ashworth 2006b; Crawford 2013). In a study of the politics of 
anti-social behaviour, Waiton (2008) applies a control approach, whereby legislative 
responses to a perceived need are determined by a desire to control disorder, rather 
than to identify and address the causes. In this context, Waiton agrees that the 
broader consequences for due process protections are less important to a government 
than the belief that doing something is what matters. Waiton suggests that “old 
freedoms are lost with almost casual political statements and bills that nonchalantly 
drift through Parliament” (2008, p.xx). Earlier research by Blake and Ashworth 
(1996), examining English Crown Court cases dealing with alleged violations of the 
presumption of innocence, expressed similar concerns about the “casualness” (1996, 
p.312) with which parliament limits individual rights and extends the criminal law. 
Government policy limiting individual rights should be supported by empirical 
evidence of both the need and effectiveness. The expectation of evidence-based 
policy development was made clear in a Victorian Government Drugs and Crime 
Prevention Committee report (DCPC 2006), and reiterated within the Charter Act 
2006. In a detailed consideration of responses to 9/11, Waldron (2003) asserts that 
the ‘means’ and the ‘ends’ of legislative and operational provisions must not be 
confused. He contends that hardening the response to crime by prioritising the 
security of the majority over the rights of the minority, who are perceived as a risk, 
does not necessarily make the majority safer. Waldron questions whether adding to 
one side (the most) justifies taking away from the other (the few). Waldron is 
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unequivocal in his assertion that “We must also be sure that the diminution of liberty 
will in fact have the desired consequence.” (emphasis in original, 2003, p.208). The 
parallels with alcohol-related disorder in the NTE are clear. While operating at a 
different scale of risk, the need to increase police discretionary powers is justified by 
the ‘end’ of increased community safety. What happens if the means do not lead to 
the desired ends, or whether the expected ends have any relation to the means 
deployed, are missing from the rhetoric used to justify the need. This echoes 
Ashworth (2004a) and Crawford’s (2009) concern that community protection and 
crime prevention are used to justify the dilution of individual due process 
protections, without empirical analysis of the effectiveness of police-imposed 
summary and prohibitive interventions. Ashworth and Zedner (2008) suggest that if a 
government limits procedural protections for certain behaviours, then any 
consequences should sit outside of the criminal process. 
Writing extensively in relation to the issues of security and liberty, Zedner's (2003, 
2005, 2007a, 2007b) critique of Control Orders in the UK  is pertinent to Victoria’s 8
banning provisions. Zedner (2007a) expresses concern about government assertions 
of technical compliance with human rights requirements, where legislation is 
declared as compatible but never sufficiently challenged by parliament or the public. 
An overriding political belief in the need for collective security leads to practical 
erosion of individual rights, despite claims of human rights compliance (Zedner 
2007b). Neocleous argues that the state will inevitably use the “anti-politics of 
‘security-trumps’” (2007, p.146) to legitimise increasing restrictions on liberty, 
against which it is difficult to argue without being accused of endangering national 
security. The myth of balance enables a move towards more authoritarian measures 
that erode individual rights. 
  Introduced under the UK Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, Control Orders restrict the freedoms 8
of anyone suspected of involvement in terrorist related activities. No prosecution or conviction is 
necessary for the imposition of an order. The Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 
2011 replaced Control Orders with Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures; carrying 
similar restrictions upon the liberty of those suspected (but not necessarily proven) to pose a 
security threat (Zedner 2014, p.106).
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Michaelsen (2005, 2006, 2010) similarly challenges the notion of balancing civil 
liberties against the needs of national security. He prefers “the proportionality 
test” (2006, p.20), whereby any reduction of civil liberties and human rights should 
be assessed against three criteria: necessity, suitability and appropriateness (p.20). 
This translates to a clear requirement for an objective understanding of the need, the 
means and the ends of any legislative or operational measure. Michaelsen (2010) 
contends that, in the context of anti-terrorism laws, Australia’s failure to apply the 
proportionality test has significantly undermined core individual rights. He rejects 
the balance metaphor as conceptually flawed, simplistic and a significant barrier to 
objective examination of policy decisions. Michaelsen (2006, p.21) agrees with 
Waldron (2003) and Zedner (2003, 2005, 2007a, 2007b) that any trade off between 
rights and security must be closely examined to establish whether security is actually 
enhanced, or if the benefits are more symbolic or political. Zedner concludes that “of 
every new preventive measure it should be asked does this initiative make us more 
secure?” (2007a, p.203). 
Necessity, perceived or actual, is a key component that determines legislative 
responses, and directly affects the way in which balance is skewed. In an 
examination of New Labour’s tough on crime approach in the UK, Tonry (2003, 
2010) maintains that the legislative response was unsubstantiated, unproven and 
lacked any rigorously researched rationale. Tonry acknowledges Caplow and Simon 
(1999), Garland (2001) and Crawford (2009), who in different ways argue that 
weakening government control over crime leads to symbolic responses that are not 
necessarily appropriate or effective. Tonry contends that the reasons why legislation 
that he considers to be lacking any empirical basis can ever be enacted is due to the 
perceived need for governments to sound or act “tough” (2003, p.22). This is typified 
by New Labour’s targeted action against the anti-social behaviour of the undesirable 
minority which “disturbed the law abiding” majority (Tonry 2010, p.404). The 
dilution of procedural protections was subordinated to a desire “to try to show it was 
doing something about something that upsets people” (2010, p.404). Little 
opposition from political opponents, the media or the public is likely when being 
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tough combines with having sufficient numbers to be able to push such legislation 
through the parliamentary process. This view echoes Zedner’s (2007a, 2007b) 
concern about fundamental failures to examine the impact of changes to criminal 
justice processes and police powers upon individual rights, typified by Victoria’s 
banning provisions. The futility of the notion of balance and re-balancing is 
reinforced when it is driven by political expedience at the expense of effective 
scrutiny. 
In an alternative critique of the balancing perspective Bronitt (2008) questions how 
risks on each side can be measured. Rather than being in conflict, he contends that 
individual rights and collective security can co-exist, with one not necessarily 
reducing the other. Bronitt cites evidence from the fields of procedural justice and 
police legitimacy  to demonstrate that procedural fairness and proportionality can 9
engender compliance (2008, p.71). However, under the auspices of the war on terror 
in the US, Australia and the UK, “human rights tend to be traded away as a threshold 
issue” that extends “to ordinary crimes, which target suspect classes or groups rather 
than individuals” (p.82). What Bronitt frames as a significant shift from preventative 
to precautionary models of justice, places the retention of human rights as a political 
choice rather than a legal necessity.  
One of the most ‘balanced’ analyses of the re-balancing agenda is the pragmatic 
perspective adopted by Golder and Williams (2007). They argue that human rights do 
not necessarily trump the interests of national security and/or community safety, even 
though balancing is not simple and human rights are not inviolable. They contend 
that legislative decision-makers require a clearer set of guidelines, and highlight the 
need for proportionality as advocated by Michaelson (2006). Golder and Williams 
(2007) augment the reasoning of Waldron (2003) and Zedner (2003, 2005, 2007a, 
2007b) and agree that any legislative response that erodes individual rights must be 
empirically evidenced, to ensure that the ends justify the means. They acknowledge 
the challenges, but maintain that the effect of legislative and operational responses 
  Epitomised by the work of Tyler (1990, 2006).9
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must be openly stated and objectively justified. Victoria’s Charter Act formalises this 
expectation, and legislative measures that impact Charter rights must be empirically 
evidenced. The extent to which the banning notice provisions complied with Charter 
requirements, and the nature of parliamentary scrutiny of their need and effect are 
examined in Chapters Five and Six of this thesis.  
3.1.iii(b)  Expanding Conceptions of Victimisation     
Embedded in the discourse of security and community protection is an expanding 
conception of victimisation. Roach (1999) extended existing models of the criminal 
process to bring individual victims of crime to the fore. Recent changes in the 
criminal process have served to broaden the depiction of victimisation. The move 
towards the pre-emptive control of risk and harm encapsulates the prospective 
victimisation of the wider community. In this approach, legislative provisions and 
increasing police powers are justified under the rhetoric of public security and safety. 
For example, a swathe of reforms in the UK from the mid 1990s embodied the 
‘tough on crime’ mantra.  They typify fundamental changes to the balance of the 10
criminal process via police-imposed, pre-emptive and prohibitive provisions, such as 
ASBOs and dispersal orders. The single priority expressed in the White Paper 
‘Justice for All’ epitomises the direction being taken.  
… to re-balance the criminal justice system in favour of the victims and 
the community so as to reduce crime and bring more offenders to justice 
(Home Office (UK) 2003, p.5). 
Pollard claimed that the focus upon civil liberties within the adversarial trial system 
in England and Wales ensured that the defendant had “become first among 
equals” (1996, p.154), while communities live in fear. His conception of balance is 
one within which offenders need fewer rights. Pre-empting Roach’s (1999) model of 
punitive victims’ rights, Pollard (1996) asserted that the criminal process must 
realign to recognise both the rights of victims and the right of the community to be 
 Specific legislative measures such as the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, Police Reform Act 2002, 10
Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2002, Criminal Justice Act 2003 and the Anti-Social 
Behaviour Act 2003, have been subject to extensive analysis. 
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safe (1996, p.160). In a detailed critique of this argument, Ashworth (1996) contends 
that rights must not be regarded as obstacles in the criminal process. A core reason to 
uphold individual rights is the need to protect all people from state power and to 
ensure state accountability. Giving due attention to the rights of all parties should not 
result in underlying issues, such as national security or community safety, being 
neglected. Ashworth (1996) asserts that full public accountability is essential to 
uphold rights, via mechanisms to challenge discretionary decisions and to review the 
effect upon criminal processes. He subsequently rebukes the balancing rationale 
within New Labour’s criminal justice reforms, many of which were introduced with 
unproven claims of reducing crime and ensuring public protection (Ashworth 
2004b). As well as disquiet about the measures themselves, Ashworth asks whether 
the ‘problem’ was so serious that individual rights should be subsumed to the greater 
need for public protection, and how the effectiveness of responses were actually 
measured. He acknowledges the value of increasing public protection, but contends 
that “it should not be pursued without respect for other fundamental values” (2004b, 
p.530). Individual due process rights and community safety are not mutually 
exclusive. 
Waldron examines whether a perceived change in the nature of the harms that 
threaten our communities is sufficient to justify a re-ordering of civil liberties and re-
prioritising of rights (2003, p.192). He suggests that defending limitations on the 
rights of individuals in the broader interests of the community, brings into question 
the place of the affected individuals within that community. Waldron’s concern is of 
direct relevance to the consequences of police-imposed summary justice. The 
resulting shift in the balance of rights and protections is embedded within a notion of 
‘them and us’.  Burnside’s observation that “majoritarian rule does not justify the 
mistreatment of unpopular minorities” (2006, p.1), while referring to the aftermath of 
9/11, can be applied to the trouble-making “unpopular minorities” in the NTE. 
Burnside reinforces his point by observing 
… it is easy to support the idea of human rights for ourselves, our family 
and friends, our neighbours and so on. It is less easy to stand up for the 
rights of the unpopular, the marginal, those we fear or hate (2006, p.2-3). 
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Both the political discourse and legislative responses, such as banning notices, 
embody what Van Dijk describes as “two complementary strategies, namely the 
positive representation of the own group, and the negative representation of the 
others” (1993, p.263). Van Dijk notes in particular the “inferiorization, 
problematization and marginalization” (1993, p.267) of the undesirable minority. The 
use of “fear systems and other emotion programs or … kin protection” are 
highlighted by Hart et al. (2005, p.191) as manipulative strategies in political 
discourse. Chilton observes an underlying “schema of self versus other” (2004, p.
117), where we all have rights but some deserve more rights than others. Rather than 
ensuring an equilibrium between the rights of offenders, victims and the community, 
discretionary powers have shifted the balance within criminal justice processes and 
diluted the separation of powers. The rights of individuals, perceived by police 
officers to behave in an undesirable manner, are steadily eroded. 
3.1.iii(c)  Consequences of Re-Balancing     
In response to the expansion of discretionary pre-emptive justice, through 
mechanisms such as banning notices, Zedner (2007c) articulates the need to ensure 
that the means are consistent with the ends. Any challenge to liberties and due 
process rights must be “proportionate to the risks faced” (2007c, p.266). Implicit in 
this perspective is the expectation that justice should be exercised appropriately and 
should look and feel suitable to the ends sought. When summary police powers erode 
due process protections, based upon a promise of community protection or crime 
reduction, both the underlying need and the effectiveness of the police response must 
be measurable and provable. Ashworth (2004b) echoes Tonry (2003) and Waldron 
(2003), and extends his earlier work to question whether re-balancing actually 
reduces crime or tangible risks to the public. O’Malley (2009, 2010, 2011) contends 
that increasing police summary justice prioritises procedural streamlining rather than 
demonstrably controlling risk or improving public safety. These perspectives reflect 
the broader expectations of evidence-based policing (Sherman 1998; MacCoun 2005; 
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Bradford, Murphy & Jackson 2014), which seeks to measure and evaluate police 
policy, decision-making and practice.  11
Much of the justification for the growth in the criminalisation of behaviours, and 
discretionary pre-emptive police powers is couched in protective terminology. It is 
aimed at re-balancing the experiences of the broader community away from the 
disorderly and nuisance-making minority (Home Office (UK) 2003, 2012; Beckett & 
Herbert 2010b). In themselves these are objectives that are difficult to counter. 
However, Crawford suggests that the re-balancing approach “means shifting the 
emphasis away from a rights-based discourse” (2009, p.815) with the potential for 
enduring and far-reaching consequences. Driven by a need to be ‘seen to do 
something’, a mismatch exists between the balancing agenda and human rights, 
between the tough on crime mantra, and the actual focus of pre-emptive policy and 
practice. The dilution of rights is regarded by legislators as justifiable and necessary, 
and any broader consequences for individual rights is not generally considered. Yet 
as Ashworth (2004b) makes clear the New Labour government relied upon weak 
arguments to justify their UK legislative reforms because the re-balancing focus was 
misplaced and offered none of the implied benefits, to victims or the public at large. 
Fundamental rights and procedural protections are undermined and diluted for a need 
and value that is unproven. Zedner (2014) contends that it has taken over a decade 
for the right of individuals to be protected from the power of the state to re-emerge 
from the hysteria of the need for public security. She is unequivocal in her demand 
that any limit placed on due process or other procedural protections must be 
proportionate and fully substantiated. 
A clear dichotomy is evident in relation to the artifice of the balancing exercise, 
which is exemplified by Victoria’s banning notice provisions. Governments use the 
need for security or public safety to justify measures that directly limit individual 
rights. However, the extent of the perceived risk to the community is not empirically 
  This thesis does not explore evidence-based policing per se. However, the ongoing scrutiny of the 11
use of the banning provisions is examined in Chapter Seven. It includes analysis of published 
Victoria Police data regarding the police use of banning notices.
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tested. A combination of rhetoric-driven public fear, a consequential need to be seen 
‘to do something’, and a pragmatic drive to streamline the judicial process allows 
effective scrutiny of legislative provisions to be side-stepped. This creates a clear risk 
when due process rights are subsumed to increasing police powers that are not 
subject to meaningful review, but which may not address the ‘need’ that has been 
asserted. 
When individuals cannot request judicial appeal of discretionary police powers to 
punish, such as banning notices, the risk to justice increases. Pue draws attention to 
the fact that “only the tiniest sliver of state action is ever subjected to judicial 
review” (2008, p.48). He highlights the limited reach of judicial oversight and 
statutory interpretation, as only a minority of cases and legislative provisions are 
reviewed by the courts. An undeveloped corollary is that an absence of independent 
scrutiny places even greater responsibility upon those enacting changes to criminal 
processes, to ensure that a verifiable need exists and that the response is empirically 
evidenced, scrutinised and evaluated. In the context of Victoria’s banning notices the 
significant potential consequences for individual rights highlights the need for 
mechanisms enabling judicial appeal. Triggers for the review of the banning 
provisions could include errors made by police officers in the imposition of a ban, its 
potentially disproportionate effect upon an individual, or more fundamental failures 
in the parliamentary scrutiny of the legislation, such as not identifying Charter-driven 
human rights issues. 
Inherent flaws in the concept and application of ‘balance’ are evident from the 
perspectives discussed in this section. Political decision-making, often in response to 
external events rather than well conceived policy, has led to the dilution and erosion 
of significant individual rights. Balance is increasingly perceived within policy 
decisions as a need to protect the broader community and thereby secure their liberty. 
However, failure to adopt a test of proportionality risks the implementation of 
measures regardless of their empirically evidenced need or their effectiveness in 
securing the desired outcome. Paradoxically, while re-asserting the rights of victims, 
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both individual and collective, the protections for alleged offenders have been 
significantly reduced. In this sense, re-balancing has arguably extended the scope of 
victimisation to include the recipients of discretionary police-imposed summary 
justice, whereby pre-emptive and prohibitive provisions may be enacted on-the-spot 
in anticipation of a subjectively assessed potential behaviour, but which may not be 
subject to review. Banning notice recipients, for example, could potentially be 
victims of state sanctioned control measures. 
Packer's (1964, 1968) models are regarded by some as limited and assumption-
driven, even constraining creative thinking in the realm of criminal justice (Feeley 
1979; Ericson & Baranek 1982; Roach 1999). The due process and crime control 
models were the focus of significant analysis for several decades after their 
publication (Feeley 1973, 1979; Goldstein 1974; Smith 1997; Duff 1998; Roach 
1999). While the intensity of debate may have diminished, the models continue to 
elicit ongoing discussion, and arguably endure. Crime is still expected to be 
controlled efficiently and effectively. Ashworth and Redmayne (2010) suggest 
viewing Packer's due process and crime control models together rather than as polar 
opposites. Findley (2009) agrees, and positions the models as clarifiers of value 
preferences that acknowledge the competing forces within the criminal justice 
system. He provides a convincing analysis of the compatibility of due process rights 
with a crime control focus to suggest the dichotomy between the two models is 
“never as stark as sometimes assumed” (2009, p.15). They are both key objectives of 
the criminal justice system. Crime control is the core purpose, but due process 
ensures proportionality and appropriate safeguards. This co-existence reinforces the 
significance of how rights are configured and ensured.  
3.2  The Centrality of Human Rights in Legislation 
As well as being enshrined in the models and practices of the criminal process, 
individual rights are formalised within charters and conventions. Williams (2006, 
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2007b) positions Victoria’s Charter Act as a framework to enable balance that 
demonstrates 
how an Australian state can enact better protection for human rights 
without undermining parliamentary sovereignty, transferring power to the 
courts or causing a surge of litigation (2007b, p.69) 
The Charter Act comprises detailed procedures to ensure legislative and operational 
conformance with the purpose of its provisions. However, the Charter protections are 
not absolute. Mechanisms exist to enable parliament to circumvent the proscribed 
human rights.  Measures that limit individual rights, such as banning notices, can be 12
legitimised. The result is a potential subversion of both the spirit and letter of the 
Charter via the subjective value judgement of politicians and police officers. The 
Charter Act, that should ensure government accountability for the rights of citizens, 
can be ignored by the government. This potential structural weakness and the 
challenges created for the synonymy of the rule of law and human rights are explored 
in this thesis, with specific reference to the legislative development of banning 
notices in Victoria. Ashworth and Zedner (2008), Crawford (2009) and Dripps (2011) 
are vocal in their expression of concern about changes to criminal justice policy and 
practice, and the potential consequences for human rights, civil liberties and 
procedural protections. The application of individual rights within a legislative 
context has elicited a complex and contentious body of research.  Across Canada, 13
the UK, New Zealand, USA and Australia, contributors have examined the role of 
parliaments in the scrutiny of legislation and how mechanisms, such as charters, 
reaffirm the centrality of human rights.  
The move towards a more rights-based approach to legislative development 
personifies the notion of ‘law in books, law in action’ (Pound 1910; Halperin 2011). 
  These range from reasonable limitations, which must be empirically justified (Charter Act 2006, 12
s7(2)), to the provision for an override declaration in “exceptional circumstances” (s31(4)).
 For example Hiebert (1998, 2005, 2012), Hathaway (2002, 2007), Feldman (2002, 2004), 13
Goodman and Jinks (2003), Landman (2004), Waldron (2005), Williams (2006, 2007a, 2007b), 
Golder and Williams (2007), Hafner-Burton and Tsutsui (2007), Gearty (2009), Valverde (2009), 
Simmons (2009), Santow (2010), Evans and Evans (2006, 2011), Argument (2011), Horrigan 
(2012), Rodgers (2012), Cole (2013), Cole and Ramirez (2013), and Rares (2013).
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Despite the proliferation of mechanisms to ensure human rights, Landman notes 
“there is a continuing disparity between official proclamation and actual 
implementation of human rights protection” (2004, p.907). Gearty (2009) highlights 
the way in which human rights law in the UK has been flexed to accommodate 
security-focused changes which undermine the separation of powers and traditional 
procedural safeguards.  Pue (2008) argues that human rights charters and 14
conventions do little to ensure or assure rights due to the ambiguity of language, 
subjective and discretionary interpretation of rights, and permitted limitation of 
rights in certain contexts. In enacting new legislation, “charter compliance is offered 
as proof positive of legislative wisdom” (2008, p.58), but this obscures effective 
analysis of the actual impact of legislation. More specifically, Valverde (2009) 
observes that charters and conventions appear to carry little weight in relation to low-
level disorder and police exercised controls. This reflects the different 'scales' at 
which such controls and rights operate, and bolsters the need for consideration of 
why localised discretionary police powers are rarely challenged by notions of human 
rights. Similarly, in their analyses of specific aspects of Victoria’s Charter Act, Tate 
(2007), Debeljak (2011) and Lau (2012) draw attention to issues within the framing 
of the Charter, and its subsequent application, that undermine the intended protection 
of human rights within Victoria. While they are supportive of the Charter in 
principle, the broad and varying ways it can be interpreted limits its effectiveness in 
protecting individual rights. 
The role of parliaments and parliamentary committees in the scrutiny of the human 
rights implications of legislation is crucial. Early human rights charters, in Canada 
and South Africa, retained post-hoc judicial rather than pre-enactment parliamentary 
scrutiny of legislation (Hiebert 1998, 2005, 2006, 2012). New Zealand and the UK 
introduced charters without the need for formal pre-enactment scrutiny by 
parliamentary committee, but with proposed limits on human rights to be made clear 
in the presentation of Bills to Parliament (Waldron 2005). The Australian Capital 
  Gearty uses the examples of pre-charge detention and executive determination of banned political 14
associations (2009, p.89).
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Territory and Victoria were the first jurisdictions to mandate the human rights review 
of Bills by formal parliamentary committees and parliamentary debates. How 
effectively parliaments and legislative scrutiny committees apply the requirements of 
human rights charters to legislation has been openly debated. The principle of pre-
enactment parliamentary scrutiny receives general approval (Hiebert 1998, 2005; 
Feldman 2002, 2004; Williams 2006, 2007a, 2007b), but its application is more 
divisive. 
Hiebert (1998) compares the Canadian post-hoc judicial review of legislation with 
the Australian model of parliamentary scrutiny. While supporting the principle of 
pre-enactment scrutiny, she contends that judicial review remains a necessary 
component to ensure the balance upon which the separation of powers is predicated. 
Her argument was refined following consideration of experiences in the UK and 
New Zealand (Hiebert 2005, 2006). Judicial review of legislation is effected much 
earlier in the legislative process, as policy proposals are assessed from a judicial 
perspective before enactment. Despite her support for parliamentary scrutiny, Hiebert 
(2012) expresses concern about its quality, effectiveness and visibility when, for 
essentially political reasons, parliaments enact legislation that is incompatible with 
human rights. She motions for more formalised legislative scrutiny via mechanisms 
such as Statements of Compatibility, arguing that this would put pressure on 
governments to explain the justifications for Bills (2012, p.102). However, Hiebert 
concedes that in Victoria, despite the clear Charter processes, including Statements of 
Compatibility, human rights scrutiny of legislation is limited. Visibility of the 
rationale underpinning Statements of Compatibility is generally absent. Bills are not 
subject to judicial review (Hiebert 2012 p.103), and are reliant upon parliamentary 
oversight. Hiebert agrees with Pue (2008), and supports the need to make 
parliamentary scrutiny of the human rights impact of legislation more effective. Once 
enacted the Victorian Parliament retains discretion to conform to, amend, or repeal 
an Act. Judicial power to overturn a Parliamentary Act applies only if the Act is 
determined to be unconstitutional. Significantly, Victoria’s Charter Act is itself an 
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Act of Parliament, and the Victorian Parliament retains control over its application to 
subsequent legislation. 
Within a generally positive assessment of parliamentary scrutiny of legislation in the 
UK, Feldman (2002) expresses concern about the sheer volume of analysis required. 
He contends that too little time is available for parliament to appropriately scrutinise 
Bills. Williams (2006, 2007a, 2007b) examined Victoria’s Charter at the time of its 
enactment, and expresses hope about the role of parliamentary scrutiny. He 
highlights the dialogue model promoted by the Charter, and the multiple levels of 
“interaction for law, policy and politics as they relate to human rights” (2006, p.902). 
Williams contends that Victoria’s Charter makes government more transparent and 
accountable in their assurance of human rights (2007b, p.72). He acknowledges that 
the Charter is not perfect (2007a, p.9), but maintains his hope that the legal 
confirmation of human rights, exercised by government rather than the courts, will 
enhance a culture of human rights protection (2007a, p.10). 
The comprehensive analysis of the parliamentary scrutiny of legislation by Evans 
and Evans (2006, 2011) provides a counterpoint to Hiebert (1998, 2005, 2006, 2012), 
Feldman (2002) and Williams’ (2006, 2007a, 2007b) qualified optimism. Comparing 
the UK and Australian models, Evans and Evans (2006) highlight the broader role 
afforded by the Human Rights Act 1998 in the UK, leading to a more comprehensive 
human rights focus than is evident in Australia. In response to Waldron’s (2005) 
concerns about executive dominated parliamentary scrutiny in New Zealand, Evans 
and Evans (2011) argue for an empirical approach to test parliamentary capacity to 
protect human rights. Their interviews with parliamentarians across Australia 
identified a number of significant issues that limit the effective consideration of 
human rights issues in proposed legislation. The intrusion of the executive, lack of 
tangible influence of scrutiny committees, and limited time to read and debate 
legislation all constrain parliamentary scrutiny. Evans and Evans noted in particular 
that 
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among the key limitations were the demands of the party and the 
necessity to compromise for political reasons unrelated to rights (2011, p.
341). 
Adding to the concern about the parliamentary rights model, Santow (2010) asserts 
that parliamentary committees operate without instructions for the assessment of 
human rights, and that political interests compete to create a situation where “scant 
attention is given by Members of Parliament to the human rights impact of even 
draconian laws” (Santow 2010, p.3). In a more legally focused paper, Rares (2013) 
also highlights the disproportionate power of the executive, and the failure to apply 
the core requirement that legislative decisions must be justified and transparent. Like 
Feldman (2002), he expresses concern about the problems of interpretation caused by 
the sheer volume of legislation.  
An impassioned challenge to Santow (2010) and Evans and Evans (2011) is made by 
Argument (2011). He robustly counters what he terms the “scant attention 
proposition” (2011, p.1) in his assertion of the key role that parliamentary 
committees play in protecting human rights. Argument (2011) asks whether the 
scrutinisation process matters if the decisions made by parliament are correct. 
Furthermore he considers whether the substantive issue for Evans and Evans (2011) 
has less to do with a lack of consideration of human rights than a failure by 
parliaments to express any reasoning for their approval of legislation “in the 
language of human rights” (Argument 2011, p.9). Of particular relevance to Victoria, 
Argument questions the revolutionary impact of human rights charters. He states that 
human rights have always been considered by legislative committees, and that much 
of this work is unseen and unacknowledged (2011, p.15). For example, Victoria’s 
Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee (SARC) was established in 1992, long 
before the Charter was enacted in 2006. SARC replaced the Subordinate Legislation 
Committee, which had been created in 1956. As a result, Argument contends that 
there is nothing in Victoria’s Charter that could not or would not have been dealt with 
under previous legislative processes. The difference is that much of the work of 
legislative committees was unseen and largely unknown. Argument concludes that 
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far from scant attention being paid to human rights by legislative committees, “at 
present, scant attention is paid to that good work” (2011, p.42). 
Section 30 of the Victoria’s Charter Act requires SARC to report to the Victorian 
Parliament, via an Alert Digest, in relation to any incompatibility with human rights. 
A response, if provided, is published in a subsequent Alert Digest. While supporting 
the principle of committee scrutiny, Gans (2009) is critical of the performance and 
capacity of SARC to ensure a human rights focus. He notes that only four 
amendments were put forward during the first two and a half years of the Charter 
Act, and that SARC reports are rarely referenced during parliamentary debate. Gans 
cites the narrow remit of SARC as limiting its potential for effective scrutiny of 
legislation (2009, p.4). Another concern is the lack of visibility of the dialogue 
emanating from SARC reviews, which Gans notes is at odds with the model 
envisaged for the Charter (2009, p.6). Government responses, if received at all, are 
not necessarily made public and SARC lacks the authority to enforce its 
recommendations. Rodgers (2012) compares Victoria’s approach with the New 
Zealand model of executive scrutiny of bills. Despite the concerns documented by 
Gans (2009), Rodgers holds the Victorian model up as one to which New Zealand 
should aspire. However, as with human rights charters in general, while the Victorian 
model of parliamentary scrutiny may appear comprehensive, its effectiveness is 
determined entirely by the manner of its implementation. In an Australian focused 
examination of parliamentary and judicial rights-based scrutiny of legislation, 
Horrigan (2012) concludes that “clear standards and guidance are needed to justify 
limits on individual and human rights” (2012, p.232). Implied within Horrigan’s 
analysis is a continued lack of clarity in the interpretation and implementation of 
Victoria’s Charter Act.  15
  The complexity of Charter Act interpretation was underlined by the “precedential mess” (Horrigan 15
2012, p.232) emanating from the diversity of views arising from R v Momcilovic (2010) 25 VR 
436 and Momcilovic v The Queen & Ors (2011) HCA 34. The case addressed the Charter 
compatibility of a reverse onus provision in Victoria’s Drugs, Poisons and Controlled Substances 
Act 1981 (Debeljak 2011; Horrigan 2012). However, as the rulings relate primarily to judicial 
consideration of Charter rights, the case is not discussed in detail here.
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3.3  Thesis Rationale 
An influential body of research has examined recent changes to the functioning of 
the criminal justice system. In the context of a “human rights revolution” (Roberts & 
Hunter 2012, p.3) sits the paradoxical rise of summary justice, with the dilution of 
individual rights that are inherent in discretionary decision-making by police officers. 
On-the-spot police powers to punish are applied in the interests of collective security 
(Zedner 2007b), yet without visibility or the safety net of judicial oversight or 
independent review, and with significant implications for individual rights (Ashworth 
& Redmayne 2010). The consequential challenge posed to key aspects of due process 
is conceptually clear but, as Crawford (2009) concedes, lacks an empirical basis. 
Research has been conducted in a number of comparative contexts,  but none has 16
been directed specifically at the effect of Victoria’s banning notice legislation upon 
individual rights and conceptions of balance in the administration of justice in the 
NTE. 
Victoria’s banning notice provisions highlight the impact and normative significance 
of the move to summary justice, and the importance of the way in which 
discretionary powers are afforded to police officers. Banning notices embody what 
Ashworth and Zedner (2008) depict as a fundamental challenge to the traditional 
liberal model of criminal justice, whereby clear procedural safeguards for the 
accused sit within a process that provides open and appropriate justice. Within a 
growing body of criminal law, and reflecting a combination of drivers and perceived 
issues with established models of criminal justice, legislation targeting undesirable 
behaviours increasingly circumvents the criminal law and side-steps the individual 
rights of defendants. 
In the antithetical context of the re-balancing agenda and the formalisation of human 
rights in the scrutiny of legislative provisions, the resolution of such divergent 
  Examples are examined Chapter Two in relation to ASBOs, Control Orders, PBOs etc. In a sample 16
of admonishments and parks exclusion orders for February, April, August, November 2005, 
Beckett and Herbert (2010a) report that police officers offered no rationale or reason in 59.8% of 
the records.
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drivers is explored in this thesis. Even under Victoria’s Charter Act, human rights are 
not assured and the Victorian Parliament may pass legislation in contravention of key 
rights. Gans (2009) raises valid concerns about the remit and application of the 
parliamentary scrutiny of Bills under the Charter. Evans and Evans (2011) are blunt 
in their expression of doubt regarding the capacity of parliamentarians to scrutinise 
legislation effectively. That legislation can circumvent provisions which should 
protect individual rights, such as Victoria’s Charter Act, in the interests of loosely 
framed public protection is directly relevant to this thesis. Passed in the first year of 
the Charter’s operation, the passage of the LCRA Bill 2007 through Victoria’s 
Parliament is examined. Given the due process and human rights issues embedded 
within the banning provisions, the enactment of the legislation raises concerns about 
the implementation of the Charter compliance requirements, and the process of 
parliamentary scrutiny as a whole. The justifying rationale and the way in which 
parliamentary processes were applied enabled the banning provisions to be 
introduced through the LCRA Act 2007, and extended under the JLA Act 2010, 
despite significant consequences for individual rights that should be protected by the 
Charter. The banning notice provisions circumvented the Charter Act to legitimise 
discretionary police powers that then circumvent individual rights. To explore these 
concerns, this thesis examines the way in which the banning provisions were enacted 
in Victoria. 
Significant legal and criminological research  has identified key themes that 17
illuminate the rationale and theoretical thinking for this thesis. In detailed analyses 
and modelling of criminal justice processes, the dilution of the separation of powers 
and consequential erosion of individual rights have been recognised. However the 
focus of much of the existing research sits primarily within the criminal law in terms 
of how recent legislative and operational policing changes undermine due process 
rights and procedural protections. Victoria’s Charter supplements the traditional 
  For example, Zedner (2005, 2007a, 2007b, 2007c), Ashworth and Zedner (2008), Crawford 17
(2009), Ashworth and Redmayne (2010), Dripps (2011), and Roberts and Hunter (2012). 
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criminal law framework with a human rights driven mechanism. This thesis 
integrates the rights-based and criminological perspectives. 
Two inter-related research themes are explored in this thesis. The first considers the 
enactment of Victoria’s banning provisions in the context of the ‘re-balancing’ 
agenda. A disconnect between the use of balance to explain the need for provisions 
such as banning notices, and to justify their consequential erosion of the due process 
rights of individuals is explored. The assumptions that underpinned the parliamentary 
rhetoric used to support the banning notice measures, and how their compliance with 
Charter requirements was secured, are analysed in detail. The extent of parliamentary 
analysis both of the ‘problem’, and of the presumed efficacy of the ‘solution’ is 
examined, providing a specific test of Waiton’s (2008) contention of the nonchalant 
drift of policies through parliament, regardless of their impact upon individual rights. 
The research considers the extent to which Victoria’s banning provisions were driven 
by what Crawford (2013) depicts as a reactive desire by Governments to be seen to 
do something in response to perceived concerns, regardless of empirical evidence to 
support the ‘need’ and the potential consequences for individual rights. Rather than 
ensuring an effective balance for all members of the community, banning notices 
circumvent the core due process rights of alleged offenders. The rights of a police-
determined undesirable minority are subsumed to the politically proclaimed need to 
protect the wider community. The result appears to be the obverse of balance. 
The second theme acknowledges concern about a lack of understanding of the use of 
discretionary police powers to punish (Crawford 2009), and the consequential 
erosion of due process rights (Zedner 2005; Ashworth 2006a; Ashworth & Zedner 
2008). Crawford (2009) contends that the broader consequences of the police 
empowered regulatory state are essentially unknown, due largely to an absence of 
empirical analysis. Victoria’s police-imposed banning notices were enacted to ‘re-
balance' the provision of justice in the NTE, to prioritise the collective needs of 
community protection and legitimise the dilution of individual due process rights. 
However, when driven by political expedience rather than public scrutiny the 
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potential futility of the notion of re-balancing is significant. Given the effect of 
banning notices upon individual rights, the post-enactment scrutiny of the police 
power to ban is examined. Published banning notice data and analysis of media 
coverage of the provisions are used to explore the extent to which the use of banning 
has been scrutinised, and to assess the potential for public awareness of the 
consequences of re-balancing in the NTE. Given the lack of judicial oversight of the 
banning provisions, interviews with Victorian Magistrates sought a judicial 
perspective of the erosion of individual rights and consideration of the extent to 
which Victoria Police are held accountable for their discretionary powers to punish. 
The broader implications for the balance of individual rights and public protection 
are considered, to determine whether the conception of ‘balance’ is appropriate at all 
to the administration of justice.
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4     Introduction           
Victoria’s banning notice provisions afford police officers discretionary powers to 
punish that undermine due process protections and individual rights. A key purpose 
of Victoria’s Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities 2006 (‘the Charter/
Charter Act 2006’) is to ensure that fundamental human rights are protected. The 
application of the Charter, and how the operationalisation of legislation sits within it, 
is ambiguous and has been the subject of limited analysis. The research for this thesis 
addresses two complementary and inter-related themes. The first explores the 
enactment of Victoria’s banning provisions in the context of the ‘re-balancing’ 
agenda. The process of Charter Act compliance is assessed, and the parliamentary 
scrutiny of the two banning notice Bills is examined. This informs consideration of 
how the need for banning was justified, and the extent to which the banning 
provisions were driven by what Crawford (2013) depicts as a desire to be seen to do 
something, regardless of both the ‘need’ and the effect upon individual rights and 
procedural protections.  
The second theme addresses the contention that the legitimacy and broader 
consequences of the discretionary police-imposed summary justice is essentially 
unknown, due largely to an absence of scrutiny (Crawford 2009). Given their impact 
upon individual rights and traditional procedural safeguards, the post-enactment 
scrutiny of Victoria’s banning provisions is examined, from a public, print media and 
judicial perspective. The key findings of the research are then drawn together to 
consider the appropriateness of ‘balance’ in the context of discretionary and pre-
emptive police powers to punish.  
This chapter first outlines the research methodology and acknowledges the 
contextual research that informed the methodological approach. The two phase 
research design and specific methods are then explained. Key benefits and 
limitations of the research approach are documented in the final section of the 
chapter.
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4.1  Methodology and Contextual Research 
This thesis applies multiple research techniques, comprising contextual analysis of 
documentary sources, secondary analysis of published data, media analysis, and 
interview research. The operationalisation of research objectives using a variety of 
approaches enhances the examination and understanding of the research topic 
(Cresswell 2003; Wheeldon & Ahlberg 2012; Johnson & Christensen 2012). 
Findings can be contextualised, compared and confirmed from each of the techniques 
used (Cresswell 2003). Within the multi-dimensional research design, this thesis 
utilises qualitative, quantitative and critical interpretive approaches and is primarily 
descriptive and exploratory in purpose. Descriptive research builds a detailed picture 
and clarifies understanding through the use of thorough procedures and 
documentation (Strauss & Corbin 1998; Ruane 2005; Hennink, Hutter & Bailey 
2011; Johnson & Christensen 2012). The analysis of published data, media records, 
Hansard and the synthesis of documentary sources enable the processes of Charter 
compliance and parliamentary scrutiny of the banning provisions to be understood. 
Exploratory research seeks to gain insight and to increase understanding of a 
particular issue (Ruane 2005; Hennink, Hutter & Bailey 2011; Johnson & 
Christensen 2012). Interview research is used to explore the application of early 
Charter processes and to obtain a judicial perspective of key issues arising from this 
research.  
The research design draws on previous studies which have used a mixed method 
approach to consider regulatory issues in the light of broader theoretical concepts 
(Hall et al. 1978; Crawford & Lister 2007; Beckett & Herbert 2008, 2009, 2010a, 
2010b; Hadfield, Lister & Traynor 2009; Young 2010). Of particular relevance to this 
thesis is the influential work of Hall et al. (1978). Their consideration of the themes 
of race, crime and youth in the context of ‘mugging’ adopted a mixed method design 
utilising crime records and data, detailed document and media analysis. Significant 
overlaps with this thesis are evident in the research focus, methods used and in 
elements of the findings. Hall et al. examined how prevailing perceptions of the 
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‘issue’ of mugging in the early 1970s were created, augmented and positioned to 
justify urgent and far-reaching legislative and operational policing responses. In 
common with this thesis, Hall et al. were not concerned about causes of mugging or 
the effectiveness of solutions. Their focus was how mugging was depicted by the 
media and politicians, the moral panic and sense of crisis that was generated and the 
authoritarian response that resulted. This thesis draws on the success of the mixed 
method approach, and combines descriptive and exploratory methods to examine the 
rationale underpinning the banning provisions and to consider the consequences for 
the conception of balance. It does not seek to explain behavioural problems in 
Victoria’s NTE or to evaluate the effectiveness of the various responses, including 
banning notices.  
Other notable studies which support the methodological approach include Crawford 
and Lister’s (2007) exploration of the issues that Dispersal Orders were designed to 
address in England and Wales. They combined interviews, observation and survey 
methods in their design. Research undertaken by Beckett and Herbert (2008, 2009, 
2010a, 2010b), to examine the use of police-imposed spatial and exclusionary 
controls in Seattle, followed a similar mixed method approach, with a combination of 
observational research, interviews, and analysis of official data and documents. 
Hadfield, Lister and Traynor (2009) used interviews, focus groups and documentary 
sources in their two year study of policing and regulatory responses in the NTE in 
England and Wales. Young (2010) analysed parliamentary debates and Penalty 
Notice for Disorder (PND) data in England and Wales, to highlight deficiencies in 
their rationale and imposition.  
In Victoria, Saunders et al. (2013) applied qualitative data derived from interview 
research with fine recipients, court room observations and secondary analysis of fine 
statistics to examine the effect of the infringement notice system upon disadvantaged 
groups. Addressing concerns related to this research, such as police discretion, net-
widening and the subjective interpretation of behaviours, the regulatory approach 
underpinning the imposition of fines and factors that lead to their non-payment were 
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analysed. Research initiated by the Victorian Parliament also supports the 
methodological approach taken in this thesis. Studies produced under the auspices of 
the Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee (DCPC) examined the reporting of 
crime, alcohol-related harms, and assaults in public places in Victoria (DCPC 2001a, 
2006, 2010). These reports combined and compared analysis of published police 
crime data, and print media coverage, and applied relevant constructions of crime, 
risk and fear. For example, the 2006 DCPC report synthesised existing research, 
documentary and data records, conducted interviews, focus groups and observational 
studies to produce a comprehensive analysis of the nature of alcohol-related harms in 
Victoria. It highlighted the absolute need for legislative and operational responses to 
be evidence-based. 
Across a range of influential studies, a mixed method approach combining secondary 
document, media and data analysis with interviews has led to valid findings that 
extend understanding of the issues being examined. The methodological approach for 
this thesis is proven, context appropriate, and common to relevant socio-legal 
research. 
4.2  Research Approach 
This thesis addresses three specific research questions. Firstly, did Victoria’s Charter 
Act compliance procedures ensure an open and comprehensive assessment of the 
consequences of the banning notice provisions for individual rights and due process 
protections? Secondly, how balanced and rigorous were the parliamentary debates of 
the banning notice provisions? Thirdly, has ongoing public scrutiny of the use of 
banning notices enabled meaningful analysis of their imposition and consequences? 
The linkages between the research themes, questions, phases and results chapters are 
summarised in table 4.1. 
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Table 4.1: Linkages between the research themes, questions and design 
The first two questions reflect the first thesis theme by exploring the pre-enactment 
parliamentary scrutiny of the banning provisions. They are addressed in phase one of 
the research, which combines secondary analysis of key documents and published 
data with interview research at the Department of Justice and Victoria Police (n=5). 
Chapter Five documents the findings of the Charter compliance analysis and Chapter 
Six focuses upon the parliamentary debates. The third research question considers 
the second thesis theme of the post-enactment scrutiny of the banning provisions, 
and is explored in the second research phase. Secondary analysis of documents, 
published data, newspaper analysis (n=185), and exploratory interviews with 
Victorian Magistrates (n=12) examine the ongoing public scrutiny of police-imposed 
banning notices. The findings are documented in Chapter Seven. 
The components of each research phase are outlined in this section, along with an 
explanation of the analysis and relevant ethical considerations. Table 4.2 summarises 
the methods for each phase and the key inputs. Additional secondary document and 
data analysis informs the research for each phase, and is outlined in the final part of 
this section. The relative weight afforded to each component of the research is not 
pre-determined and none is given priority (Cresswell 2003; Johnson & Christensen 
2012). No dependencies exist between the phases. It is emphasised that the 
Research Theme Research Questions Research 
Phase
Results 
Chapter
The enactment of 
Victoria’s banning 
notice provisions and 
the ‘re-balancing’ 
agenda
1. Did Victoria’s Charter Act 
compliance procedures ensure an 
open and comprehensive 
assessment of the consequences of 
the banning notice provisions for 
individual rights and due process 
protections? 
2. How balanced and rigorous was 
the parliamentary scrutiny of 
Victoria’s banning notice 
provisions?
One Five 
Six
Post-enactment 
scrutiny of the 
discretionary police 
power to ban
3. Has ongoing public scrutiny of the 
use of Victoria’s banning 
provisions enabled meaningful 
analysis of their imposition and 
consequences?
Two Seven
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effectiveness of Victoria’s banning notices in addressing the stated need is not 
examined. Notions of causality, with concomitant dependent and independent 
variables, do not apply. 
Table 4.2: Key research phases, methods and inputs
4.2.i  Research Phase 1 – Pre-enactment Parliamentary Scrutiny 
The first research phase examines in detail the legislative enactment of the Liquor 
Control Reform Amendment Act 2007 (‘LCRA Act 2007’) and the Justice Legislation 
Amendment (Victims of Crime Assistance & Other Matters) Act 2010 (‘JLA Act 
2010’). The application of Victoria’s Charter Act compliance processes is analysed, 
for both Bills, to consider whether the Charter ensured an open and comprehensive 
assessment of the consequences of the banning provisions for the individual rights of 
recipients. The parliamentary debates for each Bill are then examined. Given the due 
process procedural implications for recipients of a banning notice, the way in which 
the banning measures were justified during the parliamentary debates is central to the 
thesis theme of ‘balance’. The primary research methods for this phase are secondary 
document and data analysis, and exploratory interviews. 
Research Phase Method Key Inputs
Phase 1: 
Pre-enactment Scrutiny: 
Charter Compliance and  
Parliamentary Debates
Detailed Document 
Analysis
Description, synthesis and mapping 
of key documents (listed in table 
4.3)
Secondary Data Analysis Victoria Police Crime Statistics: 
2000 - 2012
Research Interviews Victorian Government Officer (n=3) 
Victoria Police Officer (n=2)
Phase 2: 
Ongoing Public Scrutiny
Secondary Data Analysis Victoria Police Banning Notice 
Data: 2007 - 2012 
Court Imposed Exclusion Order 
Data: 2007 - 2012
Media Analysis Newsbank: 
Victorian Newspapers 2007 - 2012 
(n=185)
Exploratory Interviews Victorian Magistrate (n=12)
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4.2.i(a)  Document Analysis 
Relevant legislation and written records relating to the Charter Act compliance 
requirements, implementation reviews and the parliamentary processes through 
which the LCRA Act 2007 and JLA Act 2010 passed have been analysed.  Any 1
material relating to the earliest stages of the legislative process and marked as 
‘Cabinet in Confidence’ is classified and was not available for this research. 
However, when legislative proposals receive cabinet approval, subsequent 
documentation reflects the agreed government perspective. Each document was 
examined fully to identify key themes and issues. The Hansard records of debate for 
the LCRA Act 2007 and JLA Act 2010 have also been examined in detail. 
The findings are presented across two results chapters. Chapter Five maps the 
Charter compliance requirements against the processes followed for the two banning 
notice Bills. Each human right protected by the Charter is assessed against the LCRA 
Bill 2007 and JLA Bill 2010 to identify the rights affected by the banning provisions. 
The application of the mandated Charter compliance processes to each Bill is then 
examined. Chapter Six extends the analysis of the parliamentary scrutiny of each 
banning notice Bill. The parliamentary debates are described in detail, and key 
justifications used in support of the legislation are documented, with verbatim 
quotations from Hansard included where relevant. 
There are no ethical issues pertinent to this phase of the research. All documents are 
publicly available, with no permissions or approvals required and no concerns 
regarding confidentiality. There are no restrictions relating to storage or publication 
of the material or findings. The key sources accessed are summarised in table 4.3. 
  The key stages of the parliamentary scrutiny of legislative proposals are outlined in Chapter Five. 1
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Table 4.3: Key sources and documents used in research phase 1
(* Until February 2012, liquor and gambling were regulated by separate bodies) 
4.2.i(b)  Research Interviews 
The LCRA Bill 2007 was one of the first legislative provisions subject to the 
requirements of Victoria’s Charter Act. The way in which compliance was 
undertaken is a significant element of the research. Interviews were conducted in 
2013 at the Human Rights Unit of Victoria’s Department of Justice, with policy 
Source Key Documents
Parliament of Victoria Hansard records for LCRA Bill 2007 
Hansard records for JLA Bill 2010 
LCRA Act/Bill 2007 
JLA Act/Bill 2010 
Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee Reports 
Procedural information 
Annual reports 
Additional publications and reports
Parliament of Victoria: Scrutiny of Acts 
and Regulations Committee (SARC)
SARC Charter Review Report, 2011 
Charter Review, Government Response, 2011 
SARC Alert Digest 15, 2007 
SARC Alert Digest 5, 2010 
SARC Alert Digest 14, 2010
Department of Justice, Human Rights 
Unit
Charter Guidelines for Policy Officers 
General Charter information
Victorian Human Rights Portal Victorian Government submission to SARC Charter 
Review, 2011 
General Charter information
Victorian Government Solicitors Office 
(VGSO)
Charter Newsletter, 2007
Victoria Equal Opportunity & Human 
Rights Commission (VEOHRC)
Charter Summary Reports, 2007-12 
Additional Charter reports and documentation
Austlii LCRA Act 2007 
JLA Act 2010 
Charter Act 2006 
Additional relevant legislation
Victorian Commission for Gambling and 
Liquor Regulation (VCGLR) 
(previously Liquor Licensing, and 
Responsible Alcohol Victoria)*
Designated area information 
Forums and Accords information 
Late hour entry declarations 
Victorian Ombudsman Research reports
Victorian Government Taskforce on 
Alcohol and Public Safety
Victoria’s Alcohol Action Plan, 2008 - 2013
Sentencing Advisory Council, Victoria Research and reports
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officers responsible for Charter processes. Their purpose was to explore the Charter 
compliance readiness of the Department at the time of the LCRA Bill 2007. 
Gaining access to government officials posed a particular challenge. While happy to 
talk off the record, there was initial reticence to be interviewed more formally. 
Documentation confirming the process focus of the research facilitated approval to 
interview three policy officers with direct involvement in Charter compliance 
processes. Each interviewee had occupied a human rights focused position with the 
Department since before the passage of the Charter Act. That their views are 
retrospective and benefit from hindsight is acknowledged, but is not regarded as a 
limitation of the research. Each participant offered candid and detailed perspectives. 
Written permission was obtained for the audio recording of each interview and 
verbatim transcripts are used in the analysis of the interview output. To ensure 
confidentiality, the pseudonyms DoJ1, DoJ2, DoJ3 have been adopted. 
Two interviews were also conducted with a senior member of the Victoria Police 
Safe Streets task force,  to gain an understanding of the way in which police officers 2
are advised to use banning notices in the Melbourne CBD. Written permission was 
obtained to speak with the officer and to use the output in this research. The 
interviews were not audio recorded but detailed notes were taken and are stored in 
accordance with Deakin research requirements. The pseudonym VP1 is used to 
ensure confidentiality. A follow-up interview was initiated by the police officer, who 
had undertaken additional research to examine the length of time for which banning 
notices had been imposed in Melbourne’s CBD during 2013. The findings of this 
research are noted in Chapter Five although it is acknowledged that their veracity 
cannot be confirmed.  
  Formed in October 2007, the task force maintains a high profile police presence within 2
Melbourne’s entertainment precincts. Two and four person street patrols monitor high risk 
locations on Friday and Saturday nights. The task force also visits major regional centres across 
Victoria on an ad hoc basis.
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4.2.ii  Research Phase 2 – Post-enactment Public Scrutiny 
The second research phase explores the way in which the banning provisions have 
been scrutinised since their enactment. Published banning notice data and analysis of 
ongoing media coverage are combined with exploratory interviews with Victorian 
Magistrates.  The research focus draws on the Australian Human Rights Commission 
(AHRC) assertion that 
Australia’s strong traditions of liberal democracy, an independent 
judiciary and a robust media have been sufficient to protect the rights and 
freedoms of most people in Australia, most of the time (2009, p 2). 
In addition, Victoria Police crime statistics and a range of supplementary 
documentary and data sources are used to inform the interpretation of results. 
4.2.ii(a)  Banning Notice Data Secondary Analysis 
The LCRA Act 2007 required the publication of data relating to each banning notice 
imposed. It stipulates that an Annual Report for each year ending 30 June must be 
provided to the Victorian Parliament by the Chief Commissioner of Police (LCRA 
Act 2007, s148R). Reports must contain 
• the number of banning notices imposed each year 
• the number of people to whom orders have been given 
• the number of multiple orders imposed each year (where a person has 
received more than one order) 
• the “suspected specified offences in respect of which banning notices were 
given” (LCRA Act 2007, s148R (1)a(iv)) each year 
• the designated areas where such offences were committed 
• the ages of banning notice recipients 
• indigenous status of banning notice recipients 
• number of banning notices issued in each designated area  
• number and results of charges in relation to breaches of banning notices 
• number of breaches for which no charges were laid 
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Data from the first five reporting periods, years ending 30 June 2008 to 30 June 
2012, has been examined. Descriptive analyses explore key trends over time and 
location, including numbers, types and reasons for banning notices, the Indigenous 
status of recipients, and areas in which notices were imposed. Deficiencies and 
omissions in the data published are identified and discussed. 
The way in which the data is reported is pre-determined by the legislative 
requirements and this constrains the type and complexity of analysis. Data is 
presented at category level rather than by individual banning notice, necessitating 
univariate rather than bivariate analysis. Patterns are examinable only within each of 
the data categories and no cross-tabulation or more complex analysis is possible. It is 
not known, for example, whether Indigenous recipients were more likely to receive a 
banning notice for a particular offence type or in a particular location. No sampling 
has been undertaken and there is no requirement to infer significance across a 
broader population. All available data is used in the analysis, and the results are 
documented in Chapter Seven. 
There are no ethical issues in this phase of the research, as the data is publicly 
accessible. No individual recipients of banning notices are identifiable and no 
permissions are required to use or publish the data. 
4.2.ii(b)  Media Analysis 
A Newsbank  data search of Victorian newspapers was conducted to examine the 3
media coverage of the banning notice provisions. Using a fixed set of sources and 
key word search criteria ensures comparability of results. Additional print media 
sources exist beyond those utilised by Newsbank, along with a wealth of online 
media sources. However, Newsbank enables trends in media coverage to be 
identified and relevant articles to be retrieved. The research scope reflects the 
approach adopted by Victoria’s Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee (DCPC) in 
 Newsbank is an online repository of full-text newspaper articles. A range of search options can be 3
used to interrogate the database, to identify and access relevant articles.
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their detailed enquiries (2001a, 2010). While the DCPC studies focused specifically 
on two state-wide newspapers, The Age and the Herald Sun, this thesis incorporated 
all 55 Victorian newspapers accessible via Newsbank. The five state-wide and fifty 
local publications are listed in table 4.4. 
Table 4.4: Newsbank newspapers accessed for media analysis 
The 55 Victorian newspapers were interrogated to explore the media coverage of the 
banning provisions following their enactment. As the banning provisions were 
introduced to parliament late in 2007, the research period applied was 2007 - 2012. 
The  Newsbank search identified every article that referenced the banning provisions, 
in any context. Including the single search term ‘ban’ resulted in many thousands of 
articles for each year. A review of the results identified a range of terms used in 
relation to banning notices. Further searches were conducted for each relevant year 
using six banning notice specific key-word terms, the maximum number of 
simultaneous search terms permitted by Newsbank. The search terms used were: 
‘banning’ 
‘banning notice’ 
‘banning order’ 
‘ban troublemaker’ 
State/Local Newspaper Title
State Newspapers 
(5 titles)
The Age 
The Sunday Age 
Herald Sun 
Sunday Herald Sun 
The Weekly Times
Local Newspapers  
(50 titles)
Victorian Community Publications - the Leader Group, Australia 
(38 titles) 
MX, Melbourne  
Frankston Weekly  
Peninsula Weekly (Mornington)  
Hume Weekly   
Casey Weekly (Cranbourne)   
Monash Weekly  
Wyndham Weekly   
Greater Dandenong Weekly   
Maroondah & Yarra Ranges Weekly   
Moonee Valley Weekly   
Brimbank & North West Weekly   
Knox Weekly
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‘24 hour ban’ 
‘72 hour ban’ 
Each article retrieved was read and accepted for analysis (n=185) only if it 
specifically referenced the banning notice provisions examined in this thesis. The 
precise content of each relevant article was further analysed to discern its primary 
purpose. Following a preliminary review of the articles, five categories were 
established against which to capture the core focus. Each category is defined in table 
4.5, with the identifier used in the subsequent analysis also noted. 
Table 4.5: Media content analysis categories and identifiers 
Where articles could fit into more than one category, the primary purpose of the 
article was determined. This decision was made subjectively by a single researcher. 
The potential for interpretive differences are acknowledged if multiple researchers 
are used, or if subsequent research aims to replicate or extend this study. No ethical 
considerations apply to this data as there are no restrictions on its use, publication or 
storage, and no permissions are required. The findings are detailed in Chapter Seven. 
Core Focus Description Identifier
Imposition of the 
Legislation and/or 
a Specific Relevant 
Strategy 
Primary focus upon the imposition (potential or actual) of 
the banning notice legislation. Including reporting the 
declaration of designated areas, and how the provisions 
relate specifically to strategic plans addressing issues in 
the NTE.
Imposition
Specific Events Reporting details of particular dates, events, initiatives or 
police operations in relation to the NTE, and in which the 
banning provisions are referenced
Event
General Concern Documenting general concern about behaviour in the 
NTE, including discussion of the banning provisions. 
Generally more editorial expressions of concern regarding 
the NTE and banning provisions
Concern
Data Primarily reporting published data relating to the banning 
provisions
Data
Judicial Concern/
Legal Challenge
Relating to judicial (rather than political or personal) 
discussion of banning issues, and specific court cases or 
legal challenges. 
Legal
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4.2.ii(c)  Exploratory Interviews 
Public scrutiny of the banning provisions via post-hoc independent review processes 
is not possible, as there has been no judicial examination of the legislation or court-
based appeal of individual banning notices. To fill this notional gap interviews with 
Victorian Magistrates explored their views of the banning legislation, to gain an 
understanding of how this type of discretionary police-imposed justice is perceived 
from within the judiciary. Magistrates rather than County Court judges were chosen 
as the banning provisions, specifically breach proceedings, sit within their 
jurisdiction.    
Interview participant selection was purposive. Written approval was first gained from 
Victoria’s Chief Magistrate. Each of the 11 Regional Area Co-ordinators and the 
State Co-ordinator were then contacted to seek nominations for possible participants. 
This approach was used for pragmatic reasons, but also to ensure a variety of 
regional and metropolitan participants. The State Co-ordinator and five of the 
Regional Co-ordinators forwarded the email addresses of Magistrates who, following 
a general enquiry, had expressed interest in participating. The sample is entirely self-
selected and no claims are made regarding how representative it is. The Magistrates 
who expressed an interest were contacted directly. A number chose not to proceed 
beyond this point. Those willing to explain their decision cited lack of direct 
experience or knowledge of the banning provisions.  One Magistrate determined that 4
they could no longer spare the time to participate. A sample size of 12 was chosen to 
enable sufficient numbers from which to gain a selection of views and experiences. 
Of the 12 interview participants: 
• Seven are currently based in regional Magistrates’ Courts and five in 
metropolitan Magistrates’ Courts 
• Two are female, and ten are male 
• The period of time spent as a Magistrate spanned a range of 22 years; with a 
mean  of nine years 
  This interesting finding is examined further in Chapter Seven. 4
Chapter 4: Research Methodology & Design 98
The interviews took place across late 2013 and early 2014. They were semi-
structured and acknowledged documented caution against fixed questioning (Berg 
2001). The themes and key questions were clear and consistent but the direction of 
each interview was determined by the responses given, reflecting Ruane’s notion of a 
“purposeful conversation” (2005, p.149). A general guiding script was used to ensure 
a level of consistency, but no assumptions were built in and no hypotheses were 
tested. The focus was to establish from the Magistrates: 
• their perceptions of police-imposed discretionary justice 
• their views and experiences of the banning provisions (including the 
imposition of exclusion orders  and dealing with breaches of police-imposed 5
banning notices) 
• their opinions regarding whether and why judicial appeal of banning notices 
should be permitted 
• their thoughts on how such a review could be conducted, given the immediate 
nature of the imposition of banning notices. 
The primary purpose of each interview was to gather personal perspectives of the 
themes examined. There are no claims made regarding the scientific rigour 
underpinning the interviews, or of the reliability or validity of the results. Specific 
experiences were shared, but they are anecdotal and illustrative only and not 
regarded as representative.  
Each interview was audio-recorded and transcribed in full. The research output has 
been anonymised and pseudonyms applied, which do not identify the sex or judicial 
experience of the participant. The only identifier notes whether the participant was 
based in a regional or a metropolitan court at the time of the interview, to enable 
exploration of any differences that may exist. Each is numbered sequentially: 
MagReg01 to MagReg07, and MagMet01 to MagMet05 (where MagReg refers to a 
regional Magistrate and MagMet refers to a metropolitan Magistrate). The 
pseudonyms have been applied randomly and are known only by the primary 
  Court-imposed exclusion orders, introduced in the LCRA Act 2007, are explained in Chapter Two5
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researcher. More experienced Magistrates may have moved between areas, and from 
regional to metropolitan courts, or vice versa. Only their current location is recorded 
in the data. 
Extracts from the interview transcripts are documented in Chapter Seven as verbatim 
quotations, with relevant contextual notes included in square brackets. Not all 
participants provided responses to each question. Some chose not to answer unless 
they could base their response upon specific knowledge. Others were happy to offer 
their opinion on all of the questions asked. Some participants discussed other issues, 
such as ‘hoon’  driving legislation and infringement penalties for drunken 6
behaviours. Any perspectives offered in a different context have not been 
extrapolated to apply to the banning provisions.  
In accordance with ethical requirements, written permission was obtained prior to 
each interview. Participants were advised that they could withdraw from the 
interview process at any time. No sensitive or contentious issues were anticipated or 
experienced. All recordings and transcripts are stored in compliance with Deakin 
University ethical standards. No participant is identifiable in the research output.  
4.2.iii  Additional Secondary Data Sources 
Across both research phases contextual secondary document and data sources 
supplemented the primary analysis. In particular, examination of the parliamentary 
debates and the published banning notice data is informed with the use of the 
Victoria Police crime statistics.  Victoria Police publishes its data and reports for 7
each fiscal year ending 30 June. The crime statistics have been examined for the 
period 2000-2012, to enable relevant trends in offending behaviour to be applied to 
the analysis. Victoria Police crime statistics comprise multiple offence categories, 
  ‘Hoon’ is a colloquial term used in Australia and New Zealand to refer, in particular, to anti-social, 6
dangerous and/or irresponsible driving behaviours. 
  Victoria Police data is used as its reporting period aligns with the banning notice data, and is 7
similarly offence centric. Alternative data from the Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) is 
reported by calendar year, and is typically more victim focused.
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each with many specific offence codes. Three categories are of particular relevance 
for this thesis: behaviour in public, assaults, and regulated public order.  8
As absolute figures may be affected by general population changes, relative offence 
rates per 100,000 population highlight trends in offending behaviours. It is 
recognised that the data for each offence category will include recorded offences that 
do not necessarily relate to the NTE or did not take place in the entertainment 
precincts. Where possible more specific analysis is used. For example, Victoria 
Police crime statistics include a breakdown by geographical region. Data for region 
1, which includes the Melbourne entertainment precincts that became the first two 
designated areas (CBD and Chapel Street/Prahran) has been analysed to identify any 
issues of particular significance when compared with the overall State level figures. 
Victoria Police crime statistics also include 23 offence location types. Of most 
relevance for this thesis are the locations of street/footpath, and licensed premises.  It 9
is acknowledged that not all offences in these locations will be relevant to issues of 
alcohol-related disorder in the NTE. However, these location types are the most 
pertinent for this research, and the data informs analysis of specific offending issues 
in the NTE. 
The Victoria Police crime statistics document recorded offences. For the period 
2000-2010 the data was calculated and published in a consistent manner. 
Methodological and reporting changes were introduced after 2010 that affects 
comparability. Alterations to the region specifications also render comparison of 
specific and trend data more problematic after 2010. The additional secondary 
document and data sources have not been tested or subjected to further assessment. 
However, an error was identified in the location specific data for year ending June 
 Other offence categories, such as homicide, rape, abduction, arson, burglary, theft etc. are not 8
sufficiently specific to the NTE, and are not included in the analysis.
  The location category ‘retail’ could also capture some offending behaviours occurring in 9
entertainment precincts in the NTE, as it includes 24 hour convenience stores, fast food outlets and 
restaurants. However, ‘retail’ also includes locations that are not directly relevant, such as 
shopping complexes, car yards, supermarkets and department stores. As the data does enable a 
breakdown within the location type, ‘retail’ is not used in this analysis.
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2002, as the individual totals across the location types do not reconcile with the 
overall total. This error was raised with Victoria Police’s Media and Corporate 
Communications Unit (Personal email, 20 June 2014), but no update to the data was 
provided. The incorrect data has been excluded from the analysis.
The additional document and data sources used throughout the thesis are summarised 
in table 4.6.  
Table 4.6: Additional secondary sources used across both research phases 
There are no ethical issues with this additional secondary analysis. All of the sources 
are accessible online, and no permission is required for their use or publication. 
4.3  Research Approach: Benefits and Limitations 
Key research informing this thesis utilises secondary analysis, synthesis and critical 
interpretation of documents and published data. Examples include Waldron (2003), 
Zedner (2005, 2007a, 2007b) and Crawford (2008, 2009). Existing material is 
Data Source Key Purpose
Victoria Police Crime Statistics Documents recorded offences per fiscal year; 
absolute and relative figures, by region and 
location type
Victorian Drugs and Crime Prevention 
Committee
Research reports
Australian Bureau of Statistics Published data relating to Victoria’s population
Victorian Commission for Gambling and 
Liquor Regulation (VCGLR)
Data on Victoria’s liquor licence numbers and 
trends
Victoria Equal Opportunity & Human Rights 
Commission (VEOHRC)
Additional Charter reports and documentation
Office of Victoria’s Attorney-General Infringement notice reports and data
Chief Commissioner of Victoria Police, 
Annual Reports to Parliament
Reports data on court-imposed exclusion orders
Austlii Relevant legislative provisions
Australian Human Rights Commission 
(AHRC)
Human rights information
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generally publicly accessible, often due to political or institutional accountability 
requirements or because is has been formally published. It is stable and typically 
available in full, analysis can be undertaken unobtrusively and requires minimal 
ethical consideration. Documents, online media resources, and published data may 
also be easily revisited for the purposes of replication, enlargement, clarification or 
re-analysis (Maxfield & Babbie 2012; Johnson & Christensen 2012).  
The accuracy of the documents and data collection used in this thesis is assumed and 
cannot be verified. The original reason for which documents and data have been 
compiled can limit both reliability and validity of subsequent analysis, as the content 
reflects a pre-determined focus. Jupp, Davies and Francis (2000) cite the 'dark figure 
of unrecorded crime' as a deficiency limiting the validity of crime data. Victoria 
Police crime statistics, for example, report only recorded crime. The offence 
categories are also fixed, and typically reported in summary form which limits more 
complex analysis. Formal concerns have been expressed about the accuracy of 
Victoria Police crime statistics and, in particular, the effect of political pressures 
upon the data (DCPC 2001a, 2010; Victorian Ombudsman 2009, 2011).  These 10
issues are acknowledged, but the data that was in the public domain has been 
analysed. Despite potential limitations, secondary document and data analysis 
enables the particular benefit, utilised across this thesis, of discerning patterns, 
longitudinal and comparative examination. 
This thesis builds upon detailed contextual analysis of multiple document and data 
inputs. An inductive “immersion in data” (Hennink, Hutter & Bailey 2011 p.205) 
approach utilises both critical and interpretive analysis (Patton 1990). The analysis in 
relation to Charter compliance and the parliamentary debates is thematic and 
functional in purpose. It addresses the content and linear progress of the discourse 
and highlights key discursive structures (Van Dijk 1993; Chilton 2004). By focusing 
upon parliamentary processes and debates, the analysis is necessarily of the “power 
 Until 2014, Victoria Police managed the production of the annual crime statistics. The Crime 10
Statistics Act 2014 established the independent Crime Statistics Agency, to process and publish the 
annual data.
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elites” (Van Dijk 1993, p.255) and their role in the decision-making elements of 
legislative change. 
A body of sustained research has examined media reporting of crime and criminal 
justice policy.  The analysis of Newsbank records acknowledges the capacity of the 11
media to shape policy (McCombs 2004; Altheide 2006; Beale 2006), and affect 
public perceptions of crime and justice (Gelb 2006). Newspapers are identified as 
one of the most influential contributors (Roberts & Indermaur 2009). Newsbank 
enables relevant media articles to be identified accurately, via key word search 
criteria.  The content of articles can then be analysed systematically (Riffe, Lacy & 12
Fico 2005; Schreier 2012). Coding techniques produce meaningful data that can be 
assessed, compared, repeated or expanded as necessary (Krippendorff 2004). 
Research coding categories are determined by the data available to support the 
objectives of the research (Willig 2001), and the application of content analysis is 
limited by the categories that are defined. The way in which research is theorised 
may impact the categories used (Banister et al. 2006). Where data analysis requires 
levels of cognition and interpretation beyond a straightforward count or the 
application of simple binary measures, this may limit the reliability and 
comparability of the research (Neuendorf 2002; Krippendorff 2004). This thesis used 
preliminary assessment of relevant media articles to discern the categories. The 
resulting analysis required limited subjective interpretation, as it comprised a simple 
count and a determination of the primary purpose of each article. 
Interview research enables a deep, focused and more personal understanding of 
issues. This is a fundamental component of the research for this thesis, given both the 
embryonic nature of the Charter compliance processes in 2007, and the absence of 
judicial scrutiny of the banning provisions. Interview subjects are typically 
  For example, Kidd-Hewitt (1995), Sacco (1995), Chibnall (2001), Lowry, Nio and Leitner (2003), 11
Jones and Wolfe (2010), Silverman (2012), and Surette (2015).
 The analysis addresses the extent to which the articles enabled meaningful scrutiny of the banning 12
notice provisions. Whether the media influenced the decision to introduce banning is not 
examined.
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determined by their relevance to the research topic, but a key challenge can be their 
identification and access (Kvale 1996; Maxfield & Babbie 2012). The research aims 
and questions for this thesis provide clear direction regarding the required participant 
'type'. Gaining access to the Department of Justice did pose a particular challenge. 
The staff represent the incumbent elected government and are bound by issues of 
confidentiality. Governance processes, administrative imperatives, and underlying 
suspicions constructed multiple barriers for McGovern (2011) before commencing 
research with the NSW Police Media Unit. Similar challenges experienced in this 
research were overcome through clear expression of the research objectives and 
reassurance that all interview output would be anonymised. 
Interviews may take a number of general forms, from the fully scripted to the 
unstructured (May 2001). The semi-structured interviews used in this thesis draw 
together both extremes. Key themes are evident, and a level of comparability is 
enabled between interview findings. The specific direction of each interview may 
vary and provides a valuable tool for the discovery and examination of key themes 
(Jupp, Davies & Francis 2000; May 2001). The interviews facilitate insight into the 
research issues from the participants' viewpoint; the insider or 'emic' perspective 
(Jupp, Davies & Francis 2000; Hennink, Hutter & Bailey 2011; Bartels & Richards 
2011). While the interviews with the Department of Justice and Victoria Police 
focused upon procedure, the exploratory interviews with Magistrates were more 
subjective. They examined experiences and perceptions of the banning notice 
provisions, and broader issues that they encompass.  
Effective interviews require the establishment of good rapport between participant 
and interviewer (Kvale 1996; Jupp, Davies & Francis 2000; Hennink, Hutter & 
Bailey 2011). Flynn (2011) describes the particular challenges of research with 
criminal justice agents. The legal context, in part due to the adversarial traditions, 
can hinder the establishment of trust. The researcher's personal circumstances and 
background bring a particular perspective that must be acknowledged. Dixon (2011) 
describes the benefits of both being an insider (access and instant rapport) and an 
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outsider (ability to ask naïve but useful questions) in various research contexts. As an 
outsider to the Victorian legal and judicial system, the clear articulation of the 
research issues during preliminary discussions facilitated the transcending of some 
initial boundaries. Subsequent rapport was built upon a mutual understanding of the 
research aims and of key processes, having served as a Magistrate in the UK. What 
Merton refers to as “socially shared realities” (1972, p.15) enabled some of the 
challenges to be overcome to facilitate open and candid discussion. 
The research methodology and specific approaches used in this thesis combine to 
produce a contextual, in-depth, theoretically informed and internally valid 
examination of the way in which the banning notice provisions were enacted in 
Victoria. It is emphasised that no evaluation of the effectiveness of banning notices 
has been undertaken. However, the broader external assessment of the rationale upon 
which the banning legislation is based, and the extent of ongoing scrutiny of its 
application, informs analysis of the implications for the balance of individual rights 
and public protection in the administration of justice.  
The specific research findings are documented in the following three chapters. 
Chapter Five first examines the application of the Charter Act compliance processes 
to the banning notice Bills.  
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5    Introduction         
Victoria’s Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities (‘the Charter’/‘Charter 
Act’) was passed by the Victorian Parliament in 2006. New legislative provisions 
were subject to Charter compliance during 2007, with full implementation of the 
Charter Act  on 1 January 2008. The Charter articulates 27 core human rights that are 
afforded the people of Victoria. 
Nothing in this Charter gives a person, entity or public authority a right 
to limit (to a greater extent than is provided for in this Charter) or destroy 
the human rights of any person (Charter Act 2006, s7(3)).  
The individual rights protected by the Charter mirror core rights enshrined in 
comparative international conventions, and longstanding common law tradition. 
They include a range of fundamental protections such as the right to life (s9), 
freedom from forced work (s11), and cultural and property rights (s19, 20). The way 
in which Victoria’s banning notices are imposed invokes a number of specific 
Charter rights in relation to freedom of movement, privacy, security and due process 
protections. The way in which these rights were evaluated as part of the mandated 
Charter compliance processes has significant implications for individual recipients of 
banning notices, and for the overall effectiveness of the Charter in ensuring that 
legislation is passed that protects the human rights of Victorians.  
This is the first of two chapters examining the pre-enactment parliamentary scrutiny 
of the banning notice legislative provisions. It presents a detailed empirical analysis 
of the application of Charter compliance processes to the Liquor Control Reform 
Amendment Act 2007 (‘LCRA Act/Bill 2007’) and the Justice Legislation Amendment 
(Victims of Crime Assistance & Other Matters) Act 2010 (‘JLA Act/Bill 2010’).  1
Charter rights may be limited where sufficient need can be established and justified 
(Charter Act 2006, s7(2)). This chapter explores the way in which limitations of 
Charter rights were justified for the banning notice Bills, and examines whether 
 Both Bills contain multiple legislative provisions. Only those directly related to the imposition and 1
enforcement of banning notices are examined in this research, and they are outlined in Chapter 
Two.
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additional rights that are undermined by the banning provisions should have been 
recognised in the compliance process for each Bill.  
The first section of this chapter outlines the Charter Act compliance processes, and 
examines their application to the banning notice Bills. The contents of the Statements 
of Compatibility for the LCRA Bill 2007 and JLA Bill 2010 are first documented. 
The key Charter rights that are affected by the banning provisions are then analysed 
in detail. The analysis considers whether the limitations of specific rights were 
sufficiently acknowledged in the Statements of Compatibility, and whether the 
justifications for each limitation met the expectations of the Charter Act. Significant 
omissions and deficiencies in the consideration of impacted Charter rights are 
identified and discussed. The effectiveness of the subsequent Scrutiny of Acts and 
Regulations Committee (SARC) review of the each of the banning notice Bills is 
then explored.  
The LCRA Bill 2007 was one of the first legislative proposals subject to Charter 
compliance requirements. The final section of this chapter examines the preparedness 
and operational effectiveness of the Charter processes in the Department of Justice, 
and how reasonable limitations of Charter rights can be determined. The analysis 
combines the findings of formal Charter review reports with interviews conducted at 
the Human Rights Unit, in Victoria’s Department of Justice. The chapter concludes 
by considering whether the Charter Act compliance processes succeeded in ensuring 
an open and comprehensive assessment of the consequences of Victoria’s banning 
notice provisions for individual rights and due process protections. 
5.1  The Process of Charter Compliance 
A key function of Victoria’s bicameral parliamentary system is to pass legislation 
that is fair and proportionate (Parliament of Victoria n.d.). Government Bills navigate 
a staged process through the Legislative Assembly (lower house) and Legislative 
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Council (upper house), with their introduction, first, second and third reading.  The 2
majority of debate in both Houses follows the second reading of a Bill, when 
speeches are made in support and opposition, questions are asked, and amendments 
discussed. Successful Bills are then presented for Royal Assent. With the enactment 
of the Charter Act, a “new and common framework”  was introduced to support the 3
development of statutory provisions, and to ensure that Bills are scrutinised to reflect 
the protections enshrined in the Charter. Compliance requirements are articulated in 
the Charter Act and in formal Guidelines for Legislation and Policy Officers in 
Victoria (‘the Guidelines).  The Guidelines contain advice for each human right, 4
explain the compliance processes, and are used by Government departments to 
ensure policy development is consistent with the expectations of the Charter Act.  
Both the LCRA Bill 2007 and JLA Bill 2010 were subject to the compliance 
requirements of the Charter Act. The Human Rights Unit, within Victoria’s 
Department of Justice, was responsible for the development of the Guidelines to 
ensure that Charter compatibility was embedded across the process of legislative 
development (Department of Justice 2008b; VEOHRC 2008, p.10). The Charter 
mandates that human rights must be assessed at all stages of policy development 
(Victorian Government Solicitor’s Office (VGSO) 2007; Department of Justice 
2008b). The departmental officer overseeing a legislative proposal is required, on 
behalf of the relevant Minister, to undertake an assessment of how the proposal is 
affected by the Charter. The Guidelines offer advice regarding each of the 27 Charter 
rights. The likely policy triggers are identified, along with the scope of the right 
within international and comparative law, guidance on permissible reasonable limits, 
and ways to optimise compliance (Department of Justice 2008b, p.18). 
  Both the LCRA Bill 2007 and JLA Bill 2010 were Government Bills initiated in the Legislative 2
Assembly. The drafting and initiation process differs for Non-Government Bills or those 
introduced in the Legislative Council.
  From the Victorian Government submission to the first four year Charter Review (Submission 324, 3
cited in SARC 2011, p.79).
  Published in July 2008, by the Human Rights Unit, Department of Justice.4
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The pre-enactment Charter compliance process comprises three key stages; initial 
policy analysis, impact assessment via a tabled Statement of Compatibility, and 
cross-party review by the Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee (SARC). 
Each stage is broadly sequential. Initial policy analysis is typically classified as 
‘cabinet in confidence’, and generally not available for public review.  The impact 5
assessment for the Statement of Compatibility, therefore, builds on analysis that is 
not subject to open scrutiny, and feeds into the parliamentary debates (which are 
analysed in Chapter Six). The SARC review typically runs concurrently with the 
parliamentary debates. 
The Statement of Compatibility (‘the Statement’) is tabled to both Houses of 
Parliament at the first reading of a Bill (Charter Act 2006, s28; Department of Justice 
2008b, p.27). A template Statement directs policy officers to set out the basis of the 
proposed legislation before addressing the human rights issues (Department of 
Justice 2008b, p.202). The onus is placed upon policy officers to “consider 
methodically each of the Charter rights as well as each of the provisions of the 
Bill” (VGSO 2007, p.3). Each part of a Bill which is considered to interact with a 
Charter right must be analysed in detail to confirm how the right is affected. If a 
Charter right is limited in any way by the proposed legislation, this limitation must 
be fully justified and any less restrictive means to achieve the same purpose must be 
considered (Charter Act 2006, s7(2)). 
Rights are not absolute and may be waived where sufficient justification is evident. 
Section 7(2) of the Charter Act permits justifiable limitations upon the human rights 
it upholds. For each right that is affected by a legislative proposal, the Charter 
requires that a number of core considerations are documented in the Statement. 
A human right may be subject under law only to such reasonable limits 
as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society based 
on human dignity, equality and freedom, and taking into account all 
relevant factors including— 
  Unless a cabinet-in-confidence document is published during the term of a government it may not 5
be released at a later date (SARC 2011, p.79).
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(a) the nature of the right; and 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; and 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; and 
(d) the relationship between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) any less restrictive means reasonably available to achieve the purpose 
that the limitation seeks to achieve. (Charter Act 2006, s7(2)). 
Any limitation of a Charter right must be “demonstrably justified”. The Guidelines 
assert that “assumptions will not be enough” (Department of Justice 2008b, p.42). It 
is expected that research material and empirical evidence will be presented to support 
any proposed limitation, and must reflect “societal concerns that are pressing and 
substantial…..more than just a common good must be strived for” (p.43). The 
template Statement included in the Guidelines (Department of Justice 2008b, 
Appendix C) requires that each of the section 7(2) considerations, (a) - (e), is 
completed for any proposed limitation. An additional point, (f), covers “any other 
relevant factors”.  Compliance with these s7(2) requirements, and their component 
parts ((a) to (e)), is examined in the next section of this chapter. 
Following the tabling of the Statement of Compatibility in parliament a further level 
of Charter compliance review is enabled via SARC. The remit of SARC pre-dates 
the Charter, and is outlined in Victoria’s Parliamentary Committees Act 2003. It 
includes consideration of the impact of any Bill upon rights or freedoms (which are 
not defined), or which “insufficiently subjects the exercise of legislative power to 
parliamentary scrutiny” (s17). Under the Charter Act, SARC 
must consider any Bill introduced into Parliament and must report to the 
Parliament as to whether the Bill is incompatible with human rights 
(Charter Act 2006, s30).  
The SARC review facilitates cross-party scrutiny, independent of analysis already 
undertaken for the impact assessment and Statement of Compatibility. SARC may 
ask questions and seek clarification from the relevant Minister about Charter 
compliance for any proposed legislation. Issues relating to legislative practices and 
compatibility with the Charter are identified and reported by SARC to the Victorian 
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Parliament via Alert Digests (Parliament of Victoria 2011). However, the limited 
power of SARC to effect change is conceded in the documented SARC process. 
It must be emphasised that the Committee does not have legislative or 
regulatory powers. It has the power to report to parliament and make 
recommendations, but it is the Minister's responsibility to address those 
recommendations or findings (Parliament of Victoria, 2011). 
Although the SARC review takes place after the tabling of a Statement of 
Compatibility, there is no clear timeline for the review or the Ministerial responses to 
any documented concerns.  6
The Charter’s operational principles are clear, consistent and compatible with the 
human rights that it seeks to safeguard. The strength of the Charter and its ability to 
protect human rights is determined by its application rather than the words in the 
Charter Act.  The Charter is not constitutionally enshrined and its rights are not 7
absolute. As a legislative Act, the Victorian Parliament retains the power to both 
enforce and circumvent its provisions. The way in which Statements are framed, the 
rigour of parliamentary scrutiny, and the transparent application of Charter principles 
are essential components of an effectively implemented Charter. The application of 
the Charter Act compliance processes to the banning notice provisions is, therefore, a 
fundamental consideration of this thesis. As the initial policy analysis is not in the 
public domain, the Statements of Compatibility for the LCRA Bill 2007 and the JLA 
Bill 2010 are first examined in detail.  
5.1.i  Statements of Compatibility       
The Statements of Compatibility for the LCRA Bill 2007 and JLA Bill 2010, 
documented in the Hansard record of parliamentary debates, have been analysed for 
this research. The Statements for both Bills were tabled by the incumbent Labor 
Government and each conveys similar language, tone and underlying assumptions. 
 Issues relating to the timing of the SARC review and the effect upon parliamentary debates are 6
discussed in Chapter Six. 
  Embodying the notion of ‘law in books and law in action’ (Pound 1910; Halperin 2011).7
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The sections of each Statement that address the police-imposed on-the-spot banning 
provisions have been examined to identify the human rights that are explicitly stated 
as being affected. Charter rights may be limited, but any limitation is expected to be 
fully justified. All parts ((a) to (e)) of section 7(2) the Charter Act must be 
documented in the Statement of Compatibility. The specific human rights 
observations within each Statement have been noted along with the extent of 
compliance with the section 7(2) requirements, and the respective Ministerial 
decisions. The next two sections provide an overview of the content of each 
Statement. This is followed by a detailed examination of the key Charter rights that 
are affected by the banning notice provisions.   
5.1.i(a)  Liquor Control Reform Amendment Bill 2007     
As the first visible stage of the Charter compliance process, the Statement of 
Compatibility for the LCRA Bill 2007, (‘2007 Statement’), was tabled in the 
Legislative Assembly by the Minister for Consumer Affairs (Robinson, Labor)  on 1 8
November 2007, and in the Legislative Council  on 22 November 2007. The 2007 9
Statement notes the effect of the Bill upon four Charter rights: freedom of movement 
(s12), privacy and reputation (s13), liberty and security (s21), and the presumption of 
innocence (one element of the rights in criminal proceedings (s25)). Nevertheless, 
the proposed legislation was considered to be “compatible with the human rights 
protected by the Charter” (Legislative Assembly 2007a, 3818). 
The Charter right to freedom of movement (s12) received the most attention in the 
2007 Statement. Acknowledging the Charter requirement to justify any limitation of 
a Charter right (s7(2)), the Statement cited Article 12 of the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR). The ICCPR provides a precedent for a 
  The Consumer Affairs Ministry had responsibility for liquor regulation and was one part of an 8
expansive Department of Justice.
  The Minister for Environment and Climate Change (Jennings, Labor) tabled the Statement in the 9
Legislative Council, on behalf of the Minister for Consumer Affairs.
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limitation on the right to move freely where this may enhance the freedom and safety 
of others. However, the 2007 Statement offered no empirical evidence to support the 
need to protect the broader community in Victoria, or of a banning notice as the most 
appropriate mechanism. The limitation upon freedom of movement was further 
justified in the Statement with reference to banning notices being discretionary and 
imposed by an approved police officer. 
The intention is that only officers who have received training in liquor 
licensing or have been authorised by such officers will be able to give a 
banning notice (Legislative Assembly 2007a, 3819) 
That bans are limited to 24 hours and to the designated area, and are subject to 
variation by a senior police officer were also noted as reasonable aspects of the 
limitation. Across the justifications no evidence or objective analysis was offered. 
The need is stated and banning notices presumed to be the necessary response, with 
the 2007 Statement asserting that “any less restrictive means would not achieve the 
purposes of the provisions as effectively” (3819). No evidence was provided and no 
consideration given to the full impact of a banning notice on the Charter right to 
move freely. 
The effect of banning notices upon the rights to privacy and reputation (s13) and 
liberty and security (s21) were both noted in a limited way in the 2007 Statement. 
The section 7(2) considerations were not fully addressed for either right. The LCRA 
Bill 2007 requirement for a recipient to disclose personal information to a police 
officer imposing a banning notice impacts the Charter right to privacy and reputation 
(s13). Of the section 7(2) requirements, only the nature of the right being limited 
(part a) was addressed. The Statement contended that information disclosure was 
essential to enable banning notice enforcement, and this was presented as sufficient 
justification to limit the Charter right to privacy. The Statement declared that 
whilst this may well interfere with a person's privacy, the interference is 
neither unlawful nor arbitrary and does not violate the right to privacy in 
section 13 of the Charter (Legislative Assembly 2007a,3819).  
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Similarly, the permitted use of reasonable force by police officers to ensure the 
recipient of a banning notice leaves the designated area was accepted as limiting the 
right to liberty and security (s21). Of the section 7(2) requirements, again only the 
nature of the right being limited (part a) was referenced. The Statement contended 
that “...the fact that the force used can be no more than is reasonably 
necessary” (3819) was sufficient justification to limit the Charter right to security. 
For each of these two Charter rights, the other section 7(2) requirements (parts (b) to 
(e)) were not addressed at all. No evidence was presented to support the need to 
compel personal information to be provided or to use reasonable force, and no 
consideration was given to alternative approaches. Nevertheless, the 2007 Statement 
determined that both limitations of the Charter Act were “reasonable and 
justified” (3819) 
The presumption of innocence component of the Charter right in relation to criminal 
proceedings (s25) was discussed in the 2007 Statement, but only in the context of 
alleged breaches of banning notices. There was no consideration of the way in which 
this right is affected when a banning notice is first imposed. For the offence of 
banning notice breaches, the Statement conceded that the strict liability provisions in 
the LCRA Bill 2007 place the burden of proof on the defendant to “escape liability in 
circumstances of honest and reasonable mistake or total absence of 
fault” (Legislative Assembly 2007a, 3820). Any less restrictive means were claimed 
to be inappropriate. 
If the burden were on the prosecution, it would be too easy to escape 
liability… An evidential onus would be too easily discharged by a 
defendant and the prosecution would have difficulty in proving the 
absence of the defence beyond reasonable doubt (3820) 
A further justification for limiting the presumption of innocence was that the penalty 
for a banning notice breach is financial: “it is also relevant that the offence is one that 
carries a relatively small fine only” (3820). No further explanation was offered. The 
Statement concluded “the limitation is reasonable and justified pursuant to section 
7(2) of the Charter” (3820). No empirical or other evidence was offered to justify the 
limitation. There was no consideration at all of the limitation of the presumption of 
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innocence caused by the way in which banning notices are imposed. No other aspects 
of the Charter rights in relation to criminal proceedings were acknowledged in the 
2007 Statement. 
For each of the Charter rights deemed to be affected by the LCRA Bill 2007 a 
relevant limitation of the Charter Act was conceded in the 2007 Statement. However, 
even though the Statement failed to address each of the mandated section 7(2) 
considerations, the limitations of the Charter Act were declared to be justified and 
reasonable. The 2007 Statement further justified banning notices as a mechanism to 
uphold the Charter rights of the broader population, in relation to protecting their 
rights to life (s9), privacy (s13), property (s20) and security of person (s21). No 
evidence, explanation or substantiation was provided in the Statement to support the 
need for such community protection or the effectiveness of banning to ensure that 
these Charter rights of the broader population will be upheld. 
5.1.i(b)  Justice Legislation Amendment (Victims of Crime Assistance & 
Other Matters) Bill 2010                                              
The Statement of Compatibility for the JLA Bill 2010, (‘2010 Statement’), was 
tabled by the Attorney-General in the Legislative Assembly on 25 March 2010 and in 
the Legislative Council  on the 15 April 2010. In common with the LCRA Bill 10
2007, the JLA Bill 2010 comprised multiple provisions and considerations. Only one 
element of the Bill related to banning, and extended the period for which a banning 
notice may be imposed to 72 hours. The focus of the 2010 Statement was 
significantly narrower than the 2007 Statement with respect to Charter rights 
considered relevant to the banning provisions. Only the effect upon the right to 
freedom of movement was acknowledged, but in concluding the 2010 Statement the 
Attorney-General Rob Hulls asserted 
I consider that the Bill is compatible with the Charter because, to the 
extent that some provisions may limit human rights, those limitations are 
  The Minister for Planning tabled the Statement in the Legislative Council, on behalf of the 10
Attorney-General.
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reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society 
(Legislative Assembly 2010a, 1132). 
All of the Charter Act section 7(2) considerations were noted in relation to the 
limitation of the right to move freely, but the same justifying rationale was used in 
the 2010 Statement as in the 2007 Statement. The restriction on freedom of 
movement was regarded as reasonable, and any less restrictive means “would not 
achieve the purposes of the provisions as effectively” (1132). The need to protect the 
public was declared by Hulls in the 2010 Statement, and banning was presumed to be 
an effective mechanism. 
The extension of the maximum duration for which a banning notice may 
be made, to 72 hours, is reasonable and appropriate as there have been a 
number of people to whom police have had to give a banning notice on 
multiple occasions. Police have used the banning notice system 
effectively since its inception; however, its efficacy can be enhanced 
through enabling police, in appropriate circumstances, to give notices of 
a significantly longer duration. The amendment is intended to increase 
the deterrent effect of banning notices, reduce the incidence of alcohol-
related violence and disorder and, consequently, enhance public safety 
(1132). 
No evidence was presented to support the increased limitation on freedom of 
movement, to justify the need to “enhance public safety” or of banning as an 
appropriate response to the perceived issues. The 2010 Statement continued to regard 
banning notices as “reasonable and proportionate” but did not cite any empirical 
evidence or research data. 
Given the importance of protecting public order and the rights and 
freedoms of others, and having regard to the safeguards that are and will 
continue to be in place..... any limitation on the right to freedom of 
movement is reasonable and proportionate to its purpose (1132). 
Analysis for the Victorian Government submission into the first formal review of the 
Charter Act, categorised the 2010 Statement as being of “high” complexity (State 
Government of Victoria 2011, p.74). This suggests that a detailed assessment is 
necessary to ensure appropriate understanding of potential consequences of the 
proposed legislation for Charter compliance. The 2010 Statement does address other 
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provisions within the JLA Bill 2010, but for the change to the permitted length of a 
banning notice it accepted the assumptions embedded in the 2007 Statement and only 
addressed the right to freedom of movement explicitly. No other limitations of 
Charter rights were noted in the 2010 Statement.
5.1.ii  Key Charter Rights Limited by Banning Notices     
The 2007 and 2010 Statements both acknowledged limitations of Charter rights as a 
result of the LCRA Bill 2007 and JLA Bill 2010. However, key aspects in relation to 
the justification for such limitations are missing from both Statements. Furthermore, 
although the 2007 Statement provided a more thorough examination of Charter rights 
than the 2010 Statement, by mapping the specifics of the banning proposals against 
each Statement it is evident that not all of the Charter rights limited by banning 
notices were recognised. Detailed analysis of the LCRA Bill 2007 and JLA Bill 2010 
suggests that the fundamental features of banning notices invokes five of the 27 core 
Charter rights, summarised in table 5.1. 
Table 5.1: Charter rights limited by the banning notice provisions 
The effect of the LCRA Bill 2007 upon freedom of movement, privacy and 
reputation, and the right to liberty and security of person was acknowledged, albeit 
Charter Right Relevance to Banning Notices
Freedom of movement (s12) Banning notices prohibit movement into and around 
public areas.
Privacy and reputation (s13) Banning notice recipients are compelled to provide 
their personal details to a requesting police officer. 
There is a potential risk to the reputation of a banning 
notice recipient of being summarily moved-on in 
public.
Right to liberty and security of person 
(s21)
Police officers may use reasonable force to compel a 
banning notice recipient to leave the designated area
Fair hearing (s24) Banning notices are imposed summarily, on-the-spot 
by police officers. There is no opportunity to present 
evidence or contest the notice via the courts
Rights in relation to criminal 
proceedings (s25)
Banning notices affect a number of due process 
protections. They may be imposed pre-emptively, 
presume guilt and do not permit judicial appeal.
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inadequately, in the 2007 Statement. One element of the detailed Charter right in 
relation to criminal proceedings, the presumption of innocence, was also referenced 
in the 2007 Statement but only for breaches of a banning notice. The reputation 
aspect of section 13, the right to a fair hearing and the other components in relation 
to criminal proceedings were not mentioned in the 2007 Statement. The 2010 
Statement noted only the effect of the JLA Bill 2010 upon freedom of movement.  
The preliminary analysis of the 2007 and 2010 Statements has been extended to 
examine these five Charter rights in detail. The policy triggers noted in the 
Guidelines  (Department of Justice 2008b) are highlighted for each of the five rights, 
and their relevance to the banning provisions is explained. A number of significant 
anomalies, flaws and omissions have been identified within each Statement which 
limit the extent of Charter compliance. 
5.1.ii(a)  Section 12: Freedom of Movement 
Every person lawfully within Victoria has the right to move freely within 
Victoria and to enter and leave it and has the freedom to choose where to 
live. (Charter Act 2006, s12) 
As banning notices prevent recipients entering the area from which they are banned, 
freedom of movement is the most salient Charter right affected. Policy triggers 
identified in the Charter Guidelines include any proposed legislation that “limits the 
ability of individuals to move through, remain in, or enter or depart from areas of 
public space” (Department of Justice 2008b, p.77). The Guidelines state that “public 
authorities must refrain from interfering with a person's freedom of movement” (p.
78), and any restriction “should be rational and proportionate” (p.79). In limiting 
access to a public space, such as public areas within designated zones, the Guidelines 
declare that consideration be given to the period of time the restriction is in place, the 
criteria determining the exclusion and the extent of the area covered (p.80).  
This is the only Charter right that is discussed in both Statements. The 2007 
Statement does refer to the limits on the temporal and geographical aspects of 
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banning notices. Specifically, the 2007 Statement recognised that the period of the 
ban is 24 hours and that the physical reach of the ban is restricted to a designated 
area (the town centres and entertainment districts that are ‘declared’ by the Victorian 
Commission for Gambling and Liquor Licensing (VCGLR) as designated areas and 
in which banning notices may be imposed). This acknowledges the section 7(2) 
Charter Act expectation of applying the least restrictive limitation to the right 
(Legislative Assembly 2007a, 3819). The 2007 Statement also referenced safeguards 
for people who live or work in designated areas and that a ban may only be imposed 
“on reasonable grounds” (3819). These aspects of the legislation are considered in 
the Statement to be sufficient protection for the right of freedom of movement. 
Despite the unequivocal requirement that any ‘reasonable limitation’ of a Charter 
right must be demonstrable and not rooted in assumptions (Department of Justice 
2008b, p.42), no evidence of any sort was presented in the 2007 Statement to support 
the proposed limitation on freedom of movement. 
With the subsequent extension of a banning notice to 72 hours, the 2010 Statement 
asserted that only “in appropriate circumstances” (Legislative Assembly 2010a, 
1132) will an extended ban be imposed. The term “in appropriate circumstances” 
shows some acknowledgment of the least restrictive requirement of the limitation of 
the right to move freely. However, not only is the need for an increase in the 
permissible length of a ban not empirically justified in the 2010 Statement, the 
failure to quantify what is meant by “in appropriate circumstances” creates 
uncertainty for the way in which it is applied to banning notices. Data regarding the 
use of the banning notice provisions is reported to the Victorian Parliament each year 
by the Chief Commissioner of Police.  However, as no data reporting the actual 11
length of banning notices is published the application of the “in appropriate 
circumstances” requirement is not subject to public scrutiny. 
  The published banning notice data is analysed and discussed in Chapter Seven.11
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As part of this research, a request was submitted to the Safe Streets task force  in the 12
Melbourne CBD for clarification about how the length of a banning notice is 
determined. In particular, to understand how the “in appropriate circumstances” 
clause is applied. The preliminary response from a senior Victoria Police officer 
indicated that the default position was to impose a ban for the minimum period of 24 
hours, as this addresses the most pressing concern of the officer in the street, to 
remove the individual from a problematic situation. This suggests conformance with 
the expected proportionality in the way that the banning notice restriction is applied 
and implicit acknowledgment that longer bans should be imposed only “in 
appropriate circumstances.” However, subsequent analysis of a subset of banning 
notices was undertaken by the senior officer (referred to by the pseudonym VP1).  13
The findings reported by VP1 confounded initial expectations. The notices analysed 
were all imposed in 2013 in the Melbourne CBD. VP1 reported that every notice 
analysed had been issued for the full 72 hour period. As a direct result of this 
unexpected finding, VP1 advised that the formal patrol briefing documentation 
delivered to the Safe Streets task force before each night shift had been amended. 
Police officers are now explicitly instructed to impose a 24 hour ban, unless 
exceptional circumstances justify a longer ban. While still discretionary, this change 
does attempt to acknowledge the “in appropriate circumstances” requirement of the 
JLA Act 2010.  14
Significantly, the 2010 Statement did not address why the provisions in the LCRA Act 
2007 were insufficient, necessitating additional discretionary police powers via an 
extended time period for banning notices. That a number individuals had received 
multiple banning notices was cited in the 2010 Statement, and extending the 
  See Chapter Four, footnote 2.12
  The accuracy of this research cannot be verified as individual banning notice records are not 13
publicly accessible. 
  This procedural change is a direct result of research initiated for this thesis, rather than from the 14
formal operationalisation of the banning notice legislation. The absence of effective data collection 
and review processes (which is discussed further in Chapter Seven) means that, without this 
research, the imposition of unnecessarily long banning notices could have continued indefinitely. 
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permissible length of a ban was presumed to address this.  In tabling the 2010 15
Statement, Attorney-General Hulls claimed 
The amendment is intended to increase the deterrent effect of banning 
notices, reduce the incidence of alcohol-related violence and disorder 
and, consequently, enhance public safety (Legislative Assembly 2010a, 
1132). 
Hulls did not demonstrate the inadequacy of existing police powers or empirically 
support the case for their extension. 
One aspect of the limit on freedom of movement not considered in either Statement 
is the potential permissible size of designated areas from which a recipient of a 
banning notices may be excluded. Chapter Two confirmed that designated areas are 
declared by the Victorian Commission for Gambling and Liquor Regulation 
(VCGLR), in consultation with the Chief Commissioner of Victoria Police, where the 
level of alcohol-related violence and disorder is deemed sufficient. However, there 
are no restrictions on their size. Potentially expansive spatial designation could give 
rise to significant areas from which a person may be excluded, but this is not 
addressed in either Statement. 
Both the 2007 and 2010 Statements acknowledged the effect of banning notices upon 
freedom of movement, but both used the same over-riding justification to erode that 
right. Specifically, that any “less restrictive” conditions would not ensure the stated 
purpose of the provisions to ensure public order and community protection. 
The limitation imposed on freedom of movement is directly and 
rationally connected with the purpose of the provisions (Legislative 
Assembly 2007a, 3819 [Robinson, Labor]). 
Given the importance of protecting public order and the rights and 
freedoms of others, and having regard to the safeguards that are and will 
continue to be in place..... any limitation on the right to freedom of 
movement is reasonable and proportionate to its purpose (Legislative 
Assembly, 2010a, 1132 [Hulls, Labor]). 
  Data recording the actual number of multiple orders imposed is explored in Chapter Seven.15
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Clear anomalies are evident in both the 2007 and 2010 Statements. The analysis 
provided in the Statements was not thorough or complete, and no data or research 
material was used to support the determinations that the restrictions on the right to 
freedom of movement is reasonable, in any measurable or objective sense. Charter 
Act compliance was selective and incomplete. 
5.1.ii(b)  Section 13: Privacy and Reputation 
A person has the right  - 
(a) not to have his or her privacy, family, home or correspondence 
unlawfully or arbitrarily interfered with; and 
(b) not to have his or her reputation unlawfully attacked (Charter Act 
2006, s13) 
Any legislative provision that “involves the collection of personal information, 
compulsorily or otherwise” (Department of Justice 2008b, p.81) triggers 
consideration of the Charter right to privacy and reputation. The relevance of this 
right to the banning provisions relates to the requirement in the LCRA Act 2007 
(retained in the JLA Act 2010) for recipients of a banning notice to provide personal 
information to police. The 2007 Statement accepted that this may interfere with the 
Charter right to privacy, but asserted that the interference is necessary for the 
enforcement of the banning notice, and that the banning notice recipient’s right to 
privacy is not contravened.  
…the disclosure of certain information for the purpose of enforcing 
banning notices…. may well interfere with a person’s privacy [but] the 
interference is neither unlawful nor arbitrary and does not violate the 
right to privacy in section 13 of the Charter (Legislative Assembly 2007a, 
3819). 
Significantly, no further comment was made in relation to this right in the 2007 
Statement. The 2010 Statement did not address the right to privacy at all.  
Where the line is drawn between an interference or a violation of a Charter right was 
not established in either Statement. Why the interference admitted in the 2007 
Statement does not constitute a violation was also not explained. The Charter refers 
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to “limitations” on Charter rights, but does not make clear how this relates to an 
interference. The language used in the 2007 Statement is ambiguous, and this is a 
significant issue when assessing Charter compliance of the LCRA Bill 2007. A 
banning notice recipient may not have committed a criminal act or have done 
anything wrong. Given the possible pre-emptive nature of the banning provisions, 
the expectation that personal information must be given to police to enable them to 
enforce the notice arguably does limit the Charter right to privacy. This interference 
with a person’s privacy was presented in the 2007 Statement as an absolute necessity. 
Despite the acceptance of an interference with a Charter right, the denial of any 
violation means that the section 7(2) requirement to fully justify any limitation of a 
Charter right was ignored. There was no consideration of less restrictive means to 
achieve the purpose of enforcing a banning notice. Nor was evidence presented to 
justify either the interference with the right to privacy, or the claim that the right to 
privacy is not actually limited. 
The consequences for a banning notice recipient of not providing their personal 
details  may be significant, and include an infringement notice, or even arrest for 
resisting or obstructing the police in the administration of their duties (LCRA Act 
2007, s148D). No data is available to indicate the extent to which banning notice 
recipients have refused to provide their personal information. When considering the 
appropriateness of this interference with the right to privacy under the Charter, a 
parallel could be drawn to the judgements laid down by both the Victorian 
Magistrates’ Court and the Supreme Court of Victoria in the case of Hemingway v 
Hamilton (2011) VMC 10.  
Charged with a contravention of the Summary Offences Act 1966 (s52(1)), Hamilton 
was accused of resisting a police officer by running away and refusing to answer 
questions. At the initial Magistrates’ Court hearing, the Magistrate concluded that 
whilst it may be argued that Mr Hamilton had a moral or social duty to 
stop when requested to do so and assist police with their enquiries, he 
had no legal obligation to do so (Hemingway v Hamilton (2011) VMC 
10, paragraph 12).  
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A Supreme Court review of this ruling did not specifically examine the legal issue of 
a suspect’s refusal to provide his name and address when requested to by a police 
officer,  but whether the police had the power to require the suspect to stop and speak 
to them at all, given that he was not in the process of being arrested (DPP v Hamilton 
(2011) VSC 598). In confirming the decision of the Magistrate, and alluding to 
human rights expressed in Victoria’s Charter Act, Supreme Court Judge Kaye 
contended that as Hamilton was not being arrested, he had no obligation to speak to 
the police. Applying this scenario to the banning notice provisions, to be required to 
provide personal details, the recipient must first be stopped by a police officer. 
However, as in Hamilton’s case, a banning notice recipient is not being arrested. A 
ban can be issued pre-emptively and for a range of subjectively determined 
disorderly or quarrelsome behaviours that may be innocuous and for which intent 
may have been presumed by police. Therefore, whether an individual is obliged to 
stop and accept the ban, and therefore provide their personal details, is a valid point 
of discussion. The interference with the right to privacy in such a situation was not 
examined in detail in either Statement, and significantly has never been subject to 
judicial challenge or review.  16
The right of a banning recipient not to have their reputation unlawfully attacked was 
not considered in either Statement. When compared with privacy, the Guidelines 
offer very little clarification of what the reputation element of the section 13 right 
incorporates. The Charter Act does not define what is meant by ‘reputation’ or what 
would constitute ‘unlawful attack.’ The only qualifier in the Guidelines notes that an 
‘unlawful attack’ 
is a public attack that is intended to harm the reputation of the person and 
is based on untrue statements (Department of Justice 2008b, p.88) 
The summary imposition of a banning notice embodies the presumption that the 
recipient has behaved, or is expected to behave, in a way which necessitates their 
immediate removal from a designated area. No evidence is required to be recorded. 
  The lack of judicial scrutiny of the banning notice provisions is examined in detail in Chapter 16
Seven.
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The legislation requires the recipient to accept the ban and police officers are 
empowered to use reasonable force to compel an individual to leave the designated 
area immediately. The banning provisions are not specifically intended to harm the 
reputation of recipients. However, as the decision to impose a banning notice is 
entirely discretionary it is possible that a ban may be imposed in error or as a result 
of incorrect assumptions (such as mistaken identity). In the light of research into 
discriminatory policing practices,  there is an additional risk that police officers may 17
target certain demographic groups.  Without the option for independent review of 18
individual banning notices, it is possible that a recipient may suffer damage to their 
reputation from both the act of being summarily removed from an area and a formal 
record of the ban against their name on the LEAP database. However, this aspect of 
the right to reputation was not addressed in the Statements for the banning 
provisions.  
5.1.ii(c)  Section 21: Right to Liberty and Security of Person 
(1) Every person has a right to liberty and security 
(Charter Act 2006, s21(1)) 
Liberty and security of person is a detailed right comprising eight components, with 
embedded sub-sections. The 2007 Statement addressed this right only in relation to 
the permissible use of “reasonable force” by police officers to ensure the recipient of 
a banning notice leaves the designated area (LCRA Act 2007, s148H). The use of 
force was considered justified in the context of implementing the ban, and regarded 
in the Statement as a reasonable limit on the right to liberty and security of person. 
The analysis in the Statement was minimal, with no evidence presented to justify 
how or why the limitation is necessary or reasonable. The actual use of force remains 
discretionary, raising issues of accountability, transparency and ongoing scrutiny. 
  Key literature is noted in Chapter Two, footnote 26.17
  The potential for the banning notice powers to be abused is discussed in Chapter Seven, in relation 18
to both the published banning data and the interviews conducted with Victorian Magistrates. 
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Other aspects of the banning provisions relevant to the right to liberty and security 
were not discussed in the 2007 Statement. The Charter Guidelines offer several clear 
factors that must be considered in relation to this right. In particular law enforcement 
must not be arbitrary, and “arbitrariness includes elements of inappropriateness, 
injustice and lack of predictability” (Department of Justice 2008b, p.133). With 
reference to arrest and detention, the Charter states that clear reasons must be given 
for the decision, and legal review must be possible. The status of banning notices as 
quasi-criminal sanctions creates a difficulty in both respects. Recipients have their 
liberty impacted as they are not permitted free movement, may be forcibly removed 
from a designated area, and are subject to legal sanctions if they breach the banning 
notice. Yet recipients are not afforded the typical due process rights of those involved 
in criminal proceedings, and there is no right of judicial or independent appeal 
against the imposition of a banning notice. 
The notion of predictability is particularly problematic for banning notices which can 
be imposed pre-emptively by police officers who may presume the disorderly 
intentions of a recipient. How the banning provisions fit with the Charter depiction of 
arbitrariness is unclear, and was not addressed at all in the 2007 or 2010 Statements. 
The lack of reason and evidence required for the imposition of a banning notice adds 
to the ambiguity. If a ban can be imposed pre-emptively, it is not necessarily possible 
to predict either its imposition or its effects.  The discretion afforded police officers 19
is absolute. How an officer may perceive and interpret an intention to behave in an 
anti-social manner in the NTE is inherently unpredictable, entirely subjective and 
potentially arbitrary. Such a decision may be influenced by a number of factors, both 
explicit and implicit, which are not visible or predictable. The absence of any judicial 
appeal against the imposition of a ban further compromises the right to liberty and 
security, as it is not possible to challenge the potential arbitrariness of police 
discretion to issue a banning notice. This significant omission in the banning 
legislation was not addressed in either Statement. 
  This embodies fundamental elements of the critique of pre-crime and the consequential dilution of 19
intent (cf. Zedner, 2007c; Crawford, 2009; Ashworth & Zedner, 2011).
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Of the section 7(2) Charter Act requirement to fully justify any limitations on a 
Charter right, the 2007 Statement only acknowledged the connection between the 
right to liberty and security, and the permissible use of reasonable force. However no 
evidential material or data was cited in support of a limitation of the right, and no 
less restrictive means were considered. The 2010 Statement did not address the right 
to liberty and security of person at all, even though the banning provisions were 
reinforced by extending the maximum period of a ban to 72 hours. The clearly 
documented Charter requirements were not applied fully in either Statement. 
5.1.ii(d)  Section 24: Fair Hearing 
A person charged with a criminal offence or a party to a civil proceeding 
has the right to have the charge or proceeding decided by a competent, 
independent and impartial court or tribunal after a fair and public hearing 
(Charter Act 2006, s24(1)). 
The Charter right to a fair hearing relates primarily to procedural fairness, to “ensure 
the proper administration of justice” (Department of Justice 2008b, p.152) for 
criminal and civil proceedings. The notion of a public hearing is predicated on the 
principle of open justice: not only should justice be done, it should be 
seen to be done. It is also intended to contribute to a fair trial through 
public scrutiny (p.153).  
Policy triggers for the Charter right to a fair hearing include proposed legislation that 
“creates or restricts rights of review for administrative decision-making and appeal” 
and/or “includes a privative clause (a clause that purports to make a decision final 
and ousts the jurisdiction of a court to review it)” (p.151). 
The imposition of banning notice is a discretionary decision determined by a police 
officer on-the-spot. No reasoning or evidence is required to be documented, and no 
offence need actually have been committed. The decision to ban is not subject to 
independent or judicial review. However, the right to a fair hearing was not 
addressed at all in the 2007 or 2010 Statements. This finding constitutes a significant 
grey area with respect to the quasi-criminal banning legislation and Charter rights. 
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Under the Charter Act all persons charged with a criminal offence or party to civil 
proceedings should have the right to a fair, independent and impartial hearing. A 
banning notice is imposed on-the-spot by a police officer, it is not regarded as a 
criminal sanction and is not subject to any independent review (civil or judicial). Yet 
breach of a banning notice is a criminal offence. The impact assessment for the 
LCRA Bill 2007 appears to have determined (by omitting it from consideration in the 
2007 Statement) that the imposition of a banning notice is not affected by the Charter 
right to a fair trial. This is despite the fact that a ban places a clear restriction upon 
freedom of movement, must be accepted, carries criminal consequences in the event 
of a breach, and is exclusively implemented and enforced by Victoria Police. A key 
criticism of comparative prohibitive orders  is their blurring of criminal and civil 20
boundaries, and the embedded dilution of procedural protections, such as the right to 
a fair hearing.  Banning notices reduce due process expectations even further by not 21
permitting any subsequent judicial appeal of individual decisions.  22
The Charter Guidelines do draw a distinction between criminal charges and decisions 
made by prosecutors and public authorities before a trial. In such cases the 
Guidelines concede that decisions made by public authorities when “not being the 
hearing of a criminal charge or the conduct of a civil proceeding” (Department of 
Justice 2008b, p.153) are not subject to the Charter Act s24(1) requirement to be held 
in public. However, there is no such qualifying statement made with respect to the 
right for such a decision to be fair. All decisions made by prosecutors, public 
authorities and in relation to a criminal charge must be “competent, independent and 
impartial” (p.153). Banning notices are imposed by members of a public authority, 
Victoria Police. Therefore, while the decision to ban does not necessarily need to be 
public, implied within the Guidelines is the need for it to be fair. The discretionary 
  Such as anti-social behaviour orders (ASBOs) in England and Wales, discussed in Chapter Two.20
  See, for example, Burney (2002, 2006), Ashworth (2004a), Crawford (2009), and Hadfield, Lister 21
and Traynor (2009). 
  Provisions do exist for more complex administrative and judicial reviews of legislative, executive 22
and other agency decisions. See Chapter Two, footnotes 20 and 24.
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police decision to impose a ban is not reviewable, other than by a more senior police 
officer (LCRA Act 2007, s148E). No data is available in relation to the number of 
banning notices that have been reviewed by a senior police officer or their 
outcomes.  There is no opportunity for the imposition of a ban to be judicially or 23
independently reviewed, and a decision to ban is not always predictable or made in 
response to objectively defined or measurable behaviours. This is contrary to the 
expectations of the Charter right to a fair hearing.  
The policy triggers for the right to a fair hearing apply to both the LCRA Bill 2007 
and the JLA Bill 2010, but neither Statement made any reference to this right. 
Banning notices do not require a criminal charge, but they are administered on-the-
spot by Victoria Police. Refusal to accept a banning notice and breach of a ban both 
constitute a criminal offence. Therefore, the Charter right to a fair hearing is relevant 
and should have been considered fully in the 2007 and 2010 Statements. 
5.1.ii(e)  Section 25: Rights in Criminal Proceedings 
Section 25 of the Charter Act comprises a set of minimum due process guarantees. It 
incorporates a number of specific procedural rights, such as legal advice, and access 
to evidence and witnesses. Policy triggers for Charter rights in criminal proceedings 
include any proposed legislation that creates an offence requiring “the accused to 
prove or establish the absence of an element of an offence” (Department of Justice 
2008b, p.157), or which contains a presumption of fact that puts the legal or 
evidential burden on the accused to rebut. Three components of this right are of 
particular relevance to both the imposition of banning notices and how their alleged 
breach is handled. These are 
the right to be presumed innocent until proved guilty according to law 
(Charter Act 2006, s25(1)).  
not to be compelled .... to confess guilt (Charter Act 2006, s25(2k)). 
  The absence of data is a significant gap which limits, in particular, any scrutiny of the 23
inappropriate imposition of banning notices. 
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the right to have the conviction and any sentence imposed in respect of it 
reviewed by a higher court in accordance with law (Charter Act 2006, 
s25(4)). 
The only reference to these due process procedural rights in a Statement was made in 
2007, and only in relation to banning notice breaches and the presumption of 
innocence. No aspect of the rights in criminal proceedings were addressed in the 
2010 Statement. These are significant omissions in the Charter compliance process 
for both Bills.  
The Charter Guidelines declare “the right to be presumed innocent until proven 
guilty is a fundamental common law principle” (Department of Justice 2008b, p.
158). However, this right was addressed in the 2007 Statement only in relation to a 
person who has been charged with a criminal offence by breaching a banning notice. 
This is a second grey area with respect to the banning provisions, and their quasi-
criminal status. The imposition of a banning notices does not require a formal charge, 
but a ban contains an implicit presumption of guilt. Recipients are compelled to 
provide their personal information to the police officer and to accept the ban. Police 
may use ‘reasonable force’ to ensure a person leaves the designated area, which adds 
to the presumed guilt, or strict liability. In imposing a banning notice, the 
determination of guilt is made entirely by the police officer and cannot be reviewed, 
other than by another police officer. A ban can also be imposed pre-emptively, 
without any evidence of wrongdoing, but must still be accepted. 
Although banning notices are not regarded as a criminal sanction, specific 
expectations in relation to infringement notices are pertinent to the banning 
provisions. The Charter Guidelines make reference to infringement notices in the 
context of minimum guarantees in criminal proceedings. Typically given for traffic 
offences, the Guidelines state that as infringement notices do not require a formal 
charge they are not protected by the minimum guarantees enshrined in the Charter 
Act (Department of Justice 2008b, p.164). However, the Guidelines do make it clear 
that infringement notice provisions should strive to protect due process procedural 
rights, by offering recipients the choice to elect a court resolution of the matter (p.
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164). Victoria’s Infringements Act 2006 reflects this expectation and outlines the 
options available for recipients of infringement notices who wish to challenge their 
imposition. Where a challenge is presented the infringement penalty, typically a fine, 
is not required to be paid until the review process is complete. While the 
infringement penalty may be imposed on-the-spot, minimum guarantees of judicial 
review and due process are enabled prior to the punishment taking effect. Legal 
representation may be sought, evidence may be requested, and police discretion to 
impose a penalty is subject to independent review.  
Another comparative example is the ‘anti-hooning’ legislation enacted in Victoria. 
Introduced in 2006, police were permitted to immobilise or impound vehicles driven 
in a dangerous manner, for up to 48 hours.  The powers were extended in 2011  to 24 25
allow police to seize a vehicle on-the-spot and impound it for 30 days if they 
reasonably believe the driver has committed a hoon-related offence, regardless of 
who owns the car. While the penalty is immediate, and akin to a banning notice, the 
legislation permits a decision to impound a vehicle to be reversible upon appeal, 
unlike a banning notice.  
Banning notices mirror infringement penalties and ‘anti-hooning’ powers in their 
immediate, on-the-spot, discretionary imposition. Analysis of the Charter Guidelines 
and comparisons with relevant legislative provisions suggest that the same principles 
and minimum guarantees should apply to all types of infringement notices to 
preserve due process rights in criminal proceedings. This includes, in particular, the 
option for judicial oversight of a discretionary police decision to punish. The 
expectation that formal Charter protections will apply to proceedings in relation to 
the imposition of a banning notice was not discussed at all in the 2007 or 2010 
Statements. Its omission means that no consideration was given to the limitations of 
this right caused by the banning provisions or, significantly, to any justification for 
not permitting a clear right of appeal. 
  Vehicle Impoundment and Other Amendments Act 2005 (Vic).24
  Road Safety Amendment (Hoon Driving and Other Matters) Act 2011 (Vic).25
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Rights in criminal proceedings were not considered in either Statement with respect 
to the imposition of a banning notice, but the requirements for breach proceedings 
were discussed in the 2007 Statement. The LCRA Bill 2007 permitted reverse onus 
for banning notice breach proceedings, which affects both the presumption of 
innocence and burden of proof due process rights. Anyone accused of breaching a 
banning notice is required to prove a fact or issue of fundamental relevance to their 
claimed innocence. Rather than the prosecution being required to prove that the 
defendant knowingly and intentionally breached their banning notice, the onus is 
placed upon the defence to prove one or both of two permissible scenarios: an 
“honest and reasonable” mistake and/or “circumstances beyond the control” of the 
defendant (LCRA Act 2007, s148F(3)).  
The Charter Guidelines indicate that reverse onus offences are not prohibited and do 
not necessarily breach Charter rights. However, in common with restrictions on 
Charter rights in general, reverse onus inclusions “must be a reasonable limitation 
that can be demonstrably justified” (Department of Justice 2008b, p.158). The 2007 
Statement discussed the use of reverse onus principles in relation to banning notice 
breach proceedings only. Accepting that the burden of proof is placed upon the 
defendant to “escape liability in circumstances of honest and reasonable mistake or 
total absence of fault” (Legislative Assembly 2007a, 3820), the 2007 Statement 
asserted that 
… the prosecution would have difficulty in proving the absence of 
defence beyond reasonable doubt. If the burden were on the prosecution, 
it would be too easy to escape liability… Less restrictive means would 
not achieve the purpose of the provisions as effectively. An evidential 
onus would be too easily discharged by a defendant and the prosecution 
would have difficulty in proving the absence of the defence beyond 
reasonable doubt (3820). 
All the relevant Charter Act section 7(2) factors in relation to justifying a limitation 
of Charter rights appear to be addressed within the 2007 Statement, but no actual 
evidence was presented in support of the validity of the reverse onus limitation. The 
justifications were built around assumption rather than reasoned analysis, in clear 
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contravention of the Charter Guidelines. Furthermore, the 2007 Statement implied an 
additional level of justification for permitting a reversed evidential onus, as the 
penalty for a breach is only financial. This suggests that it is more acceptable to limit 
rights under the Charter if the potential consequences are minor. However, the status 
of Charter rights should not be determined by consequences or their absolute value. 
As Bateman (2009) makes clear, mechanisms such as reverse onus fundamentally 
subvert due process protections. Yet this was overlooked in the 2007 Statement in 
favour of the overriding need to ease the prosecutorial burden.   
Statements of Compatibility are tabled in parliament as a factual assessment of 
Charter compliance. When a Statement is presented and considers a Bill to be 
compatible with the Charter, there is no evidence of specific challenge by 
parliamentarians and a Statement has never been revoked or overturned. Subsequent 
parliamentary debate may allow points of interest and concern to be raised and 
considered. However, particularly where majority or bi-partisan support exists for a 
proposed legislative change, the likelihood of detailed interrogation of Statements 
and related legislative provisions is low.  During the first four years of the operation 26
of the Charter Act, only two Statements of Compatibility prompted amendments to 
legislative provisions (SARC 2011, p.86). The specific content of Statements, 
including flaws, assumptions and omissions, largely determines subsequent 
parliamentary debate. One final safeguard, and a key phase of Charter compliance, is 
the process of review by the Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations Committee (SARC). 
5.1.iii  Scrutiny of Acts & Regulations Committee (SARC) Review 
Analysis of the SARC reviews of the LCRA Bill 2007 and JLA Bill 2010 for this 
thesis indicates that a number of issues of direct relevance to both human rights and 
procedural due process protections were identified. The ways in which the concerns 
  The LCRA Bill 2007 and JLA Bill 2010 were both passed when the incumbent Labor Government 26
had majorities in the Legislative Assembly and the Legislative Council.
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raised by SARC were addressed add to the contention that the Charter compliance 
processes applied to the banning notice provisions were flawed.  
5.1.iii(a)  Liquor Control Reform Amendment Bill 2007
Following their review of the LCRA Bill 2007, SARC’s published analysis focused 
upon three Charter compliance issues. Firstly, with respect to the creation of the new 
offence of entering or staying in an area contrary to a banning notice, and the 
potential for police to use reasonable force to remove or prevent re-entry, SARC 
“considers that these provisions may infringe such persons' rights to freedom of 
movement and liberty” (SARC, 2007). Secondly, the SARC review expressed 
concern about the absence of any restriction upon the potential size of a designated 
area.  
The Committee observes that there are no constraints as to the size of the 
area designated by the Director but rather that the area must merely 
contain a public place affected by relevant violence near licensed 
premises  
(SARC, 2007). 
Thirdly, by reversing the onus of proof in cases of banning notice breaches SARC 
“considers that these provisions may infringe such defendants' rights to be presumed 
innocent until proven guilty” (SARC, 2007). Usual due process procedures require 
the prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt the absence of any mistakes of fact 
or unavoidable circumstance, which may be regarded as acceptable defence and 
absence of criminal responsibility. The Charter Guidelines make clear that reverse 
onus imposes an additional burden on the accused, may limit the presumption of 
innocence and therefore must be examined carefully to determine if its use breaches 
the right to be presumed innocent (Department of Justice 2008b, p.158). 
To address these concerns SARC sought specific advice and clarification from the 
Minister with respect to two key facets of the LCRA Bill 2007. 
Why is there no limit in new section 147(1) on the size of the areas that 
may be designated …Given the availability of circumstantial evidence to 
disprove reasonable mistakes and reasonably unavoidable  circumstances 
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... why are the reverse burdens of proof in new sections 148F(3) ... 
necessary to enforce compliance with banning notices... (SARC, 2007).  
Despite the formal request by SARC no discernible response was provided via an 
Alert Digest or during the parliamentary debates in 2007. The SARC review of the 
LCRA Bill 2007 had no effect upon the Charter compliance process or the enacted 
legislation. In its first annual report into the operation of the Charter, the Victorian 
Equal Opportunities and Human Rights Commission (VEOHRC) expressed concern 
about limitations in SARC’s role in the Charter compliance process. 
While SARC raised concerns about the Charter compatibility of several 
Bills, only one Bill appears to have been amended in response to these 
concerns. The Commission is concerned that SARC’s comments do not 
become simply an end in themselves, but form part of a robust, genuine 
exchange on human rights. The Commission will monitor this aspect 
more closely in 2008 (VEOHRC 2008, p.12).  
The first four year Charter review  found that only two Statements of Compatibility 27
were amended in response to SARC concerns,  and that nearly all Bills about which 28
SARC noted concern regarding a potential incompatibility with Charter rights were 
passed unchanged (SARC 2011, p.86). This finding is evidenced by the progression 
of the LCRA Bill 2007. SARC raised specific and relevant concerns, but none were 
addressed publicly by the Minister in parliament. Both the 2007 Statement and the 
legislation remained unchanged.  
5.1.iii(b)  Justice Legislation Amendment (Victims of Crime Assistance & 
Other Matters) Bill 2010                                    
There is some acknowledgement of the concerns expressed by VEOHRC in its first 
annual report in the SARC review of the JLA Bill 2010. In their attempt to scrutinise 
the increasing scope and reach of banning provisions, SARC made a number of key 
  Section 44 of Victoria’s Charter Act includes provision for ongoing review. The first formal four 27
year review was conducted by SARC in 2011.
  More than 400 Statements of Compatibility were tabled to the Victorian Parliament in the period 28
before July 2011 (SARC 2011, p.84).
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observations and documented concerns regarding the 2010 Bill. Specifically, SARC 
posed questions about the fairness of the implementation of 72 hour bans, in terms of 
possible restrictions upon freedom of movement, and whether banning notices are 
inherently punitive, rather than preventative. 
While the Committee appreciates that allowing banning notices to be 
issued for longer periods may be effective in reducing the incidence of 
violence or disorder, it is concerned that clause 49 may qualitatively 
change the banning notice scheme in two respects: 
The Committee refers to Parliament for its consideration the questions of 
whether or not clause 49’s extension of the maximum period for banning 
notices to 72 hours: 
• by potentially allowing people to be banned by police from 
travelling through a city or town’s centre for legitimate weekday 
activities, is a reasonable limit on the Charter’s right to freedom of 
movement; and 
• by increasing the deterrent effect of banning notices, engages the 
Charter’s rights with respect to the punishment of suspected criminal 
behaviour, including the right to a fair hearing by an independent 
tribunal, the presumption of innocence and appeal rights (SARC 2010a, 
p.7-8). 
SARC also questioned the effect of extended bans upon individual rights and due 
process. 
The Committee is concerned that the use of 72-hour banning notices to 
deter people who are repeatedly suspected of offences in a designated 
area may amount to punishment of suspected criminal behaviour by 
police officers without a charge, trial or appeal and therefore may engage 
the Charter’s rights with respect to criminal punishment, including a fair 
hearing by an independent tribunal, the presumption of innocence and the 
right to appeal to a court (SARC 2010a, p.8). 
The response of the Attorney-General Hulls is documented in a published Alert 
Digest, demonstrating a clear procedural advancement in the Charter compliance 
process. Hulls emphasised the requirement that banning notices may only be given 
by a relevant police officer to someone reasonably believed to have committed, or be 
in the process of committing, an offence within a designated area. Significantly, 
Hulls stated 
these provisions ensure that banning notices are only given where there 
are strong community protection grounds for doing so and they would be 
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a proportionate response to a risk of alcohol-related violence or disorder. 
As such, while it is possible that a 72-hour banning notice issued on a 
weekend may now prevent a person from availing themselves of the most 
efficient or timely route to, for example, their place of work on the 
following Monday, in my opinion, the purpose that is fulfilled by such a 
notice outweighs any temporary inconvenience that may or may not be 
caused to that person. 
The potential for any such inconvenience was also possible prior to these 
amendments, under the previous 24-hour maximum period. For example, 
a notice issued on a Friday night may have prevented a person from 
conveniently travelling to his or her place of work on the Saturday  
(SARC 2010b, p.14). 
Without explaining why, Hulls asserted that the potential effect of the increase to 72 
hours was not significantly or qualitatively different from that possible under the 
existing 24 hour model. Therefore, no new issues relating to Charter rights were 
regarded by Hulls as relevant to the JLA Bill 2010. 
With respect to the second concern raised by SARC, about the possible punitive 
nature of banning notices, Hulls reiterated the fundamentally protective and deterrent 
purpose of a ban. He made clear his view that the non-criminal status of banning 
notices rendered the right to a fair hearing irrelevant. Hulls claimed that banning 
notices should not be regarded as punishment and do not amount to a criminal 
charge, thereby side-stepping the Charter right to a fair hearing. However, Hulls 
presented no evidence to support either the need to ban or its likely effectiveness in 
ensuring community protection. Despite the contradiction in Hulls’ response to 
SARC, regarding the notion that a banning notice may act as a deterrent despite not 
being a punishment, no further exchange between SARC and the Minister is evident. 
The JLA Bill 2010 proceeded through the parliamentary process and the JLA Act 
came into operation in January 2011 unchanged.  
Analysis of the timing of the JLA Bill 2010 and its Charter compliance processes 
reveals a significant anomaly. Hansard records show that the Bill was introduced into 
the Legislative Assembly on 23 March 2010. SARC documented its concerns in 
Alert Digest No. 5, published on 13 April 2010. The Bill received Royal Assent on 
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25 May 2010. However, the formal response to SARC’s concerns was not published 
until Alert Digest No. 14 on 5 October 2010, which reported the specific Ministerial 
response dated 20 September 2010, nearly four months after the JLA Bill received 
Royal Assent. While some procedural improvement in the SARC review process is 
noted, in the provision by Hulls of a documented response, its timing renders the 
content of the response obsolete in the context of meaningful Charter compliance and 
parliamentary scrutiny.  
5.2  Early Charter Compliance      
Despite the formal Guidelines and clear procedures within the Charter Act, there 
were a number of omissions and anomalies in the application of Charter compliance 
processes to the banning notice provisions. This research has examined how such 
oversights could be possible. Through a detailed secondary analysis of key Charter 
reports and exploratory interviews held within the Department of Justice, two 
fundamental procedural elements have been considered in relation to the LCRA Bill 
2007 and JLA Bill 2010. Firstly, as the LCRA Bill 2007 was one of the early pieces 
of legislation to which the Charter Act was applied, the capability and state of 
readiness of the Department of Justice is assessed to determine whether an 
operational process vacuum was evident. Secondly, the Guidelines are clear that any 
limitations on human rights must be reasoned and evidence-based, and that less 
restrictive means of achieving the same purpose must be properly considered 
(Department of Justice 2008b, p.42-47). Therefore, what constitutes a reasonable 
limitation and demonstrable justification of a limitation are explored in relation to the 
banning notice provisions. These two procedural issues are examined in the 
following sections.   
5.2.i  Operational Process Vacuum?      
A key question when considering the Charter compliance of the LCRA Bill 2007 is 
whether the Department of Justice was fully prepared for the Charter’s operational 
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requirements. The first four year Charter review noted that the processes for human 
rights assessment of new legislative provisions “may not be uniform over time and 
across different parts of the government” (SARC 2011, p.81). Since the enactment of 
the Charter Act, the Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission 
(VEOHRC) has undertaken annual reviews of the Charter’s functioning. In its first 
annual report VEOHRC described 2007 as “a year of preparation” (VEOHRC 2008, 
p.4).  The LCRA Bill 2007 was one of the first pieces of legislation subject to the 29
compliance requirements of the Charter Act. However, despite the Charter taking 
effect for new legislative proposals during 2007, the formal Charter Guidelines were 
not published until July 2008, after the LCRA Act 2007 had passed through the 
parliamentary process. This raises the possibility of an operational process vacuum 
during the early months of the operation of the Charter, which could account for 
some of the compliance issues relating to LCRA Bill 2007. 
The Human Rights Unit within the Department of Justice was developed to support 
the Charter Act (SARC 2011, p.79). The Human Rights Unit produced the Charter 
Guidelines and led the Charter specific communication strategies across the whole 
Victorian Government during 2007 (VEOHRC 2008, p.7). As the Department also 
driving the assessment of the LCRA Bill 2007, it was at the forefront of the Charter 
readiness preparations. The first VEOHRC annual report assessed the Charter 
compliance preparedness of ten government departments across three broad 
indicators: communication, education and support; law and legislation; policies and 
service delivery (VEOHRC 2008, p.6). The Department of Justice was considered to 
be in an “advanced" state of readiness and preparedness for the Charter requirements 
(p.9). It is reasonable to conclude that compliance procedures for new legislative 
provisions emanating from within the Department of Justice, such as the LCRA Bill 
2007, were not hindered in any tangible sense by key factors such as a lack of 
  This assessment echoes the title of the first annual report by the VEOHRC, ‘First Steps 29
Forward’ (2008).
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understanding, procedural awareness, cultural 'buy-in' or operationally effective 
processes.  30
To validate the information contained within the VEOHRC’s annual reviews and the 
mandated four year Charter review, exploratory interview research was conducted for 
this thesis with stakeholders (n=3) at the Department of Justice. Two key objectives 
of the interviews were to examine more directly the state of readiness of the 
Department at the time of the LCRA Bill 2007, and to gain first hand insight into the 
application of the processes underpinning Charter Compliance. As long standing 
employees of the Department, the interviewees were qualified to discussed the 
processes by which the Charter was introduced, policy transition and any issues or 
learning that was evident. To maintain confidentiality, they are referred to as DoJ1, 
DoJ2, DoJ3. Each offered candid and detailed perspectives, with DoJ1 providing the 
most comprehensive input. 
The interviewees were asked a number of direct questions about the Guidelines and 
processes that were in place during 2007. All interviewees confirmed that a draft 
version of the Guidelines was in circulation well before its formal publication in July 
2008. They made clear that no material differences are evident between the draft and 
final versions of the Guidelines. The interviewees agreed that the Guidelines were 
actively and closely followed by Department of Justice policy officers in 2007, the 
period during which the LCRA Bill 2007 was developed. Significantly, while the 
Charter introduced formal processes to ensure legislative compliance, the 
interviewees highlighted the pre-Charter and post-Charter continuity in terms of both 
processes and Departmental personnel. For example 
I'd probably make the point to you that pre- and post-Charter we don't 
typically have a different group of people necessarily involved. It's the 
same sort of policy officers involved who would have hitherto looked at 
a proposal and I guess what the Charter does is provide a framework 
 Such factors have been found to inhibit success across a range of change management contexts 30
(Paton & McCalman 2008; Seddon 2008): but there is no evidence that they affected Charter 
compliance within Victoria’s Department of Justice.
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around the analysis that arguably occurred anyway but perhaps not in as 
structured a form (DoJ1). 
There was consensus across the interviews regarding the preparedness of the 
Department of Justice for the requirements of the Charter. This supports the finding 
of the 2008 VEOHRC report that clear processes were in place within the 
Department of Justice at the time of consideration of the LCRA Bill 2007.  
As clear procedures were evident when the LCRA Bill 2007 was progressing through 
the Charter processes, this raises the question of how the Charter compliance 
anomalies identified in this research were possible. The interviews explored 
challenges for the Charter related scrutiny of legislative proposals. The interviewees 
raise a number of concerns about the way in which the Guidelines were implemented 
in the early years of the Charter. The length and complexity of the Guidelines 
themselves, at 246 pages when compared with the 44 page Charter Act, was noted by 
DoJ1. 
The fact that a guideline can be that thick for an Act that is that thin tells 
you something I think (DoJ1). 
The interviewees agreed that Statements of Compatibility were not always accessible 
to their target audience, or necessarily relevant. DoJ1 provided an interesting 
perspective on the challenge of ensuring balance in policy development. Specifically, 
DoJ1 observed the difficulty of balancing the expectations of Charter compliance 
with meaningful and accessible documentation. 
 Blind Freddy could have seen it on several occasions… it [a Statement of 
Compatibility] is not an accessible document, at least it wasn't in the first 
instance… how you inject rigour and accessibility in a document like that 
is always going to be a fine balancing act…The Guideline, and this is the 
problem with a Guideline in a new environment, it becomes like a ticker 
box. We have to go through 7(2) and then each and every one of them 
[Charter rights], and then statements started to become 30 pages. Then 
you wonder who's accessing this, who's getting any sort of sense of 
understanding from it? Certainly not the general community. Then it was 
a question of are we going through the process of these arguments just 
for the sake of being able to tick the box? So we started to have a look at 
it as well. Over time you'll notice that the statements themselves have 
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become shorter. Ultimately, if its not relevant to discuss, why discuss it? 
(DoJ1). 
As a result of the detailed Charter compliance expectations, the interviewees 
assessed early Statements as often being too long, too legalistic and addressing 
points that were not always directly relevant. DoJ1 commented “we found them 
[Statements of Compatibility] a bit repetitive,” and contended that 
One of the two practical issues that I kept coming across time and time 
again was just the length of the blessed things; I've got to stand up and 
actually read this. I'm going to have to put a half a day into this (DoJ1). 
The perspectives offered by the interviewees support key recommendations from the 
annual and four year Charter review processes (VEOHRC 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011; 
SARC 2011). The result was a progressive streamlining of the Charter compliance 
process, to produce Statements that are more digestible and understandable to a 
wider audience. DoJ2 noted the change. 
And also the understanding of the rights. There's been case law, there is a 
whole body of Statements of Compatibility, commentary by SARC, that 
all contributes to it. Even the Guidelines themselves, there was the 
review of the Charter, and one of the recommendations around 
Statements of Compatibility was to streamline (DoJ2). 
Although the Charter Guidelines have not been updated since their original 
publication in 2008, DoJ3 summarised that the Statements are now 
probably a little more narrative in style rather than a formulaic approach; 
which goes with talking about the balance and being transparent and 
accessible, rather than the legalistic formulaic approach (DoJ3). 
DoJ1 considered the way in which the Statements are used by parliamentarians, and 
emphasised the importance of ensuring that Statements are accessible. 
We argue that the simpler and the plainer English that the statements are 
written in, the more the members will be able to debate it. Ultimately the 
statement speaks to the legislation itself, and it is the legislation that they 
are there to debate (DoJ1). 
The expectation that documents such as Statements of Compatibility be accessible 
and relevant for parliamentarians is sensible, but how the ‘relevant’ content is 
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determined remains significant. The 2007 Statement was regarded by the 
interviewees as being long,  when compared with other Statements. However, 31
analysis for this thesis has found that, despite its perceived length, key areas of 
relevance were not addressed in the 2007 Statement. In particular, the Charter Act 
section 7(2) requirements to fully justify any limitation on Charter rights lacks 
specificity and completeness, and a number of affected human rights were not 
referenced at all in the 2007 Statement. 
The potential consequences of the streamlining of Statements of Compatibility are 
documented in the 2012 annual Charter report. VEOHRC noted that 
there are some instances, however, where Statements of Compatibility 
are less comprehensive than SARC or bodies with an interest in the issue 
might consider sufficient (2012, p.24).  
Corrections Victoria is cited as one agency that “no longer discusses ‘routine’ or 
‘clearly reasonable’ human rights limitations” (VEOHRC 2012, p.24). However, the 
balance between accessibility and relevance is complex. Shorter Statements are not 
necessarily better, particularly to facilitate effective and meaningful scrutiny, if core 
aspects of Charter compliance are missing. The priority for any impact assessment 
process should be thorough and accurate analysis. Mindful of the need to be concise 
without verbosity, the resulting Statement of Compatibility should still be 
comprehensive as to its potential human rights consequences. If an issue is presented 
in a way that is too complex for parliamentarians to understand, not addressing it at 
all is not an appropriate solution. Charter compliance is a process of public 
accountability for legislative action. Failure to consider all affected rights, for 
whatever reason, is anathema to the fundamental purpose of the Charter. Therefore 
the focus across parliament should be to ensure relevance, completeness, clarity and 
total conformity with Charter requirements. This was not the case for the LCRA Bill 
2007 or the JLA Bill 2010. 
  The Statement covered four pages in Hansard.31
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5.2.ii  ‘Unreasonable Limitations’?     
The second procedural issue relevant to the Charter compliance of the banning 
provisions is what constitutes both a reasonable limitation and the demonstrable 
justification of a limitation. The term “reasonable” was used in the 2007 and 2010 
Statements to substantiate each noted limitation upon a Charter right. What is meant 
by a 'reasonable' limitation is examined in the Charter's Guidelines (Department of 
Justice 2008b, p.42-47). Epitomising the balancing paradigm, the determination of 
reasonable limits is regarded as a “balancing exercise whereby the needs of the State 
are balanced against the rights of individuals” (p.42). There is a clear expectation that 
the limit must impact the human right as little as is reasonably possible 
but still achieve the objective of the limitation as effectively. An 
excessive impairment will mean the limit is unlikely to be a reasonable 
one (Department of Justice 2008b, p.42).  
The Guidelines make clear that the state is required to demonstrate that the 
reasonable limit is justified. 
… material should be available that demonstrates a limit is justifiable, 
such as studies, reviews, inquiries and consultation findings. 
Assumptions will not be enough (p.42). 
The Guidelines also require consideration of proportionality 
between the purpose of the limitation, restriction or interference with a 
right and the means employed to achieve that purpose (p.44).  
The Guidelines reflect the broader requirement for evidence-based policy 
development.  There is also a clear linkage to the literature examined in Chapter 32
Three regarding the issues of legislative change proceeding without sufficient 
evidence of need or consideration of the potential consequences.  In particular, 33
Michaelsen’s (2006) ‘proportionality test’ of the necessity, suitability and 
appropriateness of legislative responses is embodied in the Charter Act and its 
Guidelines. However, despite these clear expectations no evidence, empirical or 
  This was noted explicitly in the Victorian Government inquiry into the reduction of harmful 32
alcohol consumption (DCPC 2006), a year before the introduction of the LCRA Bill 2007.
  Discussed in Chapter Three with reference to the work of Waldron (2003), Zedner (2003, 2005, 33
2007a, 2007b), Golder and Williams (2007),  Crawford (2013) and others. 
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otherwise, was presented in support of any of the limitations outlined in either the 
2007 or 2010 Statements. This aspect of Charter compliance was far from 
comprehensive. Given these issues and the absence of an accessible audit trail of 
how each right affected by the banning notice Bills was determined, the Department 
of Justice interviewees were asked how, in principle, legislative proposals are 
assessed against the Charter Act. DoJ1 highlighted the complexity and subjectivity 
inherent in determining what is a reasonable impact of a Charter right. 
 The dilemna we always have with the Charter, and it always will ever be 
thus, is… we are not talking about a range of objective statements against 
which there is a yes/no. And it's a contested space. What I might see as 
balanced and appropriate others may not. It's in that evolutionary process 
of trying to work out what and where we land on it. Some things are 
more difficult than others… some reforms are quite challenging (DoJ1). 
When asked to expand on the notion of what constitutes a ‘balanced response’, DoJ1 
asserted “that’s a toughy”. In determining how a balanced response is achieved, the 
notion of balancing individual rights against the rights of the community at large is a 
fundamental consideration. 
How many children must die for this to be material? That becomes a very 
real issue in the legislative space when you are trying to think of 
consequences… how many peoples lives do you put at risk? If there has 
been one or two deaths it is OK for you to act or is that disproportionate? 
And where do you go with that sort of balance? It's proving challenging 
in a justice environment even. Even without the Charter analysis that's 
still the same. Without the Charter guiding us, there is always that 
imposition of the state and its coercive power on the community and 
wherein is that balance achieved... and that's a toughy (DoJ1). 
This explanation by DoJ1 highlights core issues across the ‘re-balancing’ literature 
discussed in Chapter Three, regarding the way in which the need for state initiated 
responses are weighed up against their potential consequences. Where the lines 
should be drawn is complex and cannot necessarily be objectively determined. The 
interviewees agreed that where possible evidence, such as crime statistics and other 
data, was applied to the impact assessment of policy proposals. In terms of the use of 
material to substantiate and support the reasonable limitations, DoJ3 noted a 
significant issue of availability. 
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... it's hard to get the evidence. When ministers try to base the policy on 
evidence, it's not always easy to pinpoint comparison with other 
jurisdictions… when explaining the reasonableness and proportionality, 
it’s helpful if you are able to look at evidence from other jurisdictions but 
its not always easy to compare what might be apples and oranges 
sometimes, so its always a tricky balancing act (DoJ3). 
Notwithstanding the challenges identified by DoJ3, the Charter Act requires 
limitations of Charter rights to be based upon empirical evidence. This is not only to 
substantiate the need for any given right to be limited, but to support the 
effectiveness of the proposed limitation.  This is a fundamental check on the power 34
of parliament to circumvent Charter rights. If the required evidence is not available, 
then it is difficult to justify a proposed limitation of a Charter right as being 
reasonable. The challenge of justifying new policy is acknowledged, particularly 
where no evidence of the success of a proposed new measure may yet exist. 
However, when the JLA Bill 2010 was introduced, the banning provisions had been 
operational for over two years. If sufficient evidence to support their need was 
available, it should have been presented in the 2010 Statement. That this key 
requirement of the Charter Act was not observed brings into question both the need 
for, and effectiveness of, extending banning notices to 72 hours. The extent to which 
any less restrictive means were considered with respect to each of the limitations 
identified remains unknown. 
All interviewees expressed concern about the ability of the Charter Act to fulfil its 
stated remit. Despite the passage of time since its enactment, the opportunity to 
refine the Charter procedures, and being part of the Department that acts as arbiter 
for the Charter Guidelines, DoJ1 conceded that challenges were embedded in the 
way in which Charter processes work. 
… the difficulty of trying to give life to concepts that are about some 
fundamentally held shared values of our community in the context of 
how it is we legislate. Trying to give life to that and trying to describe the 
process by which the legislators try to address some of that, wherein they 
 It is difficult to meaningfully evaluate the effect of a proposed new measure without a clear 34
statement of its need and purpose. 
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think its infringed or otherwise impacted. Its a tough ask. I'm not 
surprised no other jurisdiction has gone ahead and done it this way to be 
honest (DoJ1). 
Formal disquiet about shortcomings in the content of Statements of Compatibility 
was not evident until the VEOHRC’s 2009 annual report, which made observations 
pertinent to the 2007 Statement. VEOHRC expressed concern that proposed 
limitations upon rights were justified by perceptions of community concern rather 
than empirical or research evidence of their benefits. VEOHRC commented 
specifically upon enhanced police-imposed stop and search powers.   35
Recognising that limits on human rights are necessary in certain 
circumstances, the Commission’s view is that the government failed to 
demonstrate that the curtailing of rights through these increased police 
powers would result in a reduction in alcohol-related violence or knife-
crime, or lead to an improvement in the safety of the Victorian 
community. While understanding the motivation behind these laws – and 
supporting measures to make public places safer – it is unfortunate that a 
more rigorous consideration of the human rights issues involved was not 
undertaken… (2010, p.5). 
VEOHRC made clear its expectation that Statements of Compatibility must 
rigorously address the elements of section 7(2) of the Charter Act when it 
is being asserted that limitations on rights are reasonable and permissible 
(2010, p.94).  
Furthermore, compliance was regarded as essential for the integrity and perceived 
value of the Charter to be upheld: “complying with proper processes is essential to 
ensuring parliamentary and public confidence in the human rights dialogue.” (2010, 
p.94). Human rights issues must be 
subject to the broadest scrutiny and full accountability. A genuine 
dialogue process facilitates a vital exchange of ideas, enabling human 
rights impacts to be robustly debated (2010, p.94).  
Although too late for the LCRA Bill 2007, this was clear recognition from VEOHRC 
of the Charter compliance requirements and an explicit statement of expectation, as 
part of their formal annual review process. It is reasonable to expect that these 
  Introduced under the Summary Offences & Control of Weapons Acts Amendment Act 2009.35
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expectations would be applied to the JLA Bill 2010. However, the analysis 
conducted for this thesis demonstrates that fundamental issues persisted and the 2010 
Statement failed to assess thoroughly the Charter rights affected by the JLA Bill 
2010. 
5.3  Chapter Conclusion      
The Statement of Compatibility is a core component of Victoria’s Charter 
compliance process and the vehicle through which proposed legislation is presented 
to the Victorian Parliament. Clearly documented requirements confirm the processes 
to be followed and the content to be included in each Statement. There were flaws 
and omissions in both the 2007 and 2010 Statements, and their compliance with 
Charter expectations was compromised. While the 2007 Statement identified a 
number of human rights issues in relation to the LCRA Bill 2007, it was not a 
comprehensive impact assessment. Consideration of the right to move freely, the 
rights to privacy and reputation, liberty and security, and rights in relation to criminal 
proceedings were incomplete and lacked significant detail regarding their proposed 
limitations. The Charter right to a fair trial was not addressed at all. The 2010 
Statement only considered freedom of movement in relation to the JLA Bill 2010.  
No empirical evidence or objective analysis was presented in support of any of the 
limitations of Charter rights in either Statement. Issues of alcohol-related disorder in 
the NTE were claimed, and banning presented as a necessary and appropriate 
response. The failure to provide specific evidence-based reasoning for any of the 
affected Charter rights rendered impossible an assessment of whether the limitation 
of rights had a permissible purpose, were proportionate, or addressed the threat that 
was presumed. This absence of transparency created the potential for unseen political 
or other priorities to influence what should be a process of objective assessment. 
Lack of open disclosure of policy rationales or relevant research evidence enables 
significant legislative change to be built upon fundamentally flawed logic, which is 
opaque to scrutiny and challenge. Parliamentary processes that flow from the early 
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Charter compliance analysis should act as a safeguard to ensure all policy 
implications are understood, that the effect upon Victorians is debated openly, and 
that legislation is only passed following comprehensive discussion in parliament.   
The deficiencies identified in the analysis of the 2007 and 2010 Statements do not 
relate to their complexity, length or style. There were omissions in the acknowledged 
effect of the proposed banning provisions upon core human rights. Accusations of a 
“ticker box” (DOJ1) approach cannot be levelled at the 2007 Statement. While it is 
hard to argue against the notion that if it is not relevant to discuss then do not discuss 
it, the key point should be how relevance itself is determined. The Department of 
Justice interviewees conceded that the impact assessment process is not necessarily 
objective. This is despite the clear articulation of Charter rights and of appropriate 
policy triggers which should prompt their consideration and assessment. Core human 
rights affected by the banning notice provisions were either not addressed in the 2007 
and 2010 Statements, or were not addressed completely, particularly with respect to 
consideration of the required section 7(2) analysis of the proposed limitations of 
Charter rights. Despite a drive to streamline Statements, the Charter Guidelines are 
unambiguous in their expectation that all Charter requirements will be addressed 
(Department of Justice, 2008b). Each Charter right must be considered in relation to 
each provision of a Bill (VGSO 2007, p.3). How the precise Charter impact of the 
LCRA Bill 2007 and JLA Bill 2010 was determined is unknown. The Cabinet in 
Confidence status of the preliminary impact assessment undertaken for both Bills 
precludes any analysis. The 2007 and 2010 Statements themselves are the only inputs 
to an examination of the Charter rights deemed to be limited by the banning notice 
Bills. Whether other rights were considered in the early impact assessment and then 
dismissed, or were not considered at all, is not known. 
SARC identified concerns about the Charter Act compliance of both the LCRA Bill 
2007 and JLA Bill 2010. Yet both Bills passed through parliament unchanged. The 
documented SARC concerns are missing from both the 2007 and 2010 Statements of 
Compatibility. If thorough assessment of the human rights consequences of the Bills 
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is undertaken early in the development of policy, according to the Charter and its 
Guidelines, then the issues identified by SARC should have been identified in the 
Statements. Victoria’s Charter uses a parliamentary scrutiny model. However, its 
effectiveness is clearly undermined if the scrutiny is insufficient and misses, or 
ignores, key human rights consequences. This weakness confounds 
Williams’ (2007b) hope that the Charter Act would enable more transparent and 
accountable protection of human rights in Victoria. The findings documented in this 
chapter align more with assertions of a disconnect between human rights policy and 
practice, both in general (Landman 2004; Pue 2008; Gearty 2009; Horrigan 2012) 
and in Victoria more specifically (Debeljak 2011; Lau 2012; Hiebert 2012).  
Procedural and timing issues were also evident with respect to both Bills. The SARC 
concerns about the LCRA Bill 2007 received no Ministerial response. There is a 
suggestion of positive procedural changes by the time the JLA Bill 2010 was 
introduced. Most notably the issues raised by SARC did elicit a Ministerial response 
via an Alert Digest. However, the SARC concerns, including the impact of the 
banning provisions upon due process rights and their potentially punitive nature, 
were not sufficient to generate parliamentary discussion or review of the policy 
proposals by the Minister. The power to decide the detail of both banning notice Bills 
remained with the relevant Minister. 
Not only was the Ministerial response to the JLA Bill 2010 dismissive of the 
legitimate concerns highlighted by SARC, it was received after the enactment of the 
Bill. How this facilitates open and effective scrutiny of legislation is unclear. Due to 
the timing of the SARC review processes, their concerns were not visible during 
parliamentary debates of the legislation, and did not feed into an effective analysis of 
the provisions. The Charter compliance of both banning notice Bills was directly 
affected by such timing issues. The SARC concerns regarding the LCRA Bill 2007 
were not addressed at all. The SARC concerns in relation to the JLA Bill 2010 were 
accessible only after the Bill had been approved. Neither scenario is commensurate 
with open and accountable Charter compliance, or effective parliamentary scrutiny.  
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Overall, this chapter has found that the Charter Act compliance processes for the 
LCRA Bill 2007 and JLA Bill 2010 did not ensure a comprehensive assessment of 
the consequences of Victoria’s banning notice provisions for individual rights and 
due process protections. Statements of Compatibility are not routinely debated in 
parliament but their tabling initiates the formal stages of the parliamentary debate of 
legislative proposals. The next chapter provides a detailed examination of the debates 
of the two banning Bills.
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6    Introduction       
A key function of both the Legislative Assembly and Legislative Council is to hold 
the Victorian Government to account for its policies, actions and spending.  
The Parliament of Victoria through its elected representatives is 
accountable to the Victorian community for the provision and conduct of 
representative government in the interests of Victorians (Department of 
Legislative Assembly 2008, p.5). 
Since the passage of the Charter Act in 2006, parliamentary scrutiny of legislative 
provisions includes the specific requirements of Charter compliance in addition to 
the customary debates, discussion and amendment in both Houses and across the 
supporting Committees. The Charter compliance impact assessment produces a 
Statement of Compatibility which is tabled in the Legislative Assembly following the 
introduction and first reading of a Bill.  The substantive cross party debates take 1
place during the second reading phase. The SARC review typically occurs 
concurrently with the debates and should enable Charter related issues to be raised in 
parliament before the final reading of a Bill. Victoria’s bicameral parliament has a 
party structure embodying longstanding ideological differences.  With a clear 2
expectation of parliamentary accountability, it is a reasonable presumption that 
debate will be thorough, robust, visible and exercised in the interests of all Victorians 
to ensure effective scrutiny of legislative proposals. 
Concerns about the Charter compliance of the banning notice provisions were 
documented in Chapter Five. This chapter completes the examination of the 
parliamentary scrutiny of the Liquor Control Reform Amendment Act 2007 (‘LCRA 
Act/Bill 2007’) and the Justice Legislation Amendment (Victims of Crime Assistance 
& Other Matters) Act 2010 (‘JLA Act/Bill 2010’). A functional and thematic analysis 
of the Hansard record of debates and supporting contextual documentation has been 
  See Chapter Five, footnote 2.1
  Labor and the more conservative aligned Liberal/Nationals Coalition are the major political parties 2
in Victoria, with the Greens occupying a more minor role.
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conducted. This has identified significant themes and issues in relation to the rigour 
and balance of the scrutiny of the banning notice Bills. 
This chapter comprises four sections. The first presents an overview of the passage 
of the LCRA Bill 2007 and JLA Bill 2010. The influence of time pressures on each 
Bill is then discussed, with consideration of how the resulting concessions affected 
the detail of the banning notice legislation. The consequences of the documented 
Charter compliance issues in relation to key elements of the banning provisions are 
examined in the third section. Aspects of the parliamentary debates relating to the 
way in which the banning notices undermine individual rights are highlighted, and 
key omissions are identified for each of the two Bills. The final section of this 
chapter considers both Bills together and examines broader considerations, evident 
across the debates, that underpin the parliamentary discourse and influence the detail 
of the resulting banning provisions. There was an embedded assumption that 
‘something must be done’ (Ashworth 2006b; Crawford 2013) to address violence in 
the night-time economy (NTE). In addition, the use of fear to legitimise the 
prioritisation of community protection over individual rights, the notion of ‘them’ 
and ‘us’ in relation to the need for and consequences of banning, and the conflation 
of intent and punishment all combined to shape the way in which balance was 
applied to the banning notice legislation. 
6.1  The Passage of the Banning Notice Bills 
6.1.i  Liquor Control Reform Amendment Bill 2007 
The LCRA Bill was introduced in the Legislative Assembly on 3 October 2007, with 
the Statement of Compatibility tabled on 1 November 2007, and the pivotal second 
reading debates on 21-22 November 2007. The Labor proponents of the Bill asserted 
its need and presumed effectiveness. However, Liberal and Nationals opposition 
members, such as Asher (Liberal) and Ryan (Nationals), were more circumspect. 
Specific concern was raised by opposition speakers about the absence of any appeal 
mechanism and of possible consequences for vulnerable groups, such as Indigenous 
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and homeless Victorians. The risk that the banning measures may not address the 
underlying issues relating to anti-social behaviour in the NTE was also noted. Table 
6.1 summarises the key stages of parliamentary approval, highlighting in particular 
the rapid movement of the Bill between the Houses on 5-6 December 2007. 
Table 6.1: Passage of the LCRA Bill 2007 through the Victorian Parliament 
Following the introduction of the Bill to the Legislative Council on 22 November 
2007 a number of amendments were proposed during the second reading on 5-6 
December 2007. Ten amendments related directly to aspects of the banning 
provisions, three of which concerned the most contentious part of the Bill: the 
absence of a mechanism to appeal receipt of a banning notice. Six of the ten 
proposals generated no comment. Discussion of the other four was limited to simple 
statements of support or opposition. The actual issues to which each amendment 
pertained, or their potential consequences, were not debated. Six amendments were 
approved by the Legislative Council on 6 December 2007, and the Bill was returned 
to the Legislative Assembly for review on the same day. Three of the six 
amendments were passed with little substantive input from the Assembly members. 
The remaining three amendments, all of which related to the right of judicial appeal, 
House Parliamentary Stage Date
Legislative Assembly Introduction 
First Reading 
Statement of Compatibility 
Second Reading 
Third Reading
3 October 2007 
1 November 2007 
21-22 November 2007 
22 November 2007
Legislative Council Introduction 
First Reading 
Statement of Compatibility 
Second Reading 
Legislation Committee
22 November 2007 
5-6 December 2007 
5-6 December 2007
Legislative Assembly Second Reading; Amendments from Council 6 December 2007
Legislative Council Second Reading; Amendments returned from 
Assembly 
Third Reading
6 December 2007
Royal Assent 18 December 2007
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elicited the most expansive discussion of the entire legislative process. However, 
despite the articulation of a number of concerns, the LCRA Bill 2007 was passed on 
18 December 2007. 
6.1.ii  Justice Legislation Amendment (Victims of Crime & Other 
Matters) Bill, 2010                                                  
The JLA Bill 2010 contained multiple legislative provisions, only one of which 
related to the increase in the permissible length of banning notices to 72 hours. The 
Bill was introduced to the Legislative Assembly on 23 March 2010, and moved 
through the Assembly and Council phases with minimal delay and with no 
amendments relevant to the banning provisions. The passage of the JLA Bill 2010 is 
summarised in table 6.2.  
Table 6.2: Passage of the JLA Bill 2010 through the Victorian Parliament 
Two key matters were raised in the debate of the JLA Bill 2010. Firstly, concern was 
expressed for banning notice recipients who may need to travel to work through a 
designated area from which they are banned. Secondly, the risk of ongoing temporal 
and spatial extension of banning notices, beyond 72 hours and the current delineation 
of designated areas, was highlighted. The potential impact of banning notices upon 
House Parliamentary Stage Date
Legislative Assembly Introduction 
First Reading 
Statement of Compatibility 
Second Reading 
Appropriation Message 
Second Reading (continued) 
Third Reading
23 March 2010 
25 March 2010 
13 April 2010 
14-15 April 2010 
15 April 2010
Legislative Council Introduction 
First Reading 
Statement of Compatibility 
Second Reading 
Second Reading (continued)
15 April 2010 
6 May 2010
Royal Assent 18 May 2010
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vulnerable groups and the lack of appeal against such police-imposed orders, a key 
part of the discourse in 2007, were not mentioned in 2010. 
Only one member (Pennicuik, Green Party), during the second reading debate in the 
Legislative Council on 6 May 2010, raised specific concerns about freedom of 
movement and the lack of evidence supporting the effectiveness of banning as a 
mechanism to address disorder in the NTE. Both issues were dismissed by 
Government speakers. No discussion was forthcoming and no questions were 
answered. A clear absence of openness directly limited the scrutiny of the banning 
provisions.  No other significant reference was made across the 2010 debates to 
individual rights, procedural due process or the use of discretionary summary justice 
by police. Both main parties, the Labor Government and Liberal/Nationals Coalition, 
embedded their contributions with an assumption that banning notices work, and 
affect only those who deserve them. 
6.2  Parliamentary Scrutiny: Too Little Time? 
Before examining how the core components of Victoria’s banning notices were 
debated and justified in 2007 and 2010, the specific effect of limited parliamentary 
time is considered. Chapter Five noted issues related to the timing of the SARC 
review of the banning provisions, which contributed to the ineffectiveness of the 
Charter compliance processes. Additional time pressures were a key characteristic 
across the parliamentary debates of both Bills.  
6.2.i  Liquor Control Reform Amendment Bill, 2007 
The LCRA Bill was passed on the final parliamentary sitting day of 2007. 
Examination of Hansard reveals a tangible and building pressure to pass the Bill 
throughout the amendment debate in the Legislative Assembly on 6 December 2007. 
A determination was evident that the Bill be enacted before the end of the sitting 
year, in readiness for the Christmas and New Year period, when summer weather and 
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long evenings combine to produce optimum conditions conducive to late night 
drinking. The Attorney-General Hulls was unambiguous in his expectations: “we will 
ensure that the legislation gets through in time to implement its recommendations 
prior to the new year” (Legislative Assembly 2007d, 4404). 
During the earlier second reading debate Jasper, an Assembly member for the 
Nationals, had expressed frustration about the amount of parliamentary business 
expected to be dealt with in a short time. He noted the impact this had on the depth 
of debate and limitations on discussion of specific legislative details. 
These days we are in a situation where five, six, seven or eight Bills are 
debated over the three day period of the sitting week… It is disappointing 
that we do not have time to deal with the general provisions of legislation 
in the second-reading debate and then debate the specific clauses and 
various amendments… (Legislative Assembly 2007b, 4005). 
The ensuing parliamentary discourse was embedded with an implication from 
Government speakers that any insistence on proposed amendments, with the 
presumed concomitant delay to the passage of the Bill, was tantamount to a green 
light to alcohol-related anti-social behaviour on the streets. Proponents of 
amendments were accused of giving tacit support to “people who are drunk charging 
around the suburbs...” (Legislative Assembly 2007d, 4405 [Batchelor, Labor]). 
Batchelor accused the Liberal opposition, with its support of amendments, of 
trying to wreak havoc by allowing drunks and people who are drug 
affected to rampage through our communities, venues, shopping centres, 
neighbourhoods and streets, and we are not prepared to stand for that 
(4405).  
Attorney-General Hulls referenced media coverage of the 2007 Bill in the Herald 
Sun.  He stated “we all know that alcohol-related violence around licensed premises 3
should not be tolerated” (Legislative Assembly 2007d, 4404). Hulls claimed that by 
insisting on amendments the Liberal party in the Legislative Council wanted 
… to oppose this legislation that would indeed ban drunks and 
troublemakers from particular areas… The fact is that the Liberal Party 
  The Herald Sun is a daily tabloid newspaper based in Melbourne. It has the widest circulation and 3
readership in Australia (Roy Morgan Research, 2014).
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have been dragged kicking and screaming as a result of the exposure in 
today’s Herald Sun (4404) 
This perspective was refuted by the Liberal party. Assembly member McIntosh 
maintained that their support for the Bill was absolute. 
We were not opposing this legislation. Yes, we had concerns... However, 
the most important thing is that at the end of the day we all have to work 
together to get this important piece of legislation through, because it is 
critical (Legislative Assembly 2007d, 4404). 
The explicit time pressures during the debates of the LCRA Bill 2007 led to openly 
articulated compromises around the most hotly contested amendments: judicial 
appeal following the imposition of a banning notice. Despite evident and principled 
support for a right of appeal, time pressure alone caused both Liberal and Nationals 
members to concede the amendments and agree to their removal. Liberal member 
Napthine expressed the willingness to compromise. 
There are some proposals that the Liberal party has put and firmly 
believes in, but is prepared to compromise on in the interests of getting 
the legislation through... (Legislative Assembly 2007d, 4403). 
Nationals member Ryan asserted his support for the proposed amendments, but 
conceded them to ensure passage of the Bill. 
... as a matter of principle we think the amendments themselves are 
common sense and sensible... but again in the spirit of concessions being 
made to get this to where we all want it to go, we will not object... 
(Legislative Assembly 2007d, 4405). 
Liberal member O’Brien reiterated the importance of passing the Bill before the 
sitting year ended. In doing so, he explicitly compromised a key point of principle 
regarding the right of judicial appeal to the overriding need to pass the Bill. 
We are not prepared to stand in the way of the passage of this Bill 
because we want to make sure that it can be implemented in time for 
Christmas… We have indicated all along that we believe it is important 
that this legislation go through this house. For that reason we are not 
going to insist on this amendment [for a right of appeal]... (Legislative 
Assembly 2007d, 4405-6). 
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Compromises were made openly to enable the LCRA Bill 2007 to be passed before 
the end of the parliamentary year. Key principles, reflecting fundamental individual 
rights, were conceded as a result of time pressures. The specific effect of the 
compromises upon the enacted legislation, and the consequences for individual 
rights, is examined later in this chapter.  
6.2.ii  Justice Legislation Amendment (Victims of Crime & Other 
Matters) Bill, 2010                                 
Time pressure was evident again in the parliamentary debates of the JLA Bill 2010. 
In stating the business of the house on 13 April 2010, the Minister for Energy and 
Resources, Batchelor, outlined the order of the day: six bills, including the JLA Bill, 
were to be completed by 4pm on 15 April 2010 (Legislative Assembly 2010b, 1201). 
While not opposed in principle, this timeline elicited concern from a Liberal 
respondent. 
 I put on record that we were profoundly concerned about the 
Government business program on the last occasion… In particular a 
number of opposition speakers…are still to speak on the Justice 
Legislation Amendment (Victims of Crime Assistance and Other Matters) 
Bill, and that… many members had their allocated time cut short… 
(Legislative Assembly 2010b, 1202 [McIntosh, Liberal]). 
These concerns were echoed by other speakers. Nationals member Delahunty noted 
that the time permitted was insufficient to ensure appropriate debate. 
I raised a concern then that I did not believe we could get through the 
business program in an appropriate amount of time to allow members, 
particularly the country members from across Victoria, the opportunity to 
debate on matters of importance to them… (Legislative Assembly 2010b, 
1203). 
Liberal member Hodgett reiterated the need to allow time to debate the various Bills 
properly. 
I trust adequate time will be allowed for members to be able to make 
their contributions to the debate on these important bills (Legislative 
Assembly 2010b, 1203). 
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As well as the lack of overall time, throughout the Legislative Assembly second 
reading debate concern is evident regarding limitations imposed on the length of 
speeches. Each speaker received a reduced time allocation, which diminished the 
opportunity for detailed discussion of the Bill. Labor member Thomson noted the 
impact on what could be said about the JLA Bill 2010. “I am not going to go through 
the Bill in detail because I only have 10 minutes” (Legislative Assembly 2010c, 
1322). Another Labor member, Richardson, prefaced comments with “… in the brief 
time I have available to me...” (Legislative Assembly 2010c, 1326). Liberal member 
Asher wanted “to use my limited time to draw something to the attention of the 
house...” (Legislative Assembly 2010c, 1327). 
More significantly, in the context of parliamentary scrutiny, support for the JLA Bill 
2010 was assured from the main opposition parties before the second reading was 
debated in the Legislative Council. Reflecting the deadline set for the passage of the 
Bill, the Liberal/Nationals coalition agreed not to oppose the legislation, despite 
concerns they had with other provisions in the Bill. 
The Liberal-Nationals coalition has resolved they will not oppose this 
legislation. We are concerned about a couple of matters (Legislative 
Council 2010, 1811 [Rich-Phillips, Liberal]).  
The prior agreement to pass the JLA Bill 2010, combined with the time pressures and 
specific limits imposed on individual contributions, compromised the rigour of the 
parliamentary debates. 
A key function of Victoria’s Parliament is to scrutinise the detail of legislative 
proposals. While acknowledging the need for swift and responsive government, the 
Victorian Equal Opportunity and Human Rights Commission (VEOHRC) 
emphasised the importance of thorough parliamentary analysis, even for the most 
urgent legislative measures.
The commission recognises that there are occasions when governments 
must act quickly, but believes that compliance with the human rights 
vetting procedures stipulated in the Charter does not place a fetter upon 
government dealing with issues quickly and decisively… Indeed, 
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thorough review might be regarded as being most critical and valuable 
when legislation has had to be developed hastily (VEOHRC 2010, p.96). 
The affect of the time pressures on the specific provisions enacted in both Bills, and 
the consequences for the individual rights of banning notice recipients, are 
considered in the next section. 
6.3  Parliamentary Scrutiny: Banning Notices & Individual 
Rights 
The speed of the passage of both the LCRA Bill 2007 and JLA Bill 2010, together 
with the limits upon the scope and breadth of debate, directly affected the detail of 
the resulting legislative provisions. The parliamentary debates of key issues relating 
to the individual rights of banning notice recipients are examined for each Bill. 
6.3.i  Liquor Control Reform Amendment Bill, 2007 
The LCRA Act 2007 gave police officers a discretionary, on-the-spot power to 
exclude individuals from a defined area for a period not exceeding 24 hours 
(s148B(1,2)). Banning notices were presented to Victoria’s Parliament as a 
straightforward response to alcohol-related disorder, and a sensible addition to the 
options available to police officers on the street. Notwithstanding the validity of the 
stated ‘need’ to address behaviours in the NTE, a number of significant features are 
embedded within the banning provisions and the powers afforded to police officers. 
The LCRA Bill 2007 was passed despite flaws and anomalies in the process of 
Charter compliance, and with clear compromises resulting from limited 
parliamentary time to debate the provisions.  
The legislation provided Victoria Police with a discretionary power that undermines 
individual rights and limits established procedural due process expectations. The 
permissible pre-emptive application of banning notices changed typical burden of 
proof requirements, and their immediate imposition combined to create a number of 
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issues of concern. Each carries the potential to limit personal freedoms and 
procedural due process in the implementation of banning notices. Significantly there 
is no right to appeal against the imposition of a banning notice, while their breach 
may initiate penalties and further criminal proceedings, which include fines and even 
imprisonment. It is reasonable to expect that each aspect of the Bill would be 
scrutinised carefully before enactment, particularly given the passage of the Charter 
Act and the mandated emphasis upon human rights compliance. The following 
sections examine the parliamentary debate of the four key elements of the banning 
legislation: pre-emptive policing; police-imposed punishment; absence of 
independent appeal; and breach provisions. The specific ways in which the 
parliamentary debates justified the enhanced police powers and the potential effect 
upon recipients of banning notices, in terms of underlying due process rights and 
protections in the administration of justice, are discussed.   
6.3.i(a)  Pre-Emptive         
Specified offences for which a banning notice may be imposed are documented 
within the LCRA Act 2007. They include offences against the person, sexual 
offences, destroying or damaging property, trespass, offences relating to 
drunkenness, offensive and obscene behaviour, assault, possession of prohibited 
weapons and failure to leave licensed premises (LCRA Act 2007, s7 schedule 2).  4
However, the use of banning notices is not limited to these specified offences. A ban 
can be imposed for more general disorderly or anti-social behaviours, as perceived 
by police officers. The lack of objectivity in the definition of such conduct 
personifies concerns expressed about the criminalisation of subjectively assessed 
behaviours (Garrett 2007; Van Wick 2011). Police may also issue banning notices in 
anticipation of a problematic, disorderly or anti-social behaviour. A ban may be 
imposed pre-emptively, if a police officer believes that it will be effective in 
preventing the commission of an offence. Crucially though, no actual offence need 
  Why an individual accused of a serious crime, such as a sexual offence, would be banned rather 4
than arrested is unclear, but is not explored here.
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necessarily have been committed. There is also no requirement in the legislation for a 
police officer to prove that an offence has been committed or to objectively 
demonstrate intent to commit an offence. Clear parallels are evident with the 
concerns raised in relation to pre-emptive criminalisation by, for example, Zedner 
(2007c), Crawford (2009), and Hallsworth and Lea (2011). 
The permissible pre-emptive imposition of banning notices was acknowledged by 
some speakers during parliamentary debate of the LCRA Bill 2007. While 
foreshadowing a demand for the right of appeal against the imposition of a banning 
notice, the potential for pre-emptive application of the legislation was implied by one 
Liberal member. 
 I note in relation to banning notices ... it is specifically stated that there is 
no requirement on a police officer to then charge you with the offence 
that the officer used as the basis of giving you the banning notice ...there 
is no requirement for a police officer to follow through and charge that 
individual... I think that is an oversight. I think this is a very serious 
issue... (Legislative Assembly 2007b, 4001 [O’Brien, Liberal]). 
O’Brien identified that if no follow-up is necessary by police, no evidence of an 
offence will be required, so no actual offence need necessarily be committed. 
However, there was no parliamentary discussion of the merits of this approach, nor 
was there consideration of the effect of such pre-emptive provisions upon established 
judicial principles, or that punishment typically results, post-hoc, from an actual 
behaviour. Despite O’Brien’s articulation of concern, in all the subsequent 
parliamentary debates there was no analysis of the risks of pre-emptive imposition. 
In fact, in her denouncement of concerns about the consequences of banning notice 
imposition, one Labor member used the lack of any requirement to follow up the 
banning notice as a positive aspect of the Bill. 
 … the consequences for a person of that ban are only that ban... A police 
officer is not required to charge a person with the underlying offence 
(Legislative Assembly 2007b, 4007 [Green, Labor]). 
The pre-emptive capabilities were acknowledged more explicitly by another Labor 
speaker, who stated that a ban “is just a precautionary measure to allow police to 
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control an area” (Legislative Assembly 2007c, 4072 [Thomson, Labor]). She then 
asserted the useful nature of this provision. 
 We believe this bill is a balanced response to what is occurring in and 
around licensed premises… It gives police the ability to take immediate 
action to avoid abusive situations occurring (4073).  
Thomson explicitly promoted the presumption of balance within the banning notice 
provisions. In addition, her use of the term ‘abusive’ is apposite, and the pre-emptive 
nature of a ban was regarded as an inherently positive feature. The on-the-spot police 
power to pre-empt and therefore prevent undesirable situations was applauded by 
Thomson. However, she did not expand on what was meant by ‘abusive situations’. 
Such diffuse terminology embodies a key criticism of the increasing scope of 
discretionary police powers, that may target actions that do not necessarily pass the 
threshold of criminality (Crawford 2003; Belina 2007; Ashworth & Zedner 2011; 
Crofts & Witzleb 2011). It enabled Thomson to emphasise her point powerfully, but 
subjectively.  
The Minister for Environment and Climate Change stated what he regarded as the 
core purpose of the banning notice component of the LCRA Bill 2007. 
 … the Bill will enable police to ban troublemakers... for a period of 24 
hours where police reasonably suspect that person has committed a 
specified offence involving violence or disorderly behaviour (Legislative 
Council 2007a, 3668 [Jennings, Labor]). 
Council member Jennings referenced the specified offences noted in the Bill, 
particularly those related to drunkenness, offensive and obscene behaviours. 
However, he did not comment on the fact that banning notices can be issued in 
anticipation of behaviours leading to specified offences. Jennings also did not define 
more precisely what he meant by the term troublemaker. Like the phrase ‘abusive 
situation’ used by Labor member Thomson, troublemaker is a subjective label that 
conveys a range of possible behaviours, but which is difficult to measure or define 
objectively. 
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Some confusion was evident in the debate of the LCRA Bill 2007 regarding when a 
banning notice would be imposed. In supporting the legislation, one Legislative 
Council member stated that 
 I expect that the police will be sufficiently qualified to identify 
troublemakers who pose a threat as opposed to the great majority of 
people who are simply there to have a good night out (Legislative 
Council 2007b, 3885 [Drum, Nationals]).  
Drum approved of the pre-emptive nature of the banning provisions in managing 
those who pose a threat. He also presumed that police officers would be able to 
single out those who are a risk to the broader community. Again, Drum did not 
clarify what is meant by the term ‘troublemakers’, but assumed that police officers 
will interpret and apply it effectively. This expectation is contrary to Van Wijck’s 
(2011) contention that police assessment of behaviour is inherently subjective, 
unstructured and lacks clarity. Across the debate of the LCRA Bill 2007, even when 
the pre-emptive capacity of banning notice imposition was recognised, there was 
very limited consideration of the potential consequences for individual rights. 
6.3.i(b)  Burden of Proof and Immediate Imposition 
Imposition of a banning notice requires that a police officer suspects “on reasonable 
grounds” (LCRA Act 2007, s148B) that an offence has been committed or is likely to 
be committed. There is no requirement for police to objectively demonstrate intent to 
commit an offence. The burden of proof requires that officers “suspect that a person 
is committing or has committed a specified offence wholly or partly in the designated 
area” (LCRA Act 2007, s148B). Behaviours for which banning notices may be 
imposed are loosely drawn and largely subjective. They are embodied in terms such 
as ‘disorderly’, ‘anti-social’, ‘quarrelsome’, or as Labor Assembly member Thomson 
suggests, ‘abusive’. What each of these terms means in the context of objectively 
measured behaviours is unclear, and subject to police discretion. No proof, evidence 
or witnesses are required, which adds to the fluidity and subjectivity of the 
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behaviours that may lead to a ban. Significantly, this aspect of the banning legislation 
was not addressed at all in any of the parliamentary debates.  
The use of the label ‘troublemakers’ by speakers such as Labor Council member 
Jennings and Nationals member Drum, highlights the lack of objectivity inherent in 
determining what type of behaviour will lead to a banning notice response. With the 
exception of specified offences, the vagueness of terms such as ‘troublemaker’, ‘anti-
social’, ‘quarrelsome’ or ‘abusive’ was not resolved in any of the parliamentary 
debates. The complexity of notions of harm and offence, that their perception is 
dependent upon multiple contextual factors, and their relevance to the criminalisation 
of behaviours (Feinberg 1984, 1985; Hillyard et al. 2004; Von Hirsch & Simester 
2006) was not discussed by any speaker in either House. 
The only context in which the use of police discretion in the imposition of a banning 
notice was noted in 2007 related to concern about the effect upon vulnerable groups. 
Greens member Hartland raised a number of potential risks for disadvantaged 
groups, in which she specifically included homeless and Indigenous persons. 
Hartland expressed concern about police officers using banning as an alternative to 
laying charges, thereby avoiding the need for a higher level of evidence. She 
highlighted the risk that homeless people would be unable to access essential 
services if banned from the Melbourne CBD, or other urban centres. Hartland’s 
solution was an amendment that would trigger a review of the banning provisions “if 
any disadvantaged group is shown to be adversely affected by the 
bans...” (Legislative Council 2007b, 3882). However, Hartland’s concerns were not 
picked up by any other speaker, and her amendment was unsuccessful. 
The banning notice sanction is imposed immediately and recipients are compelled to 
accept the notice. Anyone to whom a banning notice is to be given must provide their 
name and address to the requesting police officer. They must not refuse “without a 
reasonable excuse” (LCRA Act 2007, s148D), and must not give false or misleading 
details. Penalties exist for non-compliance, but what is meant by a 'reasonable 
excuse' is not objectively articulated in the Bill or the parliamentary debates. The 
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legislation also affords police officers the necessary powers to use “reasonable force” 
to ensure the banned person leaves the designated area. (LCRA Act 2007, s148H). 
These aspects of the banning notice provisions were not mentioned at all in any of 
the parliamentary debates in 2007. 
6.3.i(c)  Judicial Appeal              
The most intensive debate of the LCRA Bill 2007 was in relation to the due process 
right of appeal against the imposition of a banning notice. The Bill permitted no clear 
right of judicial appeal. Only one avenue was available for a recipient to appeal the 
impact of a banning notice upon their freedom of movement, or it its perceived 
validity. A written notice can be submitted to a police officer above the rank of 
sergeant, who may “vary or revoke a banning notice at any time” (LCRA Act 2007, 
s148E). 
The failure of the Charter compliance processes to identify the absence of judicial 
appeal rights in the LCRA Bill 2007 was noted in Chapter Five. However, the lack of 
a right of appeal generated considerable parliamentary debate. Despite absolute 
Government support for the “substantially increased powers to address that sad but 
growing element of reckless alcohol-induced violence” (Legislative Assembly 
2007c, 4077 [Foley, Labor]), during the second readings of the Bill in both the 
Legislative Assembly and Legislative Council concerns were expressed “in relation 
to judicial review and civil liberties” (Legislative Assembly 2007c, 4086 [Asher, 
Liberal]). Specific objections were raised in the Legislative Assembly, and were 
reiterated throughout the parliamentary debates. While offering general support to 
the Bill, Liberal member O’Brien noted that “it gives significant powers to... Victoria 
Police, but it provides inadequate supervision to ensure these powers are exercised 
properly” (Legislative Assembly 2007b, 3999). He went on to articulate a 
fundamental concern about the quasi-criminal nature of banning notices, that carry a 
penalty but which cannot be challenged in court.  
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Something like a banning notice… would go on the LEAP  database. It is 5
therefore quasi-criminal in nature. I am deeply disturbed by the prospect 
that the only method of challenge open to somebody who receives a 
banning notice, which is quasi-criminal in nature, is to appeal to another 
member of the police force …Any individual could come out of a hotel 
and for whatever reason catch the eye of a police officer who then 
believed that a banning notice would be appropriate. That individual 
could apply to a senior sergeant to have it revoked, but if that was 
unsuccessful that person would have a quasi-criminal stain on their 
record which could not be removed. That is absolutely unacceptable in 
the view of the opposition. Anybody who is challenged in this way as to 
their conduct should have the right to have their day in court (4000-4001) 
O’Brien encapsulated a key issue with the formulation of the banning notice powers, 
that enable intent to be presumed and punishment to follow, but which cannot be 
independently reviewed. While acknowledging the practicality of issuing a 24 hour 
ban but then permitting an appeal against it, Nationals member Jasper urged caution 
“to make sure that we do not go too far in encroaching on people’s 
activities” (Legislative Assembly 2007b, 4005). Another Liberal speaker reiterated 
the concern expressed by O’Brien, and provided an overview of objections in 
relation to individual rights and possible enduring consequences of the imposition of 
a banning notice. 
 The aim of this Bill is laudable... however we have a number of concerns 
in relation to judicial review and civil liberties... Police can issue a 
banning notice for up to 24 hours. The banning notice can be varied only 
by another police officer with a rank above sergeant. There are no court 
appeals. So we have a situation where a police officer can issue a 
banning notice that is reviewable only by another police officer... given 
that we have been advised that this offence will appear on a person’s 
record and go onto the law enforcement assistance program database... 
that a banning notice should be reviewed by the Victorian Civil and 
Administrative Tribunal (Legislative Assembly 2007c, 4086 [Asher, 
Liberal]). 
Asher issued a more general note of concern about changes to the nature of police 
powers inherent in the proposed legislation: “Police do need powers, but there are 
key areas where I think the Government has gone too far” (4087). Asher made clear 
 See Chapter 2, footnote 21.5
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her worry that the powers afforded to Victoria Police through the banning provisions 
affected individual rights in ways that are not acceptable and for which sufficient 
checks and balances were not in place.  
Those objecting to the lack of appeal provision in the LCRA Bill 2007 put forward a 
number of possible solutions to ensure safeguards and enable procedural balance. 
The fact that details relating to recipients of bans may be stored indefinitely on the 
Victoria Police LEAP database prompted suggestions such as appeals to the 
administrative tribunal body VCAT  (Legislative Assembly 2007c, 4086  [Asher, 6
Liberal]), or a right to demand a court-based appeal (Legislative Council 2007b, 
3862 [Lovell, Liberal]) where a genuine concern exists about the appropriateness of 
a particular ban. Repeated attempts were made to secure amendments to enable 
review of banning notices via a mechanism other than another police officer. 
Speakers for the Labor Government were resolute in their opposition to a right of 
appeal. Practical considerations were deemed to render appeals impossible. The fact 
that banning notices are “only for 24 hours” and carry no consequences of note for 
those who comply made a right of appeal “totally impractical” and unnecessary 
(Legislative Assembly 2007b, 4007 [Green, Labor]). The need to address an 
immediate concern about disorderly behaviours in the NTE was adjudged by 
Government members to outweigh any risk of the misuse of banning provisions by 
the police.  
Amendments to permit judicial appeal so that a banning notice decision may be 
reviewed and a record potentially expunged from an individual's LEAP database 
entry were narrowly approved in the Legislative Council, by 20 votes to 18 
(Legislative Council 2007b, 3891). Due process concern was evident during the 
subsequent amendment debates in the Legislative Assembly, manifested as support 
for the right to a court-based appeal against a banning notice. Liberal member 
O’Brien drew a parallel with other infringement provisions. 
 The Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) is an independent process for dispute 6
resolution in Victoria, comprising civil, administrative and human rights divisions.  
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We believe that if you can challenge a parking fine in court, you should 
be able to challenge a banning order in court (Legislative Assembly 
2007d, 4405). 
 Nationals member Ryan offered a more principled rationale. 
… the notion of a banning notice being issued in the manner which is 
contemplated by the bill is something which ought as a general principle 
carry a right of appeal… (Legislative Assembly 2007d, 4405). 
Liberal Assembly member Clark noted the risk of not permitting an appeal against 
on-the-spot decisions by police officers which may be made in error. 
But it is simply a question of justice, and as much as we might like to 
think otherwise, not all police officers act perfectly on all occasions. I am 
sure there are many members on the other side of the house who, in 
many different contexts, would support the need for and the importance 
of citizens having the right to apply for review and redress in instances 
where they believe the police have acted inappropriately (Legislative 
Assembly 2007d, 4409). 
Parliamentarians opposing the right of judicial appeal dismissed these concerns, cited 
the non-criminal nature of banning notices and considered the immediate 
consequences of a spatial ban to be minimal for recipients. The possible 
disproportionate effect of banning upon the homeless or Indigenous people was 
disregarded. Labor Minister for Planning Madden asserted that “these are basically 
operational issues and were not considered as priorities in terms of the operation of 
this legislation” (Legislative Council 2007b, 3894). The primacy of control and 
public safety were upheld by proponents of the Bill, with banning notices “just a 
precautionary measure to allow police to control an area” (Legislative Assembly 
2007c, 4072 [Thomson, Labor]). Thomson even asserted that 24 hour bans are 
a good provision, and it seems foolhardy to suggest that a person should 
be able to appeal it... One would suggest that if someone is so concerned 
about it, maybe they should have been banned for 24 hours (4072). 
Despite principled support for a right to review banning notice imposition, 
amendments to permit judicial appeal were overturned in the Legislative Assembly 
as part of openly articulated concessions to ensure timely passage of the LCRA Bill 
2007 through Parliament on the last sitting day of 2007. Liberal member Clark was 
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incredulous at the lack of concern for individual rights shown by Attorney-General 
Hulls in his opposition to appeal amendments. However, despite his support of a 
right of appeal, even Clark conceded the point to ensure passage of the Bill before 
Christmas. 
… how absolutely appalling it is for the Attorney-General to be seeking 
to deny to citizens a right of appeal to the courts to clear their name and 
to have the law upheld…we have never been saying that a banning notice 
should not be able to take effect. The point of this amendment that we 
have been arguing is that a person has the right to have the issue referred 
to the court and determined…We have indicated all along that we believe 
it is important that this legislation go through the house. For that reason 
we are not going to insist on this amendment (Legislative Assembly 
2007d, 4406).  
The time pressures evident across the debates, and the continued insistence upon the 
need to address the problem of alcohol-related violence and disorder in the NTE 
superseded what, in every other context of a charge or imposition of a penalty, is the 
fundamental right of appeal. Pressure to pass the Bill before the end of the 
parliamentary year curtailed debate of the impact of banning notices upon individual 
rights, and insistence upon a right of appeal was conceded to ensure swift enactment 
of the Bill. 
The failure to identify the absence of appeal rights in the 2007 Statement of 
Compatibility  is highlighted by the rigour of subsequent parliamentary debate of the 7
consequences for individual rights of not allowing judicial appeal of a banning 
notice. That the issue of appeal was identified in the parliamentary debates does 
suggest some diligence in the parliamentary scrutiny that took place. However, 
despite documented opposition to the erosion of individual rights, the evident 
concern was subsumed by time driven political expedience. 
  Despite the Charter Guidelines making it clear that infringement notices, which like banning 7
notices are not criminal charges, should be subject to a clear right of appeal, this was not addressed 
in the 2007 Statement with respect to the imposition of a banning notice.
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6.3.i(d)  Breach Proceedings          
Breach proceedings may be initiated if a banning recipient is caught re-entering the 
area from which they are banned. Concern about the reverse onus provisions in the 
LCRA Bill 2007 was noted in the SARC review (SARC, 2007).  However, no 8
response from the Government was forthcoming in relation to SARC’s concerns, and 
the issue was not discussed or debated further in parliament. The reverse onus 
requirement was acknowledged in the 2007 Statement, as was the impact upon the 
right to be presumed innocent. However, no alternative approach was considered, 
and the need to ensure successful prosecution of breaches was prioritised in the 2007 
Statement.  
If the burden [of proof] were on the prosecution, it would be too easy to 
escape liability…Less restrictive means would not achieve the purpose of 
the provisions as effectively (Legislative Assembly 2007a, 3818 
[Robinson, Labor]). 
The Charter Guidelines, while requiring careful examination of any provisions which 
impose a reverse onus burden, note that 
if it is clearly easier and more practical for an accused to prove a fact 
than for the prosecution to disprove it, a reverse onus provision may be 
justifiable” (Department of Justice 2008b, p.159).  
The level of potential penalty for a reverse onus offence is weighed against the 
likelihood that the right to be presumed innocent has been breached (p.159). While a 
case can be made to support the reverse onus requirement with respect to banning 
notice breaches, that this aspect was not debated at all is an indication of the limited 
extent of parliamentary scrutiny of the banning provisions. 
Although no court appeal is possible following the imposition of a banning notice, 
access to judicial proceedings is permitted when a recipient is accused of breaching 
their notice. Despite the reverse onus concerns, the breach of a banning notice is 
regarded as a criminal offence and full due process rights are therefore enabled 
(LCRA Act 2007, s148F). There is some irony that the reasons for the imposition of a 
  Discussed in Chapter Five.8
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ban, which may involve perceived or actual disorderly behaviours, may only be 
appealed to a more senior police officer, but the fact of a breach by unlawfully 
entering a designated space carries full judicial and procedural protections. Parallels 
can be drawn with Anti-Social Behaviour Order (ASBO) proscriptions and 
prohibitions, breaches of which may also lead to the criminalisation of otherwise 
non-criminal behaviours (Crawford, 2003; Crofts & Witzleb, 2011). 
6.3.ii  Justice Legislation Amendment (Victims of Crime & Other 
Matters) Bill, 2010                                                                                   
A key feature of the 2010 JLA Bill was the extension of the permissible length of a 
banning notice, from 24 to 72 hours. This section examines the parliamentary 
debates in 2010 and whether there was any re-assessment of the due process issues 
arising from the original banning Bill. 
In their review of the 2010 JLA Bill, SARC had raised a number of relevant and 
pressing concerns.  9
 The committee is concerned that the use of 72-hour banning notices to 
deter people who are repeatedly suspected of offences in a designated 
area may amount to punishment of suspected criminal behaviour by 
police officers without a charge, trial or appeal and therefore may engage 
the Charter’s rights with respect to criminal punishment, including a fair 
hearing by an independent tribunal, the presumption of innocence and the 
right to appeal to a court (SARC 2010b, p.13). 
However, the due process procedural issues embedded within the banning provisions 
introduced in 2007, and identified in 2010 by SARC, were largely ignored. The 
second reading debates in both the Legislative Assembly and Legislative Council 
focused primarily on the ‘re-balancing’ discourse of community protection and fear 
to justify the need to extend banning notices to 72 hours. This aspect of the debate is 
discussed in detail later in this chapter. 
  Discussed in Chapter Five.9
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Only one member, speaking for the Greens (Pennicuik), articulated any concerns 
during the debates about the effect of banning notices upon individual rights. In the 
Legislative Council, Pennicuik referenced SARC’s review of the JLA Bill 2010. As 
well as the increasing temporal scope of banning notices, she noted the summary and 
subjective way in which bans can be imposed, that requires no actual offence and no 
evidence to be produced. Pennicuik highlighted these significant issues for the first 
time in any parliamentary debate of either banning notice Bill. 
It is quite capable, because of its wide construction and hence 
application, of unnecessarily capturing the behaviour of people who are 
not a threat to themselves or any other person… increasing police powers 
or adopting a more draconian approach… do not lead to a solution; the 
solution requires the creation of a more just society and a multi faceted 
approach to problems… the offence of disorderly conduct... is 
insufficiently defined in the legislation, it will be up to the individual 
police officer to decide who is and who is not engaging in disorderly 
conduct (Legislative Council 2010, 1814). 
In response, a Labor member openly supported the pre-emptive nature of banning 
provisions, and cited the effectiveness of banning to prevent disorderly behaviour.  
The banning provisions have been working very well. They are a great 
way of pre-empting individuals who might be drunk and disorderly and 
who are likely to commit a crime and removing them from an area 
(Legislative Council 2010, 1816 [Tee, Labor]). 
Pennicuik (Greens) pressed the Government for more specific information. 
On what evidence is the Government proposing to extend the number of 
hours, given the significant infringement it has on a person’s right of 
movement? (Legislative Council 2010, 1816).  
The Government response was evasive and predicated upon a clear assumption that a 
problem of alcohol-related anti-social behaviour was prevalent in the NTE and 
banning was the way to address it. 
The banning provisions have been working very well …The evidence has 
been that the banning notice has proved to be a very effective tool for 
diffusing a dangerous situation (Legislative Council 2010, 1817 [Tee, 
Labor]). 
Pennicuik pushed the point again. 
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However, that does impinge on that person’s right and it presupposes that 
the person coming back into the area has come back in bad faith 
(Legislative Council 2010, 1817).  
She reiterated that 
in our research we were not able to find any publicly available evidence 
that it is working well. Is that evidence publicly available, or will it be? 
(1817).  
The Government response once again was vague and equivocal.  
It is working and it is making our streets safer... the evidence has been 
given to us by police who have found it to be a useful tool. In terms of 
the use of banning orders more generally, there are reporting mechanisms 
under the Liquor Control Reform Act (Legislative Council 2010, 1817 
[Tee, Labor]).  10
Despite repeated questions and requests from Pennicuik, no evidence was presented 
to parliament about the effectiveness of banning in addressing problems in the NTE. 
Claims were made that banning notices work, reflecting similar assertions in the 
debate of the LCRA Bill 2007. As the findings of the Chapter Five analysis confirm, 
there was insufficient justification for the limitations on Charter rights that result 
from the banning notice provisions. It may not be possible for legislators to ensure in 
advance that policies will deliver the desired result. However, when claiming that 
policies have been effective then this should be verifiable. The only attempt to 
challenge the due process issues in the JLA Bill 2010 was shut down by the 
Government with the assertion of an ‘it works’ rationale. Proponents of the Bill 
insisted that a problem existed in the NTE and that banning was an effective way to 
address it. 
Despite the principled position taken by a number of opposition members during 
debate of the 2007 provisions, no opportunity was taken to re-visit the issue of 
judicial appeal in 2010. The reason for this is open to speculation. The pressure of 
time was, once again, evident and opposition parties had agreed to support the 
 The formal reporting mechanisms mentioned by Tee, and the data that is published, are examined 10
in detail in Chapter Seven in relation to the post-enactment scrutiny of the banning provisions.
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Government business within the very tight timeframe required. The failure to debate 
the issue of judicial appeal, for which there was such support in 2007, indicates a 
lack of rigour in the 2010 parliamentary debates. The provisions introduced in the 
LCRA Act 2007 appear to have been accepted. A number of speakers assumed the 
success of banning. However, even though the banning provisions had been in 
operation for over two years, no empirical proof of their effectiveness was provided 
in response to repeated requests. The JLA Act 2010 built upon the flawed rationale 
and incomplete parliamentary scrutiny of the LCRA Act 2007, without sufficient 
consideration of the consequences of either Bill upon individual rights and principles 
underpinning the provision of justice.  
6.4  Parliamentary Scrutiny: Underpinning Presumptions 
The parliamentary debates of Victoria’s banning notice provisions were 
compromised by time pressures and concessions. A thematic examination of the 
debates in 2007 and 2010 has noted the failure to adequately address the significant 
effect of banning notices upon the individual rights of recipients. Within the 
parliamentary discourse of both Bills a number of underpinning presumptions are 
evident, each of which informed and directed the debates and the resulting 
legislation. In the following sections four key themes are discussed. They highlight a 
clear drive to ‘do something’ about alcohol-related disorder in the NTE, the 
promotion of fear and a consequential need to protect the broader community, an 
embedded notion of ‘them’ and ‘us’ in relation to banning, and a conflation of intent 
and punishment. Each theme, considered in relation to the parliamentary debates of 
both Bills, addresses the conception of balance that was evident in the rationale for 
the banning notice provisions. 
6.4.i  The Drive to ‘Do Something’ 
Throughout the parliamentary debates of the LCRA Bill 2007 and JLA Bill 2010, 
across political perspectives, there was an assumption that a problem existed in the 
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NTE that must to be addressed. Reflecting the general sentiment in 2007, Labor 
Assembly member Thomson summarised the concerns and the consequential need to 
do something. 
We also recognise that the levels of abuse around the inappropriate use of 
alcohol are increasing in and around some licensed venues, and we need 
to act on it (Legislative Assembly 2007c, 4072). 
Similarly representative of parliamentary concerns in 2010, Labor Council member 
Mikakos articulated the same problems and associated need for a response. 
I support any measures that aim to reduce alcohol-fuelled violence and 
crime… it is important that these sorts of behaviours in public are not 
tolerated and that the police are armed with appropriate means to respond 
to them (Legislative Council 2010, 1816). 
The parliamentary discourse in both 2007 and 2010 was embedded with a presumed 
need for community protection against undesirable behaviours in the NTE, with the 
banning provisions presented as the necessary and appropriate response. That 
alcohol-fuelled disorder and anti-social behaviour occurs in the NTE is not disputed 
in this thesis. However, the extent of the problem, the way that it was conveyed 
across the parliamentary debates, and the effect this had upon establishing a 
hierarchy of rights implicit in the desired response, highlights concerns about the 
level of scrutiny in 2007 and 2010, and the priorities that resulted. 
Across the parliamentary debates of the LCRA Bill 2007, five speakers made 
reference to Victoria Police crime statistics or similar data regarding alcohol-related 
behaviours in the NTE to support the need for the banning provisions. Liberal 
Assembly member O’Brien noted a 21.4% increase in assaults recorded in the 
Melbourne local government area (which includes the Melbourne CBD) during the 
2006-07 financial year (Legislative Assembly 2007b, 3998). Labor Assembly 
member Green stated that crime in Victoria had reduced by 23.5% since 2001, but 
… regrettably police statistics show that assaults committed inside 
licensed premises and on the streets and footpaths outside are on the 
increase (Legislative Assembly 2007b, 4006).  
Labor Council member Scheffer agreed and stated that during 2005-06 Victoria 
Police statistics recorded 29,000 assaults, “a significant number of which were 
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contributed to by excessive alcohol consumption and occurred in and around 
licensed premises,” and that there were “high numbers of offences in open spaces or 
areas near licensed premises” (Legislative Council 2007b, 3887). Scheffer also 
directly referenced the 2006 Victorian Parliament Drugs and Crime Prevention 
Committee (DCPC) inquiry into strategies to reduce harmful alcohol consumption. 
He used selected statistics and findings from the DCPC report to justify his support 
for the 2007 Bill, which he contended addressed “a cluster of real and serious issues 
which have been exhaustively researched” (Legislative Council 2007b, 3888). 
While some attempt was made by these speakers to quantify the risks posed by 
disorderly behaviour in the NTE, detailed analysis of Victoria Police crime statistics 
suggests that the speakers applied convenient snapshot data, which lacked context 
and presented a misleading view of relevant crime rates (Victoria Police 2003, 2004, 
2005, 2006, 2007). For example, the 21.4% increase in assaults noted by O’Brien 
included domestic assaults, which increased at a higher rate than the overall assault 
category between 2005-07, and which accounted for 36-37% of all assaults during 
this period. The statistics cited and alluded to in relation to assaults at licensed 
premises, by Green and Scheffer, are similarly misleading. In the period 2003-06, 
Victoria Police crime statistics confirm that assaults at licensed premises decreased 
by 37%, from 2279 to 1429 per year. The claims of a significant number of assaults 
in licensed premises overlooks the prevailing downward trend. In the reporting year 
2006-07, the figure for assaults in licensed premises did increase, by 7% to 1535. But 
this was still significantly lower than the numbers recorded in 2003 (2279) and 2004 
(2144).  
Scheffer claimed that offence rates were increasing, and that there were high 
numbers around licensed premises. Victoria Police crime statistics for key offence 
categories that are relevant to the NTE, behaviour in public and regulated public 
order, do not support Scheffer’s assertions (Victoria Police 2005, 2006, 2007, 2008). 
The behaviour in public offences recorded on the ‘street/footpath’, which includes 
the areas around licensed premises, steadily decreased between 2005-08, to a level 
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below the 2001 figure. The number of such offences dropped by 19% in 2006 and a 
further 15% in 2007 (reducing from 2594 offences in 2005 to 1796 in 2007). 
Similarly, regulated public order offences taking place on the ‘street/footpath’ 
declined by 15% in 2006 and 10% in 2007 (from 1037 offences in 2005 to 793 in 
2007). Both offence categories recorded at licensed premises do show some increase 
over the period. However, numbers are extremely low, and the trend was downwards 
during 2007. For behaviour in public offences 140 incidents were recorded across the 
whole State of Victoria in 2005, 147 in 2006 and 114 in 2007. For regulated public 
order offences 149 were recorded in 2005, 180 in 2006 and 178 in 2007. This data 
does not support the claim of “high numbers of offences” made by Scheffer. 
In addition to a selective use of statistics, other speakers embedded their comments 
with assumptions that were not supported with any data or evidence. Nationals 
Assembly member Northe asserted that “the Bill will obviously address the rise of 
violence and assaults around licensed venues” (Legislative Assembly 2007c, 4070), 
but offered no specific data. Labor member Thomson agreed and observed “we also 
recognised that the levels of abuse around the inappropriate use of alcohol are 
increasing in and around some licensed venues” (Legislative Assembly 2007c, 4072). 
Nationals Council member Drum made a similarly assumption-based claim 
regarding “these increased trends of anti-social and violent behaviour” (Legislative 
Council 2007b, 3884). Such generalised claims were not evidence-based, and failed 
to quantify the nature of the problem in the NTE about which ‘something must be 
done’. Significantly, no direct relationship was made between the problems 
articulated and banning notices as a solution. The DCPC report, cited by Scheffer, 
was unequivocal in its expectation that any legislative provisions must be based upon 
empirical evidence (DCPC 2006). Such evidence was absent or deficient in the 
debates of the LCRA Bill 2007.  
Demonstrating the varied application of data within the 2007 debates, speakers 
applied crime statistics to highlight the success of other mechanisms to reduce 
alcohol-related disorder. For example, Liberal Council member Lovell praised the 
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impact of lockout schemes in Ballarat, Victoria, where licensed venues must not 
admit new patrons after an agreed time. She claimed a 39.85% annual reduction in 
assaults in Central Ballarat, and a 47.54% fall in assaults in licensed premises 
(Legislative Council 2007b, 3863). Another two speakers offered contextual data 
derived from research into alcohol consumption and associated health consequences. 
However accurate the data, it did not necessarily relate specifically to the NTE and 
inferences were drawn to justify the proposed banning provisions. For example, 
Greens member Hartland noted that since 1999 there had been a 132% increase in 
the number of intoxicated 20-29 year olds admitted to hospital emergency rooms 
(Legislative Council 2007b, 3867). This statistic may be stark but there was no clear 
link to behaviours in the NTE. Liberal member Wooldridge had already stated that 
50% of alcohol purchases were made in bottle shops, rather than at licensed venues 
(Legislative Assembly 2007c, 4074). Although limited, the research data cited in the 
parliamentary debates in 2007 lacked context, specificity and its application was 
embedded with unsubstantiated assumptions.  
The same problems of disorder in the NTE were claimed to support the need for the 
JLA Bill 2010, as the quotation from Labor Council member Mikakos demonstrates. 
No evidence, quantification or data was presented in any of the debates in 2010 to 
justify extending the permissible length of banning notices. That a continuing need to 
address alcohol-related disorder in the NTE was perceived in 2010, despite the 
banning provisions being in place for over two years, itself questions the presumed 
effectiveness of banning notices. No evidence of the success or failure of banning as 
a mechanism to deal with disorder is put forward during the debates in 2010. The 
Statement of Compatibility noted only that “police have used the banning system 
effectively since its inception” (Legislative Assembly 2010a, 1132). Yet the efficacy 
and deterrent effect of banning, the Statement claimed, would be enhanced by 
extending the permissible length of a ban to 72 hours. The success of banning as a 
mechanism to deal with disorder is not addressed explicitly in this thesis. However, 
the continued assertion that more needed to be done, two years after the LCRA Act 
2007, suggests that banning may not have been as effective as expected. 
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6.4.ii  Fear, Emotion and Community Protection 
Throughout the parliamentary debates of the LCRA Bill 2007 and JLA Bill 2010 
legitimising and coercive strategies were used to build fear and to justify the 
proposed banning notice measures (Chilton 2004). The discourse emphasised the 
seriousness of alcohol-related problems in the NTE, which validated the legislative 
response to address the problem that had been presented. The drive to ensure 
community protection in the face of a clear and present danger was repeated across 
all political perspectives in both 2007 and 2010. Liberal member O’Brien explicitly 
applied the language of fear in his depiction of the issues facing the NTE. 
In a number of trouble spots throughout Victoria drunken hoons pose 
genuine threats to the property and physical safety of those who live 
nearby… the abuse of alcohol…[creates] a climate of fear for innocent 
people wishing to enjoy themselves responsibly (Legislative Assembly 
2007b, 3998). 
Risks, both specific and general, were cited as an emotive vehicle to justify support 
for banning in the face of largely implied dangers. Typifying the technique, Labor 
Assembly member Thomson linked an assumption of violence and associated fear 
with the legislative response that would ensure community safety. 
We are not trying to be a wowser state or trying to ensure that people 
cannot enjoy the occasional drink, but we want to ensure that people are 
safe and not fearful of abuse when they go to licensed premises; that is 
what this legislation is about - it is about minimising abuse in and around 
the consumption of alcohol (Legislative Assembly 2007c, 4072). 
Requests for an amendment permitting judicial appeal were countered by the Labor 
Minister Robinson with an entirely hypothetical response. Rather than offering 
evidence or research data, he used a fictional scenario to refute the need for an appeal 
process. 
You can just imagine it: you could have Alphonso  doing all sorts of 11
antisocial things in Chapel Street. Under that earlier provision a police 
officer would come up and try to give him a banning notice. Alphonso 
 This is presumed to be a reference to prominent gangland figure Alphonse Gangitano, a noted 11
frequenter of the the NTE in Melbourne’s CBD and later murdered as part of Victoria’s gangland 
turf wars. A controversial TV series was in well-publicised production at the time of these 
parliamentary debates.
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would say, 'Hold on, I've got my lawyer here. I want you to withdraw the 
banning notice. We will see you in the Magistrates' Court tomorrow, and 
we will sort out the propriety of the banning order which is meant to 
apply now. We will sort that out in two or three weeks time' ... It would 
have been a lawyer's picnic (Legislative Assembly 2007d, 4406 
[Robinson, Labor]). 
The previous section noted that some data and evidence was used during the 
parliamentary debate of the LCRA Bill 2007 to support the concerns presented. In his 
assertion of “this plague” of alcohol-related violence creating a “climate of fear for 
innocent people” and a “battle” for the State, Liberal member O’Brien cited Victoria 
Police crime statistics regarding rates of assaults (Legislative Assembly 2007b, 
3998). However, the data was not specific to the NTE. Labor member Green 
presumed an increase in assaults inside licensed premises, but offered no actual 
figures (Legislative Assembly 2007b, 4007). Some attempt to quantify the perceived 
risk is acknowledged, but across the debates the provision of evidence was secondary 
to the presumed state of crisis. Layers of emotion were added to cement a sense of 
risk, using terms such as ‘plague’ and ‘battle’. The legitimising and coercive 
strategies (Chilton 2004) asserted a moral authority to ‘do something’ with the 
corollary that any opposition was not moral.  
Discursive structures were used to create a specific social representation (Van Dijk 
1993). Basic emotions were invoked, including fear, security and protectiveness, 
particularly of family and the vulnerable. The discourse embodied approaches such 
as “fear systems”, “emotion programs” and “kin-protection” (Hart et al. 2005, p.
191). In both 2007 and 2010, the case for banning was grounded in a moral position 
that was difficult to challenge. Labor Assembly member Green used parental concern 
for the safety of their children, and implied a clear physical risk.
I, like every parent in this state, want my children to be able to enjoy 
Victoria’s vibrant culture without having a concern that they may be hurt 
whilst enjoying that culture (Legislative Assembly 2007b, 4007). 
Labor member Howard also specifically used concern about the safety of children to 
justify support for the LCRA Bill 2007. The term children implies vulnerability and 
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dependence. It builds emotion and blurs the image of those who actually participate 
in the NTE. While they are all technically children, they are also mostly adults.  
Our community wants to know that our children are able to be out at 
night and to feel confident that they will come home safe and well, and 
this bill increases that sense of confidence (Legislative Assembly 2007c, 
4075). 
Despite the rhetoric, anecdotes and hyperbole, objective analysis of the issues that 
banning notices are designed to address was not evident within the debates for either 
the 2007 or 2010 Bills. Justifications for banning were built upon implication and 
presumption, with limited use of data, much of which lacked context and specificity. 
The absence of clear facts and any alternative perspective created a manipulative 
situation, epitomised by reference across the debates to individual tragic cases. Labor 
member Green typified this approach. 
Other members have referred to the awful case of young James 
Macready-Bryan,  who has been left with terrible brain damage 12
following a brutal assault outside one of Melbourne’s nightspots last 
year. I have also heard about the recent experience of …Scott Dinnage, 
who was king-hit outside a licensed premises in another part of 
Melbourne (Legislative Assembly 2007b, 4007). 
Liberal member O’Brien also cited the case of James Macready-Bryan and of 
Shannon McCormack, who was killed trying to break up a fight in Melbourne CBD 
in 2006 (Legislative Assembly 2007b, 3998). Such personal tragedies were used to 
illuminate the issue of alcohol-related disorder in the NTE, and to enhance the 
emotional response.  Individual cases, however sad, are not necessarily sufficient 13
evidence of a significant problem. In the light of the Charter Act compliance 
requirements to empirically justify any limitation of Charter rights, and the extension 
of the banning provisions in 2010, the lack of objective information regarding the 
issues facing the NTE is problematic. The justification for the banning provisions 
reflected an all-embracing rationale of fear and a consequential need for community 
  In October 2006, while celebrating his 20th birthday, James was violently assaulted. He was left 12
with permanent brain damage and is unable to walk or talk.
  In the context of media reporting of crime, Sacco (1995, p.144) refers to the particular “dramatic 13
value” of focusing upon individual cases. However atypical, their public effect can be 
considerable.
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protection. The dominance of this discourse extended beyond the specific debate into 
the concrete provisions of the enacted legislation. 
Advocates of the banning notice legislation emphasised the need to ensure 
community safety. Implied and assumed within this rhetoric is that banning works. 
The 2007 Statement of Compatibility prioritised public protection against the 
problems caused by alcohol-related disorder. 
The Bill establishes two schemes directed at reducing alcohol-related 
violence or disorder. One enables immediate action to be taken by police 
officers, through the giving of notices banning persons from designated 
areas… [banning notices] are aimed at protecting public order and the 
rights and freedoms of others (Legislative Assembly 2007a, 3818).  
The 2007 Statement presumed the effect of banning notices, “to deter alcohol-related 
violence in and around licensed venues" (Legislative Assembly 2007a, 3822), but 
failed to provide any evidence to support either the nature of the problem or the 
suitability of banning as a response. The assumptions were not political party 
specific. Liberal member Napthine agreed with the presumed effectiveness of the 
banning notice provisions. 
These powers will ensure that we have an effective and workable 
response to the issues of alcohol and antisocial behaviour (Legislative 
Assembly 2007c, 4070). 
Labor member Foley succinctly stated the purpose of the banning notice provisions. 
Essentially it seeks to make our streets safer (Legislative Assembly 
2007c, 4077). 
Banning notices may remove ‘troublemakers’ from designated areas, but Foley’s 
assertion does not acknowledge the potential for displacement to areas beyond the 
designated zone. 
The same focus upon community safety was used to justify the extension of banning 
notices to 72 hours in 2010. In the 2010 Statement of Compatibility, Attorney-
General Hulls cited the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) which 
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… expressly recognises that the right [to move freely] may be subject to 
restrictions that are necessary to protect public order, public health or 
morals or the rights and freedoms of others (Legislative Assembly 2010a, 
1131). 
Hulls directly linked the presumed problems in the NTE, community protection and 
banning notices. 
The amendment is intended to increase the deterrent effect of banning 
notices, reduce the incidence of alcohol-related violence and disorder 
and, consequently, enhance public safety (1132).  
However, Hulls did not provide any evidence to support the effectiveness of banning 
notices in protecting public order and the rights of others. Indeed, in the 2010 
Statement he noted that 
… there have been a number of people to whom police have had to give 
a banning notice on multiple occasions… its [banning] efficacy can be 
enhanced through enabling police, in appropriate circumstances, to give 
notices of a significantly longer duration (1132) 
Hulls’ contention raises two points of relevance. Firstly, rather than demonstrating 
the effectiveness of banning notices, the need to extend their length suggests that 
banning powers may not necessarily have been effective. Secondly, the number of 
multiple banning notices issued in the first two years of the legislation, for which 
data had been published when the 2010 Statement was tabled, was low. During the 
two years ending 30 June 2008 and 30 June 2009, 1512 individuals received banning 
notices. Of these, only 34 (2% of the total) received multiple notices (Chief 
Commissioner 2008; 2009).  Significantly, whether extending banning notices to 72 14
hours would mitigate the need for multiple orders is not discernible from the 
published data. No banning notice specific data is recorded, so it is not known 
whether multiple orders were issued during a 72 hour period, or whether they were 
issued weeks apart. However, such a low incidence of multiple order imposition 
points to political expedience as the driver for the asserted need to extend the length 
of banning notices. Data from the following three years indicates that the change to 
  Although it is not clear how Hulls defined ‘multiple orders,’ the analysis in this section presumes 14
‘multiple’ to mean ‘more than one.’
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72 hours had little effect on the number of multiple banning notices imposed. Of 
3639 banning notice recipients recorded between years ending 30 June 2010 and 30 
June 2012, 126 (or 3.5%) received multiple orders. While still a low number, the 
claimed improved deterrent effect of longer banning notices is not evident as the 
percentage of multiple order recipients increased. That this was not addressed during 
parliamentary debates in 2010, and has not been explored since, is a key finding of 
this thesis. The published banning notice data is examined further in Chapter Seven.   
The assumption that banning works was deeply embedded in the parliamentary 
debate of the JLA Bill 2010 but no evidence was offered to support the requirement 
to extend the banning notice powers. There was only one exchange, in the 
Legislative Council on 6 May 2010, during which the use and effectiveness of 
banning was questioned. Green member Pennicuik repeatedly requested evidence to 
justify the extension of the banning notice powers. Three times the Government 
response insisted that banning was working and making streets safer, but offered no 
proof of how this was determined or measured. That the same claims about the 
problems in the NTE were made in 2010 as in 2007, questions the effectiveness of 
banning. However, this paradox was not resolved in the parliamentary debates.  
The failure to substantiate the effectiveness of banning notices, or to provide 
evidence to justify the extension of the banning powers in 2010 is in direct 
contravention of the Charter Act and its Guidelines (Department of Justice 2008b). 
The clear framework that Golder and Williams (2007) contend is essential to enable 
effective parliamentary scrutiny of the human rights implications of legislative 
proposals was in place in Victoria. However, it was not applied effectively to the 
banning provisions. There was no consideration of proportionality or whether the 
ends of presumed community protections justified the means that eroded the 
individual rights of banning notice recipients. 
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6.4.iii  Notion of ‘Them’ and ‘Us’ 
The parliamentary debates of the LCRA Bill 2007 and JLA Bill 2010 made clear that 
the overriding purpose of banning notices was to protect the community. The 
primacy of control and public safety was upheld, with banning “just a precautionary 
measure to allow police to control an area” (Legislative Assembly 2007c, 4072 
[Thomson, Labour]). This perspective builds upon a persuasive discourse to 
legitimise a situation where the rights of individuals are conceded to the rights of the 
broader community. Implied is an assumption that the rights of those from whom the 
community needs to be protected are inherently lower. Both the 2007 and 2010 
Statements of Compatibility referenced the rights of the community, despite the 
effect of the banning provisions upon the individual rights of recipients. The 2007 
Statement noted that banning notices “are aimed at protecting public order and the 
rights and freedoms of others” (Legislative Assembly 2007a, 3818). The 2010 
Statement similarly highlighted “the importance of protecting public order and the 
rights and freedoms of others” (Legislative Assembly 2010a, 1132). 
This rhetoric subordinated the rights of individuals to the greater good of the 
perceived needs of the community. This is a clear illustration of Waldron’s (2003) 
‘few/most’ balancing dichotomy, whereby addressing the needs of one side (the 
most) does not necessarily justify taking away the rights of the other (the few). 
Extending the balance metaphor, the individuals likely to be affected by the banning 
legislation were perceived differently to the community at large, and embodied 
notions of them and us. Parliamentarians presented themselves, their families and the 
majority of their constituents as the ‘us’ who deserved protection from the problem 
causing other, or ‘them’. Alcohol-related problems in the NTE were expressly 
attributed to ‘them’, referred to variously as ‘troublemakers’, ‘hoons’, ‘morons’, 
‘thugs’ and ‘dingbats’. Liberal Assembly member O’Brien differentiated between 
them and us in his depiction of problems in the NTE. 
In a number of trouble spots throughout Victoria drunken hoons pose 
genuine threats to the property and physical safety of those who live 
nearby (Legislative Assembly 2007b, 3998). 
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Labor Minister Robinson also demonstrated the them/us divide when he asked 
Liberal members if they “are going to continue to back thugs and criminals against 
decent, law-abiding Victorians” (Legislative Assembly 2007d, 4403). Robinson 
clarified the need to protect the good people against the behaviours of the bad. 
… to move some way towards the desired protections for those honest, 
law-abiding, decent Victorians against hooligans and the anti-social 
behaviour in nightclub precincts (4406). 
‘Troublemaker’ was the term used most frequently across the parliamentary debates 
to describe those causing problems in the NTE. As a rhetorical device it highlighted 
those who behave in an undesirable way, but did not offer specificity or an objective 
assessment of behaviour which warrants the imposition of a discretionary on-the-spot 
penalty. Troublemaker is a term accessible by most people, but is a vague, non-
criminal label to describe those for whom the quasi criminal banning notices were 
intended. 
Examples have already been documented of scenarios and hypothetical situations 
whereby the problematic ‘other’ placed the needs, safety and rights of the 
predominant community in jeopardy. Labor Minister Batchelor epitomised the 
hyperbole. 
This is serious. You ask people who live near these venues and whose 
streets are affected by people who are drunk charging around the 
suburbs… (Legislative Assembly 2007d, 4405). 
Batchelor’s comment highlights the misleading and arguably manipulative nature of 
much of the rhetoric justifying the banning provision. The use of terms such ‘suburb’ 
and ‘neighbourhood’ suggest that alcohol-related violence is an imminent and serious 
risk in residential areas. Yet entertainment precincts and designated areas are not 
typically located in suburban residential districts. There is also an embedded 
assumption that the troublemaking ‘other’ do not reside in these ‘suburbs,’ further 
reinforcing the differentiation between ‘them’ and ‘us’.  
It is a reasonable expectation that the community should be free to enjoy themselves 
without fear or risk. How this freedom is effected creates a dichotomy, when in doing 
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so undermines the freedom and rights of individuals. The discourse evident across 
the parliamentary debates presupposed and reinforced a belief that banning notices 
are an essential response to issues in the NTE. The resulting limitations on individual 
rights were justified in the broader interests of the community. This brings into 
question the place of the affected individuals within that community (Waldron 2003). 
The undesirable minority become marginalised from both the process of debate and 
the consequences of the enacted legislation. In the case of banning notices the 
arguments were built upon assumption-laden rhetoric by those who perceived 
themselves to be members of the ‘us’ group. The underlying attitude and response, 
with its resulting inequality and the silencing of the ‘other’, remained unchallenged. 
The parliamentary debates of the banning notice Bills embodied the paradoxical 
disjunction that we all have rights but some deserve more rights than others. 
6.4.iv  Conflation of Intent and Punishment  
Victoria’s banning notices dilute due process safeguards and weaken the separation 
of powers, through the coalescence of intent and punishment. The way in which the 
banning provisions were framed, and the limitations evident across their 
parliamentary scrutiny, conflates the notions of pre-emption, intent and punishment. 
Banning notices may be imposed following a discretionary assessment by a police 
officer of a potential future behaviour. The sanction carries a tangible limitation upon 
personal freedom, and an enduring record against a recipient’s name. Implied 
throughout the banning legislation is the bundling up of more traditional responsive 
policing with anticipatory, pre-emptive controls and powers. Justifications of the 
'interests of the greater good' and the need for 'public protection' were used 
repeatedly across the parliamentary debates. The view was presented across the 
discourse that, as banning notices are not criminal offences, they are not 
punishments. 
The assertion that a banning notice is not a punishment is debatable. Banning notices 
are quasi-criminal in nature. They may be imposed as a consequence of an actual or 
Chapter 6: Analysis of Parliamentary Debates: Pressures, Rights & Presumptions 194
potential behaviour, and place a measurable restriction upon recipients. Details of 
banning notices are also entered into Victoria's LEAP database, as an aid to 
enforcement, data tracking and the more complex consequences of multiple banning 
notice imposition. The impact and enduring electronic footprint of a banning notice 
is tangible, and there is no mechanism to remove it from an individual recipient’s 
LEAP record. Significantly, breaching a banning notice, regardless of the basis of its 
original imposition, can lead recipients into the realms of criminal sanctions. Non-
payment of initial financial penalties may lead to more far-reaching repercussions 
through established judicial processes.    15
In supporting the LCRA Bill 2007, one Labor member stated “anybody… who is 
clearly out to cause violence... can be ordered not to re-enter for 24 
hours” (Legislative Assembly 2007c, 4075 [Howard, Labour]). How the intent to 
cause violence is to be assessed by police officers was not discussed and was not 
evident in any of the parliamentary debates. Assembly member Howard’s layered 
rhetoric combined a reduction in the threshold for those targeted by the banning 
provisions, to include ‘anybody’, with a subjectively measured presumption of 
intent. Howard’s comment raises the question of whether intent, however clear it 
may be, should be sufficient grounds for initiation of a police-imposed control. Again 
this perspective was absent from parliamentary debates in 2007 and 2010. Issues 
relating to the vagueness of the language and subjectivity of the interpretation of the 
behaviours to be controlled are noted earlier in this chapter. When added to the 
discretionary police power to determine intent, the resulting concerns increase 
further. A banning notice penalty may be based upon a subjectively measured 
presumption of intent. However, no evidence need be presented and the recipient has 
no opportunity to judicially challenge the validity of the on-the-spot decision by a 
police officer to impose a banning notice. Zedner (2007c) argues such conflations to 
 The ultimate sanction is imprisonment, in the event persistent non-compliance with the 15
requirement to pay the penalty imposed. Under the Infringements Act 2006, “The Court may order 
that the infringement offender be imprisoned for a period of one day in respect of each penalty 
unit, or part of a penalty unit, to which the amount of the outstanding fines under the infringement 
warrant or warrants is an equivalent amount” (s160(1)). A banning notice breach may lead to a 20 
penalty unit fine (see Chapter 2, footnote 10).
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be both morally and legally questionable. Neither imperative was adequately debated 
in 2007 or 2010. 
In 2010, the JLA Bill extended the on-the spot banning notice to a maximum of 72 
hours. Attorney-General Hulls was unequivocal in his view that banning notices are 
not a punishment. 
 …the purpose of banning notices is not to punish persons for ‘suspected’ 
offences. Instead, they are designed to protect the community against 
alcohol-related violence and disorder, and to enhance the freedoms and 
rights of community members, such as the rights to life, privacy, liberty 
and security of the person and rights in respect of property. As such, I do 
not believe they should be regarded as punishment of a person, 
notwithstanding any deterrent effect they may have. Moreover, since 
banning notices per se do not amount to a person being charged with a 
criminal offence or being a party to a civil proceeding, they do not 
engage the Charter right to a fair hearing (SARC 2010b, p.14-15).
As  their  purpose is to protect, Hulls contended that banning notices should not be 
regarded as a punishment. In itself this is an interesting perspective on the notion of 
banishment and exclusion. Its specific relevance is highlighted when the precedent 
already set with respect to 24 hour bans was used by Hulls to justify the extension of 
the banning period to 72 hours, but with no supporting evidence despite over two 
years of operation. Hulls asserted that the potential impact of the increase to 72 hours 
was not significantly or qualitatively different from that possible under the existing 
24 hour model. His formal response to SARC was sent after Royal Assent of the JLA 
Act 2010, therefore undermining the effectiveness of parliamentary scrutiny and 
accountability.  
Hulls’ assertions meant that someone could be excluded from a potentially large 
geographical area for 72 hours, for an assumed pre-emptive reason, for which no 
evidence need be produced, but for which significant consequences may be invoked 
in the event of non-compliance. Hulls maintained that this scenario should not be 
regarded as a punishment or breach of human rights, as it had not been regarded as 
such before. That the period of banishment had been tripled was not deemed relevant 
by Hulls, as banning notices had already been approved on the overriding principle 
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of protection of the public. Hulls’ position justified the application of pre-emptive 
provisions which may carry prohibitive consequences, to support the basic right of 
the community to be safe (Finkelstein 2003; Oberdiek 2009). The contrasting 
perspective, summarised by Duff (2011), is that presumed intent and attendant pre-
emptive prohibitions should only be used in the most serious circumstances. The 
extent to which the behaviours that may lead to a banning notice may pass this 
threshold is unclear, given the permitted subjective basis of their imposition. The 
potential consequences of way in which the banning provisions are framed, 
particularly in terms of how much further such measures could be extended, were 
noted by only one speaker in the Legislative Council (Legislative Council 2010, 
1813 [Pennicuik, Greens]). Her questions were not answered and her concerns were 
dismissed.  
There was a notable absence of parliamentary scrutiny of Hulls’ stated position that a 
banning notice is not a punishment.  There was also no meaningful consideration of 16
any broader, longer term ramifications of the 2010 extension of the existing banning 
powers. The risks of continued ‘net-widening’ (Crawford, 2009) for individuals and 
the dilution of underpinning judicial principles, which were noted during the review 
of the JLA Bill 2010 by SARC (2010a), were ignored by the Victorian Parliament. 
6.5  Chapter Conclusion 
The analysis undertaken for this chapter confirms that the passage of both the LCRA 
Bill 2007 and JLA Bill 2010 lacked rigorous parliamentary debate. Time constraints 
and political concessions limited discussion of the way in which the banning 
provisions undermine key individual rights, and compromised the debates of both 
Bills. Speech lengths were shortened and pressure exerted upon members to support 
the Bills, despite principled opposition and valid concerns. Parliamentary workloads, 
when balanced against the number of sitting days, create time pressures. In 2007, 74 
  This is explored further in the interviews with Victorian Magistrates, documented in Chapter 16
Seven.
Chapter 6: Analysis of Parliamentary Debates: Pressures, Rights & Presumptions 197
Bills passed both Houses during the 48 parliamentary sitting days. In 2010, 80 Bills 
were passed in 42 sitting days (Parliament of Victoria, 2014). The impact of the 
limited parliamentary time on the passage of the banning provisions is a key finding 
of this thesis. Parliament is required to scrutinise legislation, to enforce the Charter 
Act compliance requirements, and to ensure accountability for and on behalf of 
Victorians. None of these functions should be curtailed by what can be perceived as 
arbitrarily imposed timelines.  
Limited parliamentary debate time and pressure to pass the legislation by a set date, 
led to compromises, particularly in 2007. While the speed of enactment of both Bills 
confounds Waiton's (2008) contention of the ‘nonchalant drift of polices through 
Parliament’, the substance of the debates confirms his fundamental concern that 
parliaments fail to adequately consider the effect of policies upon individual rights. 
The progress of both banning notice Bills demonstrate an unwavering determination 
to deal with the stated problem of alcohol-related disorder in the NTE. Assertions of 
political necessity and community protection are used across the debates to justify 
compromises within the banning provisions that limit long standing due process 
rights, such as judicial appeal. Despite the requirements of the Charter Act to ensure 
the protection of individual rights, the parliamentary processes applied to the LCRA 
Bill 2007 and JLA Bill 2010 exemplify concerns identified by Feldman (2002) and 
Evans and Evans (2011) about the volume of analysis required for effective 
parliamentary scrutiny of legislation, and the limited capacity of parliament to 
protect individual rights. 
In expressing his support for the overall objectives of the LCRA Bill 2007, and his 
assertion of its expected effectiveness in promoting community safety and tackling 
the issues of alcohol-related anti-social behaviour, one Labor member acknowledged 
the extent of the changes proposed. “It is important that we appreciate the breadth 
and the scope of this legislation...” (Legislative Assembly 2007c, 4069 [Lupton, 
Labor]). However, the actual breadth and scope of the legislation was not fully 
addressed by the Victorian Parliament. In the 2007 and 2010 debates key 
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consequences for individual rights and established procedural protections, resulting 
from the imposition or breach of a banning notice, were overlooked, denied or 
conceded to the interests of political expedience.  
The significance of expedience is reinforced by the fierce Labor opposition to the 
Liberal/Nationals Summary Offences and Sentencing Amendment Act 2014. The Bill 
empowered Victoria Police to issue pre-emptive move-on orders in anticipation of a 
possible obstruction or a reasonable apprehension of future violence in a public 
place. Labor member Wynne called the Bill “extraordinarily dangerous” and 
highlighted in particular the potential “to inflict very severe harm on the most 
marginalised in our community - people who live their lives in the public 
domain” (Legislative Assembly 2014, 489-90). Such concerns are equally applicable 
to the banning notice provisions, yet none were noted by the Labor proponents in 
2007 or 2010.  17
The failure of the Charter compliance process to justify empirically the dilution of 
individual rights that result from banning notices, was compounded by shortcomings 
in the evidence presented during the parliamentary debates to support the need for 
the provisions. Banning notices afford police officers the discretionary power to 
determine what an individual is likely to do, and to impose a pre-emptive penalty. 
Any assessment of the perceived intended behaviour is entirely subjective, and not 
open to independent scrutiny. Across the 2007 and 2010 parliamentary debates 
descriptors and rhetorical devices ensured that the language applied to both the likely 
recipients of banning notices and those in need of protection was vague, but 
accessible and emotionally charged.    
In the early stages of parliamentary scrutiny of the LCRA Bill 2007, the extensive 
new discretionary police powers were acknowledged. However, despite appreciation 
 In 2015, the re-elected Labor government amended the 2014 Act. The Statement of Compatibility 17
for the Summary Offences Amendment (Move-on Laws) Act 2015 asserted that “the amendments 
made by the bill provide a more appropriate balance between the use of move-on powers to 
maintain public order and safety, and the protection of the rights and freedoms of all Victorians 
recognised under the Charter” (Legislative Assembly 2015, 174 [Attorney-General Pakula]).
Chapter 6: Analysis of Parliamentary Debates: Pressures, Rights & Presumptions 199
of the increased scope of police powers, and expression of some concern about the 
right of judicial appeal, no other due process considerations were discussed. The way 
in which the legislation passed through the Victorian Parliament, the nature of the 
debate and the detail of the final provisions are significant issues. The identification 
of the need for a right of appeal against the imposition of a ban, and some disquiet 
about the possible effect of the legislation upon vulnerable groups were 
acknowledged in the 2007 debates. They demonstrate the capacity of the Victorian 
Parliament to identify issues missed by the Charter compliance process. Although 
when parliamentarians did pose questions about the specifics of the proposed 
banning provisions, no reference was made to any omissions in the 2007 Statement. 
Concerns identified by SARC were acknowledged by only one speaker (Pennicuik) 
during the debate of the JLA Bill 2010. However, across the debates for both Bills 
there was minimal consideration of the potential consequences of banning notices 
upon due process, or the apparent lack of supervision and accountability in their 
implementation. The pressure of time and a seemingly incontestable belief in the 
existence of a problem about which ‘something must be done’ (Ashworth 2006b; 
Crawford 2013), rendered parliamentary scrutiny of both the LCRA Bill 2007 and 
JLA Bill 2010 limited and ineffective. 
The picture painted in the parliamentary debates was of disorder in the NTE, 
embedded with an underlying notion of fear. Any political opposition to either the 
principle or specifics of banning was presented by proponents of the Bills as 
tantamount to supporting drunken disorder. Across the debates examples abound of 
individuals who have suffered a violent assault, of locations that experience 
problematic levels of alcohol-related issues and of hypothetical situations from 
which protection is required. These presumptions underpinning the introduction of 
banning notices are not unique. They epitomise what Ashworth (2006b) highlighted 
as symbolic responses to high profile issues about which a perception prevails that 
something must be done, regardless of the extent of the actual problem, and how 
appropriate or effective the response may be. Bronitt’s (2008) contention that the 
upholding of individual rights is framed increasingly as a political choice rather than 
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a legal necessity is also confirmed by the findings in this chapter. The passage of the 
banning notice Bills demonstrate a failure to heed the advice of Waldron (2003) and 
Zedner (2007a, 2007b), that careful scrutiny of legislation is essential to ensure 
absolute clarity of the balance between the means and the ends.
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7  Introduction                 
A detailed analysis of the pre-enactment scrutiny of the police-imposed banning 
notice components of the Liquor Control Reform Amendment Act 2007 (‘LCRA Act/
Bill 2007’) and the Justice Legislation Amendment (Victims of Crime Assistance & 
Other Matters) Act 2010 (‘JLA Act/Bill 2010’) has highlighted the time pressures, 
unsubstantiated assumptions, analytical shortcomings and politically expedient 
priorities that secured their parliamentary passage. Despite a justifying rhetoric that 
advocated the need to re-balance the administration of justice in the night-time 
economy (NTE), there was little balance evident in the parliamentary examination of 
the provisions. This chapter considers the post-enactment scrutiny of the imposition 
of discretionary, pre-emptive police-imposed bans, and of their consequences for 
individual rights. During the parliamentary debates of the banning notice Bills a 
number of claims were put forward to substantiate their need, and expectations were 
set regarding their ongoing scrutiny. The extent to which these claims and 
expectations have been revisited and re-assessed, since the enactment and extension 
of the provisions, is examined in this chapter.  
Three key strands of post-enactment scrutiny are explored. The first part of the 
chapter analyses the first five years of formal Victoria Police banning notice data 
(2007-12). Compliance with the legislated requirements of the LCRA Act 2007  has 1
been assessed to consider the extent to which the published data has enabled 
meaningful scrutiny of the use of the discretionary police power to ban. The second 
part explores media coverage of the banning notice provisions between 2007 and 
2012. The analysis examines how the legislation has been addressed by the media, 
and considers whether this has enabled purposeful public scrutiny of banning notices 
and their effect upon the individual rights of recipients.  
  Reporting requirements did not change under the JLA Act 2010.1
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The third part of this chapter acknowledges judicial oversight and statutory 
interpretation as key tenets of the scrutiny and accountability of legislative 
provisions (Rares 2013). Despite the longstanding significance of an independent 
judiciary for the separation of powers and the assurance of individual rights, there 
has been no judicial review of the legality of Victoria’s banning legislation or any 
aspect of its application. In particular, no provision for independent appeal of 
individual notices was included in the LCRA Act 2007 or JLA Act 2010. In the 
absence of any formal judicial consideration of the legitimacy of the banning 
legislation or the discretionary imposition of individual banning notices, interviews 
were conducted with a sample of Victorian Magistrates (n=12). Their perspectives 
were sought on the due process and procedural implications of police-imposed 
banning notices, whether a right of appeal should be available, and potential broader 
consequences of the enactment of the banning notices powers. In addition to the 
police-imposed banning provisions the LCRA Act 2007 also introduced court-
imposed exclusion orders, which are reported with the banning notice data published 
by Victoria Police. Analysis of this data is used to supplement the interview research 
findings.  
7.1  Published Banning Notice Data 
Under the Charter Act 2006 all public authorities, including Victoria Police, are 
“required to act compatibly with the Charter in their conduct” (Department of Justice 
2008b, p.7). During parliamentary debates of the LCRA Bill 2007, it was agreed that 
Victoria Police must publish annual banning notice statistics (Legislative Assembly 
2007c, 4067-87; Legislative Council 2007b, 3861-899). This data was presented as a 
vehicle for the public scrutiny of the appropriate use of the banning provisions, the 
behaviours for which notices were imposed and, in particular, any disproportionate 
effect upon defined demographic groups. An amendment to trigger a review of the 
legislation if certain groups were found to be adversely affected was rejected in the 
Chapter 7: Analysis of Ongoing Oversight & Accountability 205
Legislative Assembly (Legislative Assembly 2007d, 4401-4412).  The publication of 2
recorded data was regarded as sufficient to ensure the correct use of banning notices. 
The LCRA Act 2007 (s148R) stipulated that an Annual Report for each financial 
year  must be provided to Parliament by the Chief Commissioner of Victoria Police. 3
Reports must include 
• the number of banning notices imposed each year 
• the number of people to whom orders have been given 
• the number of multiple orders imposed each year (where a person has 
received more than one order) 
• the “suspected specified offences in respect of which banning notices were 
given” (LCRA Act 2007, s148R(1)a(iv)) each year 
• the designated areas where such offences were committed 
• the ages of banning notice recipients 
• indigenous status of banning notice recipients 
• number of banning notices issued in each designated area  
• number of charges in relation to breaches of banning orders, results of breach 
charges, and number of breaches for which no charges were laid  
 (LCRA Act 2007, s148R). 
Liberal Council member Lovell expected that the published data would facilitate 
public scrutiny of the way in which the banning provisions were used by Victoria 
Police. 
… any of the figures in the report indicating that particular groups are the 
subject of banning... orders should be the subject of public debate 
(Legislative Council 2007b, 3894).  
Compliance with the reporting requirements of the LCRA Act 2007 (s148R), and the 
ongoing scrutiny of the published data has been assessed by analysing the first five 
Annual Reports covering the period 2007-12 (Chief Commissioner 2008, 2009, 
  Discussed in Chapter Six, this related in particular to Indigenous and homeless Victorians.2
 Ending 30 June.3
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2010, 2011, 2012).  No sampling was undertaken and no significance was inferred 4
within or across a broader population. Data is published only at category level, such 
as age range or Indigenous status, rather than by individual banning notice. This 
constrained the complexity of the analysis as patterns were examinable only within 
each of the data categories. No cross-tabulation or other multi-variate analysis was 
possible. It was not known, for example, which age group received their bans in 
which designated area, or whether Indigenous recipients were more likely to receive 
a banning notice for a particular offence type. As it was not possible to report 
associations, relationships or correlations between or within the data, no tests of 
significance were required. Analysis and discussion throughout this section is 
supplemented by the use of additional published data, such as Victoria Police crime 
statistics. 
The detailed examination of the banning data indicated six key findings. These are 
documented in the following sections and discussed in relation to the post-enactment 
public scrutiny of the banning provisions. The first section considers how widely the 
banning provisions have been used. Secondly, the way in which the Indigenous status 
of recipients has been recorded is examined. The findings are considered in light of 
concerns expressed during parliamentary debates in 2007 about the potentially 
disproportionate imposition and selective enforcement of banning notices. The third 
section notes key data that is not reported, and explores how this limits public 
scrutiny of the use of banning notices. In the fourth section, data relating to alleged 
breaches of banning notices is examined. The fifth section considers the trend in the 
number of multiple banning notices issued to individual recipients, given the claims 
used in 2010 (and noted in Chapter Six) to justify the extension of banning notices to 
72 hours. Finally, the implications of the limitations in the published data are 
considered in terms of the justifications used for the creation of new designated 
areas. 
  The Annual Reports include a summary of the data for the previous year. A number of minor 4
differences are in evident in the data published in the final three Annual Reports. Where 
differences exist, the data published in the original report has been used in the analysis.
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7.1.i  Key Findings             
7.1.i(a)  Number of Banning Notices Issued 
Since the passage of the LCRA Act in December 2007, the use of banning notices 
increased and then fluctuated. Figure 7.1 illustrates the number of banning notices 
issued in each of the first five years of the operation of the legislation. 
Figure 7.1: Banning notices issued each year, 2008-12 
The trend initially rose, from 129 notices in the first (part) year, to a peak of 1868 in 
2009-10. Numbers dropped significantly in 2010-11, reducing by more than half to 
850 banning notices. The final year of data recorded an increase in the imposition of 
banning notices, with 1091 issued in 2011-12. The published data includes a 
breakdown for each designated area in which banning notices were imposed. Table 
7.1 documents the number of notices imposed in each area as a percentage of the 
overall annual total and the actual number (in brackets).  5
 The designated areas are listed in the order in which they were declared.5
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The figures suggest that the upward trend in 2011-12 reflected continued growth in 
the number of designated areas, rather than an increase in the imposition of notices 
across each area. Most of the designated areas experienced a steady increase in 
banning notices imposed during the first two or three years of their designation. This 
was typically followed by a significant drop. Melbourne rose to a peak of 1639 
notices (88% of the annual total) in 2009-10, then rates fell away sharply to 681 
(80% of the total) in 2010-11 and to 667 (61% of the total) in 2011-12. Ballarat 
similarly revealed steady growth over the first three years, to a peak of 64 banning 
notices (8% of the total issued) in 2010-11. Bendigo dropped from its peak of 32 in 
2009-10 to no notices issued in 2011-12. There are exceptions to this general trend. 
Prahran, Frankston and Port Phillip all show initial growth and decline, but jumped 
significantly during 2011-12 (Prahran from 18 to 88 (2% to 8% of the total), 
Frankston from 6 to 25 (1% to 2% of the total), Port Phillip from 14 to 28 (2% to 3% 
of the total). 
As the number of designated areas increased, the proportion of banning notices 
issued in the Melbourne CBD generally declined (from 94% in 2007-08 to 61% in 
2011-12), and those in the regional and other metropolitan areas grew. It is a 
reasonable statistical explanation that as more areas are able to impose banning 
notices, their distribution will spread, and the proportion in any one area will reduce. 
However, it is notable that during the period analysed a number of designated areas 
recorded either very few or no banning notices at all. Knox, despite being designated 
in 2008, recorded no banning notices. During the 2011-12 reporting year Bendigo 
recorded none and Yarra only one. 
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Table 7.1: Number of banning notices and % of total each year by designated area 
(due to rounding, percentages may not add up to 100%) 
The location of each designated area divides broadly between metropolitan/suburban 
Melbourne and regional Victorian towns. The areas are listed in table 7.2 according 
to the number of banning notices imposed between 2008-12. 
Area Start Date 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total
Melbourne Dec 2007 94% 
(121)
84% 
(1197)
88% 
(1639)
80% 
(681)
61% 
(667)
4305
Prahran Dec 2007 6%  
(8)
6% 
(88)
3% 
(53)
2% 
(18)
8% 
(88)
255
Ballarat Aug 2008 - 1% 
(18)
3% 
(60)
8% 
(64)
1% 
(14)
156
Geelong Aug 2008 - 1% 
(15)
0.3% 
(5)
2% 
(15)
1% 
(6)
41
Port Phillip / St. Kilda Aug 2008 - 2% 
(22)
1% 
(13)
2% 
(14)
3% 
(28)
77
Warnambool Aug 2008 - 1% 
(9)
0% 
(1)
2% 
(17)
0% 
(3)
30
Yarra Aug 2008 - 1% 
(10)
1% 
(24)
1% 
(7)
0% 
(1)
42
Bendigo Sep 2008 - 1% 
(20)
2% 
(32)
1% 
(8)
0 60
Knox Sep 2008 - 0 0 0 0 0
LaTrobe / Traralgon Oct 2008 - 3% 
(45)
1% 
(21)
1% 
(5)
1% 
(8)
79
Frankston Mar 2009 - 0% 
(2)
1% 
(11)
1% 
(6)
2% 
(25)
44
Shepparton Mar 2010 - - 0.5% 
(9)
2% 
(15)
1% 
(14)
38
Dandenong Apr 2011 - - - 0 20% 
(214)
214
Docklands May 2011 - - - 0 2% 
(23)
23
Total 129 1426 1868 850 1091 5364
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Table 7.2: Number of banning notices in metropolitan/suburban and regional designated 
areas  
Banning notices have been used significantly more in metropolitan/suburban than in 
regional entertainment districts. Of the 5364 banning notices imposed between 
2008-2012, 4960 (92%) were recorded in metropolitan/suburban areas. Melbourne 
CBD accounted for 87% of the total metropolitan/suburban banning notices. From 
only one year of data Dandenong comprised 4% of the overall total, but accounted 
for 20% in the 2012 reporting period. In the regional areas, 39% of the banning 
notices were imposed in Ballarat. Across the remaining designated areas the numbers 
of notices imposed each year were relatively low. That numbers were so low is an 
interesting result. For example, despite being the second most populous city in 
Victoria, with over 140,000 inhabitants (ABS 2013), a maximum of 15 notices were 
Metropolitan/Suburban Areas 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 Total
Melbourne 121 1197 1639 681 667 4305
Prahran 8 88 53 18 88 255
Dandenong - - - 0 214 214
Port Phillip / St. Kilda - 22 13 14 28 77
Frankston - 2 11 6 25 44
Yarra - 10 24 7 1 42
Docklands - - - 0 23 23
Knox - 0 0 0 0 0
Total 129 1319 1740 726 1046 4960
Regional Areas
Ballarat - 18 60 64 14 156
LaTrobe / Traralgon - 45 21 5 8 79
Bendigo - 20 32 8 0 60
Geelong - 15 5 15 6 41
Shepparton - - 9 15 14 38
Warnambool - 9 1 17 3 30
Total 0 107 128 124 45 404
Overall Totals 129 1426 1868 850 1091 5364
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imposed in Geelong in a whole year. Given the justifications which must be put 
forward to secure designated area status,  and parliamentary claims of a behavioural 6
crisis in the NTE necessitating the banning provisions, it is surprising that in some 
areas the banning notice powers have been used so sparingly, and not at all in Knox. 
Fluctuations in the data make it difficult to discern any meaningful findings 
regarding the general deterrent effect of banning notices. That the peaks and troughs 
across the designated areas occur in different years suggests that the influence of 
more general state government policy priorities or the change of state government,  7
may have had only limited impact upon the pattern of banning notice use within 
individual designated areas. However, trends that are evident in the data can only be 
examined at a high level, which limits the analysis that is possible. In particular, as 
the dates on which banning notices were imposed are not reported, the published data 
does not enable sufficient analysis to link imposition patterns with particular 
operational enforcement initiatives or ‘hot spot’ activities.  The possible individual 8
deterrent effect is considered in section 7.1.i(e), in relation to recipients of multiple 
banning notices. 
The use of banning notices has fluctuated, over time and place, but the data confirms 
that they are used. In the first five years a total of 5364 banning notices were issued. 
This elevates debate and consequential concern about their effect to be more than just 
conceptual or theoretical. Banning notices have been used widely, with a tangible 
effect on recipients. This justifies an exploration of their broader consequences for 
due process and the erosion of individual rights. 
  These are outlined in Chapter Two.6
  In November 2010, the Liberal/Nationals Coalition replaced the Labor party.7
  Precise reasons for the fluctuating use of banning notices are outside of the scope of this thesis. 8
Explanations may include changes in operational and policy priorities, an expansion in the options 
available to police officers, such as move-on powers and an increasing range of infringement 
provisions, and the possible success of banning notices in changing the behaviours of recipients.
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7.1.i(b)  Vulnerability, Indigeneity and Banning 
During parliamentary debates prior to the implementation of the LCRA Bill 2007, 
Green Party Council Member Hartland expressed concern about the potential 
consequences of banning provisions for disadvantaged groups, in which she 
specifically included homeless and Indigenous persons (Legislative Council 2007b, 
3882). It is not possible to discern from the published data how many recipients of 
banning notices were homeless, as no data is recorded about the personal 
circumstances of banning notice recipients. Despite the inclusion of ‘no fixed place 
of abode’ as an option on the banning notice form (see Appendix B), this data is not 
recorded centrally. The effect of the discretionary police power to ban upon the 
homeless is therefore unknown. It is also not known how many other vulnerable 
recipients, such as people with mental health issues, have been affected or how 
appropriately the banning provisions have been used. 
The LCRA Act 2007 set a clear expectation that data will be reported regarding the 
Indigenous status of recipients of banning notices: “whether any of the persons to 
whom banning notices were given during that year were of Koori  origin” (LCRA Act 9
2007, s148R(1,a,vii)). This requirement reflects longstanding concerns about racially 
discriminatory policing practices. Research into US, UK and Australian policing has 
explored the way in which discretionary police powers, such as to move-on and stop/
search, have been used disproportionately against certain racial groups.  This thesis 10
does not seek to extend the existing research into issues of discriminatory policing. 
The focus of the analysis in this section is whether the ongoing scrutiny of the 
banning provisions has been sufficient to enable meaningful monitoring of any undue 
impact of banning notices upon the individual rights and liberties of Indigenous 
Victorians. The published data recording the Indigenous status of banning notice 
recipients is summarised in table 7.3. 
  Koori refers to people of Indigenous descent in Victoria and parts of New South Wales.9
  For example, Weitzer and Tuch (2002), Weatherspoon (2004), Tyler and Wakslak (2004), Goodey 10
(2006), Hallsworth (2006), Harris (2006), Walsh and Taylor (2007), Sivasubramaniam and 
Goodman-Delahunty (2008), Young (2010), Yesufu (2013), and Mazerolle et al. (2013).
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Table 7.3: Banning notices issued per year, by Indigenous and non-Indigenous recipients; % 
of total (and actual numbers) each year 
(due to rounding, percentages may not add up to 100%)  11
Three Indigenous status categories are included in the published banning notice data: 
Indigenous,  non-Indigenous or unknown.  The percentage of banning notices 12 13
given to recipients recorded as being Indigenous remained stable over the five years 
analysed at 3.1% of the total number each year. However, this is notably higher than 
the Indigenous percentage of the resident population of Victoria. Australian Bureau 
of Statistics (ABS) data sets the figure at 0.6% in 2006, rising slightly to 0.7% in 
2011 (ABS 2006, 2011). While the actual numbers of banning notices given to 
Indigenous recipients may be low, it is clear the relative percentage when compared 
with the resident population of Victoria is disproportionately high. Over the same 
five year period for which the banning notice data has been analysed, the proportion 
of alleged offenders categorised in the Victoria Police Crime Statistics as Aboriginal/
Torres Strait Islander appearance was 2.5%.  The percentage of banning notices 14
Year Ending Total Bans Indigenous % 
(actual)
Non-Indigenous  
% (actual)
Unknown % 
(actual)
30 June 2008 129 5% (7) 94% (121) 0
30 June 2009 1426 3% (40) 83% (1182) 14% (204)
30 June 2010 1868 3% (60) 82% (1535) 15% (273)
30 June 2011 850 3% (29) 50% (427) 46% (394)
30 June 2012 1091 3% (31) 62% (681) 35% (379)
5364 3.1% (167) 73.6% (3946) 23.3% (1250)
  The actual numbers for 2008 do not add up to the total. There was one instance of a multiple 11
banning notice, whose recipient is only recorded once in these figures. Subsequent reports include 
the relevant data for each notice issued.
  The banning notice form includes the options ‘Aboriginal’, ‘Torres Strait Islander’ or ‘Both’ to 12
describe the origin of Indigenous recipients (see Appendix B). These are conflated into the 
reporting category ‘Indigenous.’
  The published data includes two line items: ‘unknown’ and ‘unspecified.’ These have been 13
conflated for the purposes of this analysis as they both reflect an ‘unknown’ Indigenous status.
  This data includes individuals who were apprehended but never charged and is “based on the 14
subjective assessment of the attending police” (Victoria Police 2008, p.7). Between reporting 
periods 2007-08 and 2011-12 of 333,609 alleged offenders, 8335 were recorded as being of 
Aboriginal/Torres Strait Islander appearance (Victoria Police 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012).
Chapter 7: Analysis of Ongoing Oversight & Accountability 214
recorded as being given to Indigenous recipients is even higher than the over-
representation that is also evident in the Victoria Police crime data more generally. 
Across the five year period studied, there were marked changes in the relative 
percentages for each of the Indigenous status categories, depicted in figure 7.2. 
Figure 7.2: Indigenous status of banning notice recipients, as % of total issued each year 
In contrast to the stable proportion recorded as Indigenous, the percentage of banning 
notices given to recipients of non-Indigenous status declined significantly. In the first 
reporting year 2007-08, 94% of banning notice recipients were recorded as non-
Indigenous. This dropped to 50% in 2010-11, and averaged 74% over the five years 
analysed. When added to the disproportionate number of bans imposed upon 
Indigenous recipients as a whole, a significant issue is evident. The risk of adverse 
consequences for specific groups was noted during parliamentary debates of the 
banning provisions in 2007. The published data was offered as a mechanism to 
monitor this. However, despite the issues that are identifiable in the data, neither the 
legislation or the manner of its implementation have been re-visited. The impact of 
banning notices upon the Indigenous population of Victoria has been subject to no 
public or subsequent parliamentary scrutiny. 
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The reliability of the published data is affected by a lack of clarity about how the 
Indigenous status of banning notice recipients has been determined. The first Annual 
Report publishing banning notice data articulated the process to be followed.  
Koori identification status was based upon the existence of at least one 
instance of self identification recorded against the person (ie. an answer 
of either Aboriginal, Torres Strait Islander, or Both Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander to the question: are you of Aboriginal and/or Torres Strait 
Islander origin?) (Chief Commissioner, 2008). 
However, subsequent Annual Reports did not contain this procedural note. It is not 
known whether the classifications noted in the published data were derived by 
recipient self-report or from assumptions made by issuing police officers. Patterns in 
the data are indicative of an increasing use of assumption-based categorisation, 
similar to the subjective assessment of racial appearance from which the Victoria 
Police Crime Statistics data is derived (Victoria Police 2008, p.7). The use of 
assumption is most apparent in the steady increase in the number of banning notice 
recipients whose Indigenous status was recorded as unknown, which rose from 14% 
of the total in 2008-09 to a peak of 46% in 2010-11, and averaged 23% over the five 
years. Observation and assumption are the most likely sources of an ‘unknown’ 
assessment. This not only creates clear potential for error if simple visual appearance 
is the basis of the categorisation, the use of ‘unknown’ or ‘unspecified’ enables the 
disproportionate use of banning notices for Indigenous Victorians to be hidden in the 
data. It is notable that in the first annual report (2007-08), in which the ‘unknown’ 
and ‘unspecified’ categories were not used, 5% of banning notice recipients were 
recorded as Indigenous: more than eight times higher than the Indigenous percentage 
of the Victorian population in 2006 (which was 0.6% (ABS 2006)).   
The lack of accurate data regarding the Indigenous status of banning notice recipients 
is a significant finding. Despite the expectations of accountability, reflected in the 
LCRA Act 2007 requirement to publish banning notice data, the proportion of 
banning notice recipients who are of Indigenous origin is simply not known. It is 
possible that the number of banning notices given to Indigenous recipients is higher 
than the already disproportionate figures recorded in the published data. Public 
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examination and scrutiny of the operation of the legislation, and the particular impact 
of the discretionary police power to ban upon the Indigenous population, appears to 
be compromised. In the context of a notable body of research into discriminatory 
policing of Indigenous Australians  and subsequent admissions of racial profiling by 15
Victoria Police (2013),  the failure to accurately record the Indigenous status of 16
recipients of banning notices is a serious oversight. That this issue has not been 
identified, was not discussed during the extension of the banning provisions in 2010, 
and has never been revisited in parliament, reinforces concern about the absence of 
effective scrutiny and accountability of Victoria’s banning provisions.  
The parliamentary debates in 2007 acknowledged the risk that banning notices could 
disproportionately affect specific groups, and included a data publication 
requirement in the LCRA Act 2007. However, the precise consequences of banning 
for vulnerable recipients, such as Indigenous Victorians and the homeless, is 
unknown and has not been the subject of any ongoing scrutiny.  
7.1.i(c)  Missing Banning Notice Data 
Analysis of the published banning notice data has identified a notable omission. In 
all but the first Annual Report, the specified offences for which banning notices have 
been imposed were not published. The reports for the periods 2008-09 and 2009-10 
both stated that “the suspected offence data was not captured during the reporting 
period on electronic databases” (Chief Commissioner 2009, p.1; 2010, p.1). The 
Annual Reports for the periods 2010-11 and 2011-12 amended the explanation and 
noted that 
 For example, Johnston (1991), Luke and Cunneen (1995), Cunneen (2001), Paradies (2005), 15
Walsh and Taylor (2006, 2007), and Crofts and Mitchell (2011).
  A report by Victoria Police in 2013 admitted racial profiling by police officers. This case did not 16
relate to the profiling of Indigenous Victorians, but it highlighted racially discriminatory practices 
within Victoria Police. In 2010, six Australian men pursued a civil case in Melbourne’s Federal 
Court, claiming racial discrimination in Flemington and North Melbourne between 2005 and 2009. 
The case was settled out of court by Victoria Police. As part of the settlement, admissions were 
made. A full inquiry into public relations and training was conducted (Grossman et al. 2013; 
Victoria Police 2013).
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… this data is not readily retrievable, given the number of banning 
notices issued. Each notice would have to be individually reviewed and 
the resources to undertake that level of manual data extraction are not 
presently available (Chief Commissioner 2011, p.1; 2012, p.1). 
It is unclear why, despite the legislated requirement, this aspect of the data is too 
problematic to collate, when the recipient age group, Indigenous status and 
designated area location for each individual notice have been published. The failure 
to provide the offence data significantly limits public examination of the way in 
which designated areas are declared (discussed in section 7.1.i(f)). In addition, and 
pertinent to the issues explored in this thesis, is the lack of oversight of the 
behaviours for which banning notices are imposed. This is particularly evident where 
police officers may issue a pre-emptive ban in anticipation of disorder or a loosely 
defined expectation of ‘trouble’. If the reasons for the imposition of individual bans 
are not recorded, it is not known how or why the banning notice powers are being 
used. When added to deficiencies in the recording of the Indigenous status of 
banning recipients, this prevents full accountability and precludes meaningful 
scrutiny of these discretionary police powers. 
7.1.i(c)  Banning Notice Breaches 
The number of charges in relation to banning notice breaches, the results of any 
breach proceedings, and the number of breaches for which no charges are laid are 
required to be reported each year (LCRA Act 2007, s148F). None were reported in 
the first reporting period 2007-08. A simple count of breach charges and convictions 
was published in the 2008-09 report. The method of reporting changed for the 
2009-10 period, and reflected the use of a number of police-imposed penalty notices 
in response to banning breaches. Implicit in this reporting change was a move away 
from court-based breach proceedings. The published data suggests that from 2009 
the discretionary summary police power to issue a banning notice was increasingly 
enforced via another discretionary summary police power to issue an infringement 
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notice in response to perceived breaches.  Unlike the original ban, penalty notices 17
do at least afford the recipient the option of an appeal. The published breach data is 
summarised in table 7.4. 
Table 7.4: Number of events recorded in relation to breaches of banning notice provisions 
When compared with the number of banning notices issued each year, the number of 
breaches recorded was low. The introduction of penalty notices coincided with more 
breach activity over the final three reporting periods, despite a steady reduction in the 
overall number of banning notices being issued (from a peak of 1868 in 2009-10 to 
1091 in 2011-12). However, no information has been published about any of the 
alleged breaches. There is also no data recording the number of banning notice 
recipients who exercised their limited right to seek a review of their banning notice 
by a more senior police officer (LCRA Act 2007, s148E). The breach data illustrates 
the potential for consequences of banning beyond the short term physical exclusion 
of individuals from specified designated areas. Although the number is low, it is 
possible that recipients of banning notices, which may have been imposed pre-
emptively, without any offence being committed and with no right of judicial appeal, 
have been subject to breach proceedings and conviction.  
Action 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Charged - 4 7 - -
Convicted - 4 6 - -
Arrest - - - 3 -
Arrest not authorised - - - 2 -
Summons - - - 7 2
Penalty Notice - - 19 13 32
  The specific penalty notices applied are not recorded in the data. However, they are presumed to 17
reflect the additional police powers introduced in the Summary Offences & Control of Weapons 
Acts Amendment Act, 2009. This includes move-on notices, which can be issued pre-emptively, on-
the-spot and specify non-return for up to 24 hours (s3(3)). Breaches can lead to a further 
infringement notice. Infringement notice penalties for alcohol related offences were also increased 
(s4 & s5), and the infringement offence of ‘disorderly conduct’ (s6) was created.
Chapter 7: Analysis of Ongoing Oversight & Accountability 219
7.1.i(e)  Multiple Banning Notice Recipients 
The claims made by Attorney-General Hulls in 2010 to support the extension of 
banning notices to 72 hours are documented in Chapter Six. In the Statement of 
Compatibility for the JLA Bill 2010, Hulls linked the fact that individuals had been 
issued with multiple bans with justifications for extending the permissible length of 
individual banning notices. 
… there have been a number of people to whom police have had to give 
a banning notice on multiple occasions… its efficacy can be enhanced 
through enabling police, in appropriate circumstances, to give notices of 
a significantly longer duration (Legislative Assembly 2010a, 1132). 
The published banning notice data reports the number of multiple bans imposed 
during each reporting period.  Table 7.5 documents the figures for the five years 18
analysed for this thesis.  
Table 7.5: Multiple banning notices issued each reporting year, 2008-12 
In the first two years of the banning legislation, for which data had been published 
when the 2010 Statement was tabled by Hulls, banning notices were given to 1512 
individuals, of whom 34 (or 2.2%) received more than one notice (Chief 
Commissioner 2008, 2009).  While supporting Hulls’ claims of multiple order 19
impositions, the actual number issued was low. The figures are not indicative of a 
need to extend the duration of banning notices to prevent their multiple imposition. 
This data was available to be scrutinised but was not referenced during the 2010 
parliamentary debates. By contrast, of the 3639 individual banning notice recipients 
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Number of unique 
banning notice 
recipients
128 1384 1803 831 1005
Number of multiple 
notices issued
1 33 54 19 86
  See Chapter Six, footnote 14.18
  The published data for the first two reporting periods only specified the number of multiple 19
notices. Later reports included a breakdown for individuals receiving 2, 3, 4 and more than five 
notices.
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recorded between years ending 30 June 2010 and 30 June 2012, 159 (or 4.4%) 
received more than one order. While still a low absolute number, the percentage of 
multiple order recipients had doubled from 2.2% over the first two reporting periods 
(2007-08 and 2008-09). The data for the final three reporting periods enables a more 
detailed analysis of multiple order imposition. In 2009-10, there were 8 recipients of 
more than two banning notices (0.43% of the 1868 imposed). This figure rose to 16 
in 2011-12 (1.5% of the 1091 notices imposed). 
If extending the permissible length of a ban was an effective deterrent, as claimed by 
Hulls, the proportion of multiple order recipients (whether this is regarded as more 
than one or more than two notices) should not have increased. The enhanced effect of 
longer banning notices, used to justify their extension to 72 hours, does not appear to 
be evident. Yet there has been no subsequent parliamentary or public consideration of 
the use of 72 hour banning notices or their effectiveness when compared with 24 
hour bans. This lack of oversight of police practice was highlighted in Chapter Five. 
Analysis undertaken for this research found that Victoria Police in the Melbourne 
CBD were issuing banning notices for 72 hours as a matter of course, rather than in 
the ‘appropriate circumstances’ referenced in the 2010 Statement. The findings 
prompted pre-patrol briefings for the Safe Streets Task Force to be amended to 
reiterate expectations for the imposition of banning notices. As no information is 
published regarding the length of notices that are imposed, the effect of this change 
cannot be examined publicly. 
7.1.i(f)  Designated Areas                
A pre-requisite for the imposition of banning notices is the designation of declared 
areas in which they will apply.  The steady increase in the number of designated 20
areas that has occurred since 2007 (documented in table 7.1), reflects an assumption 
that banning notices control alcohol-related problems. However, the threshold for the 
  The LCRA Act 2007 outlines the requirements for the declaration of a designated area, which are 20
explained in Chapter Two, Section 2.1.
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declaration of a designated area is fluid and not objectively defined. No guidelines 
are evident in the banning notice legislation, parliamentary debates or subsequent 
Victorian Commission for Gambling and Liquor Regulation (VCGLR) 
documentation relating to designated areas. There are no firm or measurable rules 
that must be applied before a district can be declared a designated area, beyond the 
legislated requirement that the VCGLR “believes” that alcohol-related violence and/
or disorder has occurred in the vicinity of licensed premises within a particular area, 
and that a designated area will be an effective response (LCRA Act 2007, s147(1)). 
Data and reasons in support of designation are presented to the VCGLR by affected 
stakeholders, such as Victoria Police and local councils. The cases put forward for 
designation are not typically publicly available and how the VCGLR effects its 
decision remains unclear.   21
The declaration of designated areas presumes the effectiveness of banning notices in 
controlling alcohol-related disorder in the NTE. By not publishing the reasons for the 
imposition of banning notices (noted in section 7.1.i(c)) meaningful cross-tabulation 
with Victoria Police Crime Statistics is limited and any causal linkage is difficult to 
substantiate. It is not known, for example, how many of the 1639 banning notices 
issued in the Melbourne CBD in 2009-10 were for reasons of alcohol-related 
violence and how many were a subjectively assessed pre-emptive police response to 
a potential nuisance. The difference is significant when seeking to understand and 
scrutinise the application of the discretionary police power to ban, the parliamentary 
justifications for which focused upon what were presented as tangible issues of 
alcohol-related disorder. 
Statements accompanying the declaration of designated areas typically make 
reference to generic concerns. A government media release following the declaration 
of Dandenong (in Outer Eastern Melbourne), explained that the designation was “at 
 This thesis has not tested the rationale for each designated area declaration, or assessed the 21
effectiveness of the banning provisions. Although it was noted in Chapter Six that parliamentary 
justifications to designate the Melbourne CBD and Chapel Street/Prahran areas in 2007 were 
largely anecdotal, or supported with vague or selectively applied crime data, it is not known if 
further evidence was presented to the then Director of Liquor Licensing prior to their declaration.
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the request of local police concerned with violence and anti-social behaviour in the 
area” (O'Brien 2011a). Similarly, the media release that accompanied the declaration 
of Melbourne’s Docklands stated 
The ability to issue banning notices within Docklands will give police the 
power to act quickly to prevent anti-social behaviour before it happens… 
These measures will deliver improved safety for the precinct's growing 
number of residents, workers and visitors and help licensees better 
manage their venues (O’Brien 2011b). 
However, the absence of published data recording the offences for which banning 
notices were subsequently imposed hinders ongoing analysis of the actual way in 
which the banning provisions were used. It is acknowledged that the offences for 
which banning notices were imposed would not necessarily provide a detailed view 
of ongoing issues in each designated area, but this data would enable some 
assessment of whether the use of banning notices in each area targeted the issues for 
which they were intended. 
In addition to the gaps identified in the published data, there appears to be an 
incompatibility between the needs that are claimed prior to designation and the 
operational policing experience. Designated areas have been declared to cover the 
key entertainment precincts and hubs within Victoria's main towns and cities. The 
data analysis noted the low number of banning notices issued in some designated 
areas. In Knox no bans were imposed at all between designation in September 2008 
and June 2012. Given the arguments that must be put forward to secure designated 
area status, it is surprising that the discretionary power to ban has not been used more 
widely. 
Designated area declarations place great emphasis upon crime prevention in the 
interests of the greater public safety. The rhetoric reflects the techniques employed 
during parliamentary debates of the LCRA Bill 2007 and JLA Bill 2010, and is 
emotive, vague and couched in terms to generate fear. In announcing Dandenong a 
designated area, the Minister for Consumer Affairs hailed the extension of “new laws 
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to deal with drunken, loutish and threatening behaviour” (O'Brien 2011a). Banning 
provisions were presented as a proactive mechanism to ensure community safety. 
… rather than wait for something to happen, banning notices can be used 
to defuse situations and remove troublemakers from harmful situations 
(O'Brien 2011a).  
The 2011 designated area declaration in Docklands continued the rhetoric. 
… people doing the right thing should be able to enjoy the sport and 
nightlife on offer in the Docklands without their fun being spoiled by a 
few louts (O’Brien 2011b). 
However, without the legislated banning notice data, public scrutiny of the way in 
which the discretionary police power to ban is being used is limited. The claims 
made to justify the designation of new areas cannot be tested, and are not publicly 
examinable. 
7.1.ii  Summary                               
The way in which banning notice data has been published limits meaningful scrutiny 
of the banning notice provisions and of the need to ‘re-balance’ the provision of 
justice in the NTE, that is implicit in both the legislation and the declaration of 
designated areas. Gaps in the data hinder analysis of the way in which the banning 
provisions have been used. It is unclear why the mandatory requirement to publish 
the offence for which banning notices are imposed has repeatedly not been met. This 
is a key failing which prevents examination of assumptions made by the Victorian 
Parliament, Victoria Police and the VCGLR about the need, purpose, functioning and 
effectiveness of the banning notice provisions. Similarly, the lack of detail in the 
published data inhibits meaningful and comparative analysis of the use of banning. 
Ongoing assessment of how banning notices are being used would be informed by 
the inclusion of measurable baselines and points of comparison, such as dates, times, 
specific locations and behaviours. Such data should be recordable with little 
problem, as these details are required to be documented on the banning notices 
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imposed (see Appendix B). Inclusion in the annual statistics would carry no issues of 
confidentiality, as recipient names would not be required. 
The publication of data relating to the imposition of banning notices was a clearly 
stated requirement of the LCRA Act 2007 (s148R), regarded as essential to facilitate 
public scrutiny and to ensure that no specific demographic group is affected 
disproportionately. The way in which the data has been published, in particular the 
uncertainty about the Indigenous status of recipients and the lack of offence specific 
data, raises fundamental concerns. Effective public scrutiny of the use of the 
discretionary police power to ban is both necessary and a legislative requirement. 
The banning provisions have been justified in parliament and within designated area 
applications as essential to ‘re-balance’ community protection in the NTE. However, 
the data that should enable objective examination of their use falls short of mandated 
expectations. Significantly, despite the banning notice data being formally tabled 
each year, the findings and deficiencies noted in this analysis have not been explored 
by Victoria’s Parliament. 
7.2  Media Scrutiny                     
The media can be instrumental in constructing a social agenda which then directs and 
reinforces the need for legislative change (Hall et al. 1978; McCombs 2004; Altheide 
2006; Beale 2006; DCPC  2001a, 2010; Jones & Wolfe 2010; Silverman 2012).  22 23
The depiction of issues in the media influences public perception of crime and 
criminal justice policy. Media coverage can also serve as a check upon decisions 
made by policy makers, policing behaviours, and criminal justice processes (Surette 
2015). In their submission to the National Human Rights Consultation,  the 24
  Victorian Parliament Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee.22
  As this thesis has not evaluated the need for or effectiveness of banning notices, the contribution 23
of Victoria’s media to the development of the provisions is not documented in this chapter. 
  In 2009, the Federal Attorney-General (McClelland) appointed an independent committee to 24
undertake an extensive consultation on human rights in Australia.
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Australian Human Rights Commission (AHRC) (2009) noted the significance of a 
robust media in the assurance of rights and freedoms. To extend the examination of 
the scrutiny of Victoria’s banning provisions since their enactment in 2007, an 
analysis of the media coverage of the implementation of the banning provisions was 
undertaken. The analysis considered in particular whether the discretionary police 
powers that are embedded within the banning provisions, or the consequences for 
due process procedural protections and individual rights, have been subject to media-
driven public scrutiny.  
It is acknowledged that media coverage does not necessarily provide an accurate 
reflection of specific issues and events. The preference for episodic reporting of 
crime can dilute consideration of broader issues. This can build public fear, demonise 
individuals and create a perception that crime emanates from personal choice and is 
best countered with harsh deterrents (Beale 2006; Mason 2007; Cheliotis 2010; 
Drake 2011). Disproportionate media coverage of particular behaviours, and an 
emphasis upon specific incidents were highlighted by the DCPC (2001a, 2010)  as a 25
risk to objective policy development. However, the media remains a key influence 
upon public perceptions and a primary source of public scrutiny (Gelb 2006; Roberts 
& Indermaur 2009). A “robust media” (AHRC 2009, p.2) should act as an essential 
check on government powers by ensuring public awareness of key issues. 
The research scope was limited to Victoria’s online newspapers (n=55) and reflected 
the approach adopted by the DCPC in their detailed inquiries (2001a, 2010). While 
the DCPC studies focused specifically on two state-wide newspapers, The Age and 
 A DCPC (2001a) report mapping official crime statistics against the way in which crime is 25
depicted in the print media (specifically The Age and the Herald Sun), noted a clear disparity 
between the most prevalent offences recorded and those receiving most media coverage. For 
example, reports of crimes against the person accounted for 44.9% of all crime-related articles 
across both newspapers, but only 7.1% of recorded crime in the Melbourne CBD (DCPC 2001a, p.
106-7). A later DCPC (2010) report produced similar findings, and noted significant anomalies in 
the reporting of assaults over a six month period in 2009. In particular, 62% of articles in the 
Herald Sun referenced licensed premises in their reporting of assaults, the location of only 17% of 
recorded assaults. Alcohol was also discussed more frequently than it was flagged in police 
statistics (DCPC 2010, p.40).
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the Herald Sun, this study incorporated the 55 Victorian newspapers that are 
accessible via the online repository Newsbank, listed in Chapter Four, table 4.4.   26
Fifty of the titles are local publications, and five have a state-wide circulation. An 
‘any text’ key word search was undertaken for the period 2007-12.  The search 27
identified every article that referenced banning notices, in any context, and covered 
the various ways in which the banning provisions can be referred. The specific terms 
used were: ‘banning’ ‘banning notice’ ‘banning order’ ‘ban troublemaker’ ‘24 hour 
ban’ ‘72 hour ban.’ Newsbank returned articles that contained any of the search 
terms, as full or partial matches. As a result, reference to any type of banning created 
a match, and the search returned a total of 6413 articles across the six year period 
between 2007-12.  Each article retrieved was accepted for analysis only if it 28
specifically referenced the banning notice provisions relevant to this thesis. Of the 
6413 articles, 185 met the criteria.  
The results of the media analysis first examine the number of articles returned, and 
the proportion published in local and state-wide newspapers. The primary purpose of 
each relevant article is then explored. The extent of media acknowledgement of the 
due process issues embedded within the banning provisions is considered, and key 
assumptions contained within the articles are also assessed. 
  Additional print media sources exist beyond those utilised by Newsbank, in addition to a wealth of 26
online media. Newsbank is sufficiently representative to reveal trends and detail in the coverage.
  This enables examination of the media coverage of the first five years of the provisions, similar to 27
the period covered in the banning notice data analysis. The data is reported by fiscal year, whereas 
the media coverage is documented by calendar year.
  Due to the broad search terms used, the majority of the articles retrieved related to other types of 28
banning that were prominent in the media. Examples include sunbeds, smoking, smacking, puppy 
farms, live cattle exports, fracking and using mobile phones while driving. These articles were 
excluded from the analysis.
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7.2.ii  Key Findings                 
7.2.ii(a)  Number and Source of Articles  
The number of individual articles that specifically referenced the banning notice 
provisions was 185. Table 7.6 documents the total number returned, how the articles 
divided between state and local newspapers, and how the numbers for each changed 
over the six year period. 
Most of the relevant media articles were published in 2008 and 2009 (122, or 66% of 
the sample), directly after the banning provisions were first introduced. A similar 
pattern of coverage across the calendar years is evident in state and local newspapers. 
The overall number of relevant articles in local newspapers was higher, and the peak 
coverage occurred in 2008 rather than 2009. There are more local than state 
newspapers (50 local and 5 state), and this provides a reasonable explanation for the 
greater level of coverage. Any differences relating to article focus are discussed in 
the next section. 
Table 7.6: Total banning notice specific articles, and by state and local newspapers, 2007-12 
* Calendar year 
7.2.ii(b)  Primary Purpose of Articles 
The content of each relevant article was further analysed to discern its primary 
purpose. Following preliminary analysis of the articles, five categories were 
Year* Total Articles State Paper Local Paper
2007 23 12 11
2008 73 18 55
2009 49 22 27
2010 18 7 11
2011 20 11 9
2012 2 1 1
Total 185 71 (38%) 114 (62%)
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established against which to capture the core focus. Each is defined in table 7.7, with 
the identifier used in the subsequent analysis also noted. If an article could fit into 
more than one category its primary purpose was determined. For example, an article 
that focused upon concerns about behaviours in the NTE, but which included a 
reference to banning notice data within a particular area or timeframe, was 
categorised under ‘Concern’. This decision was made subjectively following a 
reading of each article. The results of the detailed analyses of each article are 
contained in table 7.8. 
Table 7.7: Media content analysis categories and identifiers 
Core Focus Description Identifier
Imposition of the 
Legislation and/or 
a Specific Relevant 
Strategy 
Primary focus upon the imposition (potential or 
actual) of the banning notice legislation. Including 
reporting the declaration of designated areas, and 
how the provisions relate specifically to strategic 
plans addressing issues in the NTE.
Imposition
 Specific Events Reporting details of particular dates, events, 
initiatives or police operations in relation to the 
NTE, and in which the banning provisions are 
referenced
Event
General Concern Documenting general concern about behaviour in the 
NTE, including discussion of the banning 
provisions. Generally more editorial expressions of 
concern regarding the NTE and banning provisions
Concern
Data Primarily reporting published data relating to the 
banning provisions
Data
Judicial Concern/
Legal Challenge
Relating to judicial (rather than political or personal) 
discussion of banning issues, and specific court 
cases or legal challenges. 
Legal
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Table 7.8: Primary purpose of banning specific articles, 2007-12 
(percentages are subject to rounding) 
The most common article focus over the six year period related to the ‘Imposition’ of 
the banning legislation, comprising 112 (or 61%) of the 185 articles. This coverage 
was at its peak in the immediate aftermath of the enactment of the LCRA Act 2007. 
Of the 112 articles, 57 (or 51%) were published in 2008. Articles reporting banning 
notice ‘Data’ and general ‘Concern’ about behaviours in the NTE received similar 
levels of coverage; comprising 33 (or 18%)  and 27 (or 15%) of the 185 articles. The 
final two categories, regarding specific ‘Events’ and police initiatives (9, or 5%), and 
‘Legal’ or judicially focused discussion of banning issues (4, or 2%), were the least 
common article focus. 
The analysis of the primary purpose of each article considered whether there was any 
difference in the coverage in state-wide newspapers when compared with local 
publications. Tables 7.9 and 7.10 reveal a similar distribution between each primary 
purpose. 
Year Imposition Event Concern Data Legal Total
2007 17 2 3 1 0 23
2008 57 2 7 7 0 73
2009 20 3 13 11 2 49
2010 5 0 2 11 0 18
2011 13 0 2 3 2 20
2012 0 2 0 0 0 2
Total 112 
(61%)
9 
(5%)
27 
(15%)
33 
(18%)
4 
(2%)
185 
(100%)
Chapter 7: Analysis of Ongoing Oversight & Accountability 230
Table 7.9: Primary purpose of banning specific articles retrieved from local newspapers, 
2007-12 
(percentages are subject to rounding) 
Table 7.10: Primary purpose of banning specific articles retrieved from state-wide 
newspapers, 2007-12 
(percentages are subject to rounding) 
The ‘Imposition’ category predominates across both newspaper types, although it is 
higher in local publications (69% compared with 46%). There are also 
proportionately more ‘Concern’ and ‘Data’ articles evident in the state-wide 
newspapers (25% and 23% of articles compared with 9% and 15% in the local 
papers). Overall, the proportions in each category are closer in the state-wide 
publications. A possible explanation for the higher proportion of ‘Imposition’ articles 
in local newspapers over the first three years analysed is their reporting of banning as 
the provisions were implemented in their areas. Between 2007 and the end of 2009, 
Year Imposition Event Concern Data Legal Total
2007 9 2 0 0 0 11
2008 49 1 2 3 0 55
2009 12 3 7 4 1 27
2010 3 0 1 7 0 11
2011 6 0 0 3 0 9
2012 0 1 0 0 0 1
Total 79 
(69%)
6 
(5%)
10 
(9%)
17 
(15%)
1 
(1%)
114 
(100%)
Year Imposition Event Concern Data Legal Total
2007 8 0 3 1 0 12
2008 8 1 5 4 0 18
2009 8 0 6 7 1 22
2010 2 0 1 4 0 7
2011 7 0 2 0 2 11
2012 0 1 0 0 0 1
Total 33 
(46%)
2 
(3%)
18 
(25%)
16 
(23%)
3 
(4%)
71 
(100%)
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11 designated areas were created across Victoria (documented in table 7.1 in the first 
section of this chapter), each of which were reported in their local newspapers. For 
example, prior to the designation of Geelong, the local paper ran a series of articles 
highlighting plans to introduce banning:  
‘Plan to outlaw drunks in CBD’  (Geelong Advertiser, 26 April 2008) 
‘MP pushes for CBD drunk ban’  (Geelong Advertiser, 24 May 2008) 
‘Police bid to ban thugs’   (Geelong Advertiser, 14 June 2008) 
The Geelong Advertiser then published five more articles in August 2008, following 
the declaration of Geelong as a designated area.  
The higher number and overall proportion of ‘Concern’ articles in the state-wide 
publications aligns with their focus upon broader issues of public and political 
concern. Typical examples included: 
‘This is Melbourne at night: ‘alcohol-fuelled anarchy’ - Special Report - The 
Violent CBD’     (The Age, 23 February 20008)  
‘Binge-buster cops: Police chiefs unite in push for alcohol reforms’  
      (Herald Sun, 28 May 2008) 
With the exception of the ‘Imposition’ and ‘Concern’ categories, there are no other 
significant findings from the consideration of state-wide and local/regional 
publications. The remainder of the analysis in this section is based upon all 185 
articles returned.  
The primary focus of each relevant article as a proportion of the total number of 
articles changed for each year examined, and is illustrated in figure 7.3. As the 
number of articles declined from the peak of 73 in 2008, an increasing emphasis 
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upon ‘Data’ specific articles was evident in 2009 and 2010. However, actual 
numbers remained low. The 100% ‘Event’ focus in 2012 refers to only two articles. 
Figure 7.3: Primary purpose of banning specific articles as a % of the total,2007-12  
Across all publications, the articles in the ‘Imposition’ category primarily reported 
the declaration of new designated areas and the use of banning notices as a generally 
welcomed mechanism to address issues in the NTE. Example headlines included: 
‘Bans on drunks, thugs to spread’ (Sunday Herald Sun, 20 April 2008) 
‘Drunks face ban. Police target late-night hotspots’   
     (Port Philip Leader, 11 August 2008) 
‘Police welcome Knox O-zone ban powers’  
     (Knox Leader, 30 September 2008) 
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The irony of the headline in the Knox Leader is noted, as the analysis of published 
banning notice data revealed that no bans were imposed in Knox between 2008-12. 
Published banning notice ‘Data’ was the focus of 33 (18%) of the 185 articles. 
However, each article limited the reporting of the data to straightforward numbers of 
notices imposed. A typical example was published in the Dandenong Leader, under 
the headline ‘Get out of town - 74 notices ban CBD troublemakers’ (7 December 
2011). The article noted the general location of the bans, the age range of recipients 
and the potential consequences of their breach. There was no analysis or discussion 
of the data in this or any of the 33 articles. For example, there was no consideration 
of issues relating to the effect of banning notices upon Indigenous Victorians, or of 
any limitations in the published data. Despite the expectations expressed during 
parliamentary debates of the LCRA Bill 2007, the published data was not a vehicle 
for the public scrutiny of the imposition and consequences of the banning provisions.  
Of the 27 articles (15%) that discussed general ‘Concern’ in relation to the NTE and 
alcohol-related behaviours, and which specifically referenced banning notices, there 
was no consideration of any issues relating to the banning provisions themselves. 
Banning notices were regarded as a proactive tool to target the causes of the general 
concern. For example, under the headline ‘Booze is a stain on our reputation - City 
must lose drink culture’ the Chief Commissioner of Victoria Police, Simon Overland, 
wrote in the Herald Sun in 2011. 
New laws have complemented a more visible and active presence. We 
ban troublemakers from licensed precincts… The evidence suggests that 
these and other initiatives are starting to work… (Herald Sun, 15 
February 2011) 
All of the articles addressing general ‘Concern’ about alcohol-related issues in the 
NTE extended the parliamentary assumption that banning notices were a necessary 
and appropriate response, without offering supporting evidence. 
There was some overlap between articles that discussed the ‘Imposition’ of the 
banning provisions and those addressing particular ‘Events’ and police initiatives. 
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Where overlaps occurred, the ‘Imposition’ category predominated. Only 9 articles 
across the six year period focused primarily upon ‘Events’ and operational activities. 
Following the passage of the LCRA Act 2007, the Geelong Advertiser reported that 
“Police will conduct a crackdown on licensed premises across Victoria this 
summer” (19 December 2007). Once again the article contained an underlying 
rationale that a problem existed in the NTE that must be addressed. The same article 
reported Assistant Commissioner Gary Jamieson’s assertion that “our aim is to 
ensure people are safe when they go out.” 
Across the six year period between 2007-12, only four articles addressed ‘Legal’ 
considerations or judicial concerns related to the banning provisions. In 2009 two 
articles were categorised as ‘Legal’. The first, in the Knox Leader (4 August 2009), 
reported the aftermath of a serious assault. Banning was referenced in passing in the 
context of legal powers to manage issues in the NTE. The second, in The Age (22 
August 2009), discussed the concerns of a Victorian Judge in relation to a number of 
serious assaults in the NTE. Again, banning was included in the range of possible 
responses. Each of the two articles mentioned banning notices but did not discuss the 
banning provisions. The remaining two articles in the ‘Legal’ category are among 
only four of the 185 analysed that considered the due process consequences of the 
banning provisions. They are discussed in more detail below.  
7.2.ii(c)  Consideration of Individual Due Process Rights 
Detailed analysis of the 185 articles revealed very little scrutiny of the 2007 and 
2010 legislative provisions themselves, the increased discretionary powers afforded 
to police, or their potential effect upon individual rights. Only four of the 185 articles 
addressed the due process issues embedded within the LCRA Act 2007 and JLA Act 
2010. The four articles were all published in state-wide newspapers, in the Herald 
Sun on 6 and 7 December 2007, and in The Sunday Age on 31 July 2011 and 16 
October 2011. 
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The first two of these articles contained a general discussion of the perceived need 
for and purpose of the banning provisions. They were published in the Herald Sun 
alongside the passage of the initial legislation through the Victorian Parliament on 6 
and 7 December 2007.  Their primary focus was the ‘Imposition’ of the banning 29
provisions. The headlines for each are indicative of their tone and criticism of the 
proposed amendments  that initially risked delaying the passage of the LCRA Act 30
2007, but which were subsequently conceded. 
‘BOOZE BUST: Libs sink laws to make our streets safer’  
     (Herald Sun, 6 December 2007) 
‘Booze bans in after Libs wilt’   (Herald Sun, 7 December 2007) 
The only due process consideration noted in these articles related to the right of 
judicial appeal of a banning notice. Extracts illustrate the assumptions upon which 
the articles were based. The first cited the Police Minister, Bob Cameron, and his 
objection to the right of judicial appeal against a banning notice, which he justified 
by the additional time it would take to complete the necessary paperwork. 
Laws to make Melbourne streets safer from drunks over the summer 
party season have been scuttled by political in-fighting… They would 
have given the police the power to... ban trouble-makers from 
entertainment precincts… ‘What (these amendments) mean to the 
operational policeman is that if someone is creating some sort of trouble 
and police think it’s time for them to go home and watch a DVD, if it’s 
going to be the subject of a court matter they (the police) are going to 
have to make notes. At two or three in the morning, when we want police 
to be out on the street, they’re going to be taking notes. It becomes 
entirely unworkable’ [Bob Cameron, Police Minister]  (Herald Sun, 6 
December 2007). 
In the second article, the underlying principle of appeal was again overlooked. 
Instead, the focus was the perceived Opposition support for ‘drunks’ that the article 
  These articles are referenced in Chapter Six in relation to the time pressures to pass the LCRA Bill 29
2007.
  The key amendments related to the provision of a banning notice appeal mechanism. This is 30
discussed in Chapter Six.
Chapter 7: Analysis of Ongoing Oversight & Accountability 236
contended was implied by their proposed amendment for a right of appeal. The 
article prioritised fear and the dangers of the New Year period in relation to alcohol-
related disorder. 
 Victoria will have tough new laws banning drunks and trouble-makers 
before New Year’s Eve… the laws would now be implemented in time 
for the busy and dangerous New Year period… The Opposition parties 
wanted amendments allowing drunks... the right to appeal against bans... 
The move threatened to stall the new laws until after the party season, the 
rowdiest time of the year in trouble spots… (Herald Sun, 7 December 
2007). 
Liberal spokesperson O’Brien’s support for the right of judicial appeal against a 
banning notice was quoted in the article. 
Mr Ryan [Deputy Leader of the Opposition] and Liberal spokesman 
Michael O’Brien told Parliament they had reluctantly decided to drop the 
amendments in the interests of having the laws passed in time for 
summer. Mr O’Brien said the laws meant people could appeal against a 
parking ticket but not against a 24 hour police ban that was recorded 
forever in the police database. ‘Our amendments were basically a chance 
to clear your name, as it’s a pretty serious slur on your reputation’ Mr 
O’Brien said (Herald Sun, 7 December 2007). 
However, O’Brien’s statement is placed in an article which was overwhelmingly 
unsupportive of his view, and critical of any consideration of the rights of banning 
notice recipients, portrayed as “drunks,” if this caused the passage of the legislation 
to be delayed. The headline ‘Booze bans in after Libs wilt’ and reference to a 
“humiliating backdown” by the Liberal Party demonstrate the article’s ridicule of 
O’Brien’s concern. 
The remaining two articles that noted the individual rights of recipients were 
published in The Sunday Age in 2011. Each reported the case of a 21 year old woman 
banned for a year from every pub, bottle shop and licensed restaurant in the city of 
Swan Hill, Victoria, under separate Liquor Accord provisions of the LCRA Act 2007 
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(s146A-D).  Liquor Accords enable licensees, Victoria Police, local councils and 31
other community members to address local issues of alcohol-related disorder 
(VCGLR 2012). Swan Hill is not a designated area, but under their Liquor Accord a 
Banned Person Register was introduced in January 2008. On 31 July 2011, the first 
article carried the headline ‘Lawyers challenge public alcohol ban powers’. It 
outlined a pending Supreme Court challenge to police powers under Liquor Accords. 
On 16 October 2011, the second article, ‘Police back down over pub bans’, detailed 
the decision by Victoria Police to drop the 12 month ban against the 21 year old. 
The legal challenge in the Swan Hill case related to the legality of the police powers 
under Liquor Accord provisions, rather than the merits of the individual Liquor 
Accord ban, or of banning notices more generally. The LCRA Act 2007 does not 
permit the right of independent review of a police decision to impose a banning 
notice. However, the banning notice provisions could potentially be subject to a 
similar challenge under administrative law. To date, no challenge has been made. 
The most significant media comment with respect to the themes considered in this 
thesis was published in the 16 October 2011 article, and was made by Mark Woods 
from the Law Institute of Victoria. 
It’s kangaroo justice… The person who makes the complaint against 
someone makes the decision to exclude them without their reasons or 
their evidence being tested (The Sunday Age, 16 October 2011). 
This is the only example in any of the 185 articles analysed of a clear connection 
being made between individual rights and the use of on-the-spot, discretionary police 
powers to punish. Significantly, this comment was made not in relation to the more 
expansive banning notice powers of the LCRA Act 2007, but with respect to the 
separate and more limited Liquor Accord provisions, which do not exclude recipients 
from public spaces. Banning notices were mentioned within each of the Swan Hill 
  Outlined in Chapter Two, the Liquor Accord banning powers do not relate to public spaces and 31
their specific impact upon the right to move freely is much more limited. However, Liquor Accord 
banning records and related barring order records (under provisions in the Justice Legislation 
Amendment Act 2011), are not available for examination. The VCGLR confirmed that no data is 
retained or available for public scrutiny (personal email, 27 June 2014). The implications of such a 
lack of oversight may be explored through a separate research study.
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articles in the context of police powers to ban. No direct reference was made in either 
article to due process issues or the lack of judicial oversight of the banning notice 
provisions. The reach and potential due process impact of banning notices is much 
wider than bans imposed under Liquor Accords, but has been subject to no 
meaningful media scrutiny. 
7.2.ii(d)  Key Assumptions                       
Across the 185 articles, where a perspective was evident, both the tone and focus 
presumed a problem of disorderly behaviour in the NTE and the necessity of banning 
as a solution. The media coverage reflected the parliamentary assumptions, rhetoric 
and hyperbole in relation to the LCRA Bill 2007 and JLA Bill 2010.  Loosely 32
framed, vaguely defined pejorative descriptors were applied to the problematic 
elements from whom the banning provisions would protect the law-abiding majority. 
Common terms included ‘thugs,’ ‘louts,’ ‘drunks,’ ‘troublemakers,’ ‘yobbos,’ and 
‘boozers.’  
The detail of the articles also reflected the parliamentary discourse. In particular, no 
empirical or research evidence was presented in the media articles in support of 
either the need for the banning provisions or their presumed effectiveness to address 
issues in the NTE. Anecdotes and specific incidents were again used to frame and 
generalise the issues. For example, the cases of Shannon McCormack, who died after 
being assaulted in Melbourne’s Southbank, and John Hucker, who was in a coma 
after a ‘schoolies’  incident in Lorne on Victoria’s Surf Coast, were cited by the 33
Herald Sun on 6 December 2007 as evidence of the serious problem that must be 
addressed. While not in any way diminishing the tragedy of each case, they do not 
prove a more general issue of alcohol-related disorder in the NTE. Sacco (1995) 
noted the particularly dramatic value of reporting atypical incidents, and the potential 
  Explored in Chapter Six.32
  Schoolies take place following the end of year 12 exams, when students typically spend a period 33
of time away from home to mark the completion of their formal schooling.
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for public issues to be created out of individual experiences. In 2010, the DCPC 
urged more specific caution about the representativeness of media coverage. 
… print media reporting does not reflect general recorded crime trends, 
but instead is focused predominantly on specific incidents of assault 
which later generate a disproportionate number of print media items 
(DCPC 2010, p.40). 
One finding of the media analysis casts some doubt upon the presumptions evident 
across the parliamentary debates of the banning provisions. Local media coverage in 
Geelong, shortly after the declaration of a designated area in the CBD, hailed 
banning as a significant new power which would have a marked impact upon 
alcohol-related disorder. 
New powers enabling police to ban drunken troublemakers from 
Geelong’s city centre are expected to have a greater impact than in 
Melbourne. Geelong police Chief Inspector Wayne Carson said ban 
notices... were more likely to deter alcohol-fuelled violence in a smaller 
community. ‘I think it’s going to work here better than in Melbourne 
because it’s a smaller area and it will be easier to recognise 
offenders…’ (Geelong Advertiser, 6 August 2008). 
Another article in the same month, presumed that banning notices would be effective 
in dealing with alcohol-related disorder in Geelong. 
Tough new laws targeting grog-fuelled yobbos should be more successful 
in Geelong than they were in Melbourne, Geelong MP Ian Tresize says 
(Geelong Advertiser, 14 August 2008). 
However, analysis of the imposition of banning provisions in Geelong, using the 
published data examined earlier in this chapter, does not bear out these expectations. 
Between 2008-12 only 41 banning notices were recorded for the Geelong CBD. No 
more than 15 were issued in any one reporting year (2009 and 2011). A possible 
reason for this lack of use of the banning provisions was noted in the Geelong 
Advertiser in early 2010. 
A Geelong Police Sergeant has labelled a Brumby  Government system 34
to reduce drunk and anti-social behaviour as cumbersome and ineffective 
...‘We’ve found them (the police-only banning notices) to be 
cumbersome and ineffective because we would ban them (party-goers) 
  John Brumby was the Victorian Premier between 2007-2010.34
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but the pubs and clubs would not know about it. Because the bans are 
only for 24 hours, the pubs need to know straight away (Geelong 
Advertiser, 25 January 2010). 
Despite this limited acknowledgment that banning was not necessarily an effective 
way to control alcohol-related disorder in the NTE, the majority of media coverage 
continued to reinforce the presumption that banning worked. This is exemplified in 
the following example from the Herald Sun published after the extension of the 
banning provisions in 2010. 
As alcohol-fuelled violence and anti-social behaviour increased, so did 
the number of bans dished out by police... a spokesman [for Victoria 
Police] said banning notices were a ‘terrific tool’ for police because they 
could defuse a potential situation before it occurred (Herald Sun, 8 
October 2010). 
It is noted from the published banning notice data, that for the reporting period 
during which this comment was made the number of banning notices issued declined 
sharply from 1868 in the period ending 30 June 2010, to 850 the following year 
despite the number of designated areas continuing to increase. This suggests that the 
image depicted in the media may not be a completely accurate representation of 
events in the NTE. 
7.2.iii  Summary                             
The media coverage of the banning provisions was overwhelmingly supportive of the 
discretionary police power to ban. The articles repeated many of the assumptions that 
were evident across the parliamentary debates, about the problem of alcohol-related 
disorder in the NTE, and the presumed effectiveness of banning as a response. The 
focus upon specific behaviours and individual events typified the episodic nature of 
the media coverage of crime (Cheliotis 2010; Surette 2015). There was no 
acknowledgment or consideration of any underlying societal issues or of the 
potential consequences of police-imposed banning notices for recipients. In 
particular, there was no analysis of the erosion of individual rights or procedural 
protections. The language used across the articles embodied the ‘them/us’ 
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perspective evident in the parliamentary debates of the banning Bills (Van Dijk 1993; 
Waldron 2003; Chilton 2004; Burnside 2006).  The media coverage was similarly 35
based upon fear of the ‘dangerous other’ (Simon 2007; Drake 2011) engaging in 
alcohol-related disorder, who were demonised and presumed to deserve all they get 
(Altheide 2006; Beale 2006; Mason 2007). Hall et al. (1978) observed the power of 
the media and those in positions of influence (like parliamentarians) to frame and 
reinforce issues of public concern.   36
Hall et al.’s (1978) contention that media depictions reflect the reality perceived 
through the eyes of those in power, resonates across the newspaper coverage of the 
banning provisions. The analysis highlights an inherently parliamentary and police 
perspective (Sacco 1995). The discretionary police-imposed banning notice is 
reported but its need, effectiveness or consequential erosion of individual rights is 
not questioned. There was no meaningful media-driven public critique of the 
problem that banning was expected to address, or of the effectiveness of the 
provisions. The analysis augments key findings across a body of sustained research 
into media reporting of crime and criminal justice policy (for example, Kidd-Hewitt 
1995; Sacco 1995; Chibnall 2001; Lowry, Nio & Leitner 2003; Jones & Wolfe 2010; 
Silverman 2012; Surette 2015).  In particular, that the media can distort public 37
perceptions of crime, with a one-dimensional view that is predicated upon fear and 
the need for harsh responses, without sufficient consideration of potential broader 
consequences, or underlying issues.  
As well as no effective scrutiny of the powers contained within the banning 
provisions, there was no media analysis of the published banning notice data. Despite 
the expectations expressed during parliamentary debates of the LCRA Bill 2007, the 
  See Chapter Six.35
  Hall et al. (1978) documented the ‘crisis’ of young, black, male muggers in the UK, which led to 36
far reaching legislative and operational policing responses.
  It is recognised that this media analysis is limited to consideration of the public scrutiny of the 37
banning provisions. The broader literature is referenced in acknowledgement of the context within 
which the analysis sits.
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published data was not a vehicle for the public scrutiny of the use of the banning 
provisions. Not only has the data not been published fully, or considered in 
parliament, but there was no media examination beyond simple statements of 
numbers of bans issued. It is clear that neither published data nor media coverage has 
effected any meaningful public scrutiny of the police power to ban. This lack of 
accountability has been exacerbated by the absence of judicial oversight of the 
banning notice provisions. This is discussed in the final part of this chapter.  
7.3  Judicial Oversight and Public Scrutiny               
Victoria’s Charter Act 2006 applies a parliamentary scrutiny model to assess the 
human rights implications of proposed legislative provisions. Judicial oversight, both 
expressly detailed in the Charter Act and through post-hoc judicial review of 
legislation and the actions of criminal justice agencies, should provide an additional 
layer of ongoing scrutiny of the human rights compliance of legislative provisions 
and their application. In their 2012 review of the Charter Act, Victoria’s Equal 
Opportunities and Human Rights Commission (VEOHRC) noted the human rights 
role of the judiciary. 
When a matter in court highlights significant human rights concerns with 
existing legislation, Parliament is able to legislate an appropriate 
response. This reflects the dialogue model promoted by the Charter 
(2012, p.27). 
VEOHRC also asserted the importance of judicial oversight to ensure decisions 
made by public authorities, such as Victoria Police, are fully accountable. 
Courts and tribunals play a crucial role in the Charter’s human rights 
protection framework. They are a mechanism where Victorians can hold 
government and public authorities to account for conduct that infringes 
their rights (2012, p.30). 
Judicial oversight therefore includes both statutory interpretation of legislation and 
review of individual penalties imposed, to ensure Charter compliance and ongoing 
accountability across the criminal justice system. However, human rights issues 
embedded  within  the  LCRA  Act  2007,  JLA  Act  2010  and  the  banning  notice 
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imposition processes have not been examined by the Victorian judicial system. There 
are no court data, legal pronouncements or case law regarding the banning notice 
powers. The banning notice provisions have been operating since late 2007 without 
any  judicial  review  of  their  compliance  with  the  Charter  Act  or  their  specific 
application by Victoria Police.
Judicial appeals of other police-imposed penalties, including breach proceedings for 
banning notices, are typically the responsibility of the Magistracy.  To consider the 38
significant gap in the legitimate public scrutiny of the banning provisions, their 
consequences and implications have been explored through interviews with Victorian 
Magistrates (n=12). This research sought their perspective on the absence of judicial 
and, therefore, ongoing public scrutiny of the banning notice provisions. 
Twelve interviews were conducted with Magistrates across Victoria. The exploratory 
interviews used a guiding script and open-ended question schedule to establish from 
the Magistrates: 
• their perceptions of police-imposed discretionary justice 
• their views and experiences of the banning provisions; both imposing them  39
and dealing with breaches of police-imposed notices 
• their thoughts on the judicial review of banning notices and how such a review 
could be conducted, given the immediate nature of the imposition of a ban. 
The objective of each interview was to gather a personal view of these themes. There 
are no claims made regarding the scientific rigour underpinning the interviews, or of 
the generalisability or representativeness of the results.  Any perspectives offered 40
relate only to the interview participants and no broader assumptions are made or 
inferences drawn. 
  Legislative provisions, and their compliance with the Charter Act, are reviewed at Supreme Court 38
level.
  Under the LCRA Act 2007 (s148I), Magistrates may issue an order for up to 12 months, which 39
may apply to a whole designated area, to all or specific licensed premises within the area (s148I(2)
(4)(5)).
  The research benefits and limitations are considered in detail in Chapter Four.40
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In addition to the location of each Magistrate, core demographic details for each 
participant were captured. Of the twelve interview participants, two were female and 
ten were male. Seven of the Magistrates were located in regional Magistrates’ Courts 
and five in metropolitan courts. The period of time spent as a Magistrate spanned a 
range of 22 years, with a mean of nine years.
Each interview was audio recorded and subsequently transcribed. The research 
output has been anonymised and pseudonyms applied. No participant is identifiable, 
and the pseudonyms do not note the sex or judicial experience of each respondent. 
The only identifier used is to discern whether the participant was based in a regional 
court (n=7) or in a metropolitan court (n=5) at the time of the interview. The 
pseudonyms are sequential: MagReg01 to MagReg07, and MagMet01 to MagMet05. 
The numbers were applied randomly to each interviewee. 
Too few female Magistrates were interviewed to discern any difference when 
compared with male Magistrates. Although the pseudonyms differentiate between 
metropolitan and regional Magistrates, the analysis revealed no underlying 
differences with respect to the location or relative experience of Magistrates. 
Findings from the interviews are discussed in the following section. The interview 
output is related, where appropriate, to claims made during parliamentary debates of 
the LCRA Bill 2007 and JLA Bill 2010, and additional published data has been used 
to supplement the analysis. Five key themes are evident. They include the use of 
discretionary police powers and the consequences for due process, the lack of a right 
independent appeal of banning notices, the value of extending the banning notice 
period to 72 hours, and consideration of whether banning is a punishment. The final 
theme examines the use of court-imposed exclusion orders. The Annual Reports in 
which the banning notice data is published also record the imposition of court-
imposed exclusion orders. The data for court-imposed bans has been examined for 
each reporting year between 2007-12 (Chief Commissioner 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 
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2012), and is discussed in relation to the interview findings and police-imposed 
banning notices.
 7.3.i  Key Findings                   
The identification of Magistrates who were willing to talk specifically about the 
banning provisions and the issues they embody was a significant research challenge. 
A number of Magistrates responded positively to initial enquiries. However, 
approximately half of the respondents subsequently declined to be interviewed, 
stating they had no direct knowledge of the banning provisions, and felt unable to 
provide relevant information or perspectives. This feedback was a significant finding 
in itself. It highlighted, for the sample contacted, a notable absence of judicial 
awareness of the issues embedded within the banning provisions, as well as the lack 
of judicial oversight of banning per se. One participant, who agreed to be 
interviewed, conceded that the volume of legislation made it difficult to be aware of 
every development, and admitted having no prior knowledge of the police powers 
that were introduced in the LCRA Act 2007. The Magistrate then reflected upon the 
implication of their admission in the context of public scrutiny and judicial oversight. 
To tell you the truth, I didn’t even know it [police banning powers] 
existed until I got your request [to be interviewed] and that’s damning in 
itself  (MagReg05). 
The following sections examine the key themes, and includes verbatim quotations 
from the interview participants. Relevant contextual notes are included within the 
quotations in square brackets. No inference should be drawn from the order in which 
quotations are included within each section. 
7.3.i(a)  Discretionary Police Powers & Consequences for Due Process 
Magistrates were asked to reflect on the increase in administrative justice and police 
exercised discretionary powers in recent years, such as the growing range of 
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infringement provisions, move-on powers  and banning notices. Ten of the twelve 41
participants expressed disquiet about discretionary police powers to ban people from 
public areas. Common concerns related to the effect of banning notices on due 
process protections, and accountability of the police use of banning.  
In an unequivocal expression of concern about police-imposed discretionary powers, 
MagReg03 stated. 
I thinks it’s an intrusion on the effective administration of the criminal 
justice system... I just think it’s appallingly excessive (MagReg03). 
MagMet02 noted that discretionary summary justice risked reducing accountability 
of police decision-making. 
Potentially. There would have to be, within that [discretionary police 
powers], a lack of accountability (MagMet02). 
Within a lengthy consideration of how discretionary police powers to punish are 
opaque to public scrutiny and of their impact upon the individual rights of 
recipients, MagReg05 outlined the risks of over-zealous and arbitrary application 
of banning notices. 
… those sorts of powers, arbitrary powers, are becoming more remote in 
terms of public scrutiny. At least if a person goes through the court the 
public has a chance to come and look, and understand what’s happened. 
Whereas an incident might be dealt with on the scene by a police 
officer… it’s out of the view of the public. It’s not under public scrutiny. 
I suppose that’s the reservation I have. It means that we all have to trust 
that people of good faith are operating these powers and exercising these 
powers... If they are exercised zealously to the very letter, I can see there 
could be some human rights infringed and that would concern me... I 
suppose that we just need to hasten slowly in the powers that we exercise 
arbitrarily. If you look at the entirety of the power, banning someone 
from an area is a fairly significant power. What concerns me is if it is 
exercised in a situation where both parties are in a state of heightened 
emotion... whether that power is exercised in the cool light of day or is an 
emotional response to the situation  (MagReg05). 
  Introduced under Victoria’s Summary Offences and Control of Weapons Acts Amendment Act 41
2009. See Appendix A for a summary of provisions relevant to alcohol-related disorder in the 
NTE.
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Adding to a general concern about discretionary police powers, MagMet01 noted the 
risks that banning notices may be imposed inappropriately and the potential 
consequences for police legitimacy. 
I think it [banning notice imposition] is open to abuse and has been 
abused. Individual police officers are able to go back at the end of the 
night and say ‘it’s been a good night because I’ve issued ten notices’; but 
five of them may have been without merit or basis. I’m not saying that 
happens across the board, but I think it does happen... If it is abused then 
this affects the perception of justice by individuals, the respect that they 
have; which can affect the relationship they have with police in other 
areas and on other occasions (MagMet01). 
With an explicit reference to notions of balance in the administration of justice, 
MagMet01 noted 
… on a cost/benefit balancing exercise, in terms of public safety and law 
and order, it [a banning notice] may be justified, but there is the potential 
for abuse there (MagMet01). 
In this brief observation MagMet01 identified community protection as one of the 
key parliamentary drivers for the banning notice provisions. Of significance is the 
acknowledgement that the banning legislation may enable individual rights to be 
abused.  
A link between the due process protections of individual recipients, and the 
vulnerability this creates in the appropriate imposition of bans was also perceived by 
MagReg01. 
Obviously there is [impact upon due process protections]... Without there 
being any judicial scrutiny we have to rely on the good conscience and 
morality of the police officers that impose it [banning notice] 
(MagReg01). 
The possibility that a banning notice may be imposed incorrectly was acknowledged 
by MagMet05. 
It may be unfortunate that someone is sucked into that vortex who is 
innocent (MagMet05). 
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While conceding no knowledge of actual abuses of banning notice powers, 
MagReg02 noted the risks within a police-imposed power that is not subject to 
judicial scrutiny. 
Absolutely. That’s inherent in the nature of the provisions. It’s even more 
removed from judicial scrutiny because its short term... It places 
enormous responsibility on the police and if you have relatively junior 
police with these powers it might be a cause for concern. Anecdotally 
I’ve not heard of any abuse of the process but it would clearly be open to 
abuse (MagReg02). 
Across this sample of Magistrates notable concern was expressed about the potential 
for abuse and the inappropriate application of discretionary police powers. These 
were perceptions and no Magistrates offered specific examples to verify their 
concerns. These findings, combined with the absence of judicial oversight and the 
lack of public scrutiny of police decisions to impose banning notices, reinforce 
documented concern about police-imposed discretionary justice (Spooner 2001; 
Zedner 2005; Walsh & Taylor 2006, 2007; Beckett & Herbert 2010a). The potential 
for arbitrary, discriminatory and abusive application of banning powers, 
consequential inequalities in the provision of criminal justice (McMahon & Roberts 
2008; Crofts & Mitchell 2011; Crofts & Witzleb 2011), and perceptions of police 
legitimacy (Tyler 1990; 2006), were made clear by MagMet01. The concerns 
expressed by these Magistrates embodied Waldron’s assertion that state power “is 
always and endemically liable to abuse” (2003, p.205). 
Two interview participants preferred not to offer an analysis of the banning 
provisions. MagMet03 had no personal knowledge of inappropriate use of the 
discretionary police power to ban and shared an expectation that Victoria Police 
would use banning correctly. 
… you assume those powers are being exercised appropriately and in 
accordance with the law. I’ve got no reason to think, from my 
experience, that that hasn’t been the case (MagMet03).  
MagReg04 noted that it was a parliamentary decision to enact the banning notice 
powers. No comment was offered regarding any potential consequences. 
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It’s something that’s been legislated and the power has been given to the 
police. If that’s what the Parliament has decided then the Parliament can 
do it (MagReg04). 
The Charter Act expressly permits judicial review of legislative provisions for 
Charter compliance. The importance of judicial oversight to ensure that government 
and public authorities are held to account “for conduct that infringed rights” was 
asserted by VEOHRC (2012, p.30). MagReg04’s unquestioning acceptance of the 
parliamentary decision to introduce police-imposed banning notices is a notable 
finding in the context of judicial oversight and public scrutiny. However, this 
perspective was offered by only one interview participant.  
7.3.i(b)  The Right of Judicial Appeal 
Judicial appeal of Victoria’s banning provisions refers specifically to the right of a 
banning notice recipient to challenge a police decision to impose a ban. Other appeal 
options are acknowledged. For example, the Supreme Court is empowered to 
examine the legality of legislation and/or its compliance with the Charter Act,  or a 42
local council could seek to appeal a VCGLR decision to declare a designated area in 
their locality. However, there has been no legal challenge to VCGLR decisions in 
relation to Victoria’s banning notice powers, and no judicial review of the 
discretionary police power to ban or of any potential consequences for the individual 
rights of banning notice recipients. 
The judicial appeal amendment that was a rejected during the parliamentary debates 
of the LCRA Bill 2007,  would have given banning notice recipients the right to 43
seek an independent review of an on-the-spot police decision to impose a ban. 
Recipients of infringement notices can have the decision to impose the penalty 
reviewed in court. Individuals who receive a banning notice are not afforded this 
option. Similar provisions in Queensland expressly permit the right of independent 
 The initiation of a Supreme Court review in 2011 was referenced during the media analysis, in 42
relation to a challenge to police powers introduced under the Swan Hill Liquor Accord.
  Discussed in Chapter Six.43
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review by the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal (QCAT) of a police 
decision to impose a banning notice (Safe Night Out Legislation Amendment Act 
2014, s602P). The  remit of the Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal (VCAT) 
does not extend to consideration of Victoria Police banning notice decisions.  44
The interview participants were asked to consider the significance of the absence of a 
right of court-based appeal against the imposition of a police-imposed banning 
notice, and how this could affect meaningful scrutiny of these provisions. They were 
also asked whether recipients should have the opportunity to seek a judicial or 
independent appeal of a police decision to issue a banning notice.  
None of the Magistrates interviewed opposed a notional right of appeal. MagReg03 
was unequivocal and stated that “absolutely” a right of appeal should exist. 
MagReg05 linked the right of appeal to other types of infringement penalty, and 
directly referenced the pre-emptive nature of banning notices as a reason why appeal 
provisions were necessary. 
... if you can appeal against an infringement for speeding, I would have 
thought where your freedom to move has been impinged, I think that 
should be subject to review. Especially in the pre-emptive or anticipatory 
sense, then that should be able to be challenged I would have thought 
(MagReg05). 
That banning notices limit individual rights and the possibility that police officers 
may impose a ban mistakenly, were offered by two Magistrates as justifications for 
the right of appeal. 
I think that there is a sound argument that that should be the case. The 
whole question of transparency and rights are important, and in that sense 
the court should have or be thought of as a potential avenue of appeal for 
those sorts of restrictions  (MagMet03). 
The police, just as we do, make mistakes. Given that it [banning notice] 
restricts the movement of people and their ability to associate, there 
should be an appeal process (MagMet02). 
 This was confirmed in correspondence with VCAT (personal email, 20 April 2015).44
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Another due process issue was noted by MagMet06. The immediate nature of the 
banning notice penalty was cited as the key reason why it should be subject to 
review. 
Because the order is imposed immediately, you would have to have some 
built in capacity to have a right of review within a very short time 
(MagMet06). 
A more general perspective was provided by MagMet01 who articulated support for 
the court-based appeal of banning notices. No specific reasoning or rationale was 
offered. 
Generally speaking, yes. I feel that you should be able to have that issue 
[banning notice] brought before a court if you have any grievance about 
it (MagMet01). 
The consequences for police legitimacy were again raised by MagMet01. Recipients 
of infringement penalties were perceived to be reluctant to challenge them in court, 
preferring to pay and move on. However, despite appearing to accept the penalty: 
“they’ve still got that grievance sitting there; about the police and that 
injustice” (MagMet01). 
There were two primary objections to a right of appeal against the imposition of a 
banning notice presented during parliamentary debates of the LCRA Bill 2007. 
Firstly, that an appeal was impractical, would delay the implementation of the 
punishment, and therefore reduce the ability of Victoria Police to control alcohol-
related disorder in the NTE. Secondly, that an appeal would require police officers to 
complete additional paperwork, to document evidence and record witnesses 
(Legislative Assembly 2007b, 2007c, 2007d; Legislative Council 2007b, 2007c). 
The interview participants were asked to consider how an independent review of a 
banning notice decision could be facilitated, given the context in which banning 
notices are imposed. Despite acknowledgment of the complexity of enabling an 
appeal for a penalty that must be imposed immediately for it to have the desired 
effect, there continued to be general support for the principle of independent review. 
A number of Magistrates offered potential solutions to balance the operational needs 
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of police officers with the rights of individuals. Some interviewees were absolute in 
their thinking, while others allowed their thoughts to evolve as the interview 
progressed.  
MagReg01 was the most fluid and initially acknowledged the absence of judicial 
scrutiny and the potential impact upon due process, but hoped that an appeal would 
not be necessary. MagReg01 noted that the effect of a banning notice would be 
reduced if its imposition could be delayed by an appeal process. As the interview 
progressed, MagReg01 considered what their own response may be to the imposition 
of a ban that could not be reviewed. This led to a change of mind and the conclusion 
that a right of appeal should be available, followed by detailed discussion of how 
such an appeal could be enabled. 
Suggestions for appeal mechanisms ranged from an immediate review to more 
retrospective solutions. MagReg03 supported banning notice recipients being able to 
seek an immediate review by a Magistrate upon receipt of a banning notice. 
There should be a finite period during which the recipient of one of those 
orders can make an urgent application to the court for the order to be set 
aside (MagReg03). 
Two Magistrates offered specific ideas for the implementation of an immediate 
appeal. MagReg01 suggested a variation of search warrant procedures, calling upon 
on-call Magistrates if required. 
I suppose one way would be similar to a search warrant; where a police 
officer provides a sworn affidavit and requests that this banning order be 
made for 24 hours, and we have Magistrates on-call all night. So that 
could be one way to scrutinise it (MagReg01). 
MagReg05 also proposed using on-call judicial officers, and noted the expected low 
number of reviews that would be necessary. 
It [the ban] might happen at night when a court is not available, but there 
is always access to a judicial officer and the after hours service. If there’s 
an ability to put a written appeal in for a stay of that order, pending the 
prosecution of an appeal against it the next day. I can’t see any unfairness 
in that… I can’t imagine that these orders would be imposed in such 
numbers that it would bring the court to its knees… so I can’t see why it 
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shouldn’t be possible to have an ability to appeal against it [the ban] 
(MagReg05). 
This perception of a limited number of potential reviews is reflected in the findings 
of the data analysis earlier in this chapter, in relation to the relatively low number of 
banning notices issued. Table 7.1 confirms that with the exception of Dandenong in 
2011-12 and the Melbourne CBD, no designated area recorded more than 100 
banning notices in a reporting period. The highest number of notices imposed in one 
designated area was 1639, in the Melbourne CBD in 2009-10. When compared to the 
number of infringement penalties imposed, which do carry a right of appeal, the 
banning notice numbers are significantly lower. Since 2007-08 approximately 8% of 
infringement recipients have exercised their right of internal review, which must be 
conducted by someone independent to the original decision (Attorney General, 
Victoria 2012, p.17). In 2011-12, of the 4.79 million infringement notices issued 
across all agencies in Victoria, 399,000 sought a review. Approximately 38,000, or 
0.79% of all notices issued, were resolved in court (Attorney General, Victoria 2012, 
p.16). Of the 1091 banning notices issued in 2011-12 (table 7.1), if the 8% average is 
applied, the number of reviews would have been 87. As MagReg05 suggested, this is 
not likely to “bring the court to its knees.” 
MagReg05 also felt that a more immediate review was preferable, given the impact 
of a banning notice upon the recipient. 
I think if there was some decent reason why the ban shouldn’t be 
imposed or was imposed unfairly, I think there should be a right of 
redress other than appealing after the event  (MagReg05). 
The option of a retrospective court appeal, that could lead to a banning notice being 
expunged from the recipient’s LEAP database record, was put forward by two 
Magistrates. MagMet02 preferred “a retrospective appeal to clear the person’s 
record.”  A more detailed explanation was offered by MagReg01. 
Thinking about the appeal process.... how would I feel if it happened to 
me?.....So thinking on it now, I think that there could be some appeal. On 
whether the police were acting appropriately or on the right information; 
and there could be some declaratory relief. Declaring that the ban was 
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imposed improperly and it being voided and nullified. Your name is 
cleared, but the effect would still have happened, you would have been 
prevented from access. But any breach proceedings would be null and 
void (MagReg01). 
While fully supportive of the principle of judicial appeal, MagReg05 provided some 
insight into possible changes to the way in which banning notices could be imposed, 
to mitigate the need for an appeal in the first place. 
Maybe the power ought to be exercised by a Sergeant who is at the scene, 
on-the-spot, not the person involved in the altercation… Maybe it’s a 
check and a balance that makes the power exercisable under some 
control rather that by the person involved because of emotional 
connection... It should be a third party...it should be a Sergeant or 
someone above the rank of the person involved having the power to 
impose the order rather than that person...We’re talking about a 
continuum of likes and dislikes that is considerable among the Police 
Force. What one person likes or accepts, another might think is 
reprehensible; one might impose an order and one might not. It’s 
arbitrary even by nature (MagReg05). 
MagReg05 acknowledged having no prior knowledge of the police-imposed banning 
notice powers, but the perspective is highly relevant. The way in which the LCRA Act 
2007 is framed facilitates the specific concerns of MagReg05 regarding the 
subjective and arbitrary nature of what constitutes a ‘need’ for a banning notice, and 
which have been noted across this thesis. The pre-emptive capacity of the banning 
provisions which may be imposed for behaviours that are not objectively assessed, 
combine with the absence of independent review to significantly undermine the due 
process protections of banning notice recipients. 
7.3.i(d)  The Extension of the Banning Provisions to 72 hours 
The interview participants were asked to consider the 2010 increase in the permitted 
length of a banning notice from 24 to 72 hours, and to reflect upon the necessity of 
imposing bans for longer periods of time. This aspect of the banning provisions 
received less attention from most participants. No Magistrate declared their support 
for the extension to 72 hours, but there were three clearly critical responses. Two 
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Magistrates, MagMet02 and MagReg06, questioned the effectiveness of the increase. 
Another noted that longer bans were not likely to address problematic behaviours. 
 … there’s not much point to that really… For me that’s not really going 
to achieve a great deal in terms of addressing behaviours (MagMet03). 
The extension to 72 hours was considered by MagMet02 in the context of typical 
drinking patterns. A three day ban was not believed to reflect the usual weekend to 
weekend nature of alcohol consumption in the NTE. 
As a concept [72 hour police-imposed banning notices], I don’t think it is 
effective at all. I don’t understand what three days results in… people 
don’t drink on a three day cycle. It’s weekend to weekend; three days is 
not going to have much impact at all (MagMet02). 
MagReg05 regarded 72 hours as a long time: “...it seems a long time to me to order 
someone away from an area…” However, no opinion was offered of the likely 
effectiveness of such a ban. 
During discussion of the extension of banning notices to 72 hours, both MagMet02 
and MagReg06 expressed doubt about the enforceability of banning notices, and 
their effectiveness as a mechanism to control alcohol-related disorder. MagMet02 
perceived that bans were not taken particularly seriously and that they are easy to 
breach. 
If you just keep your head down and head back into the city, the police 
don’t stop and search anybody. I really don’t know that people are that 
scared anyway (MagMet02). 
MagReg06 questioned both the rationale for the imposition of a banning notice, and 
the effectiveness of ban enforcement activities. 
Typically, limited thought is given to their imposition. They can be an 
effective option, but enforcement is an issue; both how likely it is and 
how thorough it is (MagReg06). 
Another Magistrate, MagMet01, noted that banning notices “are not enforceable 
unless they [someone breaching a ban] are caught”. Addressed in the context of the 
extension of banning notices to 72 hours, the majority of the Magistrates chose not to 
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comment on their effectiveness, citing lack of knowledge as the primary reason for 
their unwillingness to speculate. 
7.3.i(e)  Banning as a Punishment or for Community Protection? 
The quasi-criminal status of banning notices has created significant grey areas for 
their compliance with the Charter Act.  Following the SARC review of the JLA Bill 45
in 2010, the Attorney-General Hulls stated unequivocally that banning notices were 
not a form of punishment (SARC 2010b, p.14-15). The Magistrates were asked to 
consider how banning notices should be regarded. Four terms were offered, but not 
defined, that could describe the purpose of banning notices: a method of control, risk 
mitigation, community protection and punishment. Magistrates were also encouraged 
to consider any alternative depictions. This discussion elicited the most varied 
responses across the interviews.  
Opinion was divided regarding the primary function of banning notices. Punishment 
was stated by six Magistrates (half of the sample) as being a core purpose or result of 
a banning notice. Within the responses that considered banning notices to be a 
punishment, the strength of feeling ranged from absolute to more complex, multi-
dimensional perspectives. The strongest belief that banning notices are a punishment 
was offered by MagReg04, who considered them to be “… a significant sanction and 
a punishment.” MagReg01 agreed and categorised banning notices as “primarily 
punishment.”  
Other participants balanced the punishment aspect with other factors. MagReg05 
combined punishment with a method of controlling problematic behaviours. 
I suppose I can see it [a banning notices] would be imposed as a way of 
controlling behaviour, but I think there is a punishment aspect to it 
(MagReg05). 
A similar view was provided by MagMet03, who noted the deterrent effect for both 
recipients and for the broader community. 
  Discussed in Chapter Five.45
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I think there are elements of deterrence, but the question of punishment is 
in there as well…those conditions [of a banning notice] do have a 
punitive effect... (MagMet03). 
Strong opinions were also articulated that disagreed with banning notices being 
viewed as a punishment. MagMet02 focused on their protective purpose and 
dismissed the punishment perspective: “Protect the public. I don’t see it as a 
punishment, no.” MagReg03 agreed with the protective priority of banning notices, 
and regarded them as 
primarily a way of protecting the wider community from drunken 
violence, usually on Saturday nights (MagReg03). 
Continuing their consideration of the balancing agenda, MagMet01 felt that a 
banning notice is not a significant penalty and categorised them as a mechanism to 
protect the community enjoying the NTE. 
My primary focus would be on public safety. I would prefer to leave the 
punitive aspect. I think to most people not being able to go to a particular 
area or premises is not a significant penalty.... Particularly in places like 
Melbourne I think there’s a public safety drive more than a punitive 
element. I would hope that there is no punitive element to it because that 
should be subject to judicial oversight - it should all be focused on public 
safety (MagMet01). 
There was some agreement with the assumptions and claims made by Hulls in his 
defence of the provisions following SARC review in 2010. However, half of the 
sample considered that banning notices are a form of punishment. These perspectives 
support the contention of this thesis that the dilution of core procedural protections 
within the banning notice legislation does enable a punishment to be imposed 
without regard to fundamental due process and judicial protections.  
An interesting corollary to the interview findings relates to the notion of deterrence 
and its relationship to the banning provisions. Deterrence embodies complex 
constructions of behavioural and sentencing theory and practice (for example, Von 
Hirsch et al. 1999; Nagin & Pogarsky 2001; Tonry 2008). However, the deterrent 
effect typically relies upon the certainty and severity of punishment. Hulls does not 
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make clear how a longer ban constitutes a deterrent if banning notices are not 
intrinsically to be regarded as a punishment. 
7.3.i(f)  Experiences of Banning and Exclusion
None of the Magistrates interviewed had conducted breach proceedings of a police-
imposed banning notice. Most had included a banning component as a condition of 
bail. MagReg05 discussed how banning is applied to bail, citing the examples of 
family violence and persistent theft which may lead to exclusion from stated 
locations for the duration of the bail period. Despite bail hearings affording due 
process rights to defendants, MagReg05 offered a highly pertinent perspective. 
The way I look at it here has to be a good reason. You are infringing on 
someone’s human rights. You have to make sure there is no draconian 
aspect to it (MagRed05). 
In addition to the police-imposed discretionary banning powers, the LCRA Act 2007 
introduced court-imposed exclusion orders. Applying to the same designated areas as 
the police issued banning notices, an exclusion order may be imposed if an offender 
is found guilty of a specified offence committed within a designated area, is not 
sentenced to more than 12 months in prison for the offence and where the order “may 
be an effective and reasonable means of preventing the commission by the offender 
of further offences in the designated area” (LCRA Act 2007, s148I(1)). Exclusion 
orders are issued post prosecution, and their imposition is subject to full due process 
protections. 
Across the parliamentary debates of the LCRA Bill 2007 there was a presumption 
that banning notices are an effective mechanism to control and reduce alcohol-related 
anti-social behaviour and disorder in the NTE. If the principle of banning an offender 
from a designated area is accepted as being effective, it is reasonable to assume that 
exclusion orders will be an option applied proactively by the courts. Table 7.11 
details the number of exclusion orders issued during the first five years, and offers a 
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comparison with the number of police-imposed banning notices imposed over the 
same period.  46
Table 7.11: Number of court-issued exclusion orders compared with police-imposed banning 
notices
*“There was not a data collection plan ...during the reporting period... Since October 2009 a 
collection plan has been in place” (Chief Commissioner, 2009). 
The number of exclusion orders imposed across the whole of Victoria is significantly 
lower than the number of police-imposed banning notices for each of the five years 
analysed. The highest number of exclusion orders imposed in a reporting year was 73 
in 2010-11, compared with a peak of 1868 banning notices in 2009-10. 
Five interview participants had imposed an exclusion order. One Magistrate, 
confirming the evidence from the published data, observed that “they’re not very 
common at all” (MagMet01). MagReg04 had excluded an offender from a 
designated area for the full 12 months. MagMet03, MagMet02 and MagReg01 all 
recalled imposing one or two exclusion orders, but could not remember specific 
details. MagMet01 had imposed an exclusion order that applied to a limited set of 
licensed venues and not to the whole designated area. MagMet01 expressed concern 
about limiting the freedom of movement of the recipient, and perceived the offending 
behaviour to be related to these venues, creating no need to ban more generally. 
MagMet01 observed that 
Reporting Year Police Issued Bans Court Issued Exclusions
2008 129 0
2009 1426 0*
2010 1868 32
2011 850 73
2012 1091 65
Total 5364 170
  As the exclusion order is given post conviction, unlike a banning notice, the behaviour may not 46
have occurred during the reporting year for which it is recorded.
Chapter 7: Analysis of Ongoing Oversight & Accountability 260
if a person has a problem with alcohol and alcohol-fuelled violence if 
you ban them from a particular location there’s nothing to stop them 
relocating that problematic behaviour to another location (MagMet01). 
This concern with the potential for displacement was not evident at all across any of 
the parliamentary debates or media coverage in relation to the police-imposed 
banning notice provisions.  
That such a low number of exclusion orders have been imposed by the courts 
questions the presumed need to ban that was asserted across the parliamentary 
debates. This was borne out by the personal experiences offered by Magistrates 
during the interviews. If banning was believed to be an effective method to control 
alcohol-related disorder, as justifications for the police-imposed banning powers 
repeatedly claimed, then Magistrates should have a greater awareness of the benefits 
of banning and be actively seeking to impose exclusion orders. The published data, 
the anecdotal evidence of the Magistrates interviewed, and the number of 
Magistrates who chose not to participate in the research due to their admitted lack of 
knowledge of banning, suggest a low level of both awareness and use of such 
exclusionary orders. If the repeated claims of the effectiveness of banning are 
correct, the broader scope of court-imposed orders should facilitate even more 
community protection and proactive control of disorderly behaviours. 
7.3.ii  Summary                       
The limited scope of the published banning notice data and the restricted media 
coverage of banning notices contributes to the lack of accountability and ongoing 
scrutiny of the banning provisions. These limitations, the issues to which they lead, 
and specific problematic components of the banning notice legislation were 
identified by the Magistrates interviewed for this study. Significantly, the 
discretionary police power to impose banning notices was a source of concern among 
the interviewees. When combined with the lack of appeal provisions, this created a 
perceived risk of the abuse of police powers and the discriminatory imposition of 
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banning notices, all within a context of diminished due process and procedural 
protections. Without effective judicial oversight of the banning notice provisions, the 
implications for police legitimacy and for the protection of individual due process 
rights are considerable. The perspectives offered by this sample of Magistrates 
differed significantly from the assumptions and expectations that predominated 
during the parliamentary debates of the banning notice Bills. Two participants, 
MagMet03 and MagReg04, preferred not to question the parliamentary decision to 
introduce police-imposed banning powers. Although both later disagreed with 
specific details of the provisions and their parliamentary justification. MagMet03 
supported the right to appeal a police decision to impose a ban, and MagReg04 
strongly believed that banning notices are a significant punishment.  
The change of perspective evident in MagReg01’s views regarding a right of appeal, 
demonstrated the value of setting aside a ‘them/us’ (Waldron 2003) conception when 
considering the issue of banning. The initial view that an appeal would not be 
necessary reflected an admission that the interviewee had no empathy for the 
potential recipient. It was only when MagReg01 envisaged themselves as the 
recipient that the right of appeal gained significance. Adopting a more personalised 
perspective across the parliamentary debates could similarly affect analysis of such 
measures in relation to individual rights.  
Across the interview participants the level of direct knowledge and experience of the 
police-imposed banning powers was limited. With such a low level of judicial 
awareness, lack of published data and limited media coverage, ensuring ongoing 
scrutiny that is sufficient to verify the appropriate and accountable application of 
discretionary police powers to ban is highly problematic. Some differences were 
evident in the perspectives offered, but the interview research highlighted a number 
of core concerns about the use of banning notices and the potential for abuses of 
discretionary police powers. With no review mechanism, the way in which banning 
decisions are made is completely opaque, and directly undermines the fundamental 
principle of the separation of powers (Zedner 2005; Hadfield, Lister & Traynor 
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2009), and the expectation that penalties imposed summarily must be fully 
accountable (Ashworth & Zedner 2008, 2011, 2012).  
7.4  Chapter Conclusion 
The findings documented in Chapters Five and Six reveal deficiencies with the 
processes of Charter compliance and parliamentary scrutiny of the banning notice 
provisions contained in the LCRA Act 2007 and JLA Act 2010. The erosion of due 
process rights is a source of notable of criminological concern (Zedner 2005; 
Ashworth 2006a; Ashworth & Zedner 2008). The analysis in this chapter confirms 
that, despite their tangible consequences for individual rights, there has been very 
little post-enactment scrutiny of the application of banning notices. Limitations in the 
published banning notice data are evident. Not only is the data insufficiently detailed 
to enable meaningful analysis, but mandated requirements were missing. The data 
recording the Indigenous status of banning notice recipients was flawed and did not 
enable accurate assessment of the impact of banning upon Indigenous Victorians. No 
information was published at all regarding the behaviours and offences for which 
banning notices were imposed. This is in direct contravention of the reporting 
requirements contained in the LCRA Act 2007. The data does not enable effective 
scrutiny of the use of police-imposed banning powers. Furthermore, the published 
data has not been subject to parliamentary analysis, despite expectations noted in 
2007 that the data would ensure public scrutiny and appropriate use of the banning 
notice provisions. The deficiencies in the data have not been noted and the impact 
upon Indigenous recipients in particular has not been investigated. This is despite the 
opportunity presented by the extension of the banning notice powers under the JLA 
Bill 2010. Clear requests by the Green party member Pennicuik  for data and 47
evidence relating to the implementation of banning notices were ignored. No 
consideration of the published data was evident during parliamentary debates of the 
JLA Bill 2010, or since. 
  Discussed in Chapter Six.47
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There has been considerable media coverage of the imposition and use of banning 
notices, and of associated issues relating to the NTE. However, only four of the 185 
articles examined made any reference to due process issues embedded within the 
LCRA Act 2007 and JLA Act 2010. There has been no meaningful media analysis of 
the broader consequences of the provisions, of their impact upon individual rights or 
the potential misuse of discretionary police powers to ban. This aspect of the public 
scrutiny of the legislation has been non-existent.  
There has also been no judicial oversight of the way in which individual notices have 
been imposed and no opportunity for the banning provisions, or their consequential 
erosion of the due process rights of individual recipients, to be legally reviewed. The 
interview research with Magistrates reiterated fundamental concerns about the 
banning notice powers. Specifically, the potential for discretionary police powers to 
be abused and the clear implications for due process protections were highlighted by 
a majority of respondents. Among the Magistrates interviewed, there was evident 
support for the principle of the right of judicial appeal against a banning notice and 
some criticism of the extension of the banning period to 72 hours. There was some 
disagreement about the primary purpose of a banning notice, but Attorney-General 
Hulls’ assertion that a banning notice is not a punishment was refuted by half of the 
participants. As well as lacking conceptual logic in relation to deterrence without the 
risk of punishment, the absence of consensus about the purpose and therefore the 
impact of banning, deepens concern about the limited scrutiny of parliamentary 
justifications for the introduction of the banning provisions. Analysis of court-
imposed exclusion orders issued during the first five years of the LCRA Act 2007 
suggested that banning was not a high priority measure among Magistrates. This 
contrasts with parliamentary expectations that banning was an essential mechanism 
to address alcohol-related disorderly behaviours, and ensure public safety. 
Significantly, there has been no objective analysis of the specific effectiveness of 
banning in relation to issues in the NTE. 
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The ongoing parliamentary and media failure to examine the formally published 
banning notice data, media indifference to the effect of banning upon individual 
rights, and an absence of independent oversight, combine with judicial concern about 
the risks and expansion of discretionary police powers to punish. The findings in this 
chapter compound the issues emanating from the shortcomings identified in the 
parliamentary scrutiny of the banning Bills. They confirm Crawford’s (2009) concern 
about the lack of meaningful analysis of discretionary police powers. There has been 
no effective scrutiny of banning as a matter of police practice, public debate or 
jurisprudence. Balance is not evident in the imposition, scrutiny or enduring impact 
of banning notices.  
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 8    Introduction                 
Victoria’s banning provisions were introduced to address concerns about alcohol-
related disorder in and around licensed premises. Banning notices typify a move in 
recent decades towards discretionary, on-the-spot, pre-emptive police powers to 
punish, particularly in relation to issues of public order (see Chapter Two). The way 
in which banning notices are framed challenges the principle of the separation of 
powers, undermines longstanding expectations of due process in the administration 
of justice, and subordinates the individual rights of those accused of unacceptable 
behaviours (whether actual or potential) to the presumed rights of the community to 
feel safe. 
To date there has been no analysis of either the enactment or the human rights 
consequences of Victoria’s banning provisions. This thesis has addressed an 
empirical and conceptual gap in the consideration and implementation of the police 
power to issue on-the-spot banning notices. The first two research questions 
examined the application of Victoria’s Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities 
Act 2006 (‘Charter Act’) compliance processes, and the parliamentary debates of the 
banning Bills. The third question explored the ongoing monitoring of the use of 
discretionary police-imposed banning notices. The first three sections of this chapter 
discuss the key findings for each research question. In the final section the broader 
consequences and conceptual relevance of the research is considered, with reference 
to the notion of balance and its appropriateness to the administration of justice in the 
night-time economy (NTE). Research limitations are acknowledged and potential 
avenues of future study are noted.  
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8.1  Charter Act: Conceptualisation v. Operationalisation 
The passage of Victoria’s Charter Act formalised the state government commitment 
to uphold civil and political rights. The Charter provides a framework for the 
consideration of rights-based issues within legislative proposals, and to promote 
accountable decision-making by public bodies. Any provision which proposes or 
causes a limitation of Charter protected rights should be acknowledged openly and 
justified fully within a Statement of Compatibility. The first four-year review of the 
Charter Act reaffirmed the importance of the effective scrutiny of legislative 
proposals (State Government of Victoria 2011, 2012; SARC 2011). Statements of 
Compatibility should ensure “human rights analysis is a transparent process” and 
provide all relevant information in a single document that is “readily accessible to 
both Parliament and the general public” (State Government of Victoria 2012, p.21). 
This reiteration of the need for comprehensive information, mirrors 
Williams’ (2007b) expectation that the Charter should increase government 
accountability for the assurance of individual rights. The operational requirements 
within the Charter Act also reinforce the notion that policy proposals, legislative 
development, statutory provisions and the actions of public bodies will be compatible 
with the human rights that the Charter protects. However, the analysis documented in 
Chapter Five highlighted a disparity between compliance expectations and their 
application to the banning provisions.  
Detailed examination of the Charter Act compliance procedures for the Liquor 
Control Reform Amendment Act 2007 (‘LCRA Act 2007’)  and the Justice Legislation 1
Amendment (Victims of Crime Assistance & Other Matters) Act 2010 (‘JLA Act 
2010’)  revealed limitations, flaws and omissions in relation to significant individual 2
rights and the due process consequences of the provisions. Neither Statement of 
Compatibility (‘2007 Statement’ or ‘2010 Statement’) complied with the Charter 
requirement to include empirical evidence to justify the acknowledged limitation of 
  Which introduced 24 hour police-imposed banning notices.1
  Which extended the permissible length of a ban to 72 hours.2
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the right to move freely, the rights to privacy and reputation, liberty and security, and 
the presumption of innocence (as part of the rights in relation to criminal 
proceedings). The relevance of banning to the Charter right to a fair trial was not 
considered at all in either Statement.  
The Statements also failed to justify the need for discretionary, pre-emptive police 
powers to ban, or the efficacy of banning as a solution to behavioural issues in the 
NTE. A sufficiently significant problem of alcohol-related disorder was presumed, 
and banning notices regarded as an essential response. Despite the requirements of 
the Charter Act 2006 (s7(2)), no alternative provisions were considered in the 2007 
or 2010 Statements. A broadly stated need for collective security and the preservation 
of public order was the only justification offered for the qualified acknowledgement 
of the limitation of Charter rights. Material to validate the proposed limitations may 
have been referenced during the initial ‘cabinet in confidence’ impact assessment. 
However, the Charter Act presumes an open, transparent and public dialogue. Any 
evidence or relevant data used during the early policy analysis should have been 
made available to parliament. The reason why it was not is unknown, but the 2007 
and 2010 Statements did not ensure comprehensive consideration of the banning 
Bills.  
The cross-party analysis undertaken by the Scrutiny of Acts and Regulations 
Committee (SARC) also failed to effect adequate consideration of the way in which 
banning notices undermine individual rights and due process protections. In 2007 
and 2010 SARC documented concerns that banning notices may infringe freedom of 
movement, liberty and the presumption of innocence, and may be inherently punitive 
rather than preventative. However, these issues were side-stepped by the 
government, addressed inadequately and/or too late. The remit, authority and 
capacity of SARC to influence Charter compliance was rendered ineffective by 
Ministerial responses either not being provided, or delivered too late to meaningfully 
determine the formulation of the legislative provisions. 
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Human rights are not inviolable but the Charter Act makes clear that policy and 
practice across government departments and public bodies must ensure than any 
limitations upon Charter protected rights are empirically justified (Charter Act 2006, 
s7(2); Golder & Williams, 2007). The application of the Charter Act to the banning 
notice Bills epitomises concern about the purpose of formalising human rights in 
Charters: if they can be overlooked or ignored through equivocal or unchecked 
processes of legislative compliance (Ashworth & Redmayne 2010). The passage of 
the banning provisions highlight how the consideration of human rights in relation to 
the criminal law and crime control can be subject to political manipulation. In the 
case of banning, this led to the expansion of liquor control regulations and the 
inclusion of criminal consequences for the breach of police-imposed penalties which 
implicitly and explicitly undermine the due process rights of recipients.   
The operationalisation of Victoria’s Charter Act reflects a parliamentary scrutiny 
model. Consideration of human rights should be embedded across the whole 
legislative process, rather than relying upon post-hoc assurances of compliance 
through mechanisms such as judicial challenges for alleged Charter Act breaches 
(Hiebert 1998, 2005; Feldman 2002, 2004; Debeljak 2011; VEOHRC 2012). This 
examination of Charter Act processes in relation to the banning Bills adds to a range 
of research which has explored the link between human rights treaties and the rights 
of citizens (for example, Franck 1995; Hathaway 2002, 2007; Landman 2004; 
Neumayer 2005; Gearty 2009; Hafner-Burton & Tsutsui 2007; Simmons 2009; Cole 
2013). Victoria’s Charter was expected to ensure that statutory provisions are 
consistent with human rights (Williams 2006, 2007a, 2007b; Rodgers 2012). The 
Charter’s operational principles are consistent with the human rights that the Charter 
Act seeks to formalise and protect. However, exemplifying the ‘law in books law in 
action’ doctrine (Pound, 1920; Halperin, 2011), the strength of any Charter and its 
ability to both protect and enforce rights is determined by more than the words in the 
Act. Effective compliance is fundamental. Despite the clear procedures that underpin 
Victoria’s Charter Act, this thesis has identified how, in the case of the banning 
legislation, key Charter rights were circumvented, rendered ineffective or simply 
Chapter 8: Discussion & Conclusion 271
ignored. The perceived political urgency of the reforms led to the erosion of 
individual rights in the (unsubstantiated and generally unquestioned) name of law 
and order.  The disparity between the conceptualisation and the operationalisation of 3
Charter compliance led to tangible consequential deficiencies in the scrutiny of the 
individual rights, and due process protections that were limited by the banning notice 
legislation.  
The analysis of the banning notice Bills supports criticisms levelled against 
parliamentary scrutiny committees in general, and SARC in particular, of a limited 
capacity to ensure balanced and effective policy analysis. Feldman (2002), Gans 
(2009), Santow (2010), Evans and Evans (2011), and Rares (2013) contend that 
scrutiny committees lack authority and sufficient time to secure a meaningful 
influence upon legislative outcomes. Evans and Evans (2011) argue that 
parliamentarians do not possess the necessary skills to effectively identify human 
rights implications of policy proposals. The SARC response to the JLA Bill 2010 
does provide a counter to Evans and Evans’ view. SARC identified significant 
concerns regarding the due process implications of the banning notice provisions that 
were not included in the 2010 Statement. However, SARC’s analysis did not change 
the legislative outcome. The ministerial response was evasive and documented in an 
Alert Digest that was published after passage of the JLA Act 2010.  
Limitations embedded within the Charter processes and the supporting Guidelines 
were acknowledged by the Department of Justice employees interviewed for this 
thesis. There was no evidence found that the embryonic nature of Charter compliance 
procedures compromised the capacity of policy officers to undertake a thorough and 
accurate human rights assessment of the banning Bills. However, the interviewees 
conceded that the impact assessment process is not necessarily objective. Contrary to 
  Similar findings were documented by Hall et al. (1978) regarding the assertions of a crisis which 3
necessitated a tough legislative and operational policing response. With the media fanning a sense 
of crisis, the political response is framed as being crucial to the safety and well-being of the 
community (ranging from a perspective of national security with respect to current counter 
terrorism laws, to the local-level safety of patrons enjoying the Victorian NTE). Any opposition is 
positioned as political weakness, negligence, apathy or even support for those responsible for the 
‘crisis’.
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Williams’ (2006) expectation that the Charter enables human rights to be balanced 
against each other and against the need to protect the public from crime, in the 
development of the banning notice provisions the latter clearly took priority. The 
perceived need for the protection of the community was presented in the Statements 
and the limited government responses to SARC as being absolute. The findings of 
this thesis align with Zedner's (2007a) concerns that blunt assertions of human rights 
compatibility limits any effective challenge.  This disjoint is typified by the 4
unsubstantiated claims made by Attorney-General Hulls in response to SARC’s 
review of the 2010 JLA Bill: that banning is a protective and deterrent measure rather 
than a punishment, thereby rendering the right to a fair hearing irrelevant.   
The Charter Guidelines emphasise that government must “balance individual rights 
against each other as well as against other competing interests” (Department of 
Justice 2008b, p.3). However, rather than balancing the provision of justice, 
deficiencies in the mandated scrutiny of the human rights implications of the banning 
notice provisions enabled the individual rights of recipients to be subordinated to an 
unsubstantiated claim that banning would address a politically-driven demand for 
public protection. The formal human rights policy that is embodied in the Charter 
Act was disconnected from substantive practice and the consequences for individual 
rights of discretionary police-imposed banning notices were impervious to 
meaningful scrutiny.  
8.2  Political Expedience and Marginalising the ‘Other’ 
The second research question extended analysis of the pre-enactment scrutiny of the 
banning provisions, to examine the parliamentary debates of the 2007 and 2010 
Bills.  This section considers the way in which the debates constrained meaningful 5
 Zedner’s (2007a) comments referred to the legitimation of Control Orders in the UK, but are 4
equally applicable to Victoria’s banning provisions. 
  The key issues relating to individual rights and due process were introduced in the LCRA Bill 5
2007. The debates of the JLA Bill 2010 did not revisit the underlying due process concerns.
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discussion of the effect of the banning provisions upon key individual rights, 
emphasised the notion of ‘them/us’ to justify the erosion of rights, and further 
compromised the parliamentary scrutiny of both Bills.  
Despite assertions by Victoria’s Equal Opportunities and Human Rights Commission 
(VEOHRC) (2010, p.96), that critical analysis must be conducted thoroughly even 
for the most urgent legislative provisions, time pressures restricted the scrutiny of 
both banning Bills. In 2007 a stated need to respond rapidly to the perceived issue of 
alcohol-related disorder in the NTE  led to compromises over the right of appeal, 6
which removed a key due process protection for banning notice recipients. The speed 
of enactment of both Bills confounds Waiton's (2008) contention of the ‘nonchalant 
drift of polices through Parliament’, but the substance of the debates confirms his 
underlying concern that parliaments fail to adequately consider how policies affect 
individual rights. Parliamentary scrutiny of legislation for and on behalf of Victorians 
should not be curtailed by what can be construed as arbitrarily imposed timelines. 
The time pressures combined with flawed assertions of Charter compatibility to 
significantly limit the effectiveness of pre-enactment scrutiny of the banning 
provisions. 
In 2006 the Victorian Parliamentary Drugs and Crime Prevention Committee 
(DCPC) concluded that “all policies and strategies that seek to address and reduce 
alcohol-related harms must be evidence-based” (2006, p.xi). A year later, and despite 
the Charter Act 2006 s7(2) requirement to fully justify any limitation of a Charter 
right, the LCRA Act 2007 passed through parliament without any empirical support 
for either the stated need or presumed effectiveness of the banning provisions. The 
only substantive due process right that was discussed during parliamentary debates in 
2007 related to the right of appeal against a banning notice, an issue not identified in 
the 2007 Statement of Compatibility. Despite principled support from Opposition 
members, this key due process requirement was conceded as part of the time-driven 
  Specifically to enable two key entertainment precincts in Inner Melbourne to be declared as 6
designated areas before the 2007 Christmas and New Year holiday period.
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compromises, and was not revisited during parliamentary scrutiny of the JLA Bill 
2010. 
At the conclusion of the parliamentary debates of the LCRA Bill 2007 one Assembly 
member observed: “At this late hour, on our last sitting day before Christmas, this 
should be seen to be a celebration of Parliament working” (Legislative Assembly 
2007d, 4408 [McIntosh, Liberals]). The pressure of limited time that led to the 
abandonment of principled amendments was regarded by McIntosh as evidence of 
parliament working effectively. This comment highlights the primacy of expedience 
in the legislative process, whereby the longstanding due process principles of appeal 
and a fair hearing were subordinated to a greater need to pass the 2007 LCRA Bill. 
The detail of the banning notice provisions were compromised to the incumbent 
government’s need to be seen to do something about alcohol-related issues in the 
NTE.  7
Victoria’s banning provisions embody a number of recurring themes about the 
growth of summary justice, expressed across a range of relevant research 
documented in Chapter Two. In particular, the passage of the LCRA Act 2007 
personifies Crawford’s (2009) depiction of the ‘net-widening’ effect of policing by 
discretionary summary justice. Banning notices permit Victoria Police to punish 
individuals for a range of subjectively assessed behaviours, without the protection of 
an independent right of appeal. This undermines the principle of the separation of 
powers, considered by Zedner (2005, p.525) as “one long lauded means of protecting 
democratic freedom.” Banning amplifies the issues Burney (2002, 2006), Ashworth 
(2004a), Von Hirsch and Simester (2006) and others identified with similar 
prohibitive measures, such as the dispersal order in England and Wales.  The 8
 Although beyond the scope of this thesis, the compromises agreed in the passage of the LCRA Bill 7
2007 prompts more general consideration of the nature of compromise in parliamentary debate. 
For example, examining whose interests are served and whether the pressure of time should ever 
supersede adequate debate of principles or full consideration of alternative policy proposals.
  Discussed in Chapter Two, such measures enable discretionary police powers to be applied to 8
loosely framed behaviours. Dispersal orders may be imposed anywhere with blanket restrictions, 
preclusions and preventative prohibitions (Crawford & Lister 2007)
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decision to impose a banning notice is entirely at the behest of a police officer, but 
with no possibility of a court-based appeal against its imposition.  
The dilution of individual rights is compounded by the permissible pre-emptive 
imposition of banning notices. In response to the repeated assertions of a need to re-
balance the administration of justice to ensure public safety in the NTE, banning 
notices can be imposed without any discernible criminal act being committed. The 
deterrent, restorative and/or punitive effect of a banning notice is predicated upon its 
immediate imposition. The practicality of enabling an appeal before the ban takes 
effect is acknowledged. However, this should not preclude a right of subsequent 
independent or judicial review of a police decision to ban. Under Queensland’s Safe 
Night Out Legislation Amendment Act 2014 a discretionary police-imposed banning 
notice may last for ten days, significantly longer than in Victoria. However, a ban 
must first be approved by a more senior officer, which adds an additional layer of 
immediate executive scrutiny. Recipients may also seek an independent review of the 
imposition of the ban via the Queensland Civil and Administrative Tribunal. Victoria 
does not permit a similar clear right of appeal in its banning legislation.  9
In the context of ‘re-balancing’ the provision of justice, any trade off between rights 
and security must be closely examined to determine whether security is actually 
enhanced, or if the result is more symbolic or political (Waldron 2003; Zedner 2003, 
2005, 2007a, 2007b; Michaelsen 2006). The parliamentary discourse made repeated 
claims of the effectiveness of banning notices in tackling issues of disorder in the 
NTE. However, no benchmarking was undertaken prior to their introduction and 
there has been no research into the specific consequences, deterrent effect, or success 
of banning notices since. Their passage mirrors trends in other studies that 
significantly pre-date the introduction of the banning legislation, such as Fox and 
Freiberg (1989). The flaws in the Charter compliance analyses were not challenged, 
and relevant concerns raised by SARC were overlooked or side-stepped. Even a 
  More complex forms of legislative and administrative law review are possible, but there is no 9
option of appeal against the imposition of a banning notice. 
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direct request for evidence to justify the extension of banning notices to 72 hours, by 
Green’s member Pennicuik in 2010, was ignored by the government repeatedly.  
If evidence for the need and effectiveness of banning was available it should have 
been presented. If no evidence existed, then the measures should not have been 
enacted. Attorney-General Hulls’ argument, in 2010, that banning powers needed to 
be strengthened to enhance their deterrent effect, casts further doubt upon the 
continued claims that banning was both necessary and effective. Available records 
indicate that only Pennicuik demonstrated any awareness of this logical anomaly. 
Prior to the debate of the JLA Bill 2010 two reporting periods of banning notice data 
had been published (2007-08 and 2008-09). Within the justifications for extending 
the deterrent effect of banning, Hulls cited the occurrence of multiple banning notice 
recipients. However, there is no evidence that the substantive banning notice data 
was analysed and the actual effect of banning upon alcohol-related disorder in the 
NTE was not addressed during the parliamentary debates of the JLA Bill 2010. 
Furthermore, in 2007 it had been made clear that the value of banning notices lay in 
the immediate removal of troublesome individuals from problematic situations. The 
stated rationale for 72 hour bans was to increase the deterrent effect. Yet proponents 
of the JLA Bill 2010 did not explain how, for example, banning someone from the 
Melbourne CBD until Tuesday for behaviours perpetrated on a Saturday would be 
more of a deterrent than a 24 hour ban.  Other than by ‘blunt assertion’ (Zedner 10
2007a), Hulls also failed to explain why a 72 hour ban does not constitute a 
punishment.  
The parliamentary debates of the banning provisions reveal an underlying differential 
approach to the assurance of individual rights. Rights and due process protections 
should not be more or less applicable to any individual or demographic group. The 
Charter Act “provides equal protection to all people in Victoria” (Department of 
 This logical flaw was picked up during the interviews with Magistrates. It is part of a broader 10
question about the appropriateness of deterrence arguments in the context of alcohol and drug 
consumption. The behaviours that the measures seek to deter may not be based upon rational 
decision-making or consideration of potential consequences. 
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Justice 2007b, p.4). Michaelsen’s (2006, 2010) proportionality test, which should 
ensure that a state-initiated response to undesirable behaviour is necessary, suitable 
and appropriate, was not evident during consideration of the banning notice 
provisions. In 2007, a number of speakers did reference Victoria Police crime 
statistics and associated data relating to alcohol-related issues. However, the data 
used was largely selective, taken out of context, and lacked objective analysis. The 
overriding justification across the parliamentary debates, in 2007 and 2010, was a 
repeated but unquantified need to re-balance the provision of justice in the NTE to 
protect the broader community of potential victims of alcohol-related disorder. The 
actual effect of banning notices upon recipients and community safety was not 
examined during the debates in 2010. The passage and extension of Victoria’s 
banning provisions exemplify the risk identified by Waldron (2003) and Zedner 
(2003, 2005, 2007a, 2007b), whereby unsubstantiated demands for public security or 
community protection are used to legitimise the circumvention of individual rights.  
Throughout the parliamentary debates the need for public protection embodied the 
presumed moral axiom of the primacy of the rights of the ‘in group’ (Chilton 2004, p.
127). For the banning notice Bills this represented the wider law-abiding community 
who (like parliamentarians) are intolerant of, and deserving of protection from, 
undesirable behaviours. Descriptors such as ‘hoons’, ‘morons’ and ‘troublemakers’ 
used across the parliamentary debates, were rhetorical devices to highlight and 
marginalise the undesirable, in a way that was relatable to the majority of Victorians. 
As such it is easier to limit the rights of those of whom the majority intrinsically do 
not approve - such as the ‘them’ who engage in alcohol-related disorder - against the 
interests and potential safety of the ‘us’ who comprise the broader community. The 
image created by these descriptors conveys a perceptible sense of disorder, 
unruliness, recalcitrance and general non-conformance with acceptable and decent 
standards. This subjective construction of the undesirable is highlighted by 
opposition to other measures which also undermine due process rights. Most notably, 
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an expansion of pre-emptive exclusionary police powers in 2014  focused upon 11
participants in industrial disputes, and was vehemently opposed by the Labor 
proponents of the banning provisions. Unlike the undesirable ‘them’ receiving 
banning notices in the NTE, those who risked being ‘moved-on’ by the 2014 police 
powers were more likely to be aligned with the Labor cause and not so easy to 
marginalise. The ‘them/us’ divide becomes blurred when the individual rights of ‘us’ 
are threatened more directly. 
By describing those to whom the banning notice restrictions were directed as 
‘troublemakers’ or ‘morons’ the measures were positioned to target behaviours that 
were not necessarily criminal, but for which tolerance was increasingly limited. The 
actual behaviours exhibited in relation to such labels may be trivial, and not 
necessarily commensurate with the fear and risk embedded in the debates.  The 12
effect was to lower the threshold for the definition of the undesirable ‘others’ in the 
NTE. A police determined suspicion of potential disorderly behaviour, the 
interpretation of which may be vague, subjective and unpredictable, was sufficient 
for the imposition of a banning notice. The parliamentary discourse reinforced the 
notion that only those who deserve a ban will receive one, with the well-behaving 
majority enjoying protection. This perspective was epitomised by the observation 
during the 2007 debates: “is a 24 hour ban really so bad?” (Legislative Assembly 
2007c, 4072 [Thomson, Labor]). The banning provisions were legitimised with an 
innate sense that ‘the majority’ do not need to worry about the consequences of how 
it is done, because ‘the majority’ will not be affected by the measures, except to be 
safer in their communities. However, being a ‘moron’ or a ‘troublemaker’ does not 
justify the erosion of human rights. “Human rights are for all people, not just our 
friends and family… [they include] the unpopular, the unworthy, the feared and 
despised,” regardless of their behaviours (Burnside 2006, p.3). 
 The Summary Offences and Sentencing Amendment Act 2014 enabled Victoria Police to issue pre-11
emptive move-on orders from public places in anticipation of a possible obstruction or a 
reasonable apprehension of future violence (see Chapter Six).
  Although due to omissions in the published data, the precise reason for the imposition of banning 12
notices is not known (see Chapter Seven).
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The way in which the banning notice legislation passed through the Victorian 
Parliament, the nature of the debate and the detail of the final provisions had 
significant consequences for individual rights. The identification of the need for a 
right of appeal, and some disquiet about the possible effect of the legislation upon 
vulnerable groups were acknowledged in the 2007 debates, and concerns identified 
by SARC were noted during the debate of the JLA Bill 2010. This suggests that the 
Victorian Parliament had some capacity to identify issues missed by the Charter 
compliance process. However, minimal consideration of the potential consequences 
of banning notices upon due process, or the apparent lack of supervision and 
accountability in their implementation, was evident across the debates for both Bills. 
The pressure of time and a seemingly incontestable belief in the existence of a 
problem about which ‘something must be done’ (Ashworth 2006b; Crawford 2013), 
rendered parliamentary scrutiny of both the LCRA Bill 2007 and JLA Bill 2010 
limited and ineffective, and ensured that the political drive to introduce banning 
notices prevailed. 
8.3  A Vacuum of Accountability? 
The final research question considered whether post-enactment public scrutiny has 
enabled meaningful analysis of the imposition and human rights consequences of 
Victoria’s banning provisions. The importance of public engagement with human 
rights was emphasised by VEOHRC. 
The Charter is grounded in the notion of a human rights dialogue, in which 
an ongoing public ‘conversation’ or exchange of views about human rights 
takes place between the Victorian community, government, Parliament and 
the courts. The human rights based approach to government emphasises 
the importance of the community understanding human rights principles 
– both their scope and their relevance (2009, p.29). 
However, despite these expectations, VEOHRC (2009) reported limited public 
scrutiny of legislative developments and a near absence of a community perspective 
regarding their human rights implications. Crawford (2009) expressed particular 
concern about the lack of ongoing analysis of UK discretionary police-imposed 
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powers to punish. With no evidence of proactive scrutiny by the Victorian 
Parliament, Victoria Police or the media, the analysis documented in Chapter Seven 
demonstrates that banning notices typify Crawford’s perceived deficiency. For 
example, it was only as a result of interactions undertaken for this thesis that the 
routine application of 72 hour bans in the Melbourne CBD was identified, contrary to 
the requirements of the JLA Act 2010 that longer bans would only be imposed in 
appropriate circumstances.  13
The imposition of banning notices emphasises the significance of accountability in 
the use of police discretion. The formal publication of banning notice data was 
regarded during parliamentary debates in 2007 as essential to monitor the appropriate 
application of the legislation. The data, and its public scrutiny, was to be a safety net 
for police accountability and the assurance individual rights. Analysis of the first five 
years of data confirmed that the detail was insufficient to effect accurate monitoring, 
assessment of usage patterns, or identification of the consequences for specific 
groups (for example, by age, location, homelessness or Indigenous status). The 
mandated records relating to the Indigeneity of recipients are vague. The widespread 
use of ‘unknown’ to categorise the Indigenous status of recipients hides the potential 
over-policing of Indigenous Victorians,  and which could demonstrate another 14
dimension of the ‘them/us’ divide. A disproportionate number of bans given to 
Indigenous Victorians does not necessarily point to ethnic or racial profiling, but the 
opacity of the data precludes meaningful analysis of the disparity that is evident. The 
repeated omission of the offences for which banning notices were imposed also 
renders assessment of their use impossible. Attorney-General Hulls’ expectation that 
increasing the permissible length of a ban to 72 hours would improve the deterrent 
effect is not born out by the data. When compared with the period covered by Hulls’ 
concerns, the data for the three years after the JLA Act 2010 indicated that the 
proportion of multiple banning notice recipients doubled. That an increasing 
  Documented in Chapter Five.13
  Which has been a notable issue for Victoria Police (see Chapter Seven, footnote 16).14
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proportion of offenders were being banned on more than one occasion does not 
support the individual or general deterrent effect of banning notices. 
It is not known why these shortcomings in the published data have not been 
identified by the Victorian Parliament. In particular, given the legislated requirement 
to monitor the effect of banning upon disadvantaged groups, it is a clear failure of 
scrutiny that the data has not prompted a reassessment of way in which the banning 
provisions are implemented. The parliamentary debates in 2007 identified the need to 
monitor the use of banning notices. Despite revisiting the legislation in 2010, the 
deficiencies noted in this research, in particular the way in which Indigeneity is 
recorded, the failure to monitor the effect on homeless people, and the absence of 
offence specific data, appear to have been missed. There has been an “ominous 
silence” (Young 2010, p.47)  about the use and consequences of Victoria’s banning 15
notices. Irrespective of their value in addressing issues in the NTE, these 
shortcomings should be resolved as a matter of urgency.  
An examination of Victorian newspapers for the period 2007-12, revealed a lack of 
concern for the due process consequences of banning notices. The media coverage 
mirrored the parliamentary debates in both the implied assertion of the need for 
banning notices, and the demonising of likely recipients. Alcohol-fuelled challenges 
to community safety, and a focus upon individual tragedies leveraged the dramatic 
value of atypical incidents to reinforce anxiety about disorder in the NTE (Sacco 
1995). This heightened a generalised sense of fear to implicitly support the banning 
provisions (Altheide 2006; Beale 2006; Mason 2007; Simon 2007; Drake 2011). No 
consideration was given to any consequences of banning upon broader issues, such 
as individual rights. The political perspective prevailed with the additional police 
powers presumed to be necessary and effective. 
  Despite a lack of meaningful data regarding the reasons for and the recipients of police-imposed 15
summary penalties in England and Wales, Young (2010) highlighted how their use continued to 
expand within a justifying ‘crime control’ rhetoric.
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Despite the passage of a discretionary, pre-emptive police power there has been no 
post-hoc legal review of Victoria’s banning legislation or of the imposition of 
individual banning notices. This reflects a serious failing of pre-enactment and post-
enactment scrutiny. To explore the gap in the judicial scrutiny of the banning 
provisions, interviews with Magistrates gathered their perspectives and perceptions 
of police-imposed discretionary banning notices. The difficulty that was encountered 
in securing interview participants provided a valuable insight into the general lack of 
awareness of the banning provisions across the Magistracy. That judicial cognisance 
of the legislation is low emphasises the absence of meaningful post-enactment legal 
oversight. The much lower use of court-initiated exclusion orders, when compared 
with police-imposed banning notices, appears to contradict assertions across the 
debates for both Bills that banning is an essential tool for the NTE. The absence of 
objective assessment of Victoria’s banning provisions is acknowledged. However, if 
banning is accepted as effective in the control of alcohol-related disorder, then it is 
something of an anomaly that so few exclusion orders are imposed in relation to the 
more serious behaviours likely to be dealt with by Magistrates. 
The majority of Magistrates interviewed expressed concern about the lack of 
accountability in the implementation of banning notices and the clear risk of abuse in 
their use. Although no specific incidents were reported, the discretion afforded to 
police officers and the absence of effective judicial, parliamentary or media oversight 
makes it unlikely that issues of inappropriate or disproportionate use of banning will 
be visible. With respect to the only avenue through which an individual ban can be 
challenged, via an appeal to a more senior police officer, it is not known how many 
appeals are made, what reasons are given or the outcomes. 
Within a general expression of concern about the risks associated with the 
discretionary imposition of banning notices, the Magistrates agreed with the Liberal/
Nationals opposition in 2007 that a right of appeal was essential. Labor proponents 
of LCRA Bill 2007 contended that an appeal is unnecessary and/or unworkable. If 
the primary aim of a banning notice is to manage unacceptable behaviour and to 
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diffuse potentially problematic situations, delaying its imposition could remove any 
immediate beneficial effect of the ban. However this should not preclude a later 
appeal. Similarly, where a penalty is imposed upon an individual, the time it may 
take to document the evidence should not be used to justify not doing so.  Banning 16
notices are recorded on the Victoria Police Law Enforcement Assistance Programme 
(LEAP)  database and remain indefinitely. If a recipient has a genuine objection it is 17
difficult to rationalise the absence of a right of clear line of independent review of the 
decision, outside of the domain of the police to enable a banning notice record to be 
expunged from their LEAP record. The Magistrates interviewed demonstrated 
principled support for the right of appeal, and offered several practical solutions. A 
number of the appeal options put forward by the Magistrates, such as retrospective 
court or VCAT review, were considered during the 2007 parliamentary debates. 
Queensland’s 2014 banning provisions demonstrate that an immediate review and 
subsequent independent appeal of discretionary police powers are both appropriate 
and achievable.
An incidental finding from the interview research relates to the claims by Attorney-
General Hulls in 2010 that banning notices are a deterrent and not a punishment. This 
is discussed in Chapters Five and Seven. Hulls’ assertions, that the purpose of 
banning was public protection, are empirically and conceptually contentious. 
Analysis of the published banning data demonstrated his expectation of an increased 
deterrent effect due to 72 hour bans was erroneous. Although opinion was divided, 
half of the Magistrates disagreed with Hulls’ claims and considered bans to be a 
punishment. As well as casting doubt on Hulls’ justifications for banning, 
perspectives offered by some of the Magistrates highlight a significant logical flaw. 
For a deterrent to be effective, a sufficiently certain and demanding consequence 
needs to be in place (Von Hirsch et al. 1999; Nagin & Pogarsky 2001; Tonry 2008). 
  The banning notice form (see Appendix B) already requires police officers to note their ‘grounds 16
for suspicion.’ Adding the precise time and location, for the possible review of CCTV or police 
body camera footage, and the names and contact details of witnesses, on a separate record if 
necessary, would not have to be a significant additional burden.
  See Chapter Two, footnote 21.17
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If the ‘consequence’ of a ban is not a punishment it is unclear how a ban would 
constitute a deterrent.  Furthermore, Hulls’ assertions of the deterrent effect of 18
banning conflated specific and general deterrence. The thesis findings in relation to 
multiple banning notices refute the inference of specific deterrence. Although there 
has been no research examining the general effect of the banning provisions upon 
alcohol-related disorder in the NTE, no clear deterrent effect was evident in the 
banning notice data. 
The failure of the Victorian Parliament to scrutinise the published data, and media 
indifference to the consequences of banning appear to both reflect and promote a 
lack of public interest in the due process issues embedded within the banning 
provisions. This belies the purpose of a meaningful human rights dialogue, and the 
specific expectations of VEOHRC. Unlike legislative responses to high profile 
issues, such as terrorism,  banning notices have received very little public attention. 19
The analysis that has occurred, evidenced by the newspaper coverage, presents an 
overwhelmingly positive view of banning - as a valid, necessary and appropriate 
response to issues of alcohol-related violence in the NTE. Neither the actual 
effectiveness of banning, or any of the fundamental rights-based issues, have been 
examined publicly. Instead, the procedural consequences have been subordinated to 
the political and media drive to do something about the stated ‘crisis’ in the NTE. 
There may be a genuine public apathy to the due process issues. The power of the 
media to influence public perceptions and opinion (Gelb 2006; Roberts & Indermaur 
2009), and the intrinsic link between politics, power and the media (Surette 2015) are 
both acknowledged. However, the effect of the ‘them/us’ discourse, the associated 
demonising of the undesirable, and the consequences for meaningful public debate 
about fundamental rights are unknown.  
  A full discussion of deterrence theory and sentencing practices lies beyond the scope of this 18
analysis. However, future research could explore the perceptions of banning notice recipients, and 
the effectiveness of banning in addressing alcohol-related disorder in the NTE. 
  For example, the federal Telecommunications (Interception & Access) Amendment (Data 19
Retention) Act 2015, justified as being essential for counter-terrorism and serious crime 
investigations, generated widespread concern about its expansive reach and privacy implications. 
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The political and media framing of alcohol-related issues in the NTE appears to have 
generated sufficient fear among the ‘law abiding’ majority to ensure a vacuum of 
concern about the human rights consequences of Victoria’s banning provisions. 
Parallels can be drawn with the work of Hall et al. (1978) in relation to media 
coverage creating a ‘crisis’ which necessitated and justified significant legislative 
and policing change. The findings typify Crawford’s (2013) concern that reactive 
policy development is driven by a desire for governments to be seen to do something 
in response to high profile issues regardless of the possible consequences for 
individuals, or overall conceptions of due process rights. It also demonstrates 
Valverde’s (2009) contention that issues dealt with at the lower levels (in this case on 
the street by police officers) rarely raise concerns relating to human rights. Despite 
the formalisation of individual rights in the Charter Act, their application is limited 
by the different contexts in which rights exist and operate. Banning notices are a 
discretionary police power that may be imposed without visibility, accountability or 
meaningful monitoring of their impact upon individual rights. 
Whether or not a banning notice is a punishment, the effect of a ban is analogous to 
other infringement and criminal penalties. A banning notice recipient is restricted in 
their freedom to move and to exercise their usual right to enter a public space. 
Breach of a ban, to which reverse onus provisions apply, may carry criminal 
consequences upon conviction (from a fine to possible imprisonment in the event of 
persistent non-payment). The way in which banning notices may be imposed 
fundamentally dilutes individual due process rights. Given the limitations that were 
evident in the parliamentary scrutiny of the banning notice Bills, and the failure to 
offer clear, measurable and objective justifications for the dilution of the individual 
rights of banning notice recipients, ongoing scrutiny of the use to the discretionary 
power to ban is essential. However, across these three domains of scrutiny the public 
examination of the actual operation of police-imposed banning provisions is clearly 
compromised. When considered in the context of the consequences for due process 
rights and protections, the significance of such a lack of political and public 
accountability increases. 
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8.4  Conclusion: Is a 24 hour ban such a bad thing? 
Victoria’s discretionary, pre-emptive police-imposed banning notices undermine the 
individual rights of recipients. They blur the boundaries of criminal, civil and 
administrative justice (Crawford 2003, 2009, 2013) but lack visibility and 
accountability in their application. The banning provisions were enacted and 
extended despite deficiencies in the application of Charter Act compliance 
requirements, incomplete parliamentary scrutiny, evident time pressures and 
concessions, a presumed and unproven need, and without evidence of the 
effectiveness of banning as a method to ensure public safety. The discretionary police 
power to ban has been subject to no meaningful ongoing analysis and, crucially, the 
legislation and the imposition of individual notices have not been tested or validated 
by judicial oversight. Banning notices are a quasi-criminal provision within an 
administrative regulatory Act. Had banning been introduced as a mechanism within 
an amendment to Victoria’s Crimes Act 1958 or Summary Offences Act 1966 then a 
right of legal appeal would have been much clearer. By positioning banning notices 
within the Liquor Control Reform Act 1998 the processes of judicial oversight of 
discretionary policing activity and criminalisation are redefined. The option of appeal 
is moved away from the Magistracy, ensuring any possible administrative review is 
far from straightforward. 
A key justification for the introduction of Victoria’s banning notice provisions was to 
‘re-balance' the administration of justice in the night-time economy (NTE). The 
declared need to ensure that the broader community was safe from the perceived risk 
posed by the alcohol-fuelled minority, legitimised a pre-emptive, on-the-spot penalty 
that cannot be reviewed through conventional criminal or administrative processes. 
There is a disconnect between the use of balance to explain the need for the banning 
provisions and to normalise their effect upon the due process rights of individuals. 
Parliamentary scrutiny of the LCRA Bill 2007 and the JLA Bill 2010 should have 
ensured that a sufficiently evidenced need to introduce banning notices was 
‘balanced’ against full consideration of the due process consequences for banning 
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notice recipients. Apart from a clear forum for judicial review of the imposition of a 
ban, none of the significant due process limitations contained within either banning 
Bill were meaningfully discussed in parliament. Banning notice recipients were not 
afforded the protection of a presumption of innocence, legal representation, criminal 
appeal rights or any opportunity to offer a defence for the behaviours of which they 
were accused. Pre-emptive, on-the-spot banning notices are manifestly unbalanced. 
They conflate pre-emption, intent, deterrence and punishment, and reconfigure the 
meaning of individual rights in the provision of justice. Rather than framing the 
response to alcohol-related disorder as a criminal law issue in and of itself, a 
discretionary police power to punish was introduced under the auspices of the Liquor 
Control Reform Act 1998, within which due process protections were subsumed.  
Discretion is an inherent and necessary aspect of policing. However, balanced justice 
and discretionary police powers are not mutually exclusive. Police practices should 
enable the community to be and feel protected, while the rights of individuals are 
respected. Effective and balanced policing requires a clear evidence-base from which 
practices can be monitored and assessed. Despite the annual publication of data to 
enable the use of discretionary police-imposed bans to be monitored, there is no 
evidence of its proactive scrutiny by the Victorian Parliament or Victoria Police. 
Furthermore, clear flaws and omissions in the published data were not identified or 
challenged by the Victorian Parliament. Of particular concern is that banning may 
have a disproportionate effect upon Indigenous Victorians. However, the data does 
not enable an accurate assessment of either individual or collective recipients of 
bans. In the light of admissions by Victoria Police of racially discriminatory 
practices, during the time that the banning provisions were introduced,  and the 20
clear risk of banning for other vulnerable groups,  future research should seek to 21
establish a clear understanding of ‘who’ are the recipients of banning notices, and 
what effect banning has had specifically and more generally.  
  See Chapter Seven, footnote 16.20
 Beckett & Herbert (2008, 2009, 2010a, 2010b) highlight the particularly deleterious effect of 21
banning mechanisms upon the homeless.
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The absence of transparent, balanced and rigorous pre- and post-enactment scrutiny 
of Victoria’s banning provisions has been highlighted throughout this thesis. As well 
as the specific consequences for recipients, the shortcomings in parliamentary and 
public scrutiny of the banning notice powers have a number of broader ramifications 
for the balance of individual rights and community protection.  
Firstly, banning notices set a precedent in Victoria for the dilution of individual rights 
via a pre-emptive penalty issued in the name of public protection, for behaviours that 
may be trivial. Pre-punishment mechanisms had previously been directed towards 
serious risks to public safety posed by, for example, sex offenders or the post-9/11 
terror threat. However, measures such as Supervision Orders under Victoria’s Serious 
Sex Offenders Monitoring Act 2005 and Control Orders introduced under the Anti-
Terrorism Act 2005 (Cth)  required court approval and were not imposed directly by 22
Victoria Police. The discretionary banning notice provisions lowered the threshold 
for preventative justice to include public disorder in the NTE, determined by a police 
officer. Since 2007, banning notice powers have expanded temporally and spatially. 
This expansion built upon the flawed rationale applied to their initial implementation 
through the LCRA Act 2007. The original legislation was not tested or reviewed when 
the permissible length of a banning notice was extended in 2010. The fact that the 
banning notice powers existed was used by the incumbent government in 2010 to 
justify their extension. Zedner noted that any challenge to due process rights must be 
“proportionate to the risks faced” (2007c, p.266). If the curtailing of individual 
rights can ever be justified, it should be an exceptional measure in response to a 
serious and urgent risk, for which there is both a demonstrable need and a clear 
articulation and monitoring of likely consequences. The normalisation of the erosion 
of due process rights through the banning provisions confounds common law 
principles and expectations of democratic governance. The Charter Act created a 
framework for the protection of human rights, yet the individual due process rights of 
  See Chapter Two, footnotes 37 and 38. 22
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banning notice recipients have been ‘hollowed out’ (Hallsworth & Lea 2011, p.153) 
within this framework.  
The growth of Victoria’s discretionary police powers highlights a second broader 
concern. Unsubstantiated notions of ‘them/us’ in the NTE were reinforced across the 
parliamentary and media discourse of the banning provisions. The rhetoric implicitly 
justified a two-tier rights framework, with those in the majority ‘us’ expecting and 
receiving greater protection than the undesirable minority, or ‘them.’ Mechanisms 
claiming to ‘re-balance’ the criminal process in favour of the majority ‘good’ 
population have generated a wealth of research and discussion, which is documented 
in Chapter Three. Whatever the merits of the proposed banning notice measures and 
their expected benefit for the broader community, the effect of such provisions on the 
perceived ‘problem-causing’ minority should still matter. As Zedner (2003, 2005, 
2007a, 2007b) contended any erosion of individual rights in the interests of 
collective security must be carefully scrutinised. Waldron (2003) conceived the 
protection of civil liberties as a fundamental element of preventing abuses of state 
power. The specific risk of abuses of police banning notice powers were noted by 
Magistrates interviewed for this thesis. The general lack of scrutiny and 
accountability for the use of the banning provisions adds to the risk of their 
discriminatory or otherwise inappropriate imposition.     
As well as reinforcing the ‘them/us’ division to legitimise the due process 
consequences of banning notices, the provisions explicitly lowered the threshold of 
behaviours regarded as undesirable and for which a penalty may follow. Many of the 
behaviours targeted, such as being disorderly or quarrelsome, are not objectively 
assessable. This compounds the difficulty of enforcing a human rights focus to police 
interactions. Despite the discourse of balance, the individual rights of those accused 
of minor offences have been eroded. The parliamentary and media rhetoric suggests 
that the rights of those who may be affected by a banning notice are secondary to the 
politically framed needs of the community to feel and to be safe. When compared 
with other provisions that undermine individual rights in the name of public safety, 
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such as the response to the post-9/11 terror threat,  the issues embodied within the 23
banning provisions may seem insignificant. However, due process protections and 
their links with individual human rights are not relative. Although there are ongoing 
challenges to some due process rights, such as the right to silence,  defendants 24
accused of the most serious offences expect and receive the fundamental protections 
of presumed innocence, legal representation, a fair and open trial. Yet these core 
rights are diluted in Victoria for individuals accused of much less serious behaviours. 
The anomaly is made even more stark by the permissible pre-emptive nature of 
banning provisions, which can be imposed in anticipation of ‘problematic’ behaviour. 
Key rights are denied on the basis that an individual may do something unacceptable, 
in the discretionary determination of a police officer. This conflation of intent and 
punishment disregards the core purpose of the Charter Act, the separation of powers 
and expectations of due process. 
The third broad concern arising from this thesis reflects the apparent lack of appetite 
to monitor the effect of the banning provisions, upon individuals or behaviours. 
Despite the assertions made across the parliamentary debates of both banning Bills, 
there has been no explicit examination of the effectiveness of banning notices in 
addressing and controlling alcohol-related disorder. Given the consequences for the 
individual rights of recipients, and the continued increase in the number of declared 
designated areas across Victoria, it is a significant oversight that the actual deterrent 
and restorative effect of banning in the NTE has not been subject to objective 
analysis. In addition, ongoing scrutiny is essential to ensure that police officers 
adhere to the principles of procedural justice and evidence-based policing (Sherman 
1998; MacCoun 2005; Bradford, Murphy & Jackson 2014), and to confirm that 
police processes and behaviours uphold individual human rights and the protective 
elements of the criminal law. This thesis has identified that there are insufficient 
mechanisms available to enable such scrutiny. Victoria Police is a visible and high 
  See Chapter Two, footnote 38, and Chapter Three, footnote 8.23
  See Chapter Two, footnotes 5 and 6.24
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profile component of the criminal justice system. Given the lack of scrutiny of the 
application of the banning notice powers, there is a clear risk that their use may be 
inappropriate, unfair and/or discriminatory. The potential consequences for police 
legitimacy and, more significantly, individual rights, are considerable, but currently 
unknown. 
As well as issues of Charter Act compliance, parliamentary and public scrutiny, there 
is an ongoing risk of proceeding with, and augmenting, legislative provisions on the 
basis of an assumed need and presumed effectiveness. The ‘drive to do something’ 
about alcohol-related disorder in the NTE conflated and juxtaposed the principles-
based Charter Act and rhetoric-driven banning legislation. Victoria’s banning notice 
measures incorporated criminal provisions into administration mechanisms relating 
to liquor control. They undermine proportionality and the separation of powers, 
redefine the meaning of due process under the criminal law, and dilute the quality of 
justice. Although part of a growing trend towards pre-emptive justice, banning 
notices appear to sit outside of established models of the criminal process. The way 
in which the provisions are framed combines pre-emption and pre-punishment with 
aspects of the crime control and police power models (Packer 1964, 1988; Duff 
1998; Dubber 2002, 2005, 2006, 2011; Dubber & Valverde 2006). A blended ‘pre-
crime: crime-control’ model prioritises the potential future victimisation of the 
broader community over the due process rights of the accused. Paradoxically though, 
the banning provisions sanction the circumvention of individual rights to balance the 
administration of justice. In their current format, Victoria’s banning notices are the 
antithesis of balance. 
The expectation and needs of community safety are acknowledged, but the drive to 
‘re-balance’ the provision of justice in Victoria’s NTE traded the rights of the 
undesirable against the needs/rights of the broader community. The needs of 
potential or actual victims and the rights of alleged offenders do not have to be 
mutually exclusive. Whatever the perceived risk, the subordination of the due 
process protections of banning notice recipients is not a necessity. Queensland 
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demonstrates a solution that more effectively balances both ‘needs’. With the passage 
of Victoria’s Summary Offences Amendment (Move-on Laws) Act 2015,  the 25
incumbent Labor government has demonstrated its capacity to correct legislative 
measures which undermine due process rights and risk marginalising vulnerable 
Victorians. Victoria’s banning notice provisions should similarly be amended to 
ensure an effective balance of the needs of both prospective victims and potential 
offenders. The most logical enhancement is to enable a straightforward post-hoc, 
independent appeal. This would not correct all of the issues documented in this 
thesis, but would facilitate a more balanced outcome better aligned to the Charter 
Act, due process and the meaningful provision of justice. 
Alcohol-related disorder in the NTE can have tragic consequences. However, the 
upholding of individual rights and due process is fundamental to open and 
transparent justice, and meaningful scrutiny of police discretionary powers. The 
assurance of human rights, formalised in Victoria by the Charter Act, should act as a 
necessary check on the power of government and executive law enforcement 
agencies. That Charter rights can be limited and circumvented without evidence or 
scrutiny, has legitimised the erosion of longstanding principles. The steady growth of 
pre-emptive police-imposed punishment poses a particular threat to the principle of 
separation of powers and the administration of justice. When there is no provision for 
independent or judicial review of police decisions the seriousness of the threat 
intensifies. Packer emphasised that the way in which the rules of the criminal process 
are implemented is as significant as the rules themselves (1968, p.171). It is 
simplistic and disingenuous to argue that public protection necessitates and justifies 
the erosion of individual rights. However urgent or compelling, any provision that 
undermines the separation of powers or circumvents individual due process 
protections must be subject to extensive, open and ongoing parliamentary, public and 
judicial scrutiny. 
  Which amended the Summary Offences and Sentencing Amendment Act 2014 (see footnote 11).25
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Appendices                      
Appendix A   Overview of Legislation and Key Measures     
Liquor Control Reform Act 1998 
Multiple liquor licensing and control measures 
Liquor Control Reform Amendment Act 2007 
Declaration of designated areas (ss147-148) 
24 hour banning notices by police; can be ‘pre-emptive' (s148B-G) 
Use of reasonable force to remove (banning notice) (s148H) 
Exclusion orders (s148I-J) 
Use of reasonable force to remove (barring order) (s148L) 
Requirement to publish banning/exclusion order data (s148R) 
Specified offences for banning notices/exclusion orders (s7) 
Introduction of liquor accords (s146A-D) 
Liquor accord licensees given the power to ban from accord premises (s146A-D) 
Summary Offences & Control of Weapons Acts Amendment Act 2009 
Police enforceable move on powers; can be 'pre-emptive'; issued orally; non return for 24 hours; 
breach = 5 penalty units (s3) 
Search powers in designated areas (including children), without warrant (new s10, Control of 
Weapons Act 2010) 
Increased penalties for alcohol-related offences: person found drunk: 1 → 4 penalty units (s4) 
Drunk & disorderly: 1 → 5 penalty units; or, arrest and remove to safe custody (s5) 
New offence of 'disorderly conduct'; 5 penalty units; infringement notice penalty = 2 penalty units 
(s6) 
Chief Commissioner may declare temporary designated area; not longer then 12 hours (s10C-L) 
Justice Legislation Amendment Act 2010 
Terminology amendments (ss22-25) 
Justice Legislation Amendment (Victims of Crime Assistance & Other Matters) Act 2010 
Banning period increased to 72 hours (s49) 
Summary Offences Act 1966: penalties increased : 
person found drunk: 4 → 8 penalty units (s50) 
drunk & disorderly: 5 → 10 penalty units (s51) 
disorderly conduct: 5 → 10 penalty units (s52) 
Infringement penalties introduced: drunk & disorderly offences: 2 or 4 penalty units (s53) 
Liquor Control Reform Amendment Act 2010 
Various licensing and responsible service of alcohol amendments 
Justice Legislation Amendment Act 2011 
Barring orders introduced; may be issued by 'responsible person'; duration 1 – 6 months (s4) 
Breach or failure to comply: up to 20 penalty units (s4) 
Drunk & disorderly penalty change: 20 penalty units, or 3 days in custody. Second/subsequent 
offence = 20 penalty units or 1 month in custody (s9) 
Drunk & disorderly infringement notice: 5 penalty units, 10 if similar notice within 3 years (s10) 
Justice Legislation Amendment Act 2012 
Updated to include references to newly created VCGLR. No new substantive legislation (s6) 
Summary Offences & Sentencing Amendment Act 2014 
Extended police move-on powers to include non NTE situations: pre-emptive, where “reasonable 
apprehension of violence” or obstruction exists or is perceived (s3) 
Summary Offences Amendment (Move-on Laws) Act 2015 
Repealed the amendments introduced in 2014, which restricted the right to protest and extended pre-
emptive police move-on powers to non-NTE situations.
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